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English Records of Maratha History

Poona Residency Correspondence.

General Editors—Shri Jadunath Sarkar and
Shri G. S. Sardesai.

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FOREWORD

The second volume of Elphinstone's Embassy at Poona (1816-1818 A. D.) marks the last phase of Anglo-Maratha rivalry and the final British triumph over their adversary. The arrest of Trimbakji Dengle in September 1815 and his imprisonment in the Thana Fort on Salsette island in no way settled affairs. If Trimbakji was a devoted servant of the Peshwa, the latter was equally attached to his minister. His seizure by the English was looked on by the Peshwa as his own disgrace. At the same time the Governor-General conveyed to the Peshwa a message telling him that his authority was restricted to his independent possessions and no longer extended over the former feudatory Maratha states and his British allies did not propose to restore the old order of things while they were always willing to support his legitimate rights. This, the Peshwa felt as a deliberate insult added to grievous injury and his thoughts turned to retaliation and revenge which he now pursued with secrecy and duplicity peculiar to his nature.

The first stage in the act was the release of Trimbakji Dengle. Baji Rao entreated the Resident to set free his minister and spoke of sending a Vakil to the Governor-General to effect his release. The Nepal War was not progressing according to plans and the temporary reverses of English troops were much exaggerated in native courts and were received with great jubilation. Secret plans and schemes for throwing off the English yoke began to be discussed. The Resident, unaware of these rumblings, was reporting to Calcutta that all was quiet at Poona and that the Peshwa was in a chastened mood and has changed his ways. His complacency was soon to be rudely shaken.

Trimbakji Dengle managed to effect his escape from Thana Fort on 12th September 1816. Money for the purpose appears to have been supplied by the Peshwa through a relative of Dengle. The story of the escape is too well-known to detain us here. The song, recorded by Bishop Heber, aptly represents popular sentiment :

“There are five and fifty coursers there
And four and fifty men ;
When the fifty-fifth shall mount his
Steed, the Deccan thrives again.”

Trimbakji evidently fled to his native place Nimbgaon in Nasik District and when pursued, disappeared into the Mahadeo hills, south-east of Poona. By the end of February 1817, the British Resident had definite information that Trimbakji had collected 3,000 horse and 3,000 infantry including the Ramoshis of the region in the neighbourhood of Phaltan and that he was in communication with the Peshwa. A week later he was informed of money being sent to Trimbakji from Pandharpur and of men enlisting under his colours. All the accounts brought in by the Brahmin spies and harkaras to the Residency tended to prove Trimbakji's preparations for insurrection. And yet the Peshwa, when asked to explain, denied the existence of the insurrection and the Peshwa's detachment sent against *the insurgents quietly sat down in the midst of the insurgents' tract and reported that there were no rebels.*

Elphinstone was convinced that the Peshwa was privy to the conspiracy and favoured its progress. He also received reports from Berar and Khandesh of troops assembling for Trimbakji under the immediate directions of the Peshwa's officers, of forts being repaired, of the Peshwa having started intrigues at the Courts of Sindhia and Holkar and of his remitting money to Hindustan. The Resident sent repeated messages of remonstrance to the Peshwa only to be met with a total denial of facts. On 7th March a final warning was delivered that unless the Peshwa took measures to seize Trimbakji's family and adherents and disperse the insurgents he would be involved in a dispute with the British Government, the fatal consequences of which could not be foreseen.

The Peshwa was, however, not to be deterred from the course he was determined to follow. Throughout the month of March his hostile preparations continued. His principal chiefs were directed to levy troops, the hill forts were provisioned, treasure and jewels were sent out of Poona and the Peshwa was reported to be intriguing with other Native Courts. The Resident had no doubt now that the Peshwa was engaged in a deliberate conspiracy to stir up a war against the British Government. He informed the Governor-General that the Peshwa was never to be trusted again and that stern measures should be taken without loss of time to crush his power and deprive him of the means of harming the Company should it at any time be engaged in hostilities elsewhere in India. Elphinstone made the necessary military dispositions and waited for orders from Calcutta.

The subsidiary force under the Commanding Officer, General Smith, arrived at Poona on the 6th of May; about the same time Elphinstone learnt from a private source that the Governor-General had approved of his suggestion of dealing sternly with the Peshwa, but that owing to disturbances in Orissa his Dak had been delayed on the way. On the next day an ultimatum was delivered to the Peshwa insisting on the immediate surrender of Trimbakji Denge within the period of one month. For obtaining solid proof of the Peshwa's sincerity, Elphinstone demanded to be put in immediate possession of three hill forts, Sinhgad, Purandhar and Raygad. On the 8th morning the city was surrounded and the Peshwa then submitted and delivered the forts to the Resident. A proclamation, offering reward for the seizure of Trimbakji or for giving information leading to his seizure, was issued under the Peshwa's signature. His adherents were named in the proclamation and their possessions were confiscated. The Governor-General's orders were received on 10th May and in conformity with them a new treaty was concluded on 13th June. It declared Trimbakji as the murderer of Gangadhar Shastri and the Peshwa promised to arrest him and deliver him to the English. The dissolution in form and substance of the Maratha Confederacy was recognised by the Peshwa and he agreed to recall his agents from foreign Courts including those of the former Maratha feudatories. He made fresh cessions worth thirty-four lakhs of rupees to the British Government for maintaining additional troops at his cost and abandoned all claims over territories beyond the Narmada.

The treaty of Poona was a heavy blow which sent the Peshwa reeling. He had been forced to pay an enormous price for the Company's alliance which had humiliated him and made a mockery of his Peshwaship. When he met Malcolm at Mahuli in August next, he talked to him with an air of injured innocence, but at the same time pursuing his preparations against the English. The native powers had become restive at the rapidly increasing aggressions of the British and they now looked to the Peshwa to head the war against them. The Peshwa's military advisers, among whom Bapu Gokhale now occupied the chief post, counselled him to lie low and wait till the break-up of the monsoon; use the interval for perfecting negotiations with Sindhia, Holkar and Bhonsla—the former Maratha feudatories—and the Pindari chieftains and then rise simultaneously against the British. They pinned their hope to the traditional Maratha warfare, of the

Maratha horse ravaging the country all round and making it impossible for the enemy to obtain provisions. These preparations could not be concealed from the Resident and he called back the Subsidiary Force that had been sent northward to co-operate with Hislop in his operations against the Pindaris. The Peshwa could no longer delay the attack. His army under Bapu Gokhale burnt the Residency and attacked the small force under Colonel Burr on November 5th, 1817 on the plains extending from the Chatushringi hill but was repulsed. The Third Maratha War had begun.

The issue of the war was never in doubt. The Governor-General had prepared a vast army to put an end to the Pindari menace and this army took the field immediately after the end of the rainy season. The principal Pindari leader, Amir Khan, came to an understanding with the English and Daulat Rao Sindhia, cowering before English bayonets, entered into fresh treaty relations with Company on the same day that the battle of Kirkee was fought in the Deccan. Holkar's state was in utmost confusion and his army was destroyed in the battle of Mahidpur. Appa Sahib Bhonsle was defeated in the battle of Sitabaldi. Thus the friends to whom the Peshwa looked for support proved broken reeds. His own army consisting of raw levies of Maratha horse and mercenary Arab soldiers was no match for the disciplined and well-equipped English force under Smith. At the battle of Ashti (February 1818), Bapu Gokhale was killed and the English captured the Raja of Satara and his family; from now on they posed as fighting on behalf of the successor of the Great Shivaji and a number of Jagirdars left the Peshwa's standard. Baji Rao became a fugitive and nobody seemed willing to offer him shelter. At last he surrendered to Malcolm on 3rd June 1818 at Mhow near Indore and set on his journey to Bithur near Kanpur where he lived as a pensioner of the Company for quite thirty years and died in 1851.

The Governor-General had made up his mind to abolish the Peshwaship and place his territory under direct British administration. Elphinstone was appointed the first Deccan Commissioner in January 1818 and proved himself capable as an administrator. He showed great tact, foresight and sympathy in dealing with the conquered people. His object was to preserve all that was good in native administration and to remove only the gross defects that had crept into it under Baji Rao's rule. He saw that the best way to conciliate the

people was to make them feel that there was no sudden break in their lives and in this he succeeded eminently.

Such is the remarkable story of war and peace unfolded in the despatches printed in the present volume which incidentally closes the Poona Residency Correspondence Series. In the hurry of completing the work some important records relating to the Second Maratha War (1802-1805) have been left out and it is proposed to issue them in the shape of a supplementary volume.

There are wide gaps in the Poona Residency Records housed at the Alienation Office, Poona and much of the material for this volume was collected by Dr. V. G. Dighe from the Bombay Record Office.

The present Series brings our publication programme to 1818 A.D. The period that follows is the period of transition and organisation of British administration on the foundation of native rule. It was during this period that Elphinstone, Munro and Malcolm evolved the broad policies for ruling this country and educating its people. The policies pursued since then have shaped not only the administration of this province but also the life of the people. It is, therefore, proposed to take up for publication the records of this formative period of British administration as a sequel to this series.

P. M. JOSHI,

*Director of Archives,
Government of Bombay.*

Bombay,

23rd August 1952.

INTRODUCTION

This volume closes the Poona Residency Correspondence Series and heralds the first dawn of the new Maharashtra of which we are the inheritors. It gives us a full inside view of the almost inevitable course of events which brought about the deposition of the last Peshwa Baji Rao II and the annexation of his dominions to the British Indian empire. The steps which led to this momentous change in India's political destiny are here illustrated with a wealth of detail and a revelation of the secret plans and policy of the British authorities and the Maratha Courts, which make it a documentary record of equal interest and instruction to the serious student of Indian history.

Mountstuart Elphinstone dominates the scene throughout. His towering political genius and far-sighted statesmanship make him dwarf even the best of the earlier Residents at the Maratha Courts; even Malet and Collins rank as mere diplomats; Elphinstone alone stands forth as a ruler of men, a statesman. His later assistants, such as Chaplin and Warden, Robertson and Grant, were unusually capable men, but only as civil servants. Elphinstone's pre-eminence was recognised by the Governor-General choosing him as the ruler of the newly annexed Peshwa's dominions, at first as Commissioner and then elevating him to the Governorship of the greatly expanded Bombay Presidency. The student who knows Elphinstone's later achievements will not be surprised to read Secretary Adam's long despatch (No. 141 in this volume) which recounts all the steps taken by Elphinstone in the course of these negotiations and war, only to give him the unqualified praise of the Governor-General for every one of them.

In one respect Elphinstone's position during 1815-18 was far more delicate and his future far darker than was ever the case with Malet and Collins. He was bound to give Baji Rao a long rope to hang himself with, and any strong action on his part,—such as hanging Trimbakji Denglia or bringing a British force into Poona—would have precipitated a crisis before the fruit was ripe for the British plucking. We have to remember that in 1816 the early disasters to the British forces in the Nepal War had given a rude shock to British prestige throughout India, and Elphinstone was constantly afraid,—as he tells the Governor-General again and again in his secret

sympathetic and regardful of the old order ; but it seems that Munro's generous heart was static, while Elphinstone's sympathy for the natives was a dynamic force. It would be misreading history if we do not acknowledge that modern Maharashtra so quickly became what it is, mainly because it had Elphinstone's wise guidance of its affairs at the very outset, and his rule continued over it uninterrupted for ten years.

As a Resident, Elphinstone lived in a princely Court ; he was not a district Collector touring the villages and meeting all ranks of men in the course of his official duty ; and yet these despatches show how early and with what unflinching accuracy he kept his finger on the pulse of the national feeling in Maharashtra. He correctly saw that the Brahmans all over the province sided with the Peshwa's administration in spite of its many misdeeds because it was after all a Brahman raj and all members of this caste were more or less benefited by it. He felt that the jealousy of the Maratés and other non-Brahmans towards the ruling caste of Poona would not reconcile them to the destruction of their national government by an alien race ; and he predicted the danger that would spring from the natural discontent of thousands of employed soldiers and civil officers of the Peshwa's service if these useless hands were abruptly discharged to ease the British Indian treasury, and not provided for by the English rulers. Above all, he emphasised how politic it was to rally the leaders of Maratha society round the new Government by keeping up the traditional relations between them and their sovereign through the customary honours and gifts. With this shrewd policy, Elphinstone distributed clothes to the most respected Brahmans at Poona and Wai, even before the annexation was fully accomplished.

But he was no blind conservative ; he did not continue the riotous scenes of the distribution of the Shravani charity to the Brahman rabble which used to disgrace the Poona of the Peshwas ; he selected the local Brahmans of the best character and highest public repute for his gifts. And he employed such men and the clever and experienced Prabhus of the old administration wherever possible in his new government. Above all, he made provision for reform and progress by opening Sanskrit Colleges and indigenous medical schools on a reformed basis, with modern discipline and higher supervision. Thus, the public money was put to the best use, and

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ELPHINSTONE'S EMBASSY

SECTION I

ESCAPE AND INSURRECTION OF TRIMBAKJI DENGLE

1816—1817

No. 1.—The Governor General conveys instructions regarding the relations to be maintained with the Peshwa. As Dengle has been surrendered no further enquiry is to be made into the crime. Provision for the Shastri's family is to be made and the negotiations between the two Governments to go on as before.

From.—J. ADAM, SECRETARY,

To—THE RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, 20 January 1816.

Sir,

Your several dispatches have been regularly received and perused by the Governor General in Council, who has suspended a communication of his sentiments and resolutions on the important questions to which they relate until he should be able to judge with the greater confidence, of the effect produced on the mind of His Highness the Peishwa by the recent transactions relating to Trimbeckjee Dainglia, and the probable operation of those transactions and their result on His Highness's disposition and future conduct towards the British Government. It was also desirable to afford time for the agitation and emotion, which occurrences so intimately affecting His Highness's

strongest partialities and prejudices must have created in his breast to subside, before he should receive a communication directly from the Government which, while it would aim at soothing and conciliating him, must necessarily revive unpleasant recollections, and at the same time remove the hope that any relaxation could be admitted in those measures which we had been imperiously required to adopt, and which had been carried into effect in manifest opposition to His Highness's inclinations.

Your knowledge of the sentiments of the Governor General on every branch of the question and your means of satisfying the Peishwa of the deep interest taken by the Governor General in Council in this affair, will have enabled you to avert the only probable inconvenience of delay namely, the discontent which might arise out of His Highness's impatience to know the ultimate decision of the British Government, and the doubts he might possibly, though very improbably, entertain concerning the extent to which your measures and declarations had received the perfect support and authority of the Government.

After the full and comprehensive expression which I have had the honour to convey to you in my former dispatches, of the unqualified approbation with which your measures and proceedings in the more early stages of this affair were viewed by the Governor General, it cannot be necessary for your satisfaction to repeat the assurances of the Governor General in Council's equal applause of your subsequent measures. These last were conceived in the same spirit with those which had already acquired that praise, and accorded entirely with the general principles prescribed for your guidance.

It is not the less demanded, however, by justice to distinguished merit and services that the Governor General should record the cordial and unreserved declaration of the entire satisfaction and approbation with which he has regarded your proceedings throughout. To your clear perception of the true character of the transaction, and to your correct judgment of the course to be pursued, aided by uncommon firmness and decision, as well as by admirable presence of mind, prudence and circumspection must also be ascribed your having succeeded in countervailing the intrigues of those whose interested and unremitting endeavours were employed to thwart you. You thus accomplished a result which was truly essential to the honour, interests and security of the British Government. In your conduct of this arduous affair from its commencement to its successful termination, His Lordship in

Council considers you to have rendered a highly important service to the public interests, and to have acquired a fresh title to the distinguished confidence and esteem of the Government.

The Governor General in Council has perused with great satisfaction the honourable testimony borne by you to the zeal and activity manifested by Colonel Smith in the execution of the instructions which you conveyed to him for his return to Seroor and subsequent advance to Poona during the recent discussions. On this, as on all occasions which have come under the notice of the Governor General in Council, since the nomination of Colonel Smith to the command of the Subsidiary Force, His Lordship has remarked with particular approbation, the zeal, cordiality and public spirit which have distinguished his conduct, and abundantly justified the confidence in Colonel Smith's character which occasioned his selection for that honourable and responsible command. You will be pleased to communicate these sentiments to Colonel Smith in the name of the Governor General in Council.

The attention of the Government has likewise been particularly drawn to the share which Major Ford has had in the late transactions. The confidence reposed by the Peishwa in that officer is alike honourable to the national character and his own, and the prudence, judgment and fidelity of his conduct in a very embarrassing situation, undoubtedly contributed in a considerable degree to the ultimate success of your measures. His Lordship in Council desires that you will signify to Major Ford the approbation with which the Governor General in Council has viewed his conduct.

It is unnecessary to advert with any particularity to the suspicious and even hostile appearances which the measures of the Peishwa assumed during the progress of the transaction in question or to the corresponding precautionary arrangements, which were thence necessarily adopted by you. In those instances, as well as in your general execution of His Lordship's instructions your proceedings demand entire approbation.

Your voluntary assurance to the Peishwa that the life of Trimbuckjee should be spared, that he should be subjected to no personal inconvenience not unavoidably included in the requisite strictness of his confinement, that no means should be taken to compel or induce him to disclose the associates of his guilt and finally your express reservation of the question of compensation to the Guykwar for the decision of the Governor General in Council, were entirely judicious and consistent with His Lordship's views and instructions.

The surrender of Trimbuckjee and Bhugwunt Row and Bundoojee having satisfactorily terminated the main discussion with the Peishwa, it now remains to consider the further proceedings to be adopted with a view to restore confidence and goodwill in His Highness's mind to secure our own interests against the operation of an opposite sentiment arising out of the recent transactions and against the recurrence of events menacing the stability of the alliance. It is likewise incumbent on Government to advert to the satisfaction of the Guykwar the final adjustment of the depending questions between that Prince and the Peishwa, the difficulty of which has been materially augmented by the unfortunate circumstances of the Shastery's death.

The conduct of the Peishwa has unquestionably been of a nature to excite the most serious suspicions of his having been actually involved in the guilt of the Shastery's murder, and of his having nearly committed himself to a participation in all the desperate views and projects of Trimbuckjee whose ultimate arrest and surrender into our hands was evidently the result of apprehension alone. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the perseverance of the Peishwa in those measures of defence and precaution, which he adopted at a time when he was doubtful of our intentions and undecided with regard to his own plans, is to be ascribed mainly, if not entirely, to the same cause, and it may be expected that as his fears subside, those indications of distrust will disappear. Viewing the conduct of His Highness during the recent discussions and subsequently to the surrender of Trimbuckjee in this light, it is the desire of the Governor General in Council to give the whole of His Highness's conduct the most favourable construction, and to permit no suspicion of what might have been and probably were, at one time the feelings and designs of His Highness, to diminish his efforts for restoring the confidence and friendship which have received so severe a shock.

In this spirit the Governor General in Council has proceeded to deliberate and resolve on the several questions embraced by this affair, and I now proceed to communicate to you the result.

The Governor General in Council has deemed this to be a proper occasion to address a letter to the Peishwa, calculated to soothe and encourage him with regard to the undiminished confidence and friendship of the British Government, to impress on His Highness's mind the main principles and objects of the alliance, and to lead him to the conclusion that his only safe, honourable and advantageous policy is to adhere with fidelity

so its obligations renouncing the vain hope of effecting any object he has in view by means, open or covert, at variance with its maxims and spirit. A letter corresponding with the enclosed English draft will accordingly be addressed to His Highness by the Governor General and transmitted to you from the Persian Department with the least practicable delay. You will take a fit opportunity of presenting it to His Highness, explaining and enforcing its contents by personal representations in the same spirit.

The first point to be considered is the disposal of Trimbuckjee's person, and the further proceedings to be adopted with regard to him. The Governor General observes with great satisfaction that you have uniformly, since the Peishwa's evasion of your call on him to receive the proofs in your possession of Trimbuckjee's guilt, dissipated the apprehension that any further enquiry would be gone into. The incontrovertible evidence of Trimbuckjee's guilt obtained by you, renders it perfectly superfluous in point of equity to institute any further proceedings in the nature of a trial. Independently of the other proof, the facts on the substantiation of which the Peishwa himself desired to rest the innocence or guilt of Trimbuckjee, namely his repeated invitations to the Shastery to go to the temple being established beyond question, and the proof having been offered to His Highness and declined on frivolous pretexts, may be considered as closing that question altogether. The subsequent attempt of the Peishwa to make it appear that he surrendered Trimbuckjee under the belief that it was preparatory to an investigation of the charges against him, is upset by a reference to the distinct and repeated declarations made by you to His Highness on the subject and recorded at the time in your *dispatches* and is totally unworthy of attention.

Governments. Until some favourable opportunity, not immediately contemplated, shall occur for improving those relations, it is by the spirit of the existing engagements and by that alone that we must regulate our views.

These observations naturally lead to the consideration of the state of the questions which were depending between their Highnesses the Peishwa and the Guykwar, when the death of the Shastery and the succeeding events interrupted the negotiations.

It is extremely desirable that if possible those negotiations should be renewed and that an accommodation should be effected between the parties on the basis of the proposition then under discussion for the cession of territory to the Peishwa to the value of seven lacs of rupees per annum or such smaller amount as can be effected. It is accordingly His Lordship's desire that you should endeavour in concert with the Government of Bombay to bring about the renewal of the negotiation between the Peshwa and the Guykwar, and if possible conduct the matter to a conclusion without resorting to the arbitration of the British Government. His Lordship in Council is fully sensible of the difficulties which oppose the success of the attempt, and is not sanguine in his expectation that it can be accomplished. It is superfluous to suggest the arguments to be used to either Court to induce it to acquiesce in the proposal and His Lordship in Council relies on the influence and address of yourself and of the Resident at Baroda acting under the orders of the Government of Bombay for removing, if it be practicable, the obstacles of this arrangement. If they prove insurmountable recourse must be had to our arbitration according to the terms of the treaties.

It is extremely desirable either to combine with the adjustment of these questions or to effect by a separate negotiation, some arrangement for placing our interests and relations and those of the Guykwar in Guzerat and Kattywar on a more satisfactory footing than has been the case since the expiration of the farm of Ahmedabad, and the re-establishment of the Peishwa's authority in that province. The restoration of affairs to the situation in which they were placed by that lease and by the arrangements concluded by Colonel Walker in Ka'tywar, would be the most effectual means of putting an end to embarrassment and would undoubtedly tend more than any other plan to the furtherance of the interests of His Highness the Peishwa himself. There is little room for hope, however, that His Highness will consent to the renewal of the

Governments. Until some favourable opportunity, not immediately contemplated, shall occur for improving those relations, it is by the spirit of the existing engagements and by that alone that we must regulate our views.

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lease or that he will effectually restrain his officers from that course of conduct which has given such offence to the Guykwar Government and our own, although the prospect may be somewhat improved by the cessation of the active influence of Trimbuckjee, whose personal interests were deeply concerned in confirming and encouraging His Highness's opposition.

Although these objects cannot in the opinion of the Governor General in Council be connected with the questions arising out of the Shastery's death, they will nevertheless form unexceptionable and desirable subjects of separate negotiations and you will be pleased to communicate with the Government of Bombay, and in concert with that government, endeavour to renew the subject at the Peshwa's Court. If, however, you should deem it inexpedient on considerations referring to the state of the Peshwa's mind and disposition or on any other accounts to regulate these questions at present, you will of course consider yourself at liberty to suspend the execution of these instructions.

The Governor General in Council has adverted particularly to that part of your dispatch which refers to the possible event of a rebellion in Ahmedabad against the Peshwa's authority in consequence of the measures stated to be pursuing by His Highness against Trimbuckjee's adherents. Should such an event take place, His Lordship in Council apprehends that our prompt and decided aid in the suppression of the rebellion would be urgently demanded by considerations of policy, while on the other hand His Highness would be entitled by the conditions of the Treaty of Bassein to require it. His Lordship in Council cannot hesitate, therefore, in authorizing the Government of Bombay in such an event to make every effort for the support of His Highness's authority; such an occurrence terminating in the re-establishment of the Peishwa's authority by the aid of the British Power, would afford a favourable opportunity of endeavouring to effect the arrangements suggested in the dispatch of the Governor in Council of Bombay of the 28th October.

The Peshwa is not less entitled to apply for and receive our assistance in quelling any disturbances of a serious nature that may break out in Savanore; and the Governor General in Council would not hesitate to afford it, both on that ground and in consideration referring to the general tranquillity of His Highness's dominions and of our own neighbouring provinces, which could not be unaffected by serious or protracted disturbances in Savanore. There does not appear to be much reason to apprehend the occurrence of insurrection in that province

but an intimation will be conveyed to the Government of Fort St. George that in such an event, your application for the employment of a force in that quarter should be promptly attended to.

The inefficient state of the Poona Brigade has attracted the particular notice of the Governor General in Council who entirely approves the measures taken and proposed by you in communication with Colonel Smith, for placing it in a condition to act with effect, should any fresh emergency arise. The state of the Brigade and the measures for improving it as well as the other important questions discussed in your dispatches will form the subject of separate instructions.

The only remaining point adverted to in the dispatches now acknowledged to which the Governor General in Council deems it necessary to refer, is the supposed dissatisfaction of the Peshwa at your conduct and proceedings towards him. However His Highness in a moment of irritation might have expressed himself on that subject, His Lordship in Council cannot doubt the sincerity of his subsequent retraction, and his expressions of confidence in your friendship and regard for his interests. The manner in which you received the intimations of his displeasure was consistent with your characteristic frankness and spirit. It is superfluous to state that a prejudice arising from your faithful and honourable discharge of your public duty could never have produced any impression on the mind of the Governor General in Council unfavourable to the character of your conduct and demeanour towards His Highness, and that any circumstances would have been viewed by the Governor General in Council with deep regret which should have deprived him of your services at a court when your distinguished talents, judgement and firmness have been singularly beneficial to the public interests.

No.1 A—The Governor General explains to the Peshwa his constitutional position under the treaty of Bassein and the benefits conferred on him by the alliance with the English...The Peshwa is told in unmistakable terms that the ancient confederacy of the Maratha State was dissolved by the treaty of Bassein.

To

His Highness the Peshwa.

Written 20 January 1816.

Mr. Elphinstone has regularly communicated to me the progress of events and transactions at Poona, since I had the honour to address Your Highness on the 15th of August

last, on the subject of the assassination of Gungadher Shastery. The confidence which I entertained that Your Highness would vindicate the honour and character of your government by the surrender into the hands of the British Power, of the undoubted author of that atrocious crime, with such of his accomplices as might be ascertained, has been justified by the result, and I am now enabled to address Your Highness in the cordial language of friendship and congratulation by the removal, I trust for ever, of those causes which for a time menaced the permanence of your alliance with the Honourable Company.

The unquestionable evidence of the guilt of Trimbuckjee Dainglia possessed by Mr. Elphinstone and repeatedly offered to Your Highness's inspection, justified and required the demand made by that gentleman under my instructions for the surrender of Trimbuckjee to the British Government, as a measure indispensable to the honour and interests of the British nation and its ally the Guykwar, and no less essential to the reputation of Your Highness's name. Your Highness's compliance with that demand by the unconditional surrender of Trimbuckjee Dainglia with his accomplices Bhugwunt Row Guykwar and Govind Row Bundoojee, has effectually silenced all aspersions and insinuations that might have been cast on your government, and has restored to its original condition the alliance so happily subsisting between Your Highness and the Honourable Company.

Your Highness has on repeated occasions acknowledged your experience of the great and substantial benefits which have resulted to your State from your alliance with the British Government. You have frequently expressed yourself sensible of the uninterrupted enjoyment of personal security, dignity and comfort which that alliance has afforded you and contrasted it with the discomfort, danger and distress to which the violence, ambition and rapacity of Your Highness's enemies had exposed you. It is a source of the highest gratification to this government to reflect that such has been the result of the union of the two States, and that Your Highness's legitimate authority has in consequence been re-established on a basis which can never be shaken, as long as Your Highness shall continue to act in the true spirit of the alliance. That such is Your Highness's firm resolution, I am entirely persuaded, your honour and good faith no less than a correct view of your real interests, ensure your adherence to that course.

Your Highness is sensible that long before the formation of the alliance, the ancient confederacy of the Marhattah States had been virtually dissolved, that Your Highness's feudal

superiority over the great Mahrattah States had practically ceased to exist, and that your legitimate rights had become restricted to the independent possession and sovereignty of your own territories. When Your Highness had been deprived of your own dominion by violence and usurpation, you accepted the proffered alliance of the British Government as the only means of extricating yourself from the unparalleled difficulties with which you were surrounded. It was, however, to assist Your Highness in the recovery of your immediate possessions and independent sovereignty that the British Government came forward, not to restore the ancient order of things in the Marhattah Empire which had been previously dissolved by the hand of time and the natural course of political events. To the former object every stipulation of the Treaty was directed, while the latter was distinctly barred both by the provisions of that engagement and by the uniform tenor of the public acts and declarations of the British Government to Your Highness, and to the other Marhattah States. On this principle did we resist the pretensions of Sindia and the Rajah of Nagpore to interfere between Your Highness and the British Government. On the same principle were the treaties of peace concluded with those powers in the name of the British Government and its allies, including Your Highness, in the benefits of which you participated. By the same principle have our relations with those powers been since regulated. They have in every transaction been regarded as separate and independent States equally removed from that feudal subordinacy which their predecessors once owned to Your Highness's ancestors and deprived, on the other hand, of every pretension to mix in the affairs of Your Highness's Government.

While the effect of the alliance has been to consolidate and confirm this new order of things, it has, on the other hand, been powerfully conducive to the establishment of Your Highness's more important and essential interests. If it has excluded the visionary hope of re-establishing the feudal superiority of the State of Poona over the other branches of the Marhattah Empire, it has fortified and secured your just and legitimate authority within your own dominions. Under the influence of this alliance the prosperity of your country has increased; your resources have improved; your principal chiefs and Jageerdars have been reclaimed from disobedience and revolt, and their rights and obligations with relation to Your Highness have been ascertained and defined; your government has become respectable both abroad and at home, and your domestic life has been passed in a state of undisturbed

comfort, serenity and repose as well as dignity. That Your Highness may long enjoy these blessings without alloy is the cordial wish of the British Government, whose advantage and gratification in the alliance must ever be proportioned to the degree in which it is beneficial to Your Highness. It is obvious that it is calculated to secure every just and legitimate object of your wishes, and that any attempt to obtain them through other means must end in failure and disappointment. That such means will not be resorted to by Your Highness, I am perfectly assured, and my confidence in your fidelity to the true principles of the alliance can only be shaken by your own acts. On my part it must always be an earnest wish to render that engagement productive in its utmost extent of satisfaction and advantage to you. With this view Your Highness's interests in Hindostan have at various periods occupied my attention, which will not fail to be directed towards them whenever a favourable opportunity shall occur. To facilitate the accomplishment of this object, however, it will be indispensable that some precise and moderate system of proceeding, sanctioned by the fundamental principles of the alliance, shall be concerted between Your Highness and the British Government which, while it will always be forward to support and assist Your Highness's ascertained and legitimate rights, cannot countenance any recurrence to such obsolete principles and views as would derange the existing order of things.

I shall conclude this letter by repeating to Your Highness the cordial assurance of my undiminished friendship and confidence, adding my earnest exhortation that you will constantly regard the British Government as your most sincere friend, and the alliance with that Government as the only firm and secure foundation of your prosperity and honour.

Mr. Elphinstone is charged to communicate to Your Highness my sentiments and resolutions on various questions connected with the recent transactions, which cannot be comprehended within the limits of a letter. I entreat Your Highness to receive his representations as if they proceeded directly from myself. Your Highness knows that he possesses my entire confidence, and that his regard for Your Highness and the cordial interest he takes in the prosperity of your affairs cannot be surpassed.

No. 2—The Resident at Baroda discusses the pros and cons of the policy of interference in the internal administration of the Indian States. The problem arose out of the banishment of Sitaram, the Diwan of Baroda from the State.

From—THE RESIDENT AT BARODA,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Baroda, 3 February 1816.

Sir,

An early opportunity was taken to notify to Futteh Sing the inexpediency of allowing Seetaram to retire to Benares without entering upon any specification of the objections to such an indulgence, and His Highness was also advised of the proposition of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that Seetaram should take up his residence in the island of Bombay, Salsette, or Caranjah, subject only to a prohibition of quitting it.

The former endeavours to obtain my good offices in acquiring the acquiescence of the British Government for Seetaram returning to the Deccan were resorted to by Futteh Sing in reply to the proposal above stated. The serious objections to this measure were stated to His Highness and at length he abandoned the question, urging that at some future time when the political state of India presented fewer obstacles, he should renew his application in favour of Seetaram proceeding to his original house.

The discussions which followed are not of a description to require recapitulation. The Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council has seen in the whole progress of the intercourse regarding Seetaram, the tenacity with which Futteh Sing adhered to the impression of the honour and dignity of his government being compromised by the surrender of his servant, and it could not be expected that this feeling would be suddenly suppressed. Occasions have been taken in the interval of waiting for orders to point out to Futteh Sing the inconsistency of his conduct, and perhaps those accidental conferences contributed to produce the influence, which has now led to his concurrence in the proposition of Seetaram proceeding to Bombay. He will leave this place in the course of a fortnight, escorted by a party of Guicawar troops for the purpose of fixing his abode at the Presidency.

In the meeting which took place with Futteh Singh, definitive of the arrangement now reported, His Highness requested that I would bestow on him a mark of my confidence by withdrawing our guard from Seetaram's house. He pledges himself

responsible to the British Government to send Seetaram from Baroda in the period prescribed and to convey him to Bombay. I considered this proposal not only favourable for a manifestation of our confidence without hazard, but as constituting the best security for the accomplishment of my object. Some objections were made by me to the period of time which Seetaram would have to remain in Baroda, after it had been settled that he was to quit it. This delay, it was explained by Witthoba Bhow (who was present at the meeting) arose from the pecuniary embarrassments of Seetaram which required to be adjusted before his departure, but that it should not be extended beyond the period agreed. Under the circumstances therefore of Futteh Sing's word and personal responsibility, his request for the removal of our guard has been admitted.

The arrangements for the support of Seetaram will be reported when I am placed in possession of Futteh Sing's suggestions and wishes on this point.

The principles by which the control of the British Government operates over the expenditure of the Guicawar state, has often been noticed to Futteh Sing. Occasions happen in the multifarious affairs of this Government in which I am obliged to resort to such explanation with His Highness, whose character of recent date has not withstood the allurements of power.

The indications which he has afforded of his disposition in affairs, involving the prosperity of the Guicawar Government are not calculated to excite the confidence of its creditors, sufficiently for us to hope for any spontaneous desire on their part of an arrangement similar to the suggestions contained in the last paragraph of your letter; nor do I feel myself authorised until His Highness acquires greater consistency of public principle to recommend, that we make an avowal of an inclination to relinquish the supervision now exercised over the concerns of this Government.

I would be placing the creditors who have reposed confidence in our protection in a difficult situation after we had manifested to this Government an inclination of desisting from interference; their interest would obviously gain no advantage by the change sooner than incur the perpetual enmity of the Government, as its subjects there could have no choice for them, but to consent to its independent power.

The appearances in such a predicament would prove unfavourable to the British Government. Our immediate interests and a desire of avoiding responsibility might seem

to govern our principles and its natural consequence would be the impression being produced that would detract in the public opinion from the manly policy which distinguishes the British Government in this country.

It would nevertheless be consistent with the pure principles which have characterised our policy with this Government, timorously to countenance the independent exertion of its legitimate authority; but under existing circumstances the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council will probably admit that it should either be contingent on the voluntary offer of the parties whose interests are concerned, or on the character and capacity of its sovereign, or the executive power.

This competency is not apparent in Futteh Singh to the present period of his Life; it would probably in the progress of a few years entail a repetition of the disorders and confusion which demanded our original interference; then the prosperity of the Guicawar Government would be compromised, with this important effect, that one of the most efficient allies of the British Government would be reduced to a disability of a prompt performance of its public obligations.

It may be questionable also on general considerations how far our secession at the present period from our intimate superintendence of the Guicawar Government would be advisable. Our Bhandery (guarantee) to the persons of all the Ministers and Soucars in this state would perpetuate a little of interference almost equally repulsive to the present extended operation of our authority without its efficacy. The power and opportunity of checking those combinations which I presume, it is our paramount object to discountenance between the Mahratta states, would in some degree be removed by our withdrawing from the prominent character which is represented by the British Government at this Court, and perhaps it is the absence of this commanding attitude which our power could command, that leaves us the appearance without the essential of an efficient control of our foreign relations.

It will not, it is hoped, be considered presumption on my part to advert to the difference in the situation of allies to the British Government which subsists between this State and that of any other on this side of the Peninsula.

The moral character of each can have produced no influence on their respective feeling of cordial integrity and it may not be too much to calculate on the capacity of the Guicawar's co-operation, by the different circumstances of connection and dependence in which he is placed. It is natural that if we

While His Highness was here he gave his consent to the dismissal of the Jageerdars of Jamkundee, Merich and Koorundwar which I have long solicited as they have now been sixteen months in the field. I communicated this permission to the Jageerdars by letter, but having afterwards heard from Mr. Jenkins of the advance of the Pindarries, I requested them not to avail themselves of it until the country should be clear of those free-booters. Chintamun Row having failed to attend in person when repeatedly pressed, I consented to his troops being detained when the rest were allowed to retire.

Chintamun Row has been very urgent for a decision of some disputes between him and his relation the Jageerdar of Merich and has declared that the British Government has infringed the articles of Punderpore by neglecting to procure the adjustment of his complaints. I have explained to him that his assertion is unfounded, that the only breach of the articles has been on his part, but I have pressed the Durbar to bring his disputes to a speedy adjustment.

Appa Dessye's conduct has been so turbulent of late that I should not be surprised if it were to be necessary to coerce him by means of British troops. He refused to give up Bhoze and Yekshumba for which he had long since given orders of surrender, and on two Hircarras being sent from the Minister accompanied with two of mine to send information of his proceedings at those places, they were refused entrance and finally driven away. Appa Dessye was at this time employed in plundering the two districts he was to give up and in extorting money from the inhabitants, several of whom have expired under the tortures inflicted on them. As soon as I found out his intention to delay, I endeavoured to remove the motive of it by acquainting his Vakeels that their master should gain nothing by his extortions, for that if the places were not immediately given up, I should call on him to refund all his collections since the date of the order of surrender.

On finding that he was called on to give up Sonduttee Appa Dessye destroyed the works and then offered it in a dismantled state to the person who formerly held it of the Raja of Colapoor, on condition that he should pay a tribute and acknowledge that he held his land of Appa Dessye.

This Chief has also refused to pay back a sum of 36,000 rupees which he levied in the lands of the Putwurdhans. He alleges that he has just claim though of old standing to the money and disregards my references to the articles of Punderpore,

which require that the Jageerdars should abstain from violence among themselves and refer their disputes to the Paishwa. He has also entirely neglected the Paishwah's orders for his repairing to the frontier.

To check this refractory spirit which would gain ground among the Jageerdars if it met with impunity, I proposed that His Highness should peremptorily direct Appa Dessye to give up Bhoze and Yekshumba with the collections, to restore Sondutte, refunding the money levied there with the expense of rebuilding the fort, and to repay the sums levied on the Putwurduns; and should threaten him with the employment of a British force against him unless he had complied before the end of a month, informing him that if any troops marched he should forfeit a fourth of his Jageer and the whole if he offered any resistance. His Highness approved of the proposal and communicated his resolution personally to Appa Dessye's Vakeel. I have not seen the Vakeel since, but I hope the tone assumed by the Paishwa will be effectual; if it is not, any troops that may be employed against Sawant Warree might reduce Appa Dessye on their return; and should none be disposable it would be better to send a detachment of the Subsidiary Force for the purpose than to allow a revival of the old disorders to the southward, which would soon be imitated by the other Jageerdars and perhaps by the Raja of Colapore, and I had proposed that Appa Dessye should pay the expense to which the British Government should be put by his misconduct, but finding it likely to excite jealousy and opposition I immediately withdrew the suggestion.

His Highness communicated to me that four elephants with their caparisons had been sent to him as a present by Dowlut Row Scindia and that he proposed to accept them in which I readily acquiesced. He also acquainted me that he was sending a news-writer to Holcar's camp to replace the one employed there by Trimbukjee and that he should give him the usual letters of introduction to Holcar, in the propriety of which I concurred.

His Highness has now discharged a much greater number of troops than he raised during the discussions about Trimbukjee and has lessened his establishment more than would be desirable except at a time when his reductions are an indication of his confidence in the British Government. He now attends himself to all transactions with the Residency and business is conducted with much more facility and cordiality than has been the case for the last three years. All communications are made as usual to the Minister, but His Highness also

makes constant use of the channel of Moro Dikshit and Major Ford which he considers as more particularly his own.

His Highness has come to terms with the former Governor of Dharwar who is to have a small Jageer and a considerable sum of money to pay the arrears due to his garrisons. The fort is occupied by Gokla's troops.

I was lately informed by Holcar's Vakeel that Nuttoo Punseea the rebel lately expelled from Amber by the Nizam's troops and made prisoner and delivered up to Holcar by the Paishwa, had escaped from confinement and was at Seroor. I refused to give up this person to the Vakeel supposing him to have no design beyond obtaining an asylum under our protection, but as it appeared that some of his attendants had been threatening Holcar's villages in the neighbourhood, I requested Lieutenant Colonel Nuthall of the Madras Light Cavalry (who commands in Colonel Smith's absence) to order him to quit the camp. Soon after I learned that Nuttoojee was entertaining horse in different villages and I was informed by Holcar's Vakeel that he was still lurking in the Bazar at Seroor. I therefore wrote to Colonel Nuthall to beg he would find him out and secure him if still in camp. It has been usual to assist Holcar's Government in suppressing disturbances in this part of the country to prevent the necessity of its employing its own troops within the limits of the allies, and in this instance the territories of the Paishwa and the Nizam will be liable to suffer as well as Holcar's, if Nuttoojee should succeed in putting himself at the head of the banditti he is assembling.

The Vakeel has received orders to dispossess all the persons to whom Holcar's territories on this side of the Taptee have been assigned and to take the management of the country into his own hands. He communicated his orders to me and said he relied on the assistance of the British and the allies in the event of opposition. I said the allies would give no countenance to persons who resisted him, but they could not be expected to aid in settling so large a portion of Holcar's territory especially as it was within reach of the main body of that Prince's dominions. It is said that this resumption is the consequence of the mutiny of Holcar's army, but it is not easy to conjecture how it is to be accomplished, unless the Governors of Chandore and Galna are to retain their lands and to co-operate in reducing the rest.

The Paishwa's Ministers have more than once enquired whether any answer had been received to my reference regarding Dhar, Mulharghur and other places which His Highness

wishes to farm to Wittoba Naik, but they were satisfied when I pointed out the length of time required to communicate with so distant a place as Calcutta.

No. 5—The Resident reports the effect on the Peshwa's mind produced by the Governor General's letter and the advice tendered by him. He proposes a survey of the passes leading into Deccan so as to watch properly the movements of the Pindaris.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 20 March 1816.

My Lord,

I had some time since the honour to receive your commands conveyed in Mr Adam's letter dated January 20th.

I immediately made known the whole of Your Excellency's resolutions to the Paishwa making use of all the channels which I have before mentioned, to impress on His Highness the great proofs of friendship Your Lordship had given him and the utter impossibility of complying with the whole of his wishes. His Highness being at Nassick I was only lately informed of his reply. He expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the decision, and what I hear of his proceedings gives no reason to think that his disappointment here had any visible effect on his spirits or behaviour. His Highness has said nothing of the suggested provision for the sons of Gungadher Shastry, but I do not infer from his silence that he has resolved to neglect the advice that has been offered to him.

I shall pay all the attention in my power to effecting a compromise between the Peshwa and the Guicawar in the manner prescribed by Your Lordship, and to obtaining such information as may facilitate the arbitration if the first mode of adjustment fails.

Having learned from a dispatch from the Resident at Hyderabad dated 26th February, that Colonel Doveton had occupied all the passes from Luckenwarree to Adjuntee, and understanding that Captain Sydenham would be able to shut up those of Untoor and Amba, I requested Colonel Smith to detach the Light Battalion to Casserbarry and the 1st Battalion 9th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry to Unky Tunkey, so as to stop the whole of the Ghauts in that range. This has been done and His Highness at my suggestion has ordered Gunput

No. 6—Elphinstone explains the claims and counter claims of the Peshwa and the Gaikwad in their long-standing dispute. He concludes that the Baroda ruler could not escape making large cessions to the Peshwa to satisfy the latter's claims.

From—THE RESIDENT AT POONA,
To—SECRETARY WARDEN, BOMBAY.

Poona, 24 March 1816.

Sir,

The Right Honourable the Governor will have received information of the Governor General's decision that the Paishwa's claims on the Guykwar are not affected by the murder of Gungadhar Shastery. They must therefore now be settled either by a negotiation between the parties or by our arbitration; and it will contribute to promote either of those courses to examine the nature of the claims and of the Guykwar's objection to them. In the one case it will show what sum it would be advisable for the Guykwar to offer and in the other it will bring the case into such a form as will facilitate an immediate arbitration.

I have the honour to enclose translations of all the agreements* entered into between the Paishwa and the Guykwar which I could procure from Baupoo Myraul. Any new ones that are produced will probably make in the Paishwa's favour, but it does not appear from the arguments of his ministers that he has any of consequence to produce. I also enclose an abstract of the account between the governments drawn up by Bapoo Myraul.

The Paishwa's claim, the Guykwar's answer and the Paishwa's reply are fully stated in the enclosures to my letter to Mr. Adam dated the 21st September 1813 and transmitted to you on the 24th of the same month and to them I beg leave to refer the Right Honourable the Governor.

Before enquiring into the several demands in detail it is necessary to examine some general arguments that lead to overturn them all. These are of two sorts, the first of which militates against the existence of the Paishwa's rights from the beginning, while the other only maintains that they perished in the downfall of the Maratta confederacy.

The first class of arguments is fully displayed in Col. Walker's letter to the Hon'ble Governor of Bombay, dated July 21st 1803, and is founded on the facts that the Paishwa's claims are of modern date, that they were first established by

* The enclosures have not been included in the volume.

perfidy and outrage, that they have always been fluctuating and uncertain and that there have always been such large remissions as to make it apparent that the tribute to the Paishwa was merely nominal and the payments in reality, mere occasional contributions to induce the Paishwa to grant assistance or to forbear from annoyance.

How far those arguments affect the Paishwa's claims will be best seen by a view of the history of those claims. Pillajee Gykwaur was at first a Patil of a village near Poona. He rose to be a Sirdar in the service of the Senapaty and was very instrumental in conquering Guzerat under the command of Cauntajee Baunday, another of the Senapattee's servants. The Senapattee himself was the servant of the Raja of Sattarra and derived any pretensions he had to Guzerat from the grant of the Raja Sahoo. The third Raja of Sattarra, a weak and indolent prince, devolved all the cares and the powers of his government on his minister the Paishwa, who long before the death of Sahoo was the ruler of the Maratta empire in everything but the name. At Sahoo's death the Paishwa began to govern in his own name in consequence of a real or pretended grant of the deceased Raja. He still kept up the office of Raja and invested a relation of Sahoo with that dignity, but he no longer pretended to be guided by the sovereign's order or to consult him at all on state affairs.

Long before the Raja's death Trimbuk Row the Senapaty had endeavoured to resist the Paishwa's authority but had been defeated and slain in a battle in Guzerat. From this time the Guykwar's power in Guzerat appears to have commenced, though it was long before he affected independence. Eswant Row Senapattee, successor of Trimbuk Row, was suppressed in the end by the Paishwa, but as late as 1747 he gave the clearest proof of the Guykwar's dependence by conferring on Damajee, Pillajee's son and successor, the title of Shumsheer Bahaudur which is still held by the family. Nor was the Guykwar's authority established without a struggle with the other great servants of the Senapattee of the houses of Banday and Powar whom, however, he succeeded in expelling from Guzerat.

During this period some unsuccessful attempts were made by the Paishwa to reduce Guzerat under the authority of the Raja of Sattara or in other words under his own. Finding himself baffled in his open attacks he entered into a negotiation with the Guykwar, during the course of which the Guykwar joined in an intrigue that was set on foot at Sattarra for the Paishwa's destruction and came to Poona with his army to assist the

conspirators. The Paishwa dissembled the resentment occasioned by this change in the Guykwar's conduct, again commenced a negotiation which was continued until the Guykwar was thrown off his guard by a solemn truce, when the Paishwa surprised his camp, routed his army and made Damajee himself prisoner. The Paishwa then renewed his attempts to obtain possession of Guzerat but finding them entirely fruitless he was obliged to negotiate with his prisoner the Guykwar. The terms proposed were that he should cede half his possessions and hold the rest subordinate to the Paishwa. The Guykwar consented to the proposal; but it was not until he was sent himself to Guzerat with a large army of the Paishwa's that his ministers could be prevailed on to acquiesce in the agreement. The Paishwa's army was on this occasion commanded by Raghoba the present Paishwa's father who after the partition of Guzerat was joined by the Guykwar's army and proceeded to reduce the town of Ahmedabad which had till then remained in the hands of the Moguls. When Ahmedabad was taken it was divided between the Paishwa and Guykwar in the manner which subsists to this day. Damajee was set at liberty after the partition and from that time forward he appears to have served the Paishwa with zeal and fidelity. He was present in the victory over the Moguls at Tandulza and in the fatal defeat at Pauniput. Even the shock which the Paishwa's power received on that occasion did not induce him to throw off his dependence, for in the course of the next year he came to Poona to assist Ragoba in a civil war with his nephew Madhoo Row. Ragoba was successful on this occasion and rewarded his partisan by getting for him, from the imprisoned Raja of Sattarra, the title of Sena Khaus Khail and a Sunnad for his share of Guzerat. Ragoba soon after received from Damajee a cession of Teladi and five other districts near Surat as a compensation for some deficiency in the Paishwa's share at the original partition. These districts yield 2,54,000 rupees and are often mentioned in the succeeding disputes. At the same time Ragoba is stated by the Guykwar's ministers to have renounced all claim to a share in future conquests and especially to the Mahauls then possessed by the Baubees.

After this agreement Damajee returned to Guzerat and employed himself in conquering the Baubee Mahauls and other countries until he was summoned to assist Ragoba once more against Madhoo Row. Damajee was himself detained by sickness but he sent his son Govind Row with his contingent. Ragoba was now defeated and the victor punished the Guykwar's adherence to his enemy by imposing on him an annual tribute

of 5,25,000 rupees and an annual service with 3,000 horse during peace and 4,000 during war. Before this the Gykwar appears to have paid no tribute and to have served with what he could assemble according to the exigencies of the state. without being obliged to send a regular quota every year like a Seranjaumy chief. At the same time that these terms were dictated, the Paishwa promised to restore the districts worth 2,54,000 rupees in the beginning of the next year. This agreement is said to have been acted on in the Arabic year 1164, but the first record of the payment of the tribute is in 1165 from which time it was regularly paid.

Five years after this treaty Damajee died leaving the succession disputed between Syajee Row his eldest son, but by his second wife, and Govind Row his second son by the first married of his wives. The Court of Poona determined to make its harvest of this dispute and declined conferring investiture on either of the competitors till their rights should be fully investigated. Govind Row appears to have been at Poona with the contingent when his father died and he took advantage of his situation to begin a negotiation in the course of which he consented to pay a large Nazzur, agreed to annul the cession of the five Mahauls and bind himself to pay 2,54,000 rupees a year on account of them. The arrears from the cession till the date of this recession were however remitted. This brought the tribute to its present amount of 7,79,000 rupees. The above agreement was concluded in the name of the deceased Damajee, Govind Row not having as yet been recognized as chief; but next year he received his investiture on the payment of a moderate Nazzur

During this time Futteh Singh the youngest son of Damajee appears to have held possession of Guzerat in the name of Syajee who was unfitted for governing from natural imbecility. He now commenced a negotiation to supplant Govind Row, and Syajee's right being confirmed by the Pundits at Poona, a regular investiture was granted in his name and the administration was committed to Futteh Singh under the formal sanction of the Paishwa. It was at this time that the sum of 6,75,000 rupees was fixed to be paid whenever the Paishwa should dispense with the services of the horse.

This sum added to the tribute completes the amount of 14,54,000 now demanded by the Paishwa.

It appears therefore that although the cession of half of Guzerat was obtained by perfidy and force, the Paishwa's pecuniary claims are founded on regular treaties entered into without deceit or compulsion; that the Gykwar was always

subordinate to the Raja of Satara now represented by the Paishwa; that he became directly dependent on the Paishwa within 20 years of the death of his former master the Senapattee; that he began to pay tribute 53 years ago; and that the amount has not fluctuated for these 43 years which is itself no inconsiderable period in the existence of such recent states as the Paishwa's and Gykwar's.

It is next to be seen in what manner the stipulated tribute has been paid: of the 33 years between the time when a tribute was imposed and that of the last settlement of accounts tribute was paid for 21 years. It was excused for the greater part of 10 years during which no more than 15,50,000 was paid; and for two years the Gykwar has no accounts. The commutation for troops has been nearly in the same circumstances from the time when it became due. It was excused for the 10 years above mentioned and paid for all the rest except when the troops attended.

The remissions alluded to were not matters of course; of the ten years for which payment is excused 8 were occupied by the war with the British during which Guzerat was constantly overrun by hostile armies and Fattch Singh had the strongest hold on the Government of Poona, sometimes from its consideration of his services to the common cause, sometimes from its wish to detach him from his alliance with us and always from the utter impossibility of his making his stipulated payment in the actual state of his possessions. It seems therefore that the remissions which have taken place do not affect the Paishwa's right to tribute though they give the Gykwar a claim to similar indulgence in circumstances of similar embarrassment and distress.

The arguments deduced from the dissolution of the Maratta confederacy are now to be considered, and it must first be observed that there never existed any regular confederacy so constituted that the secession of the greater part of the confederates should of itself release the remainder from their engagements.

Each of the chiefs had his own distinct relations to the Paishwa fixed in general by distinct agreements. At first the only confederates were the Paishwa; the Raja of Colapore, who was only connected with the rest by a general interest in the prosperity of the Maratta name; the Raja of Berar, who was bound to furnish military aid in great wars and who acknowledged the supremacy of the Raja of Sattarra and the Paishwa's vicegerency; and the Gykwar, who was bound to general

obedience, to pay a fixed tribute and furnish a fixed contingent every year. The Prittee-Nidhee, the Punt Sacheev and the other feudatories under the Raja need not be mentioned as they never appear to have engaged in foreign politics, and though the chiefs of Sawunt Warree and perhaps those of the family of Angria used to negotiate separately with maritime powers, they had no influence on the general affairs of the nation.

At a subsequent period the number of confederates was increased as many of the Paishwa's servants became so powerful as to render it necessary to consult with them instead of commanding them. Of this number were Sindia, Holkar, the chiefs of Calpee and Jhansec. Some minor chiefs might be counted confederates for a time, but these alone were permanent.

When any of these chiefs became perfectly indifferent to the Paishwa's orders, the confederacy was in fact dissolved as far as related to him, but it was not dissolved of right, nor were the parties released from their obligations, until some treaty was concluded or admitted by both parties, acknowledging their new relations. Sindia's guarantee of the treaty of Salbye was of this nature with regard to him, and the treaties of peace with Holkar and the Raja of Berar in which the Paishwa, as an ally of the British Government treats with the other chief as an independent power, were declaratory of the cessation of the confederacy with regard to those princes.

As there is no treaty of this sort with the Gykwar and as there has been no general dissolution of the former treaties between the Paishwa and all Maratta chiefs, it remains to be seen whether the Paishwa has lost the rights he once possessed with respect to the Gykwar. This he may have done in two ways. He may have forfeited them by some act of aggression or some breach of treaty on his own part, or he may have lost them without any fault of his own, by the force of circumstances which render it impossible to observe them any longer. In the first case he will have lost the whole and in the second only as much as is absolutely incompatible with the new order of things.

Nothing of the kind contemplated had occurred upto 1798, as the Paishwa's rights were as fully acknowledged and exercised in that year as at any former period. Since that time the Paishwa is not accused of any aggression, but he is said to have broken his engagements by withholding protection when it was due. It must however be proved that protection was due. Col. Walker appears to consider that protection is always

an implied countercondition to the payment of tribute. The Gykwar Vakeels on the other hand do not allude to this general claim, but maintain that the Paishwa was bound by a special treaty to assist the Gykwar in wars with his relations. I do not think the first argument that an obligation to pay tribute on one hand implies the duty of affording protection on the other, can be maintained since in many cases tribute is promised to purchase, not protection but exemption from attack or forgiveness for offences, and in that case, the tribute will not be forfeited by refusing assistance though it may be lost by allowing the tributary to be annihilated. The specific engagement alluded to by the Vakeels is not in any of the agreements I have translated. When it does appear, care ought to be taken to ascertain whether it was a part of any of the original treaties where tribute or military service is promised (in which case it might be supposed a condition of the promise) or a mere gratuitous engagement of the Paishwa's; also whether it is of a general and permanent nature or confined to particular circumstances and particular times. This is of consequence because there are instances in the treaties, of the Gykwaur's stipulating for assistance against particular relations, which stipulation appears to be introduced at the time when the Gykwaur is purchasing his investitures, to compel the Paishwa to guarantee the possession he has sold and to prevent the rise of a competitor who might supplant the first purchaser as Syajec did Govind Row. Even if it be proved that such an engagement existed to the fullest extent and that the Paishwa neglected it, the Gykwar can scarcely make it a ground of withholding His Highness's due, unless he can prove that he formally applied for the stipulated assistance and that his demand was refused or neglected. The Gykwar's own ministers do not treat this alleged failure of the Paishwa as a breach of treaty calculated to extinguish his claims, but as the ground of a counterclaim to exemption from service during the years when the Gykwar's relations were in rebellion.

Though the treaties now in my possession do not contain the stipulation above alluded to, one of them promises the Paishwa's aid against powerful foreign armies that may invade the Gykwar's country. The promise to pay tribute also (though it did not imply a general protection) bound the Paishwa to restrain his own generals. If therefore the attacks by Sindia, Holkar and the Bhosla alleged by the Gykwar's ministers to have been made in 1804, 5 and 6, can be proved, they will furnish some ground for alleging the Paishwa of breach of treaty, but as far as I can learn the Gykwar never

was attacked by Sindia, Holkar or the Bhosla: it was he who attacked them in consequence of his alliance with the British Government. At all events he ought in this case also to have formally demanded assistance; or if the danger was too urgent for that, he ought to have complained as soon as he could and to have declared the treaty between him and the Paishwa to be dissolved, which neither he nor his ministers have done to this day.

The Gykwaur's right to withhold the Paishwa's dues as a retaliation for a failure on the part of that Prince in fulfilling his expressed or implied engagements does not therefore appear to be well founded; but without alleging that the Paishwa broke his engagements to the Gykwaur, it may be maintained that the latter Prince was placed by circumstances beyond the Paishwa's control in a situation that rendered it necessary for his own preservation to enter into new relations incompatible with those he formerly bore to the Paishwa. Such was actually the case when he concluded his treaty with the British. His Highness the Paishwa has since recognized that treaty and any of his former rights that are incompatible with it have ceased by his recognition. It is necessary therefore to ascertain how far the Paishwa's rights are affected by our alliance with the Gykwar and it must be observed that the article of the treaty of Basseen in which the Paishwa acknowledges the treaty, declares that the said treaty was mediated and executed without any intention that it should infringe any of the just rights or claims of His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur affecting the Sircar of the said Raja (the Gykwaur) and we are therefore bound to preserve all those rights and claims which are not obviously incompatible with the treaty acknowledged.

The documents to be examined are the two conventions of Cambay and the treaty signed at Baroda on the 29th of July 1802. I believe no other treaty was concluded before the treaty of Basseen and consequently no other can be recognised in that instrument. The only points in those treaties, which occur to affect His Highness's rights are the establishment of our ascendancy at Baroda instead of his; our protection of the Gykwaur and interposition in the negotiations at Poona; our guarantee of the succession; our being security for the Gykwaur's debts and our receiving a cession of his country.

The most important of these alterations is produced by the general spirit of the treaty as well as by various articles in it which by establishing the ascendancy of the British Government at the court of Baroda preclude the exercise of that power

or influence which the Paishwa used formerly to possess by the accompanying agreements and which appear to have extended to deciding who should succeed to the musnud; to constant interference between the Gykwar and his relations and even between him and his ministers; or to receiving complaints against him from his own soldiers and servants. These pretensions the Paishwa would lose by his acknowledgment of the treaties with the Gykwaur if he had not more clearly renounced them in other parts of the treaty of Basseen. But it is not a necessary consequence of his losing his influence that he should also forfeit his pecuniary claims secured to him by treaties.

The protection we promise to the Gykwaur and our consent to interpose in his negotiations with the Court of Poona secures the Gykwaur from arbitrary demands on the part of the Paishwa but leaves His Highness's just claims in full force.

In like manner our guarantee of the succession to the musnud of Baroda prevents the Paishwa from setting aside the lawful heir, but it does not free the Gykwaur from the necessity of paying the usual Nuzzerannch on his accession. The amount of that payment however appears to have varied with the security or insecurity of the Gykwaur's title and the consequent importance or unimportance of the Paishwa's support. At present as the succession is secured by the protection of the British Government the smallest of the sums usually paid will be the most equitable.

The only remaining points in our treaties with the Gykwar that can affect the Paishwa's claims are the security given for his debts and the cession required to maintain the Subsidiary Force. The existence of great debts whether they were guaranteed by us or not, would give the Gykwaur a claim to consideration on the Paishwa's part and might countenance an application for a remission but could give no right whatever to a general release; and our guarantee could only give grounds for a further request that His Highness should forbear pressing his demands until those debts were paid or that he should allow the sums owed to him to be paid by degrees along with the Gykwaur's other debts.

The cession to us can only afford a claim to exemption by rendering it impossible for the Gykwaur to continue his payments; His Highness paying his tribute to the Paishwa is not otherwise incompatible with his paying a subsidy to us and there is nothing in the treaty recognized by the Paishwa that indicates an intention of withholding it or applying it to the

payment of the British troops ; on the contrary other funds are suggested for that purpose to be derived from dismissing Arabs and making economical reforms in the expenditure of the state. The cession at the time of the treaty of Basseen amounted only to 7,80,000 rupees per annum, it now amounts to only 13,50,000 and the Gykwaur's whole revenue amounts to 70 lacs at least, of which a large proportion now goes to the payment of the Gykwaur's other debts and might in time be applied to discharge those due to the Paishwa.

Having now considered the arguments that make generally against all the Paishwa's claims we may proceed to examine those claims in detail and afterwards the counter claims of the Gykwaur.

The Paishwa's first claim is to the balance of an old account amounting to 39,82,789. This is not controverted but it appeared to me, until I had examined the accounts, that it was usual to allow balances to lie over with an understanding that they were never to be paid. This however does not appear to be the case nor has any balance remained unadjusted but the present one. There is one case in the accounts where Maunaujee Gykwaur died within 3 years of his receiving his investiture and left part of the money he had agreed for unpaid. The original sum was 70 lacs and his successor Govind Row paid 20 lacs in full but how much was the real balance and how much the remission is not clear. As Govind Row paid 78 lacs in the next four years it is probable Maunaujee had paid a large sum in the 3 years alluded to. There can be no demand for a remission on the sum of 39,82,789 which is the balance of an account in which 60 lacs of rupees have already been remitted.

The next claim is for 2,03,56,000 rupees on account of tribute and commutation for military service for 14 years at 14,54,000 per annum of which 7,79,000 is for tribute and 6,75,000 for military service. This (as four years have passed since the accounts were made out) must now amount to 2,61,72,000 rupees. The general correctness of this claim is not disputed, but a counterclaim of 6 lacs of rupees a year for 36 years is advanced on account of Broach which shall be noticed hereafter.

The Gykwaur also claims a deduction from the compensation for troops on the ground that there were domestic troubles in his State which the Paishwa was bound by treaty to assist him in suppressing but did not and that it is therefore right that his contingent should be considered as serving with him on the

Paishwa's part and that no compensation should be required for the years during which those troubles existed. These were the Arabic years 1201, 1202 and 1203 which would make a deduction of 20,25,000 rupees from the Paishwa's demand.

His right to exemption for the two first years must however depend on the production of a treaty binding the Paishwa to assist him in domestic disturbances. To exemption for the last year 1203 he will have a claim independent of all treaties if his troops were employed out of his own dominions, as he was engaged in a war the object of which was the restoration of the Paishwa to his throne and the whole of his army must be reckoned to have been serving His Highness.

This however will have no effect after the termination of that particular war. In the next wars both the Paishwa and the Gykwaur were engaged as our allies and not for any object of the Paishwa's. It may be argued that promised troops have been preserving the tranquillity of the Paishwa's lands in Guzerat, or that they have been serving the common cause of the allies and consequently the Paishwa, but the agreement requires that these troops should serve at the Presence (i.e. at Poona) and it would require an express order to justify their remaining in Guzerat, even if they had been serving the Paishwa there which I do not suppose, His Highness will admit they were. With respect to their serving the alliance in general, if they are to serve the alliance, the Paishwa ought to be consulted about the manner of their employment and they ought to be counted as part of the quota he is bound by treaty to furnish. The Gykwaur can have no more right to employ them according to his own notions of the interests of the alliance than he had to apply the rent of Ahmedabad while he held it, in the same manner. We might with equal justice reduce the Poona Subsidiary Force under the plea that a portion of our army in Bengal was the Subsidiary Force and that it was serving the interests of the alliance in that part of India.

The next claim is to a share of any revenue that might be collected subsequently to the Arabic year 1170, from the Baubee Mahauls conquered by Damajee and called Puttun Punch Mahaul. On this account 41 lac. of rupees was due in the Arabic year 1211 (and consequently 45 lacs now). The Gykwaur however states that the Paishwa renounced all claim to a share in the Baubee Mahauls in 1163 and that although he did afterwards extort a lac in one year and 25,000 rupees in another on this account, yet he afterwards desisted and in five or six settlements which took place after that period no further

demand was made on that account. Moreover the Gykwaur states that the Baubee Mahauls produce no surplus revenue for the Paishwa to share. The only mention of this subject in the enclosed treaties is in article 11th of the agreement of 1173. The silence of the Paishwa at so many settlements affords a strong presumption in the Gykwaur's favour.

The Paishwa's fourth claim is for 56,38,000 rupees on account of a Nazzeranneh for investiture and the Gykwaur urges that, in consideration of his poverty the investiture ought to be granted without any Nazzeranneh. The Paishwa has taken the highest rate ever paid. It would be more appropriate to take the lowest which is 5,00,000 rupees.

The 5th claim relates to the practice in Ahmedabad which is not connected with the general arrangement.

The 6th claim is for three elephants and five horses which the Gykwaur alleges were actually delivered when the Peshwa was at Basseen.

The 7th claim is for a sum of money borrowed from a banker by the Gykwaur on the Paishwa's security. Part of this has been paid and the whole Colonel Walker states ought to have been paid by the Paishwa. His Highness, however, will probably not admit the reason assigned and whatever may have been the character of the debt originally it ought now to be paid by the Gykwaur who has engaged to pay it. There are two other claims for money lent by bankers on the Paishwa's security. These are admitted by the Gykwaur in his first papers and passed over silently in his second; but Col. Walker represents them as obsolete. This however is more applicable to any of the Paishwa's claims than to those of individuals who have actually paid their own money for the Gykwaur's service. The payment of these debts is repeatedly stipulated for in the agreements between the Paishwa and the Gykwaur.

Malhar Row's claims mentioned in the Paishwa's 8th demand were forfeited by his rebellion.

The fees of the Furnavees in the 10th demand are admitted by the Gykwaur.

The claim to jewels is said to be obsolete which appears to be the case.

The last demand relating to the village of Raunee is of little consequence and is admitted.

We have now to consider the counter claims of the Gykwaur, the first of which is for Broach. This claim has been pretty fully discussed by both parties. To decide on it with confidence would require a knowledge of the history of the cession which I have not the means of obtaining. From what I understand, however, it appears that Futteh Sing Gykwaur being hard pressed by his rival Govind Row at the time when the British troops first appeared in Guzerat, ceded his share of Broach with some possessions to obtain our support and that of Ragoña whom we were endeavouring to raise to the office of Paishwa. The immediate effects of the treaty were the deliverance of Futteh Sing who was before besieged in Baroda and his obtaining undisturbed possession of the Gykwaur's territory by the exclusion of Govind Row.

The cession of Broach ought to be considered as full and complete from this time especially as there is no reason to think that the British Government would have restored the place to the Gykwaur if the cession had not been alluded to in the treaty of Poorunder. It's being mentioned in that treaty more from a pretension of the Paishwa's Government that the Gykwaur had no right to cede any of the lands held by him and that the right to do so resided in the Paishwa as head of the Maratta State. This can never be admitted by the Gykwaur without subjecting his whole dominions to the will of the Paishwa and if it were admitted, it would be no foundation for a claim of the Paishwa, the real cession having been the act of the Gykwaur and only legalized by the Paishwa's ratification. The Government of Bombay at the time of the treaty of Poorunder considered the cession of Broach as merely "swelling the treaty with an imaginary advantage" while the Gykwaur denied the validity of it altogether and demanded the restoration of Broach from the Government of Bombay, on the ground that the treaty by which he ceded it had not been fulfilled on our part; and that the Paishwa's treaty was null as far as respected his territories. This is an admission on the Gykwaur's part that Broach was ceded by him and for objects of his own and the same fact may be inferred from the conduct of the British Government which though it inserted an article (the 8th) in the treaty of Salbye expressly for the protection of the Gykwaur, contented itself with securing what remained of that prince's territory without stipulating for any indemnity for Broach.

It may however be admitted that by the treaty of Poorunder, the Gykwaur lost some of the advantages he expected to have

gained by the cession of Broach, while the Paishwa's Government gained by making that cession its own ; and it is not to be forgotten that the same Government has on more occasions than one promised to attend to the Gykwaur's claim to an indemnity and has expressly engaged at the last settlement to consent to a compromise (Tor Jor) on the next adjustment of accounts. When all this is considered, it may be thought equitable to divide the burden of the cession between the Gykwaur and the Paishwa ; but half the amount appears to be the very utmost that can reasonably be assigned to the latter power. The real value of Broach at the time of the Gykwaur's cession may be ascertained from the records of the Government of Bombay.

Taking the value of the Gykwaur's share for the present at the rate stated by him, the deduction will be 3 lacs of rupees per annum making for 40 years 1,20,00,000 rupees. It seems however unjust to insist on a further remission for the years previously to the last settlement when the accounts were closed without any hint of a retrospect ; especially as vast remissions have already been made on account of the calamities of the war in which Broach was lost which remissions would never have been made if the present ones had been expected. We ought to calculate the arrears from the last settlement in 1795 as 54,00,000 rupees.

The Gykwaur's 2nd counter claim is for 80,00,000 of rupees on account of the expense of reducing Safflookur the rebellious Governor of Ahmedabad. The claim is reasonable in itself but the amount seems enormous. 80 lacs of rupees would maintain for eight months (the period the service is said to have lasted) an army of 10,000 horse and 50,000 foot and still leave an ample allowance for contingent expenses. His Highness the Paishwa has besides a counter claim to a large amount for treasure belonging to his Government which fell into the hands of the Gykwaur when Ahmedabad was taken, so that 20,00,000 will probably be as great an amount as can possibly be charged to him.

The Gykwaur's next counter claim is one of great importance. It is for the amount of the expense he incurred in procuring a British force to secure the existence of his State which had fallen into great peril from the Paishwa's inability to afford the assistance he was bound by treaty to furnish. This is not the proposal formerly discussed for annulling the Paishwa's rights for breach of treaty but a demand for a compensation for the expense occasioned by his weakness or neglect. It is

however still necessary to prove the existence of the treaty alluded to and the Paishwa having failed to act up to it when due notice was given to him of the occurrence of the case contemplated in the treaty. It must also be enquired whether any loss has in reality been sustained and whether the cession of 65,000 rupees a month which was the price of the Gykwaur's deliverance from his dangerous situation was not compensated even in a pecuniary point of view by the reductions of other troops and by the other reforms the Gykwaur was enabled to make. If it should appear that the Gykwaur only substituted one sort of army for another, no reason can be found why the Paishwa should pay any part of the expense of the new establishment without sharing the savings that accrued from the reduction of the old one.

A different argument arising from the same arrangement is brought forward by Col. Walker; that the Gykwaur's Subsidiary Force is of great use to the Paishwa in protecting his lands in Guzerat, but this advantage is merely incidental and was not contemplated by the Gykwaur when he made the treaty. It is indeed the nature of intermixed possessions that the good order maintained by one of the partners is beneficial to the other, but this does not oblige the partner who derives the benefit to pay for his neighbour's prosperity. It is just also in cases where a Government is to pay a share of the expense of an arrangement likely to be advantageous to its interests, to take the opinion of that Government on the necessity of a change, on the best measures to be adopted and on the amount it is willing to expend. In this case nothing of the sort was done and if it had, I think there can be no doubt the Paishwa would have objected to the arrangement however small might have been the expense imposed on him. By the establishment of our force at Baroda the ascendancy His Highness formerly possessed at that court, is transferred to the British Government and by the same operation the preponderancy in Guzerat is transferred from the Paishwa to the Gykwaur and in return for these losses His Highness only gains a degree of tranquillity in his possessions in Guzerat, superior perhaps to what they formerly enjoyed but which His Highness might have attained by other means and certainly would have obtained by the operation of the treaty of Basseen. If all other measures were insufficient for the security of those possessions, His Highness would have preferred providing for their protection by subsidising an additional Brigade for his own Subsidiary Force to paying a share of a subsidy to maintain a force for the service of the Gykwaur.

The case of the Nizam may throw some light on that of the Gykwaur. He was driven to the necessity of subsidizing a force principally by the aggressions of the Paishwa himself and his Sirdars. The treaty of subsidy has likewise been fully acknowledged by the Paishwa. The expense of the Nizam's subsidy is quite as great as the Gykwaur's in proportion to their respective incomes: the Nizam's means of payment are smaller than the Gykwaur's as his expenses exceed his receipts by the sum of 15,50,000 rupees a year. The force which he has subsidized not only protects the Paishwa's possessions within the Nizam's limits but secures his eastern frontier for its whole length and is of little less use to him than the force at Seroor; yet no claim has ever been advanced or thought of to a deduction from the Nizam's tribute on account of the expense of his Subsidiary Force. The Nizam has not even set up the plea of poverty. He pays a large part of his tribute and he disputes the rest on the ground of ambiguous expressions in treaties. The British Government is about to examine these pleas and it is designed that he shall cede a portion of territory to cover the amount which shall prove to be due from him to the Paishwa.

These considerations appear to render it impossible to reckon on this counter claim as affording a deduction from the amount of the Paishwa's demand.

There remains but one of the counter claims, that for a remission and it has been proved by no means to be a thing of course and only to have been made when the sum to be paid was enormous and when the Gykwaur had suffered great calamities. There seems also to be a difficulty in reconciling the grant of a remission with other great reductions of the Paishwa's claims. It seems to have been the principle for the Paishwa to take all that the Gykwaur could possibly pay and grant a remission for the rest.

The following statement shows the state of the claims of both parties as they have appeared in the above examination. All claims which were considered as doubtful in the discussion of them are here put down in favour of the Gykwaur.

Paishwa's Claims.		Gykwaur's	
Old Balance	37,82,789	Deduction for the years 1201, 1202 and 1203.	20,25,000
Tribute and compensation for 17 years.	2,61,72,000	Indemnity for Breach.	1,20,00,000
Nazar.	5,00,000	Expense of reducing Ba. Lockur.	20,00,000
	<u>3,05,54,789</u>		<u>1,60,25,000</u>
	1,60,25,000		
	<u>1,45,29,789</u>	Balance.	

The above is calculated on the supposition that the Gykwaur is to receive an indemnity for the revenues of Broach even for the years long since settled, but if this appears quite unreasonable the account will be still more unfavourable and the balance against him will be Rs. 2,12,29,789.

From this it appears that the Gykwaur owes the Paishwa after all deductions upwards of a crore and forty-six lacs of rupees on the most favourable view of his affairs and even if (in addition to all the numerous reductions that have already been made) the Paishwa could be persuaded to give up the odd 46 lacs, as a remission, the balance against the Gykwaur would still be a crore of rupees

With respect to future payments I see but two fair modes of proceeding. One to regulate them by the engagements of the parties and the other by their practice. If the first plan be adopted an allowance will be made for Broach, but the Gykwaur will be obliged to pay the rest of his tribute and compensation without further deduction. Remissions will depend on the Paishwa and if he can be persuaded to make a considerable one at present on account of the past accumulation of debt under which the Gykwaur labours, he will expect that it shall not be drawn into precedent and counted on as affording a regular counter claim on the Gykwaur's part. On this plan the Gykwaur will have to pay 11,54,000 rupees per annum. If the other plan of going by old practice without regard to principle be adopted, we have no business to enquire why Broach was not allowed for on the one hand, or why the last balance was not paid on the other. It is enough for us that on the average of the 28 years we know of, the Gykwaur has paid about 10 lacs a year and at that rate he ought to pay for the future. To observe the first rule with one party and the second with the other, to bind the Paishwa to the strict fulfilment of his duties and engagements, while we allow the Gykwaur the latitude of his actual practice, would be evidently injustice and partiality. If we take the second plan as the most favourable to the Gykwaur he will have to pay to the Paishwa a tribute of at least 10,00,000;* to which if we add the interest of his arrears after all sorts of remissions and deductions and take the interest at 12 per cent. which I fancy

* Note—This is an average from the whole of the payments since 1170 when the present tribute was first paid. The unpaid balance and the sums remitted do not of course come into this account but the remission on account of Manajee's arrears has not been allowed for, because the amount cannot be ascertained; on the other hand a large sum has been cut off the average tribute to make up for the above and to bring it into round numbers and whole lacs.

is moderate for the Gykwaur to give, that State will have an annual burden of 22,00,000 in addition to its other expenses. This might be too much for the Gykwaur's revenue to bear; and it certainly would not be just to compel the payment of a sum that would ruin his State, but the Paishwa would be entitled to all that the Gykwaur was able to pay without ruin, which would be the whole of his surplus revenue, after the most rigid economy. In years when he had no surplus revenue, the Paishwa would be obliged as formerly to grant remissions.

Such it appears to me would be the result of a strict arbitration, for as I have not heard the Paishwa's side and as even on this *ex-parte* enquiry I have given all doubtful points in favour of the Gykwaur, no other decision is likely to be more favourable to him on the whole, although it might in particular points; and here also I have said nothing of the demands of bankers. It seems therefore scarcely to be hoped that the Paishwa should renounce his whole claims past, present and to come for a cession of territory yielding seven lacs of rupees a year, and altogether unlikely that he should take a smaller sum.

I would now recommend that the risk of an arbitration should be pointed out to the Gykwaur and that he should be called on to state the largest cession of land or sum of money that he will consent to give to obtain an amicable adjustment of the Paishwa's claims past and future and that Baupoo Myraul should be directed to ascertain the smallest sum the Paishwa will take, in which I shall be happy to assist him by any means that may be thought most expedient. If the views of the parties be found irreconcilable, the British Government might proceed immediately to the arbitration for which it will probably be prepared by the time the sentiments of the Peshwa and the Gykwaur are known.

At all events I would recommend that the affair should be settled out of hand while things are in their present state as by putting it off we shall keep up a constant source of renewed irritation with both of the allies.

No. 7—The Rani Durgabal of Savantwadi is reported to be enlisting the Peshwa's support in getting her grievances against the British Government redressed.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—SECRETARY ADAM.

Poona, 28 March 1816.

Sir,

I have this day received an answer from the Raunce Doorga Bhye to my last letter. She says that she has been prevented by the disturbances in the Government from sending a respectable person to make friendly communication to Major Schuyler, but that she will now very soon send one, and that she hopes for a continuance of the friendship of the British Government. This morning also I was visited on business by the Paishwah's Minister Anund Row and among other papers he produced one presented to the Paishwah by the Government of Sawunt-Warree. It complains that the British Government had wrongfully dispossessed the Raunce of Bhurrutghur and Nursinghur, that the same Government had by force and violence deprived her of Vingorla and part of the turruf of Mussoora and entreated the Paishwa's interference in her favour. I said I was astonished that the Paishwah's Ministers should present such a paper to me after all that had passed on the subject of Sawunt Warree that if the Governor General was obliged to notice it, His Excellency would not fail to testify the utmost displeasure and that I recommended their considering the subject fully before they brought forward such a paper again.

No. 8—The Resident of Baroda reports as asked for, the financial situation of the family of the late Gangadhar Shastry, explaining the will of all his property which he had prepared before leaving for Poona and fully exonerates him from the widely circulated reports of bribery and corruption.

From—J. CARNAC, RESIDENT AT BARODA,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Baroda, 15 April 1816.

Sir,

The delay which has occurred in my answer to the enquiries of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council regarding the pecuniary circumstance of the late Gungadher Shastry, and on the state of the members of his family, has been occasioned by the impracticability of acquiring the necessary information until the children of the deceased had returned to Baroda and

the subsequent occurrence of a propitious day for his confidential friends to enter on an examination.

The confidence which the Shastry reposed in me rendered an acquaintance with the general result of his affairs a matter of no difficulty. From sources therefore of unquestionable correctness I am enabled to satisfy the wish of Government.

It appears that the late Shastry on being appointed to the mission at Poona, had taken the precaution to prepare a written paper which fully described the extent of his property and the amount of his debts, with the bequests to his family from the balance on adjustment of his concerns.

This procedure is uncommon among natives. He saw the advantages of such a practice to his children, and perhaps aware that his situation in life might raise suspicions of his wealth, he may have considered the execution of a will as the best vehicle for proving the integrity of his character.

In the conclusion of this document he refers to his having accepted from the late Babajee Appajee the sum of seventy-five thousand rupees.

I have the honour in the first place to submit the copy of a report from my assistant, who with the permission of the family has examined the will accompanied by statement of the Shastry's property after the discharge of all claims against the estate, and the return of the abovementioned sum according to his own desire, subject to my decision.

The Right Honourable the Governor in Council, will observe from the extract of the will now enclosed which bears relation to the money presented by Babajee that the Shastry states himself to have spoken to me on the question of receiving it. At the distance of six years I should not have recollected the precise details of the conversation with any present accuracy if Babajee's importunities to give and the Shastry's apparent reluctance to receive the money had not made an impression on my mind. Baupoo Myral now the Agent at Poona, accompanied the Shastry to ask my sanction for the latter's acceptance from Babajee of a sum, to the best of my recollection, of 80,000 rupees to enable him to perform the thread ceremony of his three sons. The application was resisted by me in due course, and being a consideration from one individual to another, I refused to agitate such a subject with Government. The entreaties of Baupoo Myral and his asseveration of the prevalence of such donations among natives, led me to say to him and the Shastry that with such presents among the servants of the Guicawar, I could have no concern, and that if

the Shastry had been so situated, my express inhibition would have been unnecessary; under existing circumstances, however, I forbade him from accepting any gratification from Babajee, on which declaration the parties promised to drop the matter.

I had never heard of the subject since the period of this conversation until the inspection of the Shastry's will. After his introduction into the Guicawar's service, as the officiating Prime Minister, he had more than once asked my advice on the propriety of his doing what others had done in his situation to support the heavy expenses incumbent on his office. On this occasion that principle of adhering to his conduct when serving the Company was urged on his consideration, and I have never been able to trace a single instance in the public career of the Shastry, though in possession of all the power and means of enriching his family, of his having been implicated in corruption. Indeed, so far to the contrary, that in the will he renders a striking example of his inflexible honesty. He speaks of Enam villages offered to him by the Chief of Noanuggur and Joonaghur, which he turned to the account of the Guicawar, and adds that for the sake of his children, that Government may perhaps allow them to enjoy the advantages in future. The rumour of his immense wealth and the bold declarations of his participation in every species of bribery have been widely disseminated and too readily received. His elevated situation, added to his almost uncontrollable opportunities of gratifying any propensities to avarice, has engendered the worst passions among the unworthy and less fortunate, and deeply subjected his character to unmerited reproach.

However much it may be lamented that the Shastry had ever taken the money from Babajee, there can be nothing more demonstrative to a liberal mind, of the general purity of his character, than the manner in which he has related the transaction. No motive but such as assimilates with feelings of honour, can be assignable for his candour. The oblivion of the grave would have perpetuated the concealment of the proceeding or restrained the arm of power under its exposure, but wishing to adhere to the spirit of rectitude by which his public life was regulated he has not appropriated to his advantage what was not obtainable with a rigorous sense of duty, but directs its surrender.

It cannot be considered also as inclination to extenuate the principle of receiving presents if in the present instance under

the avowal which the Shastry has given, some probable circumstances may be cited which apologize for his having accepted the money from Babajee.

Possibly the importunity of that Minister put it beyond the power of the Shastry to give a direct refusal before he and Baupoo Myral consulted me regarding the offer. This inference is in a measure warranted by the deputation to me of the latter person, at that time the confidential servant of Babajee; and the Shastry may virtually have conceded before he came to me, in the expectation that I would endeavour to acquire the sanction of Government after having consented. The fear of offence to Babajee, and the urgent necessity for the transaction of highly important public duties to maintain the best terms with that powerful Minister may have operated with the Shastry in not returning the money, when he had my directions for its being declined. It is fair to place this construction on his conduct from his having made no use of the present and now directing its restitution.

I have considered it proper to make enquiries concerning the connection of this present from Babajee with the House of Hurry Bhugty. It results from these enquiries that on the demise of Samul Bhugty, the abatement made to the Guicawar of 10 lacs of rupees for permitting the adoption of a successor to the deceased was followed by donations to other servants of Government according to the established usage among them. From this source Babajee offered the gratification of a part of the sum received to Gungadher Shastry.

The statement as prepared by Mr. Williams on a careful examination of every item in the Shastry's will, exhibits a balance which leaves his family in a state of comparative indigence, when it is considered that he has three sons who are still unmarried, and the expenses of whose nuptials from their situation in this Government will much exceed the assets of the estate.

I shall not occupy the time of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council by entering on a specification of the Shastry's services or on an examination of his character. The value of this public servant has been testified and acknowledged on repeated occasions. His career has been terminated by an act of monstrous barbarity and his family consisting of three sons and two daughters are by his loss deprived of every parental superintendence. He was assassinated in the discharge of his public duty, because his zeal, devotion and abilities put him above the price of political apostasy; and it is to the humane

intervention of the British Government that the Shastry's family has a title to look for a permanent provision and a support commensurate with the distinguished merits of the deceased, and the revolting nature of his melancholy death.

An appeal in a case of such manifest justice can only be attended with every desire by referring to the generous feelings of the Government from which present assistance is implored. The family of the late Shastry is composed of relations of nearest affinity according to the enumeration in the enclosed paper. All of these subsisted on the bounty and patronage of the deceased, and none are now in the enjoyment of any obvious means of livelihood.

I beg leave to add in conclusion that the will of the late Shastry was executed and attested by His Highness Futteh Sing and Mr Williams during my absence on the service to Palanpoor, and that His Highness, Wittoba Dewanjee and myself are the first named executors and guardians to his children.

No. 9—Details of the will and property of the late Gangadhar Shastry are mentioned herein.

From—JAMES WILLIAMS, 1ST ASSISTANT,
BARODA,

To—CAPTAIN JAMES R. CARNAC.

Baroda, 15th April 1816.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose three papers being a translate of two articles of the late Gungadher Shastry's will, stating his having received the sum of eighty-five thousand rupees from the late Babajee Appajee on two several occasions, and desiring that these sums be repaid in case of yourself or the Guickwar Government disapproving the transaction. The other papers* contain a schedule of his debts and amount of his property in money, jewels and cash and exhibits; after providing for the payment of his debts and the marriage expenses of Suckoobye, a balance only of rupees 1,55,033-1-5, out of which the marriage expenses of his three sons are to be defrayed, which will leave the family literally worse than nothing, save the revenues of his village and their salary from the Government. The remaining parts of the will, I have not conceived it right to extract, as containing bequests to females and others, and having no

* These papers have not been included in this volume

relation to the proposed objects of ascertaining the debts &ca of the late Shastry. Having been one of the witnesses to the will, it was with less reluctance the family acceded to my desire of inspecting the will.

Enclosures :

(No. 1) A.

Translate of two articles of the will of Gungadher Shastry.

On the demise of Samul Bhuktee, Parekh of Baroda, Behoor Samul was adopted as his heir with the consent of the Sirkar, on which occasion the late Babajee Khasgeewalla, received 50,000 rupees for conducting this affair, and that sum thro' Bapoo Myral he gave to me, and it is now in the house of Bunsalee in Surat, in the account of 1,25,000 rupees.

I made known this circumstance to my master Captain Carnac and he said, "As long as you continue in the English service, you must not receive anything. If ir time to come you should go into the Guickwar service then you are not prohibited. Now leave this alone". After having entered the Guickwar's service, I asked, but Saheb did not advise me to take it. This money, if I live, I will repay; if I should die the circumstance to be reported to the Guicawar Sirkar and the Resident. If they will excuse it, it is well, if not, the money must be repaid, then I shall not be indebted to any person, and this money 50,000 rupees to be paid out of my share which is written in the will.

(No. 2.) B.

When Babajee Appajee was in Kattywar, I went to Bombay at which time he had settled to give me 25,000 rupees and 15,000 rupees being on account of profit on the amount of jewels I had sold for Dada Saheb. I carried with me to Surat, Hoondies for 40,000 rupees when I first went to perform the ceremony of Vashtooshant and it is also there. This I did not conceal from the Saheb, nevertheless after my decease my papers are to be inspected and if my two parents choose to excuse it. well, otherwise it must be repaid, as follows. (Then follow the details not necessary for the purpose of this volume.)

(No. 9.) A.

The undermentioned are near relations who always lived in the Shastry's house.

Eswant Row Mahratte, a near relation to the Shastry's late wife.

Eshwunt Row Gorbolla, a near relation to the Shastry's late wife.

Moropunt Anna, the Shastry's brother.

Mahadeo Punt Baba, 1st cousin to the Shastry.

Baloba Bhow, 1st cousin to the Shastry.

Row Mahratte, brother-in-law.

Luxmon Annah, son-in-law.

Krishna Row Abba, nephew to the Shastry's late wife.

Babajee Gorbolla, nephew to the Shastry.

Bhasker Punt Mama.

Madow Punt, his wife's brother.

Moropunt Shusraboodhe, a relation.

While no. 1 in the list holds the situation of Marrattee Carcoon in the Residency at a salary of Rs 40, the rest are without employ.

No. 10—The Resident reports the Peshwa's objections to the change of the cantonment ground at Poona so long occupied by the English Brigade.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 21 April 1816

My Lord,

On the receipt of Your Excellency's instructions dated the 10th of February I took measures for conveying them into effect as soon as possible. The plan that had been laid for intercepting the Pindarries, rendered it inexpedient for the force at Seroor to move before those freebooters had returned from the southward, but accounts of their descending the Ghauts into Candeish have at length arrived and the force commenced its march yesterday for the part of the country prescribed by Your Lordship.

The Pindarries have not done much damage to the Paishwah's country in this incursion. They passed along His Highness's eastern frontier for some distance but they were already loaded with plunder and wanted nothing but provisions and forage. Colonel Smith sent out three detachments of a squadron of Cavalry and a Company of Infantry each to endeavour to cut up some of the Pindarries; but although one party went 180 miles from Seroor and the two others from 80 to 100 miles, they were not so fortunate as to meet any of the enemy. The Pindarries did not approach the Ghauts occupied by the troops from this subsidiary force. The Battalion at Unky Tunky was

long since joined by 500 horse under Gunpat Row Putwurdhun. I have not heard that Chintamun Row's troops joined the Battalion at Casserbarry.

When I communicated to His Highness the Paishwah that Colonel Smith was to advance, I called on His Highness to furnish his contingent. I received no explicit answer to this communication, but I understand His Highness is gradually enlisting Cavalry some of which he will probably consent to attach to the subsidiary force.

At the same time I mentioned the intended change of the cantonment as part of Your Lordship's orders giving the real reasons; that the present was not such a position on military principles to be occupied; that it was ill supplied with water and that its vicinity to the town was very inconvenient, especially by causing desertions I said this had been long since observed and submitted to Your Excellency although your orders were only now received. At first the proposal met with little opposition, but when it was reported to the Paishwah, His Highness urged that the ground I pointed out was near the road by which His Highness some times goes to a temple at Phoolgong, Apty and that our pickets or sentinels might interfere with His Highness passing: he also said our occupying that spot would obstruct some plans of plantations which he was thinking of. These objections being entirely removed by explanations, others were brought forward and at last it was said that the removal of the Brigade from the only exposed side of the town would create great uneasiness among the inhabitants. This objection has some weight; and some alarm has certainly been felt in the city at the prospect of a change in the situation of our troops, but that it is not His Highness's objection, is plain from his having suggested various other spots one of them six miles from Poona. His Highness's aversion to the measure seems to arise from apprehension of the consequences of an innovation the motives of which he does not clearly understand. I have several times represented that orders had been received from Your Excellency for the change and that I was therefore unwilling to report the occurrence of any obstacle to it. I have also used such arguments as are calculated to remove the impression that the town will be exposed, and I have suggested that the only means of removing the objection to the present ground will be for His Highness to procure a better supply of water and for us to draw a ditch or other work round the cantonment which might prevent our men from going into the town without leave. I should think this plan would be less acceptable to the Paishwah than the

proposed change of ground, but if he should seem to prefer it, it would remove many of the disadvantages of the present position.

I often receive communications from Holcar's Vakeel about Nuttoo Punsia who has now assembled 400 or 500 horse. I have advised the Paishwah's Minister to disperse them, which he has promised to do and Raja Govind Buksh has also made an unsuccessful attempt against them. As yet Punsia has injured no villages but those belonging to Scindia and Holcar. He has even given out that he is supported by the English, but as the natural consequence of his proceedings is to throw the Nizam's and Paishwah's country into confusion, he can only be considered as an enemy to the whole of the alliance

Holcar's Vakeel also communicated to me with great satisfaction the settlement of the disputes in his master's camp which intelligence I assured him would be very agreeable to Your Excellency.

Foreseeing that intrigues would be set on foot to procure the investiture of the new Raja of Berar by the Paishwah, I thought it advisable to intimate to His Highness at this early stage that the same objections that were urged to his granting investiture to Holcar appeared also in this instance.

Appa Dessye's Vakeel left this with the Minister after assuring me that all my demands should be complied with, which promise was confirmed by the Bhow. No signs of performance have however appeared as yet.

His Highness the Paishwah is expected back in the beginning of June.

No. 11—The Resident requests permission to present to the Peshwa a few lustres of which he was fond and which were obtainable in the Bombay markets, the price of the lot being Rs. 4,000.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—SECRETARY ADAM.

Poona, 5 May 1816.

Sir,

Before the Paishwah left this place for Copergaum he begged the favour of me to procure him a list of such minor lustres, carriages and curiosities as were obtainable at Bombay that he might purchase such of them as he was pleased with from description. I thought this favourable opportunity of gratifying His Highness by an attention to his wishes and while I

procured him the list he desired, I also purchased such of the most curious articles as were procurable at a cheap rate for the purpose of presenting them to His Highness in addition to the usual presents when he visits the Residency. The whole amount does not exceed 4,000 rupees. I hope this expenditure will meet with the approval of His Excellency the Governor General.

No. 12—This communication is instructive and explains how the British influence penetrated into the Gaikwad's state; it was the system of guarantee which brought about the subsequent state of affairs.

From—F. WARDEN, CHIEF SECRETARY,

To—J. ADAM, SECRETARY, CALCUTTA.

Bombay Castle, 7 May 1816.

Sir,

I have been directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th of March last containing the observations of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council on certain passages in the dispatches from this Government to Captain Carnac of the 15th of January and 12th of February, in respect to the extent of the powers derived from our Bhaindary engagements extended to the creditors of that state connected with the removal of Seetaram Rowjee.

I have been instructed to assure you for the information of His Lordship in Council, that every practicable degree of vigilance will be exerted to prevent Seetaram's escape from this island, and the occurrence of any embarrassing consequences arising out of his residence in Bombay; but as in the event of his escaping the allowances to be assigned for his support would be stopped, it is hoped that that consideration alone would operate as a sufficient check upon any disposition he may entertain of absconding, besides which it may with the approbation of His Lordship in Council, be intimated to Seetaram Rowjee and to the Guicawar Government, that as soon as its affairs shall have been retrieved, and its finances placed on a secure basis, permission would be granted for his resuming the exercise of his office of Dewan provided his future conduct should render him worthy of that trust.

Under the limited view which His Lordship in Council has taken of the extent of our Bhaindary engagements the Governor in Council finds it necessary on a point of such importance to

enter into a full explanation of the grounds on which the instructions to Capt. Carnac of the 15th of January were founded in respect to the right of our interference in the internal affairs of the Guicawar State, and to exercise a control over its ministers equally with the Guicawar.

On an abstract view of the question and supposing the Guicawar Government to have enjoyed an ordinary degree of prosperity, to have been regulated on a scale adequate to its expenditure, the Governor in Council would concur in the construction which has been afforded to those engagements in the 5th paragraph of your letter of 16th March 1815 and would not have felt itself warranted in stepping beyond that limitation, but this Government has been accustomed to consider the extraordinary circumstances under which the Company's Bhandaries were substituted for those of the Arabs, to have empowered the British Government to exercise a control for other, the most important purposes of the state, beyond the mere guarantee of the just appropriation of the funds to the payment of the debts, for which they were pledged

Referring generally to Colonel Walker's letters of the 29th of January 1804 and the 29th of March and 15th of October 1805, descriptive of the Bhandary securities, the Governor in Council begs leave particularly to quote those parts which support the construction for which he contends. Colonel Walker in his letter of the 29th of March, after entering into various explanations of the tenor of those obligations, confesses that "it is not an easy matter to convey a true conception of this extraordinary engagement, which is so remote from our ideas of the relation which ought to subsist between a Government and its subjects, that it is peculiar to Guzerat. It shows a strong mistrust in the Guicawar Government and affords a certain sign also of the low state of its authority, but that whatever opinion may be formed on this subject, every material transaction of the Guicawar Government is secured by a Bhandary; that before our arrival in the country these transactions were under the guarantee of the Arabs and two or three of the principal military officers; that in their capacities of Bhandars they had a right to interfere in the most important public affairs, and made it a plausible pretence for controlling the administration. It formed the legitimate ground and a very efficacious mode of extending their influence, and that the Government were desirous of transferring this authority to the Company, and of liberating itself from a pernicious dependence on its

own servants. That the responsibility consisted in obliging the parties to be just to each other, and the security or Bhaindary necessary implies the possession of power to ensure the performance of conditions which both the Government and Individuals agreed to entrust to the guarantee."

In his despatch of the 15th of October in which he enters into a fuller explanation of these engagements, he particularly adverted to "the change which had taken place in the nature of this obligation by the substitution of the Honourable Company's Bhaindary in the transactions of the Guicawar Government, instead of its own Sirdars and subjects. In the latter instance the necessity of soliciting the Bhaindary of a powerful Sirdar hurt the efficiency of the administration and imposed a restraint on their measures even in cases in which the Bhaindary was not directly concerned", again "that it is in the relation of Bhaindary that we derive the least exceptionable title to interfere in the internal administration of the country as it is founded on established usage."

Hence the Bhaindary engagements have been considered by the Governor in Council in the enlarged sense explained by Colonel Walker, "as giving the British Government a power of control over the Guicawar almost unlimited" not only in the particular direction defined in your letter, that is, "as far as applies to the purpose of securing the application of those means which have been pledged for the fulfilment of the pecuniary obligation incurred by the Guicawar to a third party, but more especially and above all, in the imposition of restraints on their measures, even in cases in which the Bhaindary was not directly concerned", and that in their capacities of Bhaindars, the Company "have a right to interfere in the most important public affairs."

In fact when the exhausted state of the Guicawar finances at the period when these Bhaindaries were entered into is considered, when the uncontrolled command which the great officers of the Government exercised over its resources, and the consequent scenes of speculation which were practised, are borne in mind, our Bhaindary securities, if limited in their operation in the degree prescribed in your letter, would have been nugatory and unavailing; the pecuniary obligation could not have been enforced, except under the assumption of a leading and active interference in the most important public affairs of the Government in checking the rapacity of its officers, and in punishing their delinquency or contumacy in concert with the Sirkar."

Independently of this construction of our powers as derived from our pecuniary guarantee alone, the Hon'ble Company's Bhandaries have been granted to the family of Rowaba and therefore to Seetaram. "The guarantee for personal security differs very little from the pecuniary guarantee. The person in whose favour the Bhandary is granted relies with safety on its efficacy and deems himself secure against any attack from the Government affecting his life or the liberty of his person, and so faithfully are the parties concerned that the violation of the guarantee seldom or never occurs; should however the person in whose favour a Bhandary is granted be imprisoned, the guarantee proceeds from expostulation to every other means in his power to effect his release. But should the party commit a new offence, the security ought not to screen him from punishment, although in such a case occurring there is a respect due to the Bhandary, and the Sirkar should proceed against the criminal in concert with his security." A personal Bhandary differing very little from a pecuniary one, it follows that it gives the British Government a power of control over the Guicawar almost unlimited in this particular direction and also over the Officers of the Government whose security is guaranteed.

It was under the influence and protection of the British Government that Seetaram succeeded Rowba in the office of Dewan to the Baroda state, in opposition to the interest made in favour of his younger brother Succaram. By the control of the same authority acting in concert with the Sirkar or with the executive officers of the state, was his agency in the administration superseded in consequence of his opposing those reforms which under our Bhandary we were pledged to effect; and under this construction of the extent of our powers was the observation made in my letter to the Resident at Baroda of the 15th January "that the British Government possessed a control over the officers entrusted with the administration of public affairs equally with the Guicawar", founded.

It is now necessary to advert to the nature and extent of the control which we have actually exercised over the affairs of the Guicawar. Col. Walker's despatch of the 1st of January 1806 forcibly points out the necessity of his obtaining from Government ample powers and full instructions for the prosecution of those important reforms which were essential to the redemption of our pledge guaranteed under the Bhandary engagements, and conformably to his suggestion arising out of the incapacity of Anund Row for the conduct of

public affairs, a commission was established for the administration of the Government, consisting of the Dewan, the Fernaveez, the Mozmoodar, the Resident of the British Government or an agent on his part, Futteh Sing having been subsequently invested with such a controlling power in the administration as might provide for the constitutional defect in the Rajah. The affairs of the Baroda Government are still administered by that Commission and the British Government, therefore, possesses a legitimate right to exercise a power over every branch of the state and even its ministerial officers, equal as it appears to the Governor in Council, with that of Guicawar. Had we not entered into these pecuniary guarantees, the necessity for our granting the personal Bhaindaries, and being included in the Commission for the administration of the Government would not have existed.

In reference to the 7th paragraph of your despatch, I have been directed to remark that the observation contained in the 12th paragraph of my letter descriptive of the peculiar character of our connection with the Baroda State as entirely differing from any of the alliances subsisting with the "other Native Powers" was certainly founded on the existence of the Bhaindary engagements, and consequently of a limited duration. On the debts guaranteed by our Bhaindary being discharged, the dissolution of the Commission of Government and of the obligation of the personal Bhaindaries will naturally follow, the one being interwoven with the other; when our connection with the Guicawar will, under such circumstances "not differ in principle from the Subsidiary Alliances with the other chiefs and the Paishwa. The observation indeed was drawn from the opinion expressed by the Supreme Government which stated, that the peculiar situation of the affairs of the Guicawar and the circumstances under which our connection with the state has been established, and has become in a manner interwoven with its internal concerns, distinguish our relations with that state from those which subsist with the great states of India, although the general political relations and obligations are the same."

From these observations it will be obvious that the demand of this Government for the punishment of Seetaram was founded upon the construction of powers derived from our Bhaindary engagements of a more extensive latitude than His Lordship in Council has afforded to that instrument, nor did the demand exclusively arise out of the murder of Gungadher Shastry, as inferrable from the tenor of your letter, but had reference to

No. 13—An insurrection in the Southern Satara District by one named Ghatge is reported.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 8 May 1816.

My Lord,

An insurrection has lately broken out in the country to the southward of Sattarra headed by a person of the name of Ghatky.* He pretends to support the claims of the family of Chittursing a relation of the Raja of Sattarra who rebelled many years since, was taken prisoner by the Paishwah and died in confinement.† Ghatky's enterprise has hitherto been attended with remarkable success. He has assembled a body of 200 horse and 12, or 1500 foot and has taken 6 forts among which are Wassuntghur and Muchundughur, considerable hill forts about 140 miles south of Poona. The Paishwah has sent a body of troops under Gokla from Nasik to act against the rebels. Other troops are moving from different quarters for the same purpose and it is supposed the insurrection will soon be quelled. Major Ford offered his services very early in the affair but they were not accepted.

No. 14—An interesting account of the Intelligence Department controlled by the Residency is given herein.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—SECRETARY ADAM.

Poona, 29 May 1816.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter from the Post Master at this station referred to in a former dispatch. The Post Master's statements will I hope make it appear that there is no unnecessary expenditure in his Department.

I have only to add a few words regarding the intelligence procured by the Dawk. There are writers belonging to the Post-Office in many parts of the country where there are no news-writers; and these persons by merely writing anything extraordinary that occurs save the necessity of keeping up news-writers at those stations. Where there are news-writers

*Not Ghatke but Yashvantrao Baba—Chatursingh was taken prisoner by Trimbakji Dengle in May 1811 and was kept confined at Fort Raighur. He died on 15th April 1818.

† The corrections occur in a later despatch of 17th June 1816.

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their accounts are checked by those of the Post-Office writers who send intelligence when anything remarkable is going on though they do not make regular reports. The dawks also bring in the reports of the regular news-writers from most parts of the country. The accompanying statement of the duties of the Post Master will probably be a sufficient answer to the question suggested by the Honourable the Court of Directors as to the necessity of allowing him a salary, and the letter I have already had the honour of addressing to you on the subject of the Assistants will show that they are already more fully employed than any other gentleman at the Residency.

No. 15—This paper sets forth Baji Rao's complaints against Elphinstone and the latter's replies.

Extracts of a secret despatch from the Resident at Poona to Mr. Secretary Adam, dated the 14th of June 1816.

“Most of these messages, however urgent, have been in a tone of friendship and of confidence; but within these few days His Highness has adopted a new language. Two days ago Chimnaje Narain sent for Ballajee Punt Nathoo, (the person to whom a pension was lately granted by His Excellency the Governor General) and after paying him many compliments on the Paishwa's part said, that His Highness had ordered him a present of 2,000 rupees, and that it was his intention to provide for him on the most liberal footing, if he would engage to use his interest to procure Trimbuckjee's release and to prevent certain encroachment on our part at which His Highness was alarmed and offended. Balajee Punt declined the present, and professed his inability to be of any service, but Chimnaje sent for him a second time and charged him to communicate to me His Highness's great surprise and uneasiness at the numerous new and unauthorised demands with which I was attacking him, and his sense of the contrast between my conduct and that of former Residents, and his apprehensions that I entertained a design to ruin his state. He then enumerated the Paishwa's grievances. He said that His Highness had subsidised six Battalions and given more country to pay for them than we had ourselves required, yet his interests and wishes were never attended to, and everyone's claims were supported rather than his; that instead of giving him up Kattywar, as we were bound by treaty to do, we had kept it back, and saddled the surrender of it with unauthorized

conditions ; 2nd, that we had not adjusted his demands on the Guicawar, but made it a condition of doing so, that His Highness should provide for the Shastry's children ; 3rd. that we virtually withheld the settlement of his claims on the Nizam, since in the present state of affairs he could have no confidence in our decision ; 4thly, that after having our Brigade thirteen years on one spot we were now going to remove it to another, which would shut up His Highness's road over the only bridge by which he could cross the river to the north of the town in the rains, and would besides injure his mango trees : 5thly, that I had brought forward new and vexatious demands about exemptions from customs ; 6thly, that I was constantly annoying His Highness about the Southern Jageerdars, and above all that I would not procure the release of Trimbuckjee.

It would perhaps have been more consistent with the dignity of the British Government to have abstained from any mention of these complaints, especially as they came through an unofficial channel, but Chimnajee Narrayen is on so intimate a footing of confidence with the Paishwa, that the message could only be considered as coming direct from His Highness, and it seemed expedient to make some sacrifice for the chance of removing His Highness's false impression on some at least of the grounds he complained of. I therefore requested Ballajee Punt Nathoo to communicate to Chimnajee Narrayen my surprise at the motives attributed by His Highness to my proceedings on subjects of current business, most of them of old standing, all of evident justice, and some of urgent necessity. I said that Chimnajee was not acquainted with the first affair (Kattiwar) and that it would take a long time to explain it, but he might be assured nothing was intended regarding it, which was at all a variance with His Highness's rights. 2nd, that his dispute with the Guicawar should be submitted to the Governor General as soon as I had translated some papers relating to it which I had just received (after repeated applications) from His Highness's ministers, that the pension to the Shastry's children was not a condition of our arbitrating the Guicawar's disputes but an appeal to His Highness's own sense of honour, and that if he was disposed to incur the obloquy of leaving them unprovided for he should find that no obstacle to the arbitration of his claims ; 3rd, that an officer had been appointed to conduct the arbitration of His Highness's claims on the Nizam ; that it was not easy to suggest a remedy for His Highness's distrust of the British

No. 16—The Resident reports the settlement of disputes between the Patwardhan chiefs and the trouble created by Appa Desai.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 8 September 1816.

My Lord,

Since I last had the honour to address Your Excellency His Highness the Paishwah has repeatedly demanded of Appa Dessye the repayment of the money advanced on his behalf as reported in my despatch. Appa Dessye having failed to pay the amount or to enter into any explanation on the subject, the Paishwah determined to carry into execution his threat of resuming a third of that Chief's Jageer. He communicated this intention to me and allowed me to send again to Appa Dessye's Vakeel to warn him of what was likely to be the result if he failed in immediate payment. The Vakeel said that his master depended entirely on the support of the British Government but made no offer to come to any arrangement. It will be in Your Excellency's recollection that this money was advanced by His Highness in consequence of my demands and on a condition which was agreed to by Appa Dessye's Vakeel that it should be repaid by his master in two months on pain of forfeiture of a third of his lands. This agreement was repeated in my presence and acquiesced in by me. Appa Dessye's failure therefore has left His Highness at liberty to resume a third of his Jageer and I imagine he will not fail to do so and to support the measure if necessary by force of arms.

Should such a course be required, I shall endeavour to prevent the arrangements for effecting it from interfering with the defence of the northern frontier, but notwithstanding the violence of Appa Dessye's character, he can scarcely be so irrational as to risk his whole Jageer by engaging in a contest for a part of it in a case where the Paishwah's right to resume it is so well grounded.

The disputes so long subsisting between Chintaman Row and the Chief of Merich, have at length been in part adjusted by the Ministers. They have decided all the questions regarding the lands and revenues allotted by the Government for the maintenance of their troops and they have promised at an early period to settle those arising from the domestic transactions of the two chiefs. Their decision appeared to be equitable, but it has not given satisfaction to Chintaman Row's Vakeel and may perhaps be as unfortunate with the Chief of Merich.

His Highness the Paishwah left Poona yesterday on a visit to his lady and his new born daughter at Wye. He will be absent about a fortnight.

No. 17—The birth of a son and heir to the Peshwa and his death on 9 September 1816, are reported by the Resident to the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 12 September 1816.

My Lord,

I have the pleasure to announce to Your Excellency the birth of a son and heir to His Highness the Paishwah.

His Highness sent immediate information of this event from Wye and ordered it to be communicated to me without delay. The accounts reached me last night. I received them with warm congratulations and made the present usual on such occasions. A royal salute was fired this morning at the British Cantonments. I beg leave to suggest that it would be very gratifying to His Highness if Your Excellency should think proper to order a salute to be fired on this occasion at Fort William and a letter to be addressed in Your Lordship's name to His Highness. These compliments were formerly observed on a similar occasion.

No. 17A.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 12 September 1816.

My Lord,

I am concerned to acquaint Your Excellency with the death of His Highness the Paishwah's infant son. This unfortunate event took place at Maholy three days ago.

No. 18—The escape of Trimbakji prepared Elphinstone for a final blow up as an inevitable consequence of the Peshwa's harbouring the culprit.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—COL. SMITH, COMMANDING OFFICER, SUBSIDIARY FORCE.

Poona, 14 September 1816.

My dear Colonel,

You will observe by the enclosed that we are likely to be all alive again in this part of the world. It has been badly managed at Tannah and must I am afraid get Major Eldridge into a serious scrape. I was thinking of only applying to you to send back part of your folk by which means you would have been ready for Trimbukjee on either side of the Godavery but I thought that he was as likely to go south as north and that you would want a detachment to go after him and some troops to leave in this part of the country besides, which made me write as I have done. I hope all will blow over without any disturbance or violent discussions, but I am equally prepared for a blow-up which would infallibly be the consequence of the Peishwa harbouring this man after all that has passed.

No. 19.

From—LIEUT. GENERAL NIGHTINGALL,

To—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

Bombay, 23 September 1816.

Hon'ble Sir,

In transmitting the accompanying proceedings of a court of enquiry held at Tannah by my order for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council it becomes my duty to offer the following remarks.

1. It appears that the officer of the day who had no other duty than the charge of the guard over the state prisoner was allowed to remain at his quarters out of the fort during the whole of the day, until at night after which hour the gates were all locked, and he was of comparatively little use. It is besides very unusual for a guard of 27 Europeans to be placed under

the command of a sergeant; if it had been represented that the duty bore hard upon the commissioned officers, the number of subalterns could easily have been augmented. On this point I conceive much blame is imputable to Major Eldridge.

2. Considerable blame is likewise in my opinion imputable to that officer for not having reported the state of the necessary* and the adjacent out-houses, as means might easily have been adopted to secure them effectually, if their actual state had been known to Government. A light ought also to have been constantly kept burning in the place where the prisoner was allowed to have access on those occasions.

3. It appears to me that Major Eldridge was not acquainted with the proceedings of the prisoner throughout the 24 hours, as he was not aware of Trimbuckjee being in the habit of going after dark every evening to the place above mentioned, which ought to have excited suspicion and should probably have induced that officer to take additional measures to prevent his effecting his escape. Adverting to the circumstances in which the prisoner was placed under his charge he ought to have caused a regular and minute report to be made to him every morning verbally or in writing, of the whole of the proceedings of the prisoner during the preceding 24 hours.

No. 19A.—The escape of Trimbakji from his confinement at Thana is described in these papers. The Keeper Maj. Eldridge is punished.

Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry held by order of His Excellency Lieut.-General Sir Miles Nightingall, Commander-in-Chief on the Bombay establishment.

Tannah, 17 September 1816.

Major Eldridge being called into court and requested to state the means that were adopted for the safe custody of the state prisoner Trimbuckjee Denglah, lays before the Court the orders No. 3 which are read.

Question.—Be so good as to state to the Court the circumstances attending the escape of the state prisoner?

Answer.—On the evening of the 12th instant about a quarter before eight o'clock I heard a noise below my quarters. I immediately got up and heard the European woman (a wet nurse in my family) call out the prisoner Trimbuckjee had escaped. I ran downstairs, crossed the fort to the main-guard, called out to the Drummer to beat arms instantly and close the gates. As soon as any of the men were assembled, I directed them to go and

*Necessary means latrine.

distribute themselves around the works. Mr. Whitehill the fort Adjutant joined me and took some of them outside of the fort. I then went with a lantern with one of the Sergeants and two or three of my servants all round the works myself, and examined every gun and place as I went along, but could hear nothing of the prisoner. Upon my return to the main-guard I desired one of the officers to acquaint Mr. Babington, the Judge and Magistrate, of what had happened, and requested he would send me all his people to assist in the search, and I also sent to the Collector Mr. Williams, that his people might be also sent out in every direction. I requested Mr. Babington to be kind enough to send an express to Mr. Elphinstone, the Resident at Poonah, and also to offer a reward of one thousand rupees through the Bazar, which was accordingly done. After every search had been made, I desired that some additional sentries might be placed on the works during the night, that we might search again at day-break in the morning, as the night was very dark and raining the greatest part of the time. On my returning to my quarters I sent an express off to the General about 9 o'clock and requested Captain Digby should take the prisoner's servant, who had accompanied him down to the necessary and endeavour to frighten him, and see if he would confess anything. On his being threatened he said that two horse-keepers had been concerned, Mr. Whitehill's and my own. Capt. Digby sent to inquire for the horse-keeper. I told my own servants to go down and call him, but he was not to be found. Mr. Whitehill's was secured and the next morning I sent him to the Judge and Magistrate to be examined, and forwarded the examination to the Governor in Council in the evening of the 13th. On the morning of the 13th at day-break a rope was discovered with a black camely tied to it and fastened to one of the gun carriages on the works, my horse-keeper's shoes lying on the grass; but whether the prisoner escaped by that means or through the gate I cannot say. I ordered a Court of Enquiry, the proceedings of which I forwarded to Government.

I beg to add that I live inside the fort, and my quarters overlook every part of it, so that had there been at any time the least neglect of duty I should have taken notice of it, and I have great pleasure in stating that the officers of the Detachment of the 65th Regiment, have been most particularly attentive to their duty. I have never excused a single man who has been reported to be neglectful of duty on the prisoner's guard.

Sergeant James Stewart of the 65th Regiment being called into Court the following questions were put to him.

Question.—Were you Sergeant of the guard over the state prisoner Trimbuckjee Dengliah on the 12th instant?

Answer.—Yes, I was.

Question.—Relate to the Court what happened respecting the escape of the prisoner.

Answer.—On the evening of the 12th instant between the hours of 7 and 8 o'clock the prisoner sent for me and told me when I went to him that he wanted to go to the necessary. I told him to go, and ordered one of the sentries that was then posted over him to go with him. I also accompanied him myself for his better security as I had always made it a practice although it was not my duty to do so. I went downstairs in front of the prisoner, and on my arriving at the bottom of the stairs I allowed the prisoner to pass me for the purpose of seeing him inside the yard where the necessary was. I remained at the entrance of the yard with the prisoner and sentry and the prisoner's servant went forward to the necessary with his lowta. On his return the prisoner went forward to the necessary accompanied by the sentry. I remained at the entrance of the yard with his servant. After the prisoner had remained at the necessary a sufficient time, the sentry said to me he thought he stayed long I replied in the affirmative. He then said I will go in and see what he is about. I desired him to do so, the sentry took the servant with him and ordered him inside to find out the reason his master did not come out. He did so, and on his return said "Counh ne". The Sentry then went in himself and on his coming out said "Sergeant Stewart, the prisoner is gone". I told him to keep the servant fast and I would run to the gate. I did so, and directed the sentry not to allow any person to pass him from the gate. I went to the main-guard, and brought a lantern out of it. I then went and searched the necessary, and outhouses adjoining it. On going into Captain Digby's stable I found the prisoner's mantle and trousers lying at the horse's head, and two bars of the small window forced out, which fully convinced me it was by that way he had made his escape. I then gave the alarm to the Guard. The night was very dark and it rained very heavy, so that had the sentry been even inside of the necessary he could not have seen him. The insecurity of the necessary and the outhouses adjoining it were a screen for his escaping. The sentries in the gateway had no orders to examine any native passing out between sunset and eight o'clock.

Question.—As you say it was so dark on the night alluded to, did you ask for a lantern to accompany the prisoner to the necessary?

Answer.—No, I did not.

Question.—As you had no light, why did you not order more sentries to accompany the prisoner?

Answer.—I did not think it necessary to order any more than what was my orders.

Question.—Have you ever been on the prisoner's guard before?

Answer.—Yes.

Question.—What was the usual time at which the prisoner went to the necessary?

Answer.—In the morning generally about seven o'clock, and in the evening about the same time.

Question.—Had the prisoner been in the habit of going to the necessary after dark in the evening?

Answer.—Invariably so, when I have been upon duty.

Question.—Did you always accompany him upon these occasions?

Answer.—I did.

Question.—Did you never take a light with you in the evening when it was dark?

Answer.—No, I did not.

Question.—Did you examine the windows of Captain Digby's stable, previous to retreat-beating, or during any part of the day on which you were on guard over the prisoner?

Answer.—I did not know there was any such place there.

Question.—Was there any person in Captain Digby's stable when you went into it?

Answer.—No.

Question.—Did you ever hear the standing orders of the Guard read?

Answer.—Yes.

Question.—Were they read to the guard upon that day?

Answer.—No, they were not.

Question.—Were the men on duty that day acquainted with the orders of the guard?

Answer.—I believe they were, they had been often read to them.

Question.—Has it not been customary for more than one sentry to accompany the prisoner to the necessary?

Answer.—Sometimes.

Question.—Had the prisoner been taking a walk during that afternoon?

Answer.—Yes, he was walking from four o'clock till sunset under my charge accompanied by an escort of four men.

Question.—Had he any conversation with a native in passing during that time?

Answer.—There was a horse-keeper passing by, that he made a Salam to. Major Eldrige's horse-keeper was invariably in the habit, when the weather permitted, to walk his master's horse to and fro, the exact way of the prisoner's walk and humming over a song to himself in passing the prisoner, that no person could take notice of the discourse as it was in the Mahratta tongue, not even casting his eye towards the prisoner, although it is evident by his elopement with the prisoner that the song was directed to him; but there being only Europeans with the escort, no one could understand him.

Question.—On these occasions, did you desire the horse-keeper to desist, or did you report the circumstance to the officer of the day?

Answer.—No, I did not, it was so trifling an affair as I thought at the time.

Question.—Did the prisoner Trimbuckjee ever speak to the horse-keeper on these occasions?

Answer.—Not to my knowledge.

Question.—Did any of the prisoner's servants accompany him in the afternoon when he walked?

Answer.—Yes, one.

Question.—Did any conversation take place between the servant and the horse-keeper?

Answer.—Not to my knowledge.

Question.—Can you give any further information on any points whatever on the subject now under investigation?

Answer.—There was a native permitted some time ago to bring water to the prisoner's apartments, who had every opportunity of carrying messages to and fro without any interruption, as when he came to the stairs with the water, he would not enter the stair while there was any person upon them; he shewed evident marks of terror towards the Europeans and was missing that night the prisoner escaped.

Sergeant Stewart retires.

Private John Develin being called into court, the following questions were put to him.

Question.—Were you on the state prisoner's guard on the 12th instant?

Answer.—Yes.

Question.—Relate to the Court what you know respecting his escape.

Answer.—I was sentry inside the prisoner's room from six to eight o'clock in the evening. About half past seven the prisoner sent for the Sergeant of the guard. The Sergeant came upstairs and I was ordered to take charge of the prisoner to the necessary. On our arriving at the yard, the servant went forward with a lowta, and upon his return I accompanied the prisoner to the necessary, and saw him enter the door. I stood a few paces from the door and waited for his return under the eaves of the house; after that when I supposed he had been in about ten minutes I said to the Sergeant of the guard, "he has been a long time in." The Sergeant said he had. I then said, I will send his servant in to fetch him out. I did so; and the servant went in and began falking; he came out immediately and said, "Coun ne". Upon that I laid hold of the man by his cloths, and felt with bayonet all round the necessary, for it was so dark I could not see. I then came out and clapped my hands and said, "Sergeant, the prisoner is not in the necessary." I held the servant fast, and the Sergeant went away bidding me take care of him. I remaining near the necessary door, and some time after the Sergeant returned with a lantern and we searched the necessary and then went into a stable at the corner, where we found the prisoner's cloths. I was then desired by the Sergeant to take the servant upstairs.

Question.—Where and what was the prisoner's servant about during the time his master was in the necessary?

Answer.—He was in the yard betwixt Sergeant Stewart and me singing as loud as he could.

Question.—Did you ever attend the prisoner to the necessary upon any other occasion?

Answer.—Never before to the necessary.

Question.—Did you or the Sergeant endeavour to put a stop to the servant's singing?

Answer.—No.

Question.—Did the servant's singing in any degree serve to attract your attention from the door way of the necessary?

Answer.—No, I never took my eye from the necessary which I was near to.

Question.—Do you know if the Sergeant made any mention of a want of light in taking the prisoner to the necessary?

Answer.—Never made any mention of light, good or bad.

Question.—How old are you?

Answer.—Fifty-five next March.

Question.—Is your eye-sight good?

Answer.—No, I can't clean my firelock without spectacles which I have used for the last four years.

Private John Develin retires.

[After this follows the evidence given by: (1) Samuel Kelly Private, (2) Sergeant John Davies, (3) Sergeant Charles Middleton, (4) Sergeant Christopher Groundwell, (5) Sergeant John Buggle who were on guard duty. All testified that Trimbakji used to go to the necessary in the evening between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m., that they always went with the prisoner, examined the necessary but not the adjoining building. They also testified that the prisoner used to take a walk in the evening after 4 o'clock and the horse-keeper of Major Eldridge used to walk his horse to and fro at the same hours and used to sing aloud*.]

The examination of evidences being closed Major Eldridge requests to address the Court and states that as Captain Digby Commanding the detachment of His Majesty's 65th Regiment was living in the same building and under the same roof where the prisoner was confined and the Fort Adjutant Lieut. Whitehall residing within 30 or 40 yards from the state prisoner's apartment and my own house being in the fort, which overlooks every part of it, I did not conceive it necessary that the officer of the Day should remain in the fort during the day time, but allowed him to go to his quarters. He was ordered to come in at 8 o'clock and remain at the State prisoner's guard till regularly relieved the next morning. I also wish to mention that it never was reported to me, that the prisoner quitted his apartment after sunset, or I should have taken such steps as I deem necessary for his further security, particularly by ordering lanterns which were never applied for. My chief dependence upon the security of the State prisoner was the orders I gave to the sentries over his person, that he was never to be out of their sight. Consequently I concluded that it was next to an impossibility that he could make his escape.

*Note by V. G. Digne.

Mr. Whitehall the Fort Adjutant has been constantly in the habit of visiting the prisoner and the guards of the garrison. The Sergeant Major has been ordered frequently to visit the sentries to see that the duty was carried on agreeable to orders; he has also mentioned to me that he never knew of the prisoner going to the necessary after sunset and he never was applied to for any lantern, he had always two at his quarters ready in case of any accident.

The Court having brought their examination of the circumstances attending the escape of the State prisoner Trimbeckjee Dengliah, to a close and having also minutely inspected the place of his confinement, particularly, the necessary and that part of the premises from which he is supposed to have made his escape, beg leave to report as follows:—

That with respect to the measures adopted for the security of the State prisoner, they are fully detailed in the appendix No. 3 and that the prisoner's escape is imputable to the very insecure state of the necessary and to the extreme darkness of the night on which he effected his purpose.

No. 20—A report on the search for Trimbakji is made from Nimbgaum.

From—LT.-COL. KINGSCOTE,

To—THE RESIDENT AT POONA.

Camp at Neemgaum, 1 October 1816.

Sir,

In my letter of yesterday I stated it to be my intention to make a forced march on Neemgaum during the night, and although the force had performed a march of 13 miles that morning, I had every hope of being able to surprise the fugitive Trimbeckjee early this morning.

I have now the honour to acquaint you that at 8 last night I marched with the Brigade of Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, the Light Battalion flank and rifle companies of H. M.'s 56th Regiment and Pioneers, but from the excessive heavy roads intersected with deep and rapid rivers, nullahs and ravines, and by an increase of distance of 7 miles making in all between 42 and 43 miles; but in consequence of the former, I found that the advance was considerably retarded from the cavalry and infantry proving a mutual hindrance to each other, and daylight approaching I determined to push for

the village with the horse artillery and cavalry only, in order to surround the place and secure the gate and sally-port, and thereby prevent either egress or ingress until the arrival of the infantry, which were about ten miles in the rear and might render more decisive measures eligible; the above plan was carried into effect about 9 o'clock this morning, the approach of the force having been covered by a jungle until it nearly reached the walls. They were evidently taken by surprise and instantly shut the gates. This circumstance which was strengthened by several armed men appearing in the town induced me to suppose for a moment that I had been fortunate enough to meet with Trimbuckjee at last; but the delusion was of short duration for no sooner had the village been surrounded as previously directed, than the gates were thrown open accompanied with an invitation apparently sincere, to search the place which was accordingly done but in vain.

I have to lament that Captain Grant did not send the three sepoy to me as guides instead of sending them to Poona. They would have been of the greatest service to me in a country so favourable as this is for concealment, and I think there is much presumptive proof that Trimbuckjee is somewhere in this neighbourhood from many circumstances, but particularly his riding horse with 50 others and two elephants being in the village at present. His private apartment, which he must have used for his devotional ceremony, was found on our arrival this morning fresh cowdunged and his book open.

I have also to regret the non-appearance of your promised guide, not however that I think the country at all favourable for cavalry as it is quite the contrary, but I calculated much on his services. Under the circumstances which have turned out I have had the Patil strictly examined but he denies all knowledge of the retreat which His Highness the Paishwa's late Minister has chosen. I shall continue in this neighbourhood until I am honoured with your further instructions.

No. 21—Orders are solicited about the way the six servants of Trimbakji were to be treated.

From—MAJOR ELDRIDGE, COMMANDANT AT
THANA,

To—LIEUTENANT COLONEL AITCHISON,
ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Thana, 18 October 1816.

Sir,

Not having received any instructions regarding the treatment of 6 native servants of Trimbuckjee Dainglia who are still

in confinement, may I request you will be pleased to bring it to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I may know his wishes respecting them and under what restraint they are to be kept, as also what allowance they are daily to receive for their sustenance.

I beg leave to state that I have hitherto desired the acting Fort-Adjutant to supply them (the six prisoners) with one rupee per day and not hearing of any complaints, I should think it was perfectly sufficient. I believe I mentioned to you in my letter of the 24th ultimo the weak state of this garrison, being chiefly composed of invalids who are very infirm. I deemed it necessary to place the prisoners at sunset in the stocks for the night. They are released again in the morning and allowed to remain in two rooms formerly occupied by the state prisoner.

No. 22—John Dunlop reports Trimbakji having appeared at Khanapur.

From—JOHN DUNLOP, RESIDENT AT MALWAN,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY, WARDEN.

Malwan Residency, 19 October 1816.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you for the information of Government that a report reached me a few days ago of Trimbeckjee Dainglia having landed somewhere in the Rajapoor river and being still in the neighbourhood, on which I sent a person from hence to ascertain the truth of the report; and this morning I received a letter from him stating that Trimbeckjee had been there and that he had lived in the house of Luxmun Punt a person of considerable property in the village of Khanapoor, about nine coss beyond Kharepatan.

My informant states that Trimbeckjee was attended by about twenty persons, and called himself a * * * Patil of some considerable village in the Deccan, who having been fined a large sum by the Paishwa, was obliged to beg to raise the amount of his fine, a practice not uncommon.

It is stated that Trimbeckjee was at Khanapoor until the 5th instant, but where he went on leaving that place my informant had not been able to learn, who however had some reason to suppose, he had taken the direction of Severndroog and intended proceeding towards that place next morning if he heard nothing further during the day.

No. 24*—Major Eldridge punished for Trimbakji's escape.

From—THE SECRETARY TO THE SUPREME
GOVERNMENT,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Fort William, 9 November 1816.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of September enclosing a copy of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held at Tannah for investigating the circumstances of the escape of Trimbuckjee from that fortress.

The Governor General in Council cannot but impute to Major Eldridge a very culpable negligence in the custody of the prisoner, there appearing to have been a want of those common-place precautions which the ordinary course of military service enjoins. His Lordship in Council therefore concurs in the sentiments expressed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay in your letter of the 26th September to His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir Miles Nightingall regarding the conduct of Major Eldridge.

The Governor General in Council is not aware that there is any ground for the institution of further proceedings, but he recommends to the consideration of the Governor in Council the propriety of removing Major Eldridge from the command of the fort of Tannah if it be as is presumed, a situation of responsibility and emolument, as a public mark of the dissatisfaction of the Government.

No. 25—Pindari raids in the district of Poona, and their rapid movements are reported to the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—MR. SECRETARY ADAM.

Poona, 23 December 1816.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of letters from Colonel Smith and Colonel Milnes respecting the motions of the Pindarries.

A body of uncertain strength appears to have forced the Waukhe Ghaut after beating the party of the Paishwah's troops

*No. 23 of the editor's Ms. has been omitted as unnecessary, but the subsequent serial numbers of the letters have not been changed.

who occupied that pass. They appear to have proceeded straight to the southward scattering over the whole country to their right and left. I yesterday received a message from the Paishwah to say that 500 of them were within 4 or 5 miles of his residence at Phoolgong Apty and that he had detached some cavalry to endeavour to overtake them.

An idea of their rate of movements may be formed from their being at the Waukhe Ghaut at 2 o'clock on the 19th and at Phoolgong Apty distant about 140 miles by the same hour on 22nd and the facility with which as long as they are fresh, they can elude detachments posted to intercept them, is shown by the fact that the following troops were scattered over the country through which they passed and yet they appear to have come in contact with none of them. Colonel Milnes was at Undersool with a Regiment of Cavalry and a Battallion of Infantry. The 1/4 Madras Native Infantry with 200 of the 65 was on its march to join Colonel Milnes by the route of Ahmednuggur. The 2/4th Bombay Native Infantry was marching from Undersool to Poona, the 2/1st was between Poona and Seroor. Headquarters of the Subsidiary Force were at Seroor and there was a detachment at Ranjengaum for the protection of the country besides the usual detachments at Ahmednuggur Toka and Hewra. The 4th Regiment, Madras Light Cavalry, is also on route from Punderpoor to Ahmednuggur and may still have a chance of striking a blow at the Pindarries.

No. 26—The Resident's Street Service List. Ballajipant Nathu and others were in regular employ of the Resident on Secret Service.

Poonah, 12 January 1817.

Account of sums expended for Secret Intelligence in the months of October, November and December 1816.

	Rs.	a.	p.
October 1st Paid Ballajee Punt Nathoo his salary for September ...	525	0	0
October 1st Paid to a Secret Agent employed to trace Trimbuckjee ...	200	0	0
November 1st Paid Ballajee Punt Nathoo his salary for October ...	525	0	0

	Rs. a. p.
November 1st Paid Gunaish Punt pay for September and October and a present of 50 Rupees ...	150 0 0
Total	<u>1,400 0 0</u>

Contingent charges in the accounts—

For September	1,250
For October	150
Total	<u>1,400</u>
Paid as above	<u>1400</u>

E. E.

(Signed) M. Elphinstone.

No. 27.

Return of persons vaccinated at Poona during the month of
December 1816.

Poona, 18 January 1817.

Vaccination.	Bramins.		Hindoos of different castes.		Mohamedans.		Outcaste.		Total.
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.	
Total vaccinated ...	23	16	193	112	3	7	8	5	307
Successfully vaccinated ...	22	15	124	107	3	6	7	5	299
Failed or events not ascer- tained.	1	1	9	5	...	1	1	...	18

Thomas Coates,
Surgeon, S. V. at Poona.

No. 28—The Resident reports his compliance with the Peshwa's request for Balaji Kunjar returning to his native place.

From—THE RESIDENT,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

About January 1817.

His Highness having frequently expressed a great anxiety to permit Ballajee Coonjur to retire to Punderpoor and the original objections to his entering His Highness's dominions no longer existing, I have communicated my acquiescence in His Highness's wish and letters conveying the desired permission have been addressed to Ballajee Coonjur. His Highness of his own accord has promised that his minister shall not reside at Poona and declared that he only allows him to return in consideration of his age and infirmities that he may end his days in his native country.*

I have occasionally mentioned the proposed change of ground for the cantonment; but the Paishwa appears to consider it as a very alarming movement and altogether shows so much uneasiness and repugnance to it, that I should be inclined to suspend the proposal until I received further orders, if I were not apprehensive that my doing so might afford H.s Highness a pretence for interfering on other occasions in the disposition of the Subsidiary Force.

Most of our other affairs with the Paishwa's Government are going on well and are only obstructed by the usual delays and the usual private interests which retard everything at Maratta Durbars.

No. 29—The Resident reports Trimbakji's movements in full detail, with proofs of the Peshwa's complicity with him.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 11 March 1817.

My Lord,

In my last despatch I had the honour to report to Your Excellency, that Trimbuckjee Danglia had assembled a body of plunderers about 50 miles from Poona, that a detachment

*He died at Pandharpur on 9th May 1817.

of Gokla had been sent against them by the Paishwa, and that I expected soon to hear of their dispersion. His Highness's detachment however instead of dispersing the rebels has quietly sat down in the midst of the tract throughout which they are dispersed; and the Commander has reported that there are no rebels in that part of the country. This language is re-echoed by the Paishwah, who says that he can obtain no intelligence of any assemblage of troops within his territories, and that, anxious as he is to act against them, he must depend on me for finding them out.

The insurrection has therefore now changed its character, and appears as an attempt of Trimbuckjee to recover his power by carrying on war against the British Government, under the protection of H. H. the Paishwah. As these facts can scarcely fail to lead to important consequences, it becomes necessary to show the grounds from which I derive my conviction of them.

It is proper, in the first place, to show my reasons for asserting that there are assemblages of troops in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo, which is denied by His Highness. I shall, at the same time, show that they are headed by Trimbuckjee. The simple fact of such assemblages in a very frequented part of the Paishwa's country, and within 50 miles of his own residence will of itself, establish that His Highness is acquainted with the proceedings and his long connivance and subsequent denial of the existence of it, together with his refusal to act against the troops assembled, will probably be thought a sufficient proof that the design for which they have collected is approved by His Highness.

Early in the last January I received intelligence that Trimbuckjee was at Phultun in which neighbourhood he appeared to have already passed some time. During the months of January and February, I heard from numerous sources, that he was in that part of the country, constantly changing his residence between Phultun on the West, and Punderpoor on the East, extending his range as far as the Forts of Tallore and Mymungur on the South. On the 5th of January, the news writer at Narsingpoor announces a rumour, that some insurgents are collecting. He confirms this report on the 18th and specifies that 25 Horsemen and 100 Foot had assembled between Sirsatwarra and Mahadeo, under a Mahratta Sirdar, and that another body was at Poorundwar about twenty miles to the East of the last village. On the 20th the same writer mentions another party at Mymungur, and adds a rumour that all are to unite under Trimbuckjee Danglia.

On the 24th he writes, that the party at Sirsatwarree, had moved to Natta Pootta and Burrud, North of Mahadeo, and that those at Poorundwar have encamped between Mahadeo and Mymungur. On the 28th he announces that more troops are collecting, and on the 29th he gives the following disposition of the whole :—

Near Natta Pootta & Burrud	500
Near Mahadeo	300
Near Mymungur	600
Near Phultun	400

Total .. 1,800

Almost the whole of these were foot, and the bulk of them Maungs and Ramoosses (and lowest castes like Bheels). At this time I doubted whether the troops assembled were under Trimbeckjee, and if they were, for what purpose such a gang could be designed.

From this time till the 18th of February the newswriter continues to report the accession of fresh bodies of Infantry, and likewise the commencement of measures for collecting cavalry. He also represents, that one of his Hercarras, who was sent for intelligence, has been cut off by the insurgents, and that he himself was in such danger that he had been obliged to take refuge in a fortified house belonging to Seddasheo Mannkaisur. On the 18th of February he writes, that bodies of horse, in parties from 10 to 20, are moving from all parts to join the insurgents at Mahadeo, that the whole country is full of Trimbeckjee's spies, and that dreadful examples are made of all persons who talk of the preparations of the insurgents. On the 19th he repeats the same intelligence, and gives a copy of a paper inviting the services of a particular Chief, and his troops, and promising a specific rate of pay. Similar papers he says are circulated in great numbers. On the 22nd he says, nobody now hesitates to speak of the insurrection or to say that Trimbeckjee is at the head of it. He also mentions that the 18th of March is the day fixed for the breaking out of the conspiracy.

Early in February, the newswriter and intelligencers at Poona began to communicate intelligence similar to that received from Narsingpoor, and by the middle of the month a full confirmation of it was received from two Bramins who were sent separately to Mahadeo to collect information. The Post Office writer at Jewoor (40 miles, from Mahadeo and about

the same distance from Narsingpoor) also writes about the 17th that Trimbuckjee was at Burrud assembling Horse, and that, he had got 1,500 into the neighbourhood of Mahadeo. All accounts concurred in representing Trimbuckjee's vigilance to be very great, and the difficulty of passing through his haunts, and those of his adherents, to be extreme.

On the 24th a person of some consequence, long connected with the British Government, brought to me a Mahrattah Chief of a village who had actually enlisted in Trimbuckjee's service with 20 Horse. He said that Trimbuckjee lived in the jungle apart from his Horse, and that he had about 500 Rammoses at some distance round his person that he had got from 2,000 to 3,000 Horse in different villages near his retreat, under the command of his Father-in-law Ruvee Row Sindia; that he had many others engaged in his service who were still at their villages, and he particularly mentioned different chiefs of Horse in his own neighbourhood, which is on the Nizam border beyond the river Beemah. He said, that Trimbuckjee had given him a small advance of money and desired him to remain quiet until after the Hooly (the last day of which was the 7th instt.) after which he promised him two months' pay at 40 or 50 rupees a month, according to the goodness of his Horse.

On the 25th a private horseman was introduced to me, through another channel, who though in the Paishwa's service was engaged with Trimbuckjee. His account agreed, in most particular, with that last noticed but he was a particularly intelligent man, and gave good accounts of the present state and future plans of Trimbuckjee which derived credit from his knowledge of Trimbuckjee's past proceedings. The only part of his information that is at present applicable was, that Trimbuckjee had been near two months in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo and Phultun, that he had 3,000 Horse and 3,000 Foot about him; that he had constant communication with Poonah, and excellent intelligence; that he had a vakeel from the Pindarrees, with him, and was in close communication with the Paishwah, who had very extensive intrigues on foot against us in different parts of India, and that Trimbuckjee was to set up his standard about the 18th of March.

On the 1st of March the Nursingpoor writer sends accounts of more Horse enlisting for Trimbuckjee. He specifies, as usual, the villages where they are quartered, and in many cases the names of the Commanders. On the 2nd he writes that 2,13,000 rupees have been sent in the night from

Punderpoor to Trimluckjee. He mentions the names of the persons concerned in sending it, and the spot where a party of Horse is stationed for the purpose of furnishing an escort. On the 3rd one of the Brahmins sent to Mahadeo confirms the accounts of Trimluckjee's collecting troops, and adds that a confidential agent of Appa Dessye had had an interview with him, he likewise states that the detachment sent by the Paishwah against the rebels had settled quietly at Natta Pootta, and appeared to be on a friendly footing with the insurgents. The people of the country believed that they were sent out at Trimluckjee's request. On the same day the Post Office writer at Jewoor mentions different places where troops of Trimluckjee are posted, and states that much activity prevails in recruiting for him even about Jewoor, and that considerable quantities of treasure have been sent to him from Punderpoor.

On the 5th I received an overture from a person formerly of some consequence, but whose Jageer has been sequestrated of late, to say that he had been invited by Trimluckjee to raise a large body of horse for him, and offering to give me intelligence, and even to concur in apprehending Trimluckjee.

About the beginning of this month a villager came to Colonel Leighton, and acquainted him, that a body of troops was quartered in his village on the Neerah, and that Trimluckjee had many parties in the villages around. I sent out Hircarrahs with this man, whom he carried in the night to his village, and showed them the Horse. He also shewed them a smaller party picketed in the woods at some distance from the village. While they were looking out for these a party of Horse passed them travelling with secrecy and by night. They heard everywhere of the intended insurrection, and of parties going by night to join it, and understood every where, that it was to break out on the 18th of March.

On the 6th the Post Office writer at Meritch writes, that troops are raising at different places in his neighbourhood which he specifies who are for Trimluckjee, and that others are collecting for him to the south of the Kistna. The Post Office writers at Sanglee on the Kistna, and Poossa Sowly near Sattarah, also report the assembly of troops under Danglia in the hills of Mahadeo.

On the 7th a person came to a broker employed by me to collect intelligence, and wished him to exchange some gold money. By well managed inquiries the broker discovered that the gold had been issued by Trimluckjee to a Patan Chief

the same distance from Narsingpoor) also writes about the 17th that Trimbuckjee was at Burrud assembling Horse, and that, he had got 1,500 into the neighbourhood of Mahadeo. All accounts concurred in representing Trimbuckjee's vigilance to be very great, and the difficulty of passing through his haunts, and those of his adherents, to be extreme.

On the 24th a person of some consequence, long connected with the British Government, brought to me a Mahrattah Chief of a village who had actually enlisted in Trimbuckjee's service with 20 Horse. He said that Trimbuckjee lived in the jungle apart from his Horse, and that he had about 500 Rammosses at some distance round his person. that he had got from 2,000 to 3,000 Horse in different villages near his retreat, under the command of his Father-in-law Ruvee Row Sindia; that he had many others engaged in his service who were still at their villages, and he particularly mentioned different chiefs of Horse in his own neighbourhood, which is on the Nizam border beyond the river Beemah. He said, that Trimbuckjee had given him a small advance of money and desired him to remain quiet until after the Hooly (the last day of which was the 7th instt.) after which he promised him two months' pay at 40 or 50 rupees a month, according to the goodness of his Horse.

On the 25th a private horseman was introduced to me, through another channel, who though in the Paishwa's service was engaged with Trimbuckjee. His account agreed, in most particular, with that last noticed but he was a particularly intelligent man, and gave good accounts of the present state and future plans of Trimbuckjee which derived credit from his knowledge of Trimbuckjee's past proceedings. The only part of his information that is at present applicable was, that Trimbuckjee had been near two months in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo and Phultun, that he had 3,000 Horse and 3,000 Foot about him; that he had constant communication with Poonah, and excellent intelligence; that he had a vakeel from the Pindarrees, with him, and was in close communication with the Paishwah, who had very extensive intrigues on foot against us in different parts of India, and that Trimbuckjee was to set up his standard about the 18th of March.

These statements though strongly asserted by many different persons and though highly probable in themselves, are not sufficiently well established to build upon, but it is certain that troops have been raised for Trimbuckjee in Poonah, and that treasure has been sent to him from this place in one very recent instance: An Arab Jemadar, who was reported to have joined the rebels, returned to Poona, and told a Mahomedan friend, that he had been employed to carry a casket of jewels to Phultun to an adherent of Trimbuckjee; that Trimbuckjee's family and dependents are still in His Highness's favour, that most of them make excursions into the country, which if made without design are unaccountably indiscreet; and which are constantly reported to be for the purpose of consulting with Trimbuckjee; that Bhasker Punt, one of Trimbuckjee's principal officers, who commanded one of the divisions of his force attached to Colonel Smith's in 1815 had made repeated journeys of this kind from His Highness's court at Phoolshehr, that he finally left that place shortly before His Highness's return to Poonah, and is stated, on very good authority, to be now with the rebels. His Highness has been unable to answer my repeated demands to be informed, what has become of him. His Highness's employment in maturing this plan also accounts for several deviations from his fixed habits which before excited a good deal of surprise. The first is his journey to Joonere, when Trimbuckjee was supposed to be in that part of the country soon after Colonel Kingscote's attempt to seize him at Neemgaum His excuse was a vow of an annual pilgrimage made when he was in prison which he had forgotten for the last 20 years to perform. Another is his long residence at Poolshehr, out of the way of observation and the pains he took to explain his motives to me, frequently complaining that he was detained against his will by his arm, though the distance is only 16 miles, and his arm was but little bruised. The last is his giving up his annual journeys to Goorgur, and Copergaum for the first time, I believe, since his restoration, although the excuse of his arm has for some time been removed.

It remains to examine the extent and design of the conspiracy Long before Trimbuckjee's release it was the common opinion in the Mahratta country, that the Paishwa would endeavour to revenge the disgrace, which he conceived himself to have suffered, by raising up wars and insurrections against the British, in which he should not appear himself. It was stated, on better authority and in a less vague form, that His Highness would try all means for Trimbuckjee's release and restoration,

who had enlisted with him, and whose servant the person who offered the money was. He gave much the same account of the state of Trimbuckjee's preparations with those already noticed. It is to be observed that numerous accounts represent all Trimbuckjee's money to be in gold, and constant efforts to be made, in all the country from Phultun to the Bheema, to procure silver in exchange for it. I leave out many accounts brought by Hircarrahs, all tending to prove the existence of the preparations I have described, and the notice they have attracted throughout the country. I shall only add that for the last fortnight, at least, Trimbuckjee's preparations for an insurrection have been the common topic of conversation in Poonah, and that every Carkoon who comes to the Residency if spoken to on the subject treats it as one of public notoriety.

It is in these circumstances that His Highness the Paishwah asserts, that his local officers have allowed preparations such as I have described to go on for two months without noticing them; that his ministers have shut their ears to the common talk of the country, and of the capital; that even when His Highness's attention was drawn to the subject his messengers could learn nothing of these notorious facts; and finally, that a detachment of his troops under an Officer selected for the occasion could sit down in the centre of Trimbuckjee's army and know nothing of its existence. After all this it is scarcely necessary to bring further proof of His Highness's knowledge of the insurrection, the existence of which he so strongly denies, but his confidential adviser, and intelligencer, Prabauker Pundit, mentioned it to me long ago, and could scarcely have concealed it from the Paishwa had it really been unknown to His Highness until then; and his minister, Sadasheo Maunkaisur, who is not in the secret of the Paishwa's intentions, casually mentioned to Kishen Row early in February, that he heard the insurgents in the Mahadeo hills intended to attack his fortified house at Timboornee, that he had therefore increased the garrison, and had applied to His Highness the Paishwah who promised him assistance, and who afterwards made a merit with him of sending out Gokla's detachment, as if it had been done in attention to his wishes.

From all these circumstances I think there remains no doubt but the Paishwa is privy to Trimbuckjee's conspiracy, and has favoured the progress of it. I say nothing of the constant intelligence I have received of His Highness having continual communications with Trimbuckjee, of his having sent him considerable sum in gold, and of his having had more than one secret interview with Trimbuckjee himself.

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that if he did not succeed in entreaties and temptations, he would try intimidations and if that failed, he would secretly foment insurrections in the hope of wearying us into a compliance with his wishes. All the plans represented as precursors to the insurrection have already been tried, and it is remarkable, that the language held by His Highness's avowed agents should so closely resemble that made use of by Trimbukjee's emissaries. The same entreaties and promises at first, followed by the same absurd attempts at intimidations, and the same desire to obtain a categorical answer immediately, before the time the insurrection began to be talked of.

It will be in Your Excellency's recollection that on the 3rd of the last November, the Paishwa sent me a secret message saying that as he was going to quit Poona for a time, he was desirous to leave his country secure, that Trimbuckjee would probably create disturbances if not conciliated, and he therefore, wished to offer him terms on the part of the British Government, and offered to answer for his faithful observance of them. Considering this message as a threat, or at least an attempt to discover the effect which would be produced on the British Government by Trimbuckjee's raising an insurrection, I returned such an answer and sent such messages, public and private, as I conceived most likely to impress on His Highness the impossibility of any insurrection on Trimbuckjee's part for which His Highness would not have to answer, and the total ruin it would bring on his State, if such a proof were to appear of his hostility to the British Government, and infidelity to the Alliance. As His Highness has entered on the present conspiracy in the face of this remonstrance, and it should seem immediately on receiving it, it must be inferred that he will not easily be deterred from the prosecution of a plan so deliberately formed. The same conclusion may be drawn from the apparent extent of his intrigues. It appears by the intelligence already noticed that troops are assembling for Trimbuckjee in the centre and Southern parts of His Highness's dominions. Mr Jenkin's

a body of freebooters in Candesh. Contrary to the practice of such gangs, this body remained quite every since and has not been heard of till this time, but it is now reported in Poonah that His Highness has a body of men in Candesh ready to join Trimbuckjee, and the last Ukhbar from Candesh revives the mention of Jeswunt Row Jewajee, and says he is getting ready to move, all which circumstances agree so well as to make it very probable that the whole proceedings of Jeswunt Row Jewajee have been directed by His Highness. His Highness's repairs of his forts have never entirely been discontinued and they are now carried on with unusual activity. His Highness's overtures to the Guj war, and his intrigues at the Courts of Sindhia and Holcar have often been brought to Your Excellency's notice. The orders lately issued to the Vakeels afforded no proof at all that those intrigues are discontinued but are quite as likely to have been agreed to, on purpose to blind the British Government, at a moment when His Highness was contemplating these secret operations against it. It is to this motive that I attribute the unusual profusion of attention and compliments which His Highness has displayed since the time he now appears to have entered vigorously into his plots with Trimbuckjee. His orders to the vakeels are easily rendered nugatory by his intrigues through unavowed channels. Of this character is Ballajee Coonjur whose agent, Ballajee Doondew manages most of His Highness's communications with the other Mahratta powers, and who himself as well as his son, are pointed out by several reports as engaged in constant communications with Trimbuckjee. There is a circumstance which appears to be connected with His Highness's intrigues in Hindoostan, though it may possibly only relate to the levies of troops in Candesh. It is that large sums of money have been remitted, from this place to Choly Mahaisur or Ougien which are said to be remitted on His Highness's part and which really appear to be sent by his directions. Though I have long heard rumours of this nature, I was at first led to inquire into them by the seizure of a large sum of money (about 30,000 rupees) by one of our detachments in the Ghauts. This money was passing off to Malwa in a secret manner, care was taken to elude our parties, and various subterfuges were resorted to to account for appearances after it had been seized. No applica'ion was made to me to release it, although the banker, to whom it avowedly belonged, is a frequent attendant at the Residency and when he was at length called on for an explanation he gave no satisfactory reason for his long silence. While this subject was under inquiry, I received intimation, that

the money was His Highness the Paishwa's. I afterwards received information on which I think I can rely, that His Highness has remitted several lacs of rupees to Hindoostan in the name of five different Marwaree Bankers, the principal of whom is Ummur Chund. It appears from the state of the market, that these remittances are not made for mere commercial purposes, and several convoys which have been seized by the Paishwa's officers, in consequence of a standing prohibition against exporting the current coin, have always been released by His Highness's own orders. It is to be observed that the greater part of the treasure intercepted by our detachment consists of the prohibited coins (Hally Siccas).

I now proceed to report the communications I have made to His Highness, and the answers I have received since the date of my last despatch. Up to the 24th of February, I treated the insurrection as equally offensive to the Paishwa and the British Government, expressed my confidence in his exertions to put it down, at the same time pointing out the bad consequence of any remissness on his part. On the 24th, the Paishwah's ministers sent me a letter from the Commandant of Gokla's detachment, that had gone against the insurgents, dated from Phultun, denying that there was any insurrection and enclosing a letter from the revenue officer at Natta Pootta to the same effect. The ministers triumphantly referred me to these papers for a complete refutation of all that I had said about Trimbuckjee, and his proceedings, they also pointed out, in polite language, the propriety of deliberation and inquiry previous to bringing forward charges of so much importance. I replied by stating the disagreeable impression made on me by their denying all knowledge of a rebellion that everybody else knew of, and saying that I had done my part, and the responsibility now rested with them. This only producing fresh denials, I sent a message on the 2nd of March requesting an explanation of His Highness's conduct and intentions, and saying, that I should consider his mere denial of a fact so generally known as a proof that he was determined to avoid

between Trimbuckjee and His Highness's Government. I also desired to be informed, whether any of the troops which His Highness said were not rebels were his, or whether he had any troops in the tract round Mahadeo? I also begged to know what precautions had been taken to check the intrigues of Trimbuckjee's family and adherents, and what was become of Bhasker Punt? His Highness now said that there must be an insurrection as I had such positive accounts of it, but asked what he could do? He did not know where Trimbuckjee was, and he could not obtain intelligence about his followers, and that however anxious he was to shew his sincere friendship for the British Government, it was totally out of his power to do anything which might convince it of his cordiality. I replied on the 4th that if His Highness really wished to show his cordiality he might seize Trimbuckjee's family and adherents, and if that proved no check on him, His Highness might give them over as hostages to the British Government; that he might also give such orders to his troops and officers as would soon change the face of affairs. Signs of his cordiality would then appear of themselves, intelligence would pour in both on him and us, he would offer his troops to act with our officers, and those who acted by themselves would attack and disperse the rebels, wherever they were assembled. On the other hand, if appearances continued as formerly, I begged His Highness to consider the suspicions they would lead to. His Highness continuing his professions, offering more troops and ordering out Major Ford's Brigade, but without taking any of the steps that were in his power, or even ceasing to deny the existence of an insurrection; I addressed on the 7th a long and serious message to him, pointing out the impossibility of his continuing his present course without being involved with the British Government, the impossibility, in that event, of his ever being trusted more, and the fatal character, which the dispute would therefore assume. I endeavoured to shew the uselessness of assisting Trimbuckjee, who surely was not expected to conquer us, and with whom we could never make terms; the impossibility of any arrangement that should ever secure the life of that fugitive till he was lodged in a British prison; the difficulty His Highness would have in satisfying Your Lordship of his good intentions, even if this insurrection were to die away, and the wisdom of adopting such a course as should show, that His Highness was sincere in his professions, the result of which, I saw could not fail to be the speedy capture of Trimbuckjee. To this His Highness sent the usual answer that his troops were at my disposal, that they

should move whenever I should point out the rebels, and that he would seize any persons whom I should declare to be adherents of Trimbuckjee. I replied, on the 9th that my object was less to crush the insurgents, which could be done by a very small body of British troops, than to obtain proofs of His Highness's good disposition which might be counted on in future times and under all circumstances; that if His Highness were disposed he could find no difficulty in discovering the rebels, and in ascertaining who were Trimbuckjee's adherents. If then, he were cordial and sincere he would act on my former suggestions, if not, he would come back and desire me to point out individuals. His Highness now promised to seize Trimbuckjee's adherents, requesting me to point out any that he might omit. He also ordered Major Ford to march against the rebels, and promised him a party of the best Horse in his service, but this movement of troops I declined as quite unnecessary, the insurrection being formidable from the appearance of secret encouragement alone, and not from its own strength. I had also received intelligence, which I thought might be relied on, that the troops at Mahadeo and the neighbourhood had broken up and dispersed. I have not yet heard what has been done about Trimbuckjee's adherents.

The above communications were mostly made through Major Ford and Moro Dikshit. I sent similar messages by Praubauker Pundit, but, in general, received still more unsatisfactory answers. Yesterday however Praubauker Pundit brought me a long message from His Highness the purport of which was to vindicate himself from the accusation, I had brought against him, to persuade me that he was not so mad as to meditate war against the British, or to prefer Trimbuckjee's friendship to ours; but a considerable part of the message was taken up by very sharp remonstrances against the tone of the message which I had sent to His Highness by Major Ford, and which His Highness declared were full of unbecoming imputations against him, and expressed with unwarrantable freedom of language. His Highness showed particular resentment at one passage, which he conceived to threaten him with the fate of Tippoo Sultan, but as there was not the most distant allusion of the kind in any of my messages, this was easily explained away. His Highness assigned as a reason for not agreeing to some applications that I had made for a personal interview, that, in the present state of things, such a meeting would be liable to lead to altercation; and to expressions which His Highness might afterwards wish to recall. His Highness also

gave some reason for not sending any man of rank and consequence to discuss the subjects now in hand on His Highness's part: I understood him to mean Gokla, who has perhaps impressed him with high notions of the manner in which he would support His Highness's dignity if he were to conduct a conference on his part. My answer to His Highness's professions was in the same spirit as those which I sent through Major Ford; that His Highness's denial of the insurrection obliged me to give way to very unfavourable surmises; that His Highness's conduct on this occasion, at a time when Your Excellency was impressed with a particular conviction of His Highness's friendship and good intentions, was calculated to shake your confidence in him for ever, that it could not be expected that aggressions could be passed over as if they did not exist merely because they were not avowed; that His Highness was therefore in a situation of danger, and that the only wise course for him to pursue was to deliver up Trimbuckjee, and which I said would be the best course even for Trimbuckjee himself. I took pains to efface the bad impression made by my messages, observing that it was my duty to be explicit with His Highness and that even if I were his own minister I should still think I served him better by laying open the true state of his affairs to him, however it might offend him than by encouraging him in pernicious courses by dissembling or assentation; that with respect to the terms in which my sentiments were conveyed His Highness would recollect that neither I, nor Major Ford, could be expected to avoid improprieties in an Indian language, but that he might be assured I had every wish to render my communications as acceptable as was consistent with the principle I had just avowed. I then begged Praubauker Pundit to remind His Highness of the timely caution I had given him on Trimbuckjee's escape, of the pains I took to warn him in November last of the danger of harbouring Trimbuckjee, and of the very cordial and friendly terms in which I at first addressed him on the very occasion, until His Highness by shutting his eyes to the proceedings of the insurgents, compelled me to call his attention by louder complaints. I said, that I had now had so many interviews with His Highness that he was enabled to judge whether anything I should offer, if he admitted me to an audience, were likely to give him offence, and that with respect to sending Gokla, His Highness would act entirely according to his own pleasure.

During the above discussions, I received two different messages from Gokla, in his usual strain of respect, and attachment for the British Government, but complaining of my having applied for the recall of his troops, reminding me of his former services, protesting that there was no insurrection, and assuring me that if the insurgents would only be found out, I should soon have cause to applaud his exertions. I replied that I had imputed no blame to Gokla, who no doubt acted up to the orders he had received, that it was my knowledge of his vigour on former occasions that led me to inquire into the causes of his present inaction, that with respect to the existence of the insurrection, it was with the Government that I had to deal, and that unless Gokla insists on coming forward of himself, I had no dispute with him on that head. As far as I can learn, Gokla has been His Highness's great adviser through the whole of the present business assisted perhaps by Waumon Row Aphy, and some others of His Highness's dependants. The plan I conceive to originate with His Highness and Trimbuckjee. It suits Gokla's views to fall into any opinions that His Highness may entertain, and as there is no way to win His Highness's favour like standing between him and danger, I should not be surprised if Gokla should have talked of his own military prowess, and offered to take all consequences on himself. Considering the craft and treachery of his confederate it is not unlikely that this may cost Gokla, dearer than he intends, but I cannot suppose that he had any deliberate intention of incurring the resentment of the British Government, or of embarking in a cause the success of which depends on the constancy of His Highness the Paishwa.

Moro Diksheet and his party appear really to be, as they profess, mere instruments of the Paishwah's, without any great share in his confidence, or any influence over his conduct. It is even possible that they may not be admitted into the secret of His Highness's interior policy: all his intelligence, and some of his vakeels at foreign courts, are under the management of Wamon Row Apty. Moro Diksheet has no share whatever in those departments; a Carkoon of Gokla, named Govind Raishoo Joshee, is stated from several quarters to have lately been dispatched to Sendeah's camp. I shall apprise Captain Close of his mission to enable him to find out the object of it.

I have omitted to mention in the former part of this letter, that the Paishwah has occasional private meetings with the

vakeels of Appa Dessye, which gives some colour to the alleged connection between that Chief and Trimbuckjee. His late severity to Appa Dessye is no argument against the fact, for it is quite in the spirit of His Highness's policy to turn against us the enmity which has been provoked by our exertions in support of his own authority.

I shall now wait a few days to see what course the Paishwa determines on, and if he does not take effectual measures against the insurgents, I shall immediately act against them with a British detachment. For this purpose I have requested Colonel Smith to order the 4th and 8th Regiments of light cavalry to move into the neighbourhood of Puraindor and the light Battalion into that of Ahmednuggur. I have also suggested to the Resident at Hyderabad to direct Major Macdowell to move his detachment to the neighbourhood of Tooljapoor. Thus I shall be able to assemble a considerable light force in the neighbourhood of the insurgents within three or four days, and at the same time, I hope the scattered position and apparently unconnected movements of the detachments will prevent the insurgents from quitting the part of the country throughout which they are now quartered.

No. 30—The Resident conveys his opinion on the deliberate conspiracy that the Peshwa was now engaged in with a view to declaring war against the British Government. He proposes measures to prevent these dangers.

From—THE RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 21 March 1817.

My Lord,

The narrative contained in my late despatches will probably have satisfied Your Excellency that the Paishwa is engaged in a deliberate conspiracy to stir up a war against the British Government, and that his object is to restore Trimbuckjee Dainglia to power. If this be the case, the reduction of the insurrection in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo becomes a point of secondary importance, and it is necessary to consider how far the Paishwa can be trusted after the present disturbance shall have been quelled, and what course is to be adopted to secure the British interests from the dangers to which his perfidy may hereafter expose them. It may assist in forming a decision on these important questions to submit to Your Excellency the opinions that present themselves on the spot.

would push on his hostilities with the utmost confidence and alacrity. He would immediately collect the insurgents whom he has prepared on this occasion: part might occupy the fortresses of the western Ghauts, or perhaps might be allowed to take possession of some of the most convenient of His Majesty's numerous forts, from which they could make descents on such points as His Highness thought best; while the rest might secure the open country, plunder the territories of the Nizam or the Company, or attempt to surprise detachments, to cut off convoys, or to obstruct communications. Either division of the insurgents might in time be joined by any of His Highness's Jageerdars whom His Highness might direct to go into a pretended rebellion, while His Highness would wait events at Poonah or retire into a hill-fort, as if for protection from the insurgents as suited his convenience. In the meantime he would increase his army under the pretence of assisting us, and would be ready to take advantage of every turn of affairs that might occur. If we were unsuccessful in the war abroad, His Highness would throw off the mask and join our enemies; or if, as is more probable, we were victorious he would be the most clamorous of the allies for his share of the conquests. But what he probably contemplates more than either of those cases is, that we should be harassed and cramped in our greater designs by the operations of his insurgents, and should at length give in to his proposal for coming to terms with Trimbuckjee under his guarantee.

It would therefore be necessary, in the event of war abroad, to leave such a force here as would be sufficient to undertake sieges and carry on operations among the Ghauts, and at the same time to push down Horse and to overawe the Paishwa. If we were not able to accomplish this the Paishwa's country would soon be a scene of confusion, which before long would extend to that of the Nizam.

If we cannot spare a sufficient force for this purpose or if the plan be thought at best to be insecure, it will be necessary for our own safety to deprive the Paishwa of the means of injuring us. This is not to be accomplished by any half measures. It is never politic to leave the power of doing harm in the hands of an irritated enemy, and in the present case the peculiar rancour of the Paishwa's enmities, and his great talent for intrigue, would render him particularly dangerous in the event of an ineffectual attempt to restrain him.

The first method that suggests itself is, to transfer the powers of the state to a Minister as at Hyderabad, and leave the Paishwa nominally in possession of all the independence which he now enjoys, but this is impracticable with Bajee Row. The indolence of the Nizam's character made him almost a page before our support of his Minister compelled him to become entirely so, and our power was rather exerted to retain the authority of the state in the hands in which we found it, than to transfer it to others. But at Poonah there is no man about the Government to whom this sort of ministry could be offered Seddasheo Maunkaisure is the only person at all suited to it, and he has not sufficient courage or abilities. He would probably refuse the office from the fear so generally entertained of sooner or later falling a victim to the Paishwa's machinations, and wherever he accepted it, it would be so obnoxious to the Paishwa that we should be obliged to carry all his measures by mere intimidation, nor would it be possible to deter the Paishwa from carrying on the most active intrigues both against us and his Minister. It is a peculiar trait in His Highness's character that he is extremely bold as long as he thinks that he is concealed, and it was during a time when his life was in Scindeeah's hands that he carried underhand conspiracies that threw that Prince's whole army into confusion, and ended in obliging him to retire to Hindoostan.

It would be impossible therefore to govern in the Paishwa's name without reducing him to the condition of a pensioner like the Rajah of Sattarah. If this were once done it would perhaps be best to set up one of his brothers as Minister. This would be conformable to the practice of the Government of Poona, and would show the Mahrattas that we had no design to deprive the reigning family of its rights. It would however be a complicated system. Amrut Row could not be appointed to the prejudice of Chimnajee Appa, and the latter Prince from his inexperience, would probably exercise his delegated power through the means of a subordinate Minister, and he might himself be as difficult to manage as his brother. There was a plan, once thought of by the Marattas themselves to confer the nominal viceregency on Chimnajee and the real administration on Amrut Row, but this could produce only discord and weakness and would probably end in one party coalescing with Bajee Row.

These plans, though our right to execute them would be founded on the Paishwa having placed himself in the relation

of an enemy to the British Government, would yet have the appearance of regulating His Highness's Government rather than of reducing his power, or punishing his breach of faith, but the same principle should fully justify us in treating His Highness as an open enemy, in which case we might either restrain him by a new treaty, and weaken him by cessions, or entirely remove him from the Government. On the first plan we might increase the Subsidiary force, and place His Highness's whole army under British Officers, providing largely for the pay of it independent of His Highness's will; or take the money requisite to pay the army, maintain it in our own name, and bind up His Highness not to keep more than a fixed number of troops in his service, (say 2000 troops besides garrisons). We might also compel him distinctly to renounce all connection with the other Marattas, to engage to keep no Vakeels, and to communicate with no foreign states except through our Ministers. We might also insist on a right of advising him in his internal administration; or we might require cessions in addition to the above (or separately, or as the means of paying the troops), and then the Concan, which is a very strong country and which affords a communication with the sea and with European maritime powers, might be taken. Candesh also might be taken, which would cut the Paishwah off from all communication with Hindustan, or oblige him to give up part of the treasures which he is now employing against us, and which I believe are much more considerable than I before stated them. He might as a part of any of these plans, be required to cede Ahmednuggur, and to give up some of the forts he has been preparing as pledges for his good conduct, till such time as Your Excellency might think necessary. The effect of this on his mind might be good, but it would not be of much advantage to us to have a few forts to garrison while there were still so many to which His Highness might retreat.

On the other plan of removing the present Paishwa from the Musnud we should have our choice of several courses. We should be engaged in a just war with the Paishwa's Government, and if we could conquer his dominions we might bestow them on whomsoever, and with whatever conditions we chose. We might set up his brother, either unconditionally or with all, or some, of the cessions and restrictions mentioned in the last paragraph; or we might set up the Rajah of Sattara on terms similar to those on which the Rajah of Mysore holds his

country; or to conclude we might reduce the Paishwah's country to a province.

The best of these plans (and of all that I have been considering) would be to set up the Paishwa's brother on such conditions as Your Excellency might approve. This would keep up the old form of Government, afford employment to the public servants, civil and military, and would be as agreeable as the present state of affairs to the rest of the inhabitants of the country. To set up the Raja of Sattara would be nearly as offensive to the Brahmins as to take the country to ourselves. The class to whom it would be most acceptable is the Maratta subsidiary and the petty land proprietors who may (with some profanation of the term) be called Mahratta gentry, but a Rajah of Sattara to please them must be a robber like his ancestors. A Rajah who acted on English maxims would give little popularity to the administration though he would certainly be less obnoxious than an English Magistrate, with an Adowlut and an establishment of Police. The name of the Raja of Sattara is pleasing to the common Marattahs, and his Government under our superintendence would probably be even more popular with them than the direct Government of the British, which in other parts of India is the great object of the wishes of the peasantry. To all other classes the introduction of our Government would be more or less unwelcome. Even the Jageerdars, who are in constant danger of being swallowed up by the Paishwa, would dislike to be brought under a more vigorous Government, and if ever it were wished that they should join us, it would be necessary to offer them much more favourable terms than they now serve on, as they would expect that the service which they were bound to perform would be strictly exacted.

Whatever plan Your Excellency may determine on, it will be necessary to have the Subsidiary Force in this neighbourhood, to chastise the insurgents if you resolved to make another trial of the Paishwa, and to enforce your commands, if they should be of a character more likely to meet with opposition. I have accordingly requested Colonel Smith to recall his detachments from the Ghauts (where from the advanced season they are no longer wanted), to leave one Brigade to the northward, where it will keep the country quiet, and observe the preparations in Candeish, and to move the rest of the force by divisions, on Punderpore by the way of Ahmednuggur. I have mentioned this arrangement to the Durbar and it drew no particular remark.

I shall report the Paishwa's proceedings up to this time in another despatch, and I shall defer submitting to Your Excellency any plan for military operations that may be required, until I have consulted with Colonel Smith, who has kindly proposed to come to Poonah for the purpose, and who will probably arrive in the course of today or tomorrow. In the meantime, I shall only mention the outline of each subject. While the Peshwa on the one hand professes his readiness to assist us in crushing the insurrection, and is certainly preparing a Vakeel to go to Calcutta, on the other, he still denies the existence of any preparations by Trimbuckjee. He is preparing his forts, and raising troops with the greatest possible haste, and is sending his treasure, his jewels, and even his wardrobe out of Poonah, and when called on to explain his proceedings, he gives vague answers with great apparent indifference as to the way in which they will be received. In the meantime the insurgents have retired further into the hills, and are more scattered than formerly, but are still recruiting with the same assiduity as before. On the whole if the Paishwa were a bolder man, I should think he meant to go to war; as it is, I am at a loss to account for his conduct, unless on the improbable supposition that he is weak enough to expect to intimidate the British Government, and to force it to come to some terms with Trimbuckjee. The supposition of alarm for his own safety does not now as formerly apply, for no step has yet been taken to threaten His Highness and his preparations have been going on for upwards of a fortnight. It is a characteristic of all His Highness's proceedings on this occasion that they are entirely unprovoked and uncalled for by any step whatever on the part of the British Government.

With respect to my own proceedings, if the Paishwa does not push matters to extremities, I shall go on the plan of keeping everything open for Your Excellency's decision. I shall endeavour to seize a number of the ringleaders of the intended insurrection, because their punishment will be absolutely necessary to afford any prospect of future tranquillity, if Your Excellency should determine to overlook the Paishwa's conduct; but I shall not employ the force for this purpose at such a distance as to prevent its assembling, if required, when Your Lordship's orders are received. I shall not decline the Paishwa's assistance in seizing the insurgents, but shall tell him that Your Excellency will not look to any particular act of his, but to his general disposition which if favourable must soon lead to the capture of Trimbuckjee.

The voluntary surrender of that criminal by the Paishwa would even now restore things to their former footing. It would show that His Highness was determined to rely entirely on Your Excellency's generosity, and it would place a hostage in our hands for His Highness's good behaviour during the war; for if Trimbuckjee were once in our hands, we might hold out hope of his being made over to His Highness after the settlement of the Pindarries, if His Highness conducted himself to our satisfaction in the interim. To give the least hint of such concession at present would be ruinous as well as disgraceful, as it would only lead the Paishwa and all other powers to suppose that it was easy to extort from the British Government by force what it was impossible to obtain by entreaty.

Even if His Highness were of his own accord to act decidedly against the insurgents, to cut up some bodies of them and point out others to our troops, to issue orders for their apprehension, and to put some of the Chiefs to death, or if he were to expel Trimbuckjee from his territories, I think we might still venture to trust him, because it would seem that he had changed his policy, and because he would find it difficult to get anybody to embark with him in his secret hostilities again. But it is necessary to this effect that his exertions should be voluntary. If they are undertaken at our instance they only show that His Highness is not yet prepared to break with us, that he wishes to hush up this ill-timed insurrection, and to wait until we are engaged beyond the Nerbudda before he breaks out again. It is indeed no easy matter to account for His Highness's commencing operations at this season, unless it is to be attributed to Trimbuckjee's impatience, or unless His Highness knowing of our negotiations with Sindiah is anxious to encourage that Prince to resist us by the prospect of a diversion in the Deccan. He cannot have been drawn in by the hope of escaping observation, as I so often warned him that he would be held responsible for any movement of Trimbuckjee. It is therefore, apparent, that His Highness will adopt neither of the courses which I have mentioned as still affording him the means of preserving the alliance unimpaired, and it will remain with Your Excellency's wisdom to determine the means of securing your Government from the danger of a breach of it.

No. 31—The Resident seeks orders for conducting operations against Trimbakji and even against the Peshwa if the latter would support him; he explains the plan of military action.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona. 25 March 1817.

My Lord,

Having now had the advantage of Colonel Smith's sentiments on the course to be pursued in the present state of affairs, I do myself the honour to submit to Your Excellency the opinions in which we have concurred.

The first object is to disperse the banditti that are forming under Trimbuckjee, to endeavour to seize or destroy that criminal, and to pursue him and his adherents, as far as may be practicable without interfering with a state of preparation for the execution of Your Excellency's ulterior views. To carry this design into effect, Colonel Smith proposes to form a light force under his personal command in the immediate neighbourhood of Natta Pootta, consisting of the Horse Artillery, two Regiments of Light Cavalry, the light and rifle Companies of H. M.'s 65th Regiment, and the light Battalion. This detachment will be formed in the first week in April and Colonel Smith will immediately enter the hills near the temple of Mahadeo, with the light Infantry, employing the cavalry in the plains on each side of the range. The greater part of the Paishwa's Brigade will also arrive in the neighbourhood of the Salpy Ghaut in the beginning of April, and the light Companies will enter the hills at the same time with Colonel Smith, while the remainder with the guns, will join the main body of the Subsidiary Force consisting of the foot artillery, with the battering guns, H. M.'s 65th Regiment, and the Battalions of Native Infantry, which will arrive in the neighbourhood of Phultun about the 10th of April and will remain in the vicinity until required elsewhere. One hundred Europeans, and two Battalions of Native Infantry, with two six Pounders, will be left between the Paira(Nira) and the Godavery, to check any operations of the banditti in that quarter, and to observe the movements of the freebooters that are collecting in Candeish. I shall take it upon me to detain for the present the 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, which ought to march on the 28th when the 1st Battalion of the 7th Regiment is expected to relieve it. This will leave four Battalions at Poona which, in all circumstances must be a point of the utmost importance. If Trimbuckjee should take to the open country he will be pursued by the

cavalry, assisted, if he goes towards the Nizam's country by the detachment under Major Macdowall. If, which I am afraid is more probable, he should disperse his horse or detach them from his own person and retire to the southward of the Kishna, to the western Ghauts or the Conkan, Colonel Smith will pursue him as far as is practicable without drawing him to too great a distance from Poona, but if he should be sheltered in any strong place or if he should take shelter in Sawant Warree, or any other remote and strong country, he must be left unmolested until Your Excellency's resolutions shall be known.

If Your Excellency should be determined to leave the Paishwa untouched, Colonel Smith will continue his pursuit of Trimbuckjee, besiege any fort that may shelter him, and if the season admits, follow him into Sawant Warree, and compel any chief with whom he may take refuge to expel him or give him up. By these means all traces of the insurrection above the Ghauts will be at an end before the return of the season for operations against the Pindarries, and if there be any remains of it in the Concan they will probably take no great time and no considerable force to extinguish. The troops destined to watch the Paishwa will then be left at Poona, and the rest of the force will proceed to take its part in the operations to the northward. The whole will probably be disposable for that purpose by the end of the year, and the cavalry and a great part of the Infantry by the month of November.

If Your Excellency should direct any demands to be made on the Paishwa which it would require troops to enforce, or if His Highness were of himself to commence hostilities before your orders were received, the Battalions at Poona, reinforced by a small body of Europeans, would be sufficient to take possession of the capital. One Regiment of Cavalry may also be left with the troops at Phultun to endeavour to prevent the Paishwa's escape; but if His Highness should retire to one of his forts, the whole force might follow and lay siege to it, with the exception of such troops as might be required to check any force he might leave in the open country. The reduction of Trimbuckjee, Appa Dessye, or any other insurgents would then become quite secondary to the final settlement with the Paishwa. If the fort His Highness retired to were above the Ghauts the siege could be carried on until the place fell, but if he fled into the Concan it would depend on the time of the year and on other circumstances, whether it would be best to lay siege to his place of refuge, to blockade it for the rainy season, or to leave it, and settle the country above the Ghats. If our means would at all

admit of it, it would be of infinite importance to continue the siege or blockade, and at the same time to settle the open country, and set up the Government Your Excellency might have resolved to establish.

It is obvious that in a case of this nature, the proportion of our force to the obstacles opposed to us would determine the conduct of the inhabitants of the country, and decide the question between an easy arrangement and a protracted struggle. The Subsidiary Force, though ample to crush any army that could be brought to meet it in the field, is obviously not sufficient to introduce a new Government into all parts of the country at once, especially if the deposed sovereign should still remain at liberty and in arms. Means must therefore be taken to support Colonel Smith from other quarters. The Resident at Hyderabad will undoubtedly afford all the assistance that can be given by the Subsidiary Force or by the Nizam's troops, and this means might be adequate to the settlement of the Paishwa's country north of the Godavery. The full employment of the whole Bombay Force would deprive that Government of the power of assisting our operations above the Ghauts, but it would be on the Government of Madras that we should depend for the most extensive and most efficacious co-operation. A body of troops advanced from the ceded districts the moment Your Excellency's course was determined, would probably be able to settle the whole of the country south of the Kisnah, and to render the whole Subsidiary Force disposable for the Pindarree war at the opening of the season. If our operations are to be confined to the pursuit of Trimbuckjee, these troops might take up the service in the Concan or in Warree after the rains, and might afterwards form the corps intended to keep the Paishwa in check during our operations abroad. In the event of war with the Paishwa these same troops might still undertake the service that might remain below the Ghauts, and might assist in preserving the tranquillity of the country and the authority of the new Government. It is greatly to be wished that the services of these troops may be easily obtained, as, supposing Your Excellency's orders to be received by return of post, only one month of this valuable season will remain for active operations. In the meantime I shall submit these suggestions to the Right Hon'ble the Governor of Madras, and shall recommend the immediate dispatch of the Light Battalions and a Battalion of the line with one Company of Artillery to join Colonel Smith.

In the event of a war with the Paishwa it would be of great consequence to secure the freedom of the Rajah of Sattara, and

still more of Chimnaje Appa. If the Paishwa withdrew to a hill fort, he would probably compel those princes to accompany his flight, but even if he sent them to different places of confinement, our first object would be to seize his person and that once done, it would be easier to obtain the release of the others.

In any circumstances that I can contemplate except the quiet establishment of a new Government, it will be necessary to have a regiment of Cavalry, and four Battalions of Native Infantry with some Europeans at Poona, besides the Battalions employed on the communications, and the detachment generally reckoned on for protecting the Nizam's and Paishwa's countries during foreign wars.

No 32—The Resident requests the Bombay Government to order their regiments to co-operate with the Subsidiary Force in quelling the rebellion of Trimbakji, and overawing the Peshwa's Capital, Poona.

From—M ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN

Poona, 25 March 1817.

Sir,

My despatch of the 11th instant will have made the Right Hon'ble the Governor acquainted with the commencement of the insurrection under Trimbuckjee Dainglia. Since that time the preparations of the insurgents have continued unopposed by the Peshwa, and His Highness himself has begun to raise troops, to garrison and provision his forts, and to send his treasures, his jewels and even his wardrobe away from Poona.

In this aspect of affairs, it becomes of the utmost importance to crush the insurrection, and at the same time to be prepared to watch the Paishwa; and to act against any chiefs of the country who may join Trimbuckjee by His Highness's instructions. I have therefore requested Colonel Smith to move with a light detachment immediately to the Mahadeo Hills and to disperse and to pursue the insurgents, while the rest of the force with certain exceptions will move by Ahmudnuggur to Phultun near Mahadeo and about 50 miles S. E. of this place. Two Battalions with one hundred Europeans, and two guns remain near the Godavery to keep that part of the country quiet, and to observe the bodies of

Horse and other banditti that are assembling in Candeish, and one Battalion is left as usual to protect Seroor, Ahmudnuggur, Toka and other places on our usual line of communication.

The most important of our objects, must at all times be to overawe the Capital, and to possess the means of occupying it if hostilities should break out. I am therefore anxious, if the Right Hon'ble the Governor can permit it, to retain for the present the services of the 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment which is soon to be relieved by the 1st Battalion 7th Regiment. I hope that circumstances may not render this arrangement inconvenient, and I intend at all events to detain the corps until I am honoured with a communication of the sentiments of the Right Hon'ble the Governor.

No. 33—The rebellion of Trimbakji and the Peshwa's exasperation at the method of quelling it are detailed in this communication in which personal recrimination between the Peshwa and the Resident is much in evidence.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 26 March 1817.

My' Lord,

On the 11th of this month the Paishwa ordered guards to be placed over the family of Trimbuckjee Dainglia and ordered five of his principal adherents to be taken into custody. They have since lived in Trimbuckjee's house under a guard but subject to no great restraint and not prevented receiving visits from their friends. Their imprisonment has no other effect than that of showing the people that His Highness does not openly take part with the insurgents. It does not affect the general belief that His Highness is the real instigator of the disturbance, in which belief all descriptions of people are agreed.

About the time when this measure was adopted there was a report that the insurgents had dispersed and my own news-writers and Hircarrahs stated them to have in a great measure withdrawn from the tract they had hitherto occupied to the north of the hills of Mahadeo. Further information discovered that they had only retired across the Mahadeo Hills thirty or forty miles to the south of their former position, that they had not dispersed, but on the contrary continued to recruit with

great vigour. Besides their immediate neighbourhood great preparations went on in Candéish. A considerable body of troops is said to have been raised in Balla Ghaut, north of Tooljapoor, and in Sholapur, south-west of that and a large body was given out as expected from Hindoostan where Waghojee, Trimbuckjee's father-in-law who assisted him in his flight, was said to have gone to raise them. I should transmit detailed accounts of these proceedings to Mr. Adam. They would be useless if it were not for the strange course the Paishwa has chosen of denying the existence of the insurrection.

About the same time with the imprisonment of Trimbuckjee's dependants His Highness the Paishwa began to recruit with the utmost eagerness, redoubled his exertions to prepare his principal forts for a siege and dispatched his treasures and other property to one or other of those fortresses. He even sent his wardrobe to some fort and to save the trouble of transmitting the less valuable part of that establishment, he is openly asserted to have compelled the shopkeepers of Poona to purchase a quantity of clothes at a certain valuation and to have burned down others for the sake of the gold and silver they contained.

It was also current in the city that His Highness intended to have fled from Poona about the 13th of the month. If this be true, it shows that His Highness was entering on some line of action which he was conscious would bring him in danger; for there was no movement on the part of the British troops and nothing in my language to lead to any particular alarm. I am, however, doubtful whether this report and some others of the same nature may not have been circulated by the Durbar with a view to persuading me that His Highness is on the point of a rupture. There certainly prevails among those about His Highness a strong opinion that the British Government will submit to anything rather than proceed to extremities with the Paishwah. This dangerous delusion it has always been a great object with me to remove, but there are not wanting advisers about His Highness to instigate him to hold out, and to remind him of the impunity of Holcar and the Rajah of Barpore and especially of Scindia after his attack on Mr. Jenkins. The counsellors allow none of our political mistakes, however old, to be forgotten and reason from them that the true way to carry a point with us is to meet us with a resolute opposition.

The forts which His Highness is most anxious about preparing and to which he sends treasure are Ryeghur (near Mhar in the Concan) Wussoota (S. W. of Satara) Seemghur (about 12 miles south of Poona), Poorunder (about 30 miles S.E.), Paundooghur near Wye (about 80 miles south), Coowarree (a little to the south of the Bore Ghaut) and Trimbuck near Nassick. The principal persons employed in recruiting are the following—and the proportions assigned to each are as follows:—Gokla 5,000; Abba Porrunderre, the Vichoorkur and Rastia 500 each, and Appajee Seola 2000 foot to which some guns are to be attached. Chintamun Row's troops that were employed to the southward in taking charge of the country resumed from Appa Dessye, have been recalled to Poona. The Paishwa appears desirous of conciliating the latter Chief and has summoned him also with his contingent to Poona. His Highness spares no pains in conciliating all his chiefs and has even shown a desire to gain the goodwill of the Bhow Mahrauj, the Vakeel from Colapore. This may be meant to obtain the support of the personages to whom his attentions are directed, as well as to shake our confidence in those attached to us; but he certainly does not think that any dependence is to be placed on the Jageerdars in the event of a quarrel with the British Government. His principal reliance appears to be on Gokla and that Chief has lately given signs of disapprobation at the proceedings of the British Government and even expressed through his Vakeel to one of my principal native servants an affected apprehension that we might demand his imprisonment. But though this language is at variance with the attachment which he always professes towards the British Government, I have taken no notice of it, nor shewn the least distrust of Gokla. Whatever language that Chief may hold out to His Highness the Paishwa, he cannot forget that he owes his rise to the British Government, nor be insensible to the means which we possess of immediately occasioning his ruin in the event of a rupture with this state.

My negotiations with the Paishwa during the period embraced by this letter have not much varied from the tone I at first adopted. At the time when Trimbuckjee's adherents were confined, His Highness offered to send troops against the insurgents, which he said would be an indubitable proof of his good intentions and declared that if I did not consent to their going, I must take the continuance of the rebellion on my own head. I replied that I could not agree to this reasoning, that His Highness might send troops if he chose,

but that he must not consider that step as satisfying my demands. If His Highness was sincere, his officers would act against the insurgents, in whatever parts of the country they were dispersed; if they were too weak to attack any considerable bodies they would send distinct intelligence to that effect and apply for aid: the result would be the dispersion of the rebels and probably the seizure of Trimbuckjee, and I could not take it upon me to say that anything short of this sincere co-operation would satisfy Your Excellency or convince you that you might hereafter depend on His Highness's fidelity. On that His Highness ordered Major Ford to prepare his Battalions to move out and promised to give him authority to punish the rebels and all officers that might fail to co-operate in putting them down. He also promised to issue proclamations against the rebels. In this arrangement I at length acquiesced, announcing that I should also take measures against the insurgents with the Subsidiary Force, but I cautioned the Paishwa that things could never be restored to their former footing unless His Highness gave up Trimbuckjee. I however authorized Major Ford to say on his own part in explanation of my message that if His Highness failed in seizing him after exerting himself, the British Government would look to his exertions if undoubted, more than to his success. This I thought the farthest I could go, without receding from my original language, to encourage the Paishwa to join with us even now in putting down Trimbuckjee and recurring to habits of friendship.

At this time His Highness professed to have determined to send Annabah Rahtikur as his Vakeel to Calcutta and there was a great deal said about his immediate departure. When this intention was announced to me I remarked that His Highness had now thought of the real means of removing all his difficulties and obtaining all his wishes, which was to throw himself on Your Excellency's generosity, but that before he could reap the fruit of this measure, he must show a more friendly disposition than he did now. If the Vakeel's object was to make any terms about Trimbuckjee while he remained at large, he would assuredly fail and I should not be surprised if Your Excellency refused to see him as long as that fugitive was harboured by His Highness.

About the 20th just after the Paishwa's preparations had become very notorious, I addressed His Highness on the subject of them and pointed out their inconsistency with

His Highness wishing to keep on friendly terms with the British Government. Moro Dikshit answered this without consulting His Highness that the forts were put in order for fear Trimbeckjee might surprise any of them and that the army was recruiting in consequence of the Paishwah's having at length acceded to my frequent admonitions in favour of his maintaining an efficient body of troops. I took no notice of the air of irony which this message assumed, but answered that this explanation was quite unsatisfactory—that I wished His Highness would consider before he took steps that would make an indelible impression on the Governor General's mind against him; but that he must be guided by his own judgment, and his friends would regret when they saw him adopting measures which he would never be able to retrieve. This brought promises of discontinuing all military preparations, but as no alteration appeared in the Paishwa's conduct, I renewed my remonstrances on the 23rd and declared that while His Highness shewed such a disposition to have recourse to arms, I should perhaps do well not to trouble him with negotiations, but that I could not prevail on myself to allow him to run so desperate a course without warning him of his danger. On the 24th His Highness renewed a request he had often made that his troops might be allowed to act against the rebels instead of ours, and his Ministers proposed, as terms on which an accommodation might be effected, that he should promise not to allow Trimbeckjee to remain in his Dominions and never to assist him in any shape. It was of course understood that nothing more was to be said about the present disturbances. His Highness indeed is far from admitting the existence of any disturbance, for to this day he strenuously denies that there has been any assemblage of troops or other preparations for insurrection in his territories. My answer to this proposal was in the strain of my former communication and was as ineffectual as the rest.

Yesterday, however, Major Ford brought me certain propositions from Moro Dikshit and Chimnaje Narraen which they proposed, if I agreed to them, to lay before the Paishwah. They were that all military preparations should be effectually discontinued and things restored to their former footing in that respect and that Chimnaje Narraen should go out at the head of a party either to co-operate with Colonel Smith or to act, without moving our force, against the insurgents. They offered that an agent of mine should accompany Chimnaje and promised that I should hear from all quarters

the result of their exertion. I said the first proposal was of course acceptable to me, it was indeed necessary to preserve peace, but that I must beg explanations of the second, where Chimnaje was to go, whom he was to act against, what were his powers, and other points of that nature.

During all this time I have again and again entreated to be admitted to an audience of the Paishwah, but His Highness has uniformly declined to see me. On one occasion His Highness having taken as a ground of objection his reluctance to give publicity to our disagreement, Major Ford very properly offered that I should attend him alone and in the most private manner, but this made no alteration in His Highness's resolutions

On the 21st I received a message from His Highness the Paishwah through Praubaukhur Pundit which I avoided introducing at the date of it, that I might give it at more length. His Highness began with reminding me of his long friendship for the British Government and the proofs he had given of it, of the sacrifice he made in surrendering Trimbuckjee and of the disgrace he suffered in allowing him to remain in confinement, a conduct so little befitting a Prince whose ancestors had carried their arms to the Indus. He then adverted to his innocence of Trimbuckjee's escape and to the readiness with which he took all requisite measures against the fugitive, and then remonstrated in animated terms on the constant unjust imputations which I cast on him; said he knew that his situation was destitute but for the support of the British Government, that he was conscious of our military superiority and most anxious to avoid a quarrel with us; he said "he was now so blinded by the sparks that I was always throwing out against him, that he went he knew not whither". He spoke of his forbearance with us in cases where we manifestly wronged him, as in his disputes with the Gykwar, with the Nizam & ca, and said his patience in bearing all this was a proof of his anxiety to preserve our friendship. I may here mention that the Paishwa's Ministers have frequently adopted this tone of accusation to Major Ford and in particular have loudly complained of the excesses always committed by our troops in His Highness's country, although as I have had occasion to report to Your Excellency, the troops composing this force are the most orderly I have ever had an opportunity of hearing of, and although the Paishwah knows the long and careful investigation ordered by the Government of Bombay

on the only serious complaint against our troops ever preferred by His Highness.

His Highness in the rest of his message adverted to the collection of banditti of which I so positively maintained the existence, said he had done all he could to discover if there were such a body by employing Gokla to search for them, that neither he nor I could go in person to ascertain the truth, and that I was bound to attend to his assertions as much as he was bound to hearken to mine. He then asked, if I was so sure that Trimbuckjee was collecting men, why did I not wait till they appeared in the field, when I could have been able to have convicted both Trimbuckjee and His Highness. What harm (he said) were the insurgents doing to me that I should be so impatient of their existence? As it was he said I had no evidence for what I asserted, and he called on me to prove him guilty of any participation in the alleged insurrection. He concluded by desiring me to weigh all that he had said and to determine which was best, friendship or disagreement.

I replied to this last question, first, I said there was no doubt friendship was best; that it was for His Highness's friendship that we had exerted ourselves for fourteen years to uphold his Government; it was for it, that Your Excellency passed over His Highness's hostile conduct in 1815 and were content with the surrender of Trimbuckjee alone; for that we bore with Trimbuckjee's escape and did not call on His Highness to discover him and give him up again though certainly, he was in His Highness's dominions; for that I addressed him even on the commencement of the insurrection in the same tone and language I should have held to the Governor General and that was no less my motive for plainly and directly placing His Highness's situation before his eyes when I found him

would be restrained from taking measures for its own defence by the want of such direct proof as would convict a prisoner in a court of Justice. I then adverted to the complaints which His Highness made of the imputations I cast on him: I said I trusted there was nothing in the manner of them to offend His Highness. If His Highness thought there was, he had only to get them from Major Ford and have them translated into Mahratta to remove the impression, that as to the matter, it was my duty to state it and I should no less injure His Highness than myself if I failed to perform it; that it was my great consolation in present circumstances that I had spoken out and laid the whole truth before His Highness from the beginning so that whatever His Highness did, he did with his eyes open. I said I should now say something stronger than I had ever before conveyed to His Highness and that I must trust to Prubaukur Pundit for putting it into such terms in Mahratta as might not give unnecessary offence. It was that His Highness by his present conduct and especially by his preparations appeared to have one of two objects, either to go to war or to intimidate the British Government; that in my deliberate opinion the first of these designs would be madness and that I wanted a word to explain what I thought of the second: that His Highness might depend on my sincerity in this declaration, and if he believed me acquainted with the policy and power of my own Government, he would follow my advice while it was yet time, but that if he thought any person about him knew them better, he was at liberty to follow theirs. On this occasion there was a good deal said about my meeting with the Paishwah which, he said, should take place some time and at which he wished Prubaukur Pundit to be present. I expressed my anxiety for the interview, but discouraged the proposal with which it was accompanied.

Colonel Smith with the light Detachment will have marched this morning from Ahmudnuggur according to the plan I submitted to Your Excellency and will reach the neighbourhood of the Mahdeo Hills on the 2nd April. The two Regiment of Light Cavalry must be there by this time. The Paishwa's Brigade is to march tomorrow and will reach a point farther west in the same range on the 2nd also. On the next day Col. Smith will commence probably his operations. Major Macdowall remains on the west of Tooljapoor to watch any party that may take the direction of the Nizam's territories the most probable course for horse. The main body of the force will

be at Ahmednuggur about the 3rd and at the position assigned to the north of the hills of Mahadeo by the 10th April. The detachment under Colonel Milnes will take up its position between the Nira and Godavery about the time when the rest of the force reaches Ahmednuggur. The 1st Battalion 7th Regiment Native Infantry arrived at this station today. I have detained the 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment which it was to have relieved, so that there are now four Battalions at Poona.

No. 34—The Resident reports Baji Rao's insidious methods for shaking off the British control. He reports talks and conferences in which the Peshwa fully discussed the situation with his ministers.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE EARL OF MOIRA, K. G.

Poona, 7 April 1817.

My Lord,

Since I last had the honour to address Your Lordship Trimbeckjee has gone on increasing his force as usual. He has persons scattered through the villages for a considerable extent of country, recruiting for him, but finds some difficulty in raising men. Some refuse to join him, unless he will shew a warrant from the Paishwa in whose name he recruits; while others join him with less difficulty, but desert whenever there is any report of an attack. Trimbeckjee himself remains separate from the troops and often changes his ground. He is now stated to have retired across the Krishna towards Darwar, but the fact is uncertain. His troops are now chiefly in the district of Jut, between Punderpore and Beejapore. Troops still continue to be raised in Candeish.

There are constant reports of communications between His Highness the Paishwa and the rebels, but they are from their nature difficult to prove, and the following is the only instance in which the chain of evidence appears to be complete. It was mentioned on 24th of March by an intelligencer at Poona that the Paishwa had given 6 lacs of rupees to Gokla for Trimbeckjee's use; on the same day it was stated by a person who had good opportunities of knowing, that Gokla had furnished four persons with money to recruit for the rebels; three of these persons are stated, through many channels to have recruited accordingly and one of them, Bapoo Gykwar, can be distinctly traced through the whole of his progress. The person above alluded

to represented him to have received an order for 30,000 rupees as payable at Sanglee. The Post Office writer at Sanglee reports Roodrojee Gykwar to have arrived there with a Bill for 25,000 rupees for the purpose of raising men. The Post Office writer at Erroor also mentions that a large sum of money had been given by Gokla to Baupoo Gykwar to raise troops, and all accounts mention Baupoo Gykwar of Shetbal, or Roodrojee Gykwar of Shetbal, to be arming the most active of Trimbuckjee's partisans. It is probable the two names apply to the same man, for the Mharattas have always a familiar name besides their real name, and Baupoo is one of the commonest of the former description.

The clearest proofs of His Highness's participation with the insurgents are furnished by his constant denial of the existence of such a body, and by his own preparations which were made at a time when His Highness neither could have felt, nor indeed pretended to feel any alarm, that might have accounted for them on any supposition consistent with a consciousness of good intentions.

These preparations were continued without intermission until the 2nd instant, and gave rise to several messages and remonstrances on my part. On the 26th I pointed out to His Highness the imprudence of the course he was pursuing, and told him that if his preparations ever got to such a pitch as to threaten our security, the effect would be in the highest degree dangerous to him; that this state of things was creeping on, and would arrive before long even if His Highness should wish to retard it; that I begged him therefore to consider while it was yet time, and to determine on the course he meant to pursue. If he chose to go to war, his present measures were suited to his plan. but if he either intended to restore cordiality, or to wait Your Excellency's decision in a state of neutrality, he ought to stop his preparations. In answer to this message Moro Dixit promised a speedy reduction of the troops and pressed for my consent to the mission of Chimnaje Narayan with a force against the rebels; to this I agreed, but added that Your Excellency would look more to His Highness's conduct and to general results, than to the mere march of the troops in question. This passed on the 27th and on the same day, Prabakur Pundit came to me, and went over all the old professions offering on His Highness's part to take any oath that he had no connection with Trimbuckjee, that his army was increased for the defence of his dominions, especially against the Pindarries, that his forts were repaired to prevent their going to ruin, and that the local officers had made some arrangements about the garrisons, unknown to His Highness. His Highness, he said, wondered

that I should suspect him of any unfriendly intention, said he could furnish any troops required to act against the insurgents, and would even consent to our putting Trimbuckjee to death if he should fall into our hands. I need not detail my reply to this message, which went to show the inconsistency of His Highness's proceedings, with the interpretation he put on them, the folly of any attempt to intimidate the British Government, and the hopelessness of a real contest with it, the difficulty of retreating even now, and the wisdom of attempting to do so without more delay. On the 28th Prabhakur Pundit came again and proposed that the Paishwa should disband his new levies, and reduce his garrisons and that the matter should end there, to which I answered that his doing so would be wise, as averting immediate disagreement; but that the original suspicion regarding the insurrection would remain and I would recommend his removing it also by a sincere co-operation against them.

On the 29th Prabhakur Pundit came again and said that the Paishwa would make what reductions I chose, but before he make any he must have some definite answer about our intentions. That I had set on foot a story of an insurrection and that if the Governor General were to act on it, and to order me to move a force against him, he would be left defenceless if his troops were discharged. He must therefore know the nature of the Governor General's decision, before he took the measure. I replied that this was a distinct avowal that it was against us that his troops were raised, and that if His Highness determined on that mode of securing himself from the Governor General's decision, he was the best judge. That this entirely altered our relations. Prabhakur Pundit asked in the Paishwa's name, what he was to do if we came forward every hour with fresh attacks on him, and I told him that His Highness would do the British Government the justice to consider whether it began the attack on this occasion, or whether it had ever done so. I then desired him to repeat what I had said in the most respectful language to the Paishwa.

On the 30th Prabhakur Pundit acquainted me from the Paishwa, that His Highness was resolved to place his whole dependence on the British Government that he would reduce his troops, dismantle his forts, and act with vigour against the insurgents. That I should hear of this officially through Moro Dixit, and that the effect would soon be apparent. His Highness also promised to give me an audience in a day or two excusing himself for delaying to do so, on the ground of indisposition. On the same day Moro Dixit informed me through Major Ford,

that he had received orders to make the reductions above alluded to and to take the most decisive measures against the rebels. I expressed great satisfaction with this decision, and strongly advised His Highness to make a real exertion to disperse Trimbuckjee's banditti. Moro Dixit on this occasion sent me a copy of a proclamation which His Highness had issued against the insurgents and which I enclose to shew how completely illusory His Highness's arrangements were.

These messages must have been sent early on the 30th; yet during the whole of that day, the recruiting went on with more vigour than ever. There was a difficulty in procuring men but all who offered were taken. The Paishwah also desired his Chiefs to hold themselves in readiness. He hastened the preparations in his arsenal of which he has lately given the superintendance to Chintaman Row; and to crown the whole he ordered all his gun bullocks to be brought into Poona, as if he were on the eve of an action. On the 31st his recruiting continued, and he sent off a large quantity of treasure to Wassoota and to Trimbuck.

It was now quite apparent that His Highness did not intend to keep his word, but either hoped that I would recede in my demands, or actually entertained the design of proceeding to a rupture. I therefore determined to bring the question to a speedy decision and accordingly addressed to him the enclosed note, in which I informed him that I should put the British troops at Poona in a state of preparation; and should proceed to further measures if he continued his preparations; that if he suspended his preparations I should forbear any further measures until I received Your Lordship's orders, but that I should consider any attempt of His Highness to quit Poona as a clear indication of a design to go to war. After I had sent this note to the Paishwa I requested Lieutenant Colonel Leighton to put the Brigade in a state of complete preparation, and to send such a party as he thought requisite to the Residency, thus placing things on the footing on which they were during the discussions about the surrender of Trimbuckjee.

Whatever were His Highness's intentions, this step seems to have had an immediate effect on him. He sent for Major Ford on the 2nd and told him with evident mark of alarm, that he was most desirous of returning to the old footing of friendship with the English; and that he referred him to his Ministers for the requisite arrangements. Major Ford was now joined by Waumun Row Aphy and three others of His Highness's principal advisers besides the Ministers. They proceeded to deliberate on the best measures to be pursued, that the new

usual arguments to show that it was the Paishwa's interest to adhere to the alliance and to act against Trimbuckjee, from which it was to be inferred that he would do so and he had done so.

When he had concluded his speech which lasted near an hour, I took the opportunity of viewing the proceedings of the British Government with regard to the Paishwa. I said that amidst the professions of satisfaction and gratitude which His Highness for years used to dwell on there were four grounds of complaint (and only four) to which he used from time to time to advert. These were the state of the Southern Jageerdars, the non-adjustment of his discussions with the Nizam, the neglected condition of his possessions in Hindoostan, and the delay in settling his claims on the Guykwar. The first of these affairs was adjusted in a manner which even His Highness (though it did not satisfy his desire for increase of territory) could not deny to be effectual. The Jageerdars were now at his disposal ready to serve against the British Government itself if required. The British Government had carried into effect every measure that depended on it or on the Nizam for the settlement of the second affair; the delay in it was entirely and avowedly owing to His Highness the Paishwah. The settlement in Hindoostan was of a complicated nature and depended on negotiations with foreign states; but His Highness was well aware that it had never been forgotten, nor neglected. In the affair of the Guykwar a Vakeel was first sent from Baroda to Poona at the instance of the British Government and when it was found he made no progress, the Prime Minister of the Guykwar State was deputed with full powers to effect adjustment. This Minister continued his negotiations, notwithstanding provocations on the Paishwa's part that would have justified breaking off all terms with him, and at length agreed to procure for the Paishwah a territory yielding seven lacs of rupees annual revenue; a cession very far exceeding that which on a full examination of the Paishwa's claims, I had since thought it reasonable to offer to him. The Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay had promised to procure the Guykwar's consent to this arrangement, and there can be no doubt it would have been carried, but for the murder of the Shastery. It was needless to recapitulate the circumstances that followed that dark transaction; it was enough to say, that in spite of His Highness's attempt to stifle inquiry and afterwards to protect the murderer by open force, the British Government was content with a surrender of a single

criminal and was even induced to spare his life at the entreaties of the Paishwah: the same entreaties procured such a relaxation of his confinement as led to his escape, and this stage of the history ended with the return of Trimbuckjee to His Highness's territories.

From this time His Highness acknowledged no intelligence of him until his arrival at Alundee when His Highness gave me notice that he was there, and sent a party to seize him soon after he had quitted the village. At this place eleven miles from the Capital, His Highness lost sight of him, but public report continued to trace him through various villages in the neighbourhood of Phoolshehr, until he was lodged in the hills of Mahadeo. His assemblage of Ramoosces there soon became notorious, but after having repeatedly warned His Highness of the consequences of harbouring Trimbuckjee I thought myself at liberty to observe in silence the course he would pursue of his own impulse, and at the same time to secure myself by careful enquiries against the chance of having the truth of my information denied by the Durbar. When at length I did mention it, I was surprised at His Highness's flat denial of a matter of such complete notoriety, and still more at the result of His Highness's sending troops to disperse the insurgents. I, however, continued to make the requisite representation to His Highness, but I only held out to His Highness the remote ill consequences of his conduct. I made no peremptory demand on him, and in particular I had not moved a single soldier from the Ghauts, when His Highness began to put his forts in a state of preparation, with the eagerness of a person already engaged in war, and soon after to recruit his army with equal assiduity. This arming from the circumstances I have stated, could only be intended to cooperate with Trimbuckjee, or to resist the British Government, if it should insist on His Highness's taking part against him. either of which proceedings was a flagrant breach of the alliance. I nevertheless continued my remonstrances which were at first received with marked indifference, but which at length led His Highness to promise in the most solemn terms that he would discontinue his preparations, and restore his forts and army to their former state. This promise was no sooner made than it was broken in the most decided and most public manner; on which, after allowing two days for the full disclosure of the Peshwah's intentions, I made preparations corresponding to those of the Paishwah and pointed out the only terms on which I could remain quiet even until the arrival of the

Governor General's orders. These terms appeared to have been complied with, and if they continued to be acted on, I should wait His Excellency's orders, but without doing anything that should in the smallest degree limit his decision. That I could not accept of His Highness's assistance as any satisfaction for his conduct, the experience of two months and particularly the affairs of Allundee and Natta Poota, having shown me what assistance I was to expect from him; that I felt as strongly as the Bhow, that it was the Paishwa's true interest to join with the British Government against Trimbuckjee, and that I joined with the whole country in my astonishment at the motives that could lead His Highness to renounce our alliance for the sake of a convicted murderer.

The Minister answered me by repeated protestations of the Paishwa's ignorance that Trimbuckjee was in his territories and of the alacrity with which he would have seized him if he had known where he was to be found. He endeavoured to throw the blame of the inactivity of the Paishwah's troops at Natta Poota on their Commander and to make it appear that all the time when I was accusing His Highness of inactivity, His Highness was full of anxiety for the discovery and punishment of Trimbuckjee and his gang. He said His Highness's levies of troops were totally unconnected with the discussion then pending with me, that they were usual with His Highness and were designed in a particular measure against the Pindaries; that the forts were put into a state of repair because they were tumbling down and also because several of them had been so easily carried by the insurgents last year, that the addition to the garrisons were made by the subordinate officers in consequence of some new arrangements about the lands allotted for the support of forts; that at all events we might be sure that no preparations could be intended against us, and might rely on the experience of 14 years and on the Paishwa's obvious interest. At the time that he gave explanations of the Paishwa's preparations, he did not desist from denying their existence and more than once told me in plain terms that common rumour however general and lasting was not to be relied on and that he thought I was too hasty in believing what was said against His Highness. I defended myself from this charge by saying that I did not bring forward a hundredth part of what I heard, that I had confined myself throughout to one point of perfect publicity; that there were banditti in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo; and that I had never attacked His Highness for receiving visits from Trimbuckjee.

or supplying him with money, or for carrying on clandestine negotiations with foreign states, although I had often heard those things alleged. That with regard to the troops and forts, it was impossible that so many causes should concur to produce such effects, even if the complexion of the terms had not been sufficient to have induced His Highness (supposing him well disposed), to restrain their operation; that neither the fear of the Pindarries (after the season was over), nor the dilapidation of the forts, nor the sudden change of system that occurred at once to so many subordinate officers, would occasion His Highness's sending away his treasures, his jewels, and even his clothes, to a hill fort; and that the attempt to account for his proceedings on such weak grounds, only showed how averse he was to acknowledge the real ones.

The Minister next said that the preparations however made, should now be discontinued, that His Highness was sincere in his professions of attachment, and that we might at once revert to the old state of things which had continued so happily for so many years. To this I replied that such a return to our old relations was absolutely out of the question even if the Paishwah wished it; that I had no orders applicable to the present state of affairs; that I therefore could not make war unless justified by the approach of danger, and as little could I agree to any adjustment until I received fresh instructions from Your Excellency; that moreover I saw no signs of the disposition he had attributed to the Paishwa. His Highness seemed willing to suspend our operations for a time, but he kept up all his preparations, he continued to afford to Trimbuckjee the full and free use of his country as much as at any former period; of what use was it for his Highness to propose sending troops against the rebels, when his local officers, who must know his sentiments, allowed recruits to be raised, money to be transported from place to place, and provisions to be furnished, not only without opposition, but without violating the secrecy which it was the interest of the insurgents to preserve, and while every person connected with His Highness's Government continued to maintain that there was no insurrection in direct opposition to every other man in the country. In short although His Highness might avoid an immediate rupture with us, and might disband a few troops whom it would not take a week to reassemble, though he might make the strongest professions of his devotion to our cause, yet he showed not the smallest intention to take any step that would even place him in the situation of a neutral between us and the insurgents but seemed resolved to afford

them all the assistance he could without being compelled to embark his whole fortune in their cause.

The Minister then admitted that I could not restore things to their old footing of my own authority, but said he, "We will henceforth do as you have recommended in everything, and shall rely on receiving a favourable answer from Lord Moira." To this I said I could give no ground for such reliance, and that if His Highness understood me to mean so, I was happy to be able to explain myself before he had taken any one step under that impression. The Minister said he certainly understood me to mean that if the Paishwah took the road I pointed out, it would obtain for him a mitigation of Your Excellency's decision. This was flatly contradicted by Moro Dikshit, who said my meaning was quite obvious, and had been perfectly understood. After some altercation between the Ministers, and their examining the papers in question (that dated April 3rd), I explained myself in clear terms to mean nothing but a suspension of hostilities until Your Excellency's order should arrive. With regard to the course I had advised, I made use of several illustrations to show them clearly the extent of my meaning, and to impress on them that although I had pointed out the only way by which any modification of Your Excellency's decision could possibly be obtained, yet I neither gave them any hopes that it would be so obtained, nor by any means insisted on their adopting my suggestions, if they preferred any other course hostile or friendly.

I have no doubt that this is fully understood by all parties, for Moro Dikshit on another occasion asked Major Ford in plain terms whether we would not even promise to forbear from any attack on His Highness's person, to which Major Ford gave no reply.

Before we parted the Minister wished me to fix a day for another meeting, which I declined, observing that I had now said all I was authorized to say; that I would observe my promise of taking no hostile measure till I received orders and that all the rest lay between the Paishwah and Your Lordship. The Minister said I might point out to His Highness what I wished him to do, but I said I could not make any demand when I had no advantage to offer in return and that in present circumstances I would rather decline giving any advice. The Minister has since sent to beg I would visit him again, which I declined on the same ground as before. As I cannot give the Paishwah any hopes, and as my uncertainty regarding Your Lordship's decision makes me unwilling to make him desperate, I am desirous of avoiding as much as possible all communication either with His Highness or his Ministers.

Through all these conferences, Your Lordship will observe that His Highness's Ministers are so sensible that no insurrection like the present could exist in His Highness's country except with his concurrence, that they have no way to maintain his innocence but by denying its existence altogether, and that they are so far from pretending any ground for hostilities, that they endeavour to explain away their preparations. That this is not the mere effect of fear is apparent from their uncalled for complaints of our conduct in the affairs of the Nizam and the Guicawar, and from the menacing attitude His Highness has more than once assumed.

His Highness appears now to be thoroughly alarmed. He has placed pickets all round Poona on pretence of preventing any troops who desire to enlist from entering the city, and he has placed additional guards over his own palace and over that where his brother resides. This last precaution was taken as early as the 28th. Similar precautions are reported to have been taken at Sattara. The Paishwa appears willing to try the effect of conciliation with his brother. He visited him lately, and appeared to treat him with kindness.

His Highness has disbanded 400 or 500 men of his new levies and is going on with his reductions. Accounts from the southward mention that Appa Dessye is raising troops by the Paishwa's order and that Chintamun Row's Detachment has marched from that quarter to Poona as well as a Detachment belonging to Waman Row Apthey. That the Subedar of Savanore is raising men to send to Poona, that the Paishwa's officers sent to seize some of the lands belonging to the Dessye of Kittore have been removed, and that the Dessye is encamped on the outside of his town and is preparing men to accompany him to Poona. The Paishwa's troops on the northern frontier have not moved.

It is almost impossible to say what are the intentions of a prince like the Paishwa who is bound by no principle and firm to no resolution; but however he may fluctuate in the moment of danger, His Highness never renounces the hope of ultimately obtaining his object. I think it may therefore be inferred that if he should abandon his hostile demeanour for the present, he will renew them when he has a prospect of doing it with more safety. Whether he will abandon them even now, must depend on his hopes of support from abroad and on the prospects held out to him by Your Lordship's decision. I have obtained no distinct accounts of his foreign negotiations, though I have strong reason to think that some have been carrying on. The reports I have heard represent Scindia as

reluctant to join with him, but they are not to be depended on unless confirmed from other quarters. It is deserving of notice that the Akhbar from Holkar's camp, dated the 20th of March and that from Scindia's dated the 10th of March mention that means had been taken by the Paishwa to accelerate the transmission of correspondence between those places and Poona. On the whole I should rather think that the Paishwah would prefer remaining quiet for the present, provided he could be allowed to support Trimbuckjee underhand, or at least to remain neutral in the contest (if it can be so called) between him and our Detachments. I have already stated the circumstances in which His Highness is likely to renew his attacks. One thing I think quite certain, that the unqualified submission of the British Government and the restoration of Trimbuckjee to power would not disarm his hostility for a single hour. It may be doubted whether His Highness (who never before shewed attachment to any one) feels much interest in Trimbuckjee unconnected with the execution of designs in which that Minister might have been instrumental, and with the resentment excited by the manner in which he was forced to surrender him; but even if the object of his present policy be merely to recover his favourite, there can be no question that the counsels of that favourite and the experience of a successful opposition would soon lead him to more extensive plans for shaking off our control.

No. 34A—Enclosure.

Translation of a draft of a circular letter from His Highness to the officers of his Government.

Bodies of rebels have assembled at 4 or 5 different places in the territories of the Sircar which some ascribe to Trimbuckjee Dainglia, others to Ramoossees and others to various other persons. These ought speedily to be punished by the Sircar. To this effect a message has been received from the British Government in consequence of which this letter is written. If any of the horse or foot of your villages should have gone to serve the rebels, you will make careful enquiry and seize on their houses and their families. Whomever you may apprehend belonging to the rebels you will keep in confinement and report your proceedings to Government.

It is incumbent on the Government to punish the rebels. Wherefore this letter has been ordered to be written. You will therefore exert yourself to enforce it as soon as it reaches you. If you disobey it, it will not be well.

No. 35.—Adam communicates to Elphinstone the decision of the Governor General in respect of the measures to be adopted towards the Peshwa for having aided Trimbakji Dengle's rising and for his other anti-British activities.

From—J. ADAM, ACTING CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,

To—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, 7 April 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour by command of the Governor General in Council to communicate to you the result of the deliberations of His Excellency in Council on the momentous questions to which your dispatches No. 48 and 49, dated respectively the 11th and 21st of March relate.

On a careful review of the whole course of the Paishwa's proceedings of the known character, disposition and views of that Prince, his infatuation with regard to Trimbackjee Danglia and the impossibility of explaining his conduct in any manner consistent with a just sense or faithful discharge of the obligations of public fidelity and honour towards the British Government, the Governor General in Council is compelled to declare his conviction that His Highness has been, and continues to be, deeply involved in a plot for raising War against the British Government. The tenor of His Highness's present conduct is strong presumptive evidence of his personal implication in the mischievous negotiations of Ballajee Conjur and in the secret correspondence managed against this Government by the Government of Ahmedabad, a guilt which the Governor General in Council had hitherto forced himself to regard, as exclusively imputable to intriguing and unauthorized dependants.

A primary object of this conspiracy, however absurd and improbable the expectation of success may seem, is evidently to compel the British Government either by intimidation or positive force to admit of the restoration of Trimbuckjee to power. But there are grounds for imagining that views still more extensive and injurious have been cherished.

The chain of facts, and of rational and legitimate deductions from those facts, so clearly and ably exhibited in your dispatch dated 11th and 21st March, constitute a body of evidence of His Highness's direct implication in a conspiracy against the British Government which amounts to a complete conviction of his criminality in the mind of the Governor General in Council.

Under these circumstances, the Paishwa must be considered to have placed himself in the condition of a public enemy of the British Government, a condition from which even the surrender of Trimbuckjee and the punishment of his adherents by His Highness would not be sufficient to extricate him, although the British Government might in that case be disposed on grounds of political expediency, to abstain from enforcing the extremity of penalty, which would justify attach upon his treachery, on obtaining sufficient security against the otherwise possible effects of such designing hostility on its own interests, and those of the general alliance

Before I proceed to communicate to you the sentiments and resolutions of the Governor-General in Council, on the course of the measures to be adopted under the different forms which this affair may assume, I am directed to signify to you the high and unqualified applause with which His Lordship in Council has regarded the wisdom, firmness, energy and promptitude of your proceedings, no less than the temperate and decorous language in which you have uniformly addressed the Paishwa in the course of your discussions, under circumstances of considerable provocation arising from the manner in which your declarations were contradicted and your demands disregarded. Without receding in the slightest degree from the ground of argument and expostulation which you were entitled to assume, and without permitting His Highness to deceive himself into a belief that his schemes were undetected or to remain in ignorance of the dangerous consequences of his proceedings by any want of directness and explicitness in your statements and remonstrances, you have never departed from the most perfect propriety and courtesy of manner and expression, nor can His Lordship in Council perceive the slightest ground for the offence which the Paishwa has affected to take at the language of your communications to His Highness. In fact, never, either in the tone or in the essence of any intervention exercised by the British Government or its agents, has there been anything calculated justly to offend His Highness or alarm his fears, which could be made to account for his late proceedings or operate in any degree either in defence or explanation of his conduct. It is well stated by you to be characteristic of all His Highness's proceedings on the present occasion, that they are entirely unprovoked and uncalled for by any steps whatever on the part of the British Government.

Your instructions to Colonel Smith to move the force (with exception of one Brigade to be kept to the Northwards) by

divisions towards Punderpore, and the eventual employment of the forces against the rebels is perfectly approved, and the course of proceedings in other respects which you propose to pursue has received the entire approbation and concurrence of His Excellency in Council.

The deliberate opinion already pronounced of His Highness the Paishwa being directly and deeply involved in the conspiracy against the British Government, which is the undoubted object of the assemblage of troops in the vicinity of Mahadeo, and in other parts of His Highness's dominions, will prepare you to expect that the proceedings which the Governor-General in Council has determined to adopt, will be regulated and restricted solely by his notions of political expediency. The actual infraction by the Paishwa of the solemn obligations of public faith, and the express stipulations of the Treaty having given to the British Government the unquestionable right to treat him as a public enemy and clothed it with full extent of privilege resulting from that condition of its relations with the State of Poona.

It is yet possible, that the Paishwa alarmed at the dreadful consequences in which he has involved himself, and awakened to a sense of danger by the impressive and repeated warnings which you have conveyed to him, may act against the rebels, and have either seized and delivered them up to you, or expelled Trimbuckjee and apprehended and punished his adherents. If His Highness shall have acted in this manner of his own accord and shall have shown by his general conduct such change in his policy as may reasonably encourage a reliance on his future fidelity, or at least his inability again to form a combination against us by the impracticability of his procuring adherents, after such a palpable sacrifice of his confederates to his own safety, it may still be expedient to consider the alliance as restored to its original footing, to abstain from requiring the Paishwa to make any other atonement, or give further security than is implied in those procedures. The exemplary punishment of all the ring-leaders, the confiscation of their property and the delivery of Trimbuckjee's family into our hands as hostages for his good behaviour, supposing that person to escape, will be deemed indispensable as tests of His Highness's repentance. On the other hand the actual surrender into our hands of Trimbuckjee's person, as it would constitute a more decided proof of an improved temper of mind in His Highness, would, with the punishment of his principal adherents amount to the atonement and security required under the supposed circumstance. It must be clearly ascertained that

these proceedings result from the spontaneous will of the Paishwa founded on a conviction of the error of the past conduct and the necessity of acting on different principles, and in the event of either case occurring, you will be pleased to accompany your report of it with such information as you may be able to obtain, calculated to assist the judgment of the Governor-General in Council on that point, or with a statement of such concurring facts and circumstances as may afford ground for estimating the real merits and motives of His Highness's conduct and you will await the result of the deliberation of His Lordship in Council on the case as it will then be before him.

You will understand from this direction, that it is the wish of the Government to avoid, if it can do so consistently with its own safety any harsh measures. It is true, there are distinct traces of very mischievous and very extensive intrigues in which it is impossible at present to doubt the Paishwa's having been personally a party. Still, it may be reconcilable to policy as well as to candour, to give the Paishwa credit for internal conviction of his error and a resolution to repair it by immediate exertion in checking the insurrection which he has fostered, as well as by maintaining a strict fidelity in future. This obviously applies alone to the case in which the Paishwa shall give the desired proof of such a spontaneous change of sentiment, as may fairly be attributed to his own reflection. The footing would be different were he to surrender or at least attempt to seize Trimbuckjee only on the threat of War. Because in those circumstances, he must be necessarily construed to act simply from the desire of escaping instantaneous infliction without our having any security against his availing himself of the first convenient moment for attacking us. It would then be incumbent on us in self-defence to narrow his powers of acting injuriously toward us.

Considering the extremities to which the Paishwa has proceeded, and the blindness with which he has persevered in his present course in spite of your unceasing warnings and remonstrances, there is little room for entertaining the expectation that he will adopt either of the steps above adverted to. Under the supposition, that on your receipt of this letter no such test of a change in His Highness's counsels shall have been afforded, you will be pleased to adopt the course of proceeding I am now to point out to you.

You will inform His Highness that the whole of his late proceedings have been laid before the Governor-General in Council, and have satisfied His Lordship that His Highness has been and still is deeply engaged in a plot directed against the

interests of the British Government, and of the general defensive alliance, of which, both it and His Highness are members; that the Governor-General in Council forbears to animadvert with the severity which it merits on the conduct of His Highness, after the extraordinary marks of moderation, forbearance and delicacy, which characterized the former proceedings of this Government in the case of Trimbuckjee, when the crimes of that person first rendered him an object of its justice and in the whole of its intercourse with His Highness from the date of Trimbuckjee's arrest up to the present moment. That the conduct of His Highness in planning and fomenting a conspiracy against our interests at a moment when he was in full enjoyment of our protection and confidence, and amidst constant and warm professions on his own part of unceasing fidelity and attachment, when there was not a single subject of unpleasant discussion in agitation at his Durbar, nor the smallest grounds for apprehension or alarm of any kind, a proceeding of such a character as must for ever prevent the British Government from placing any confidence in His Highness again, and must compel it for its own security and that of the faithful members of the General Alliance, to seek more effectual means of preventing the evil consequences of His Highness's intrigues and hostility than a reliance on his honor or on his adherence to the most solemn engagements. That you have received the commands of the Governor-General in Council to demand in the first instance and as preliminary to all discussion the surrender of Trimbuckjee into our hands within a certain time. (That time is to be fixed by you with reference to the distance of his supposed position and as the importance of leaving as little time as possible between making the demand and learning the issue of it.) That if the demand be not complied within the specified period, you are authorised to declare the British Government to be at War with the State of Poona, and to direct the British troops to attack His Highness's forces, and reduce his territory. You will add, that on Trimbuckjee's being delivered up within the time specified to a British Detachment, but not till then, you will be prepared to state the further demands of the Governor-General in Council a compliance which alone can avert the immediate and active prosecution of hostilities against His Highness. Should it appear to you that an assurance of Trimbuckjee's life being spared would operate as an inducement to a compliance with this demand, you are at liberty to offer such an assurance. You will further inform the Paishwah, that any attempt on His Highness's part to leave Poona while these discussions are pending, or any movement of His Highness's own troops or of Trimbuckjee and his adherents

in any part of His Highness's dominions, will be considered as a declaration of war on his part, and will be followed by active and immediate hostilities on ours.

If Trimbuckjee be not delivered up within the period you may fix, and if either of the cases stated at the close of the preceding paragraph occur, you will declare the relations of peace to be dissolved and will direct Colonel Smith to attack and disperse His Highness's troops and occupy the country in the name of the British Government. The Governor-General in Council concludes that you will have previously concerted with Colonel Smith a plan of operations, and that such a disposition of his forces will have been made as to enable him to carry the plan into effect with the least practicable delay after the declaration of war shall have been made. You will consider the seizure of the Paishwa's person and that of Trimbuckjee if possible, as objects of first attention. The occupation of the capital and public archives and property deposited there is also a point of peculiar importance His Lordship in Council considers it not improbable that the Stationary Brigade at Poona reinforced as Colonel Smith may have judged advisable, will be sufficient to overcome any opposition that may be made by the Paishwa's troops at Poona, and be able to effect the double object of occupying the Capital and securing His Highness's person. It is superfluous to inform the observation of the utmost consideration and delicacy consistent with the security of his person towards the Paishwa as well as towards the members of his family if matters should come to this extremity. The most courteous attention will also be manifested by you towards Chimnaje Appah, His Highness's brother, and the immediate family and dependants of that Prince whom you will consider to be under your immediate protection. You will exercise your own discretion with regard to retaining Baji Row at Poona or removing him to Ahmednagar or any other station during the progress of these transactions.

In the event now supposed you will concert with the ministers and public functionaries of the former Government a provisional arrangement for the administration of affairs until a final settlement shall be made.

Should the British force at Poona not be sufficient to act immediately, you will either remain under the protection of the brigade or withdraw to Colonel Smith's Headquarters as you may judge most expedient for the advantage of public interests.

Before I state the sentiments and views of the Governor-General in Council with reference to the settlement of the country under a result of our operations which shall place it at our disposal accompanied with the flight or capture of Baji Row, it will be proper to state to you the conditions on which in the event of Trimbuckjee's being delivered up within the period to be fixed by you, His Lordship in Council is willing to leave Baji Row in possession of the power and authority of the Government of Poona.

The actual conduct of the Paishwa, unless it be redeemed before your receipt of this dispatch by his adoption of one or other of those courses which has already been pronounced, can alone restore things to their former footing, has been such as to justify the Government in demanding securities it may deem necessary for the preservation of its interests, as the alternative of proceeding against the Paishwa in the light of a public enemy.

In considering the species of security to be required from the Paishwa, as the conditions of the renewal of the alliance, the points to be adverted to have appeared to His Lordship in Council to be the maintenance of a preponderating military force in our interests in His Highness's territory, and the appropriation to its payment of a larger portion of His Highness's resources, than has hitherto been the case and the extinction of his means of intriguing with other powers for purposes hostile to our interests.

The former object might be obtained by augmenting the subsidiary force to be maintained at His Highness's expense, or by the reform and reorganization of a large portion of His Highness's cavalry, placing it under the command of European officers and establishing a system of its payment independent of the Paishwa. The latter would in His Lordship's opinion be preferable, both as giving us the command of a species of force which will probably be of essential use in the operations contemplated at no distant period against the Pindarries, and as naturally springing out of His Highness's failure in the performance of an existing stipulation of the Treaty.

By the Supplementary Articles to the Treaty of Bassein, the Paishwa is bound to provide and furnish in time of war, a body of five thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores. The total inefficiency of the troops brought forward by the Paishwa at different times has always been a topic of complaint, and is too notorious to require remark. It is obvious that no reliance can ever be placed in the Government of Poona for equipping

an efficient contingent of troops in time of war, and it is both just and expedient to take the present opportunity of effecting an arrangement by which that object shall be secured by the regular maintenance of the stipulated quota at all times. His Lordship in Council has accordingly determined to require the Paishwa to engage to maintain in conformity to the existing Treaty, a body of five thousand horse to be commanded by European Officers, and to provide funds for their regular payment at the rate of 40 rupees per mensem for each horseman, exclusive of the pay of the officers

The present establishment of regular infantry in His Highness's service, may be held to be a partial performance of the stipulation regarding that description of force, and it may not be advisable to require an augmentation of it to the full number of 3,000 men. The pay and the discipline of the existing force of that description ought however to be independent of the Paishwa. The total charge on His Highness's Government on this account will be about Twenty-nine lacs of rupees per annum. The mode in which this payment is to be secured will be adverted to in the sequel:—

	Rs.
Five thousand Horse at Rs. 40 per mensem for each man for the year	24,00,000
Add one lac on account of the pay of officers and contingencies	1,00,000
Major Ford's Brigade	4,00,000
	29,00,000

With this direct augmentation of force which though nominally in the service of the Paishwa, will be in effect under our exclusive control, the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that an addition to the regular Subsidiary Force may be dispensed with, that is to say, that no demands on the resources of the Paishwa need be made on that account. We shall still have the option of introducing our troops into His Highness's territories when necessary, a right which is implied by the spirit of the alliance, but since the occurrence of recent events, it may be expedient to make this right a matter of express stipulation, which you will accordingly consider yourself authorised to do.

The further securities to be demanded from the Paishwa are directed to the object of debarring him from future intrigue by circumscribing or extinguishing his ostensible excuses of

secret means of communication with foreign powers by depriving him of all pretext for interfering in the affairs of Hindostan, Bundelcund and Guzerat, and of formally declaring the extinction of that connection with the other Mahratta Powers, which was before left to rest on a general understanding. Some of these sacrifices will also combine the means of contributing towards the payment of the reformed horse and regular infantry, to be maintained in the manner above prescribed.

With these views Bajy Row must be required to renounce for his heirs and successors, all connections whatever with the other Mahratta Powers and formally to recognize the complete dissolution, both in form and substance of the Mahratta Confederacy, including of course all the relations still maintained between him as the executive head of the Marhatta Empire, and those States. He must engage in no communications with those courts*except through our Ministers.

He must especially renounce all future demands on the Guycowar resulting from his executive head of the Mahratta Empire over that Prince, or from any other cause. He must be required to renew in perpetuity to that Prince. the farm of Ahmedabad on terms of the former lease, and must consent to his share of the Mooluckgeery tribute of Kattewar, being collected by the Guycowar in conformity to the arrangement of Colonel Walker, and generally to the renewal of that arrangement as far as affected His Highness's rights and interests in all its branches. The transfer of all these branches of revenue to the British Government would form a part of the fund to be applied to the payment of the troops on the reformed establishment.

He must be required to transfer to the British Government all his rights, claims and pretensions, feudal, territorial and pecuniary in Bundelcund, including Saugor, Jhansi and the territories of Nauna Govind Row and agree to relinquish all connections with the Chiefs in that quarter. He must renounce all the rights, claims and pretensions of the State of Poona of every denomination in Hindostan, engage never more to interfere in the affairs of that Country.

The Paishwa must further be required to cede the fort of Ahmednagar in perpetual sovereignty to the British Government. If you should continue to be of opinion that an useful impression will be made on His Highness's mind, by requiring the temporary admission of British Garrisons into any of his Forts as a pledge of his conduct, you will consider yourself at liberty to make that demand.

The above is the general outline of the securities which His Lordship in Council would deem it necessary to require from the Paishwa as conditions of his remaining at peace with the British Government, after the surrender of Trimbuckjee; but His Lordship's reliance upon your approved judgment and discretion, induce him to authorize you to relax or modify these demands in such manner as may be suggested to you by the actual circumstance of the moment or any changes in the conduct and views of the Paishwa, which may in your opinion render such changes expedient. Without these considerations the leaving of Bajy Row in possession of any degree of power would be hazardous to our interests in a high degree. With them, and the additional security against his future combinations which the second surrender of Trimbuckjee into our hands under such circumstances would afford, we might leave to him the internal administration of his Dominions without much apprehension of danger from his secret intrigues or open enmity.

The only remaining point connected with this branch of the subject which it remains to consider is the provision of funds for the payment of the reformed troops. Exclusive of rent of the farm of Ahmedabad and the Paishwa's share of the Kattewar Mooluckgerry above adverted to, further assignments or cessions of their territory will be required. His Highness's revenues derived from the Chiefs of Jhansi and Saugor are inconsiderable and uncertain and His Lordship in Council believes are chiefly obtained in the form of Nazerana on special occasions, or of compositions of mutual demands. His Highness had cherished a belief that a considerable portion of the estimated revenues of Bundelcund would have fallen to his share, if his claims in that quarter had been duly supported by the British Government, but from the enquiries that have been made when this subject had been under consideration, there is no reason to think that this would not have been the case, notwithstanding the large scale in which the revenues of that Province were computed and the limited proportion of them transferred to the British Government.

The remaining funds then must be found in cessions of territory in Candeish or the Concan or in Savenore, according to local facilities and convenience of which the Governor-General in Council is not prepared to form a judgment. His Lordship in Council will not authorize you to decide the question unless there shall be time for a further reference to Government, accompanied by a statement of your opinion regarding the most convenient quarter in which to require the cession of assignments of territory.

Another mode of supplying any deficiency of funds occurs to the mind of the Governor-General in Council, namely to require from the Paishwa the transfer to the British Government of his pecuniary claims on the Guycowar, under which an adjustment might be effected with the Guycowar on the basis of a territorial cession from that Chief to the British Government to the extent of that formerly proposed to be made to the Paishwa, the British Government calculating the value of that proposed cession (seven lacs of rupees per annum) in part of the fund for the payment of the reformed troops. This is stated for your consideration, and it may be expedient for you to communicate on the subject with the Governor in Council of Bombay.

On his acceptance of these conditions and executing a Treaty comprehending these stipulations, and a renewal of such of the provisions of the Treaty of Bassein as are not affected by them, or (if with a view to the advantage of a further discussion of any points of detail you should deem a further reference to the authority of the Governor-General in Council advisable) a preliminary Treaty binding himself to the general objects now stated, and engaged to frame a definitive treaty hereafter, the Governor-General will overlook the past conduct of the Paishwa; and will renew relations of peace and alliance with his Government under the declaration that any future breach of the conditions of the General Alliance would be regarded as criminal against the contracting powers. You will accordingly consider yourself to be empowered to conclude a treaty comprehending these provisions subject to the ratification of the Governor-General in Council, and after it shall be executed by His Highness and you shall have received the orders of cession from the Paishwa, you will discontinue all hostile preparations and remand the troops to their usual stations, as soon as you think it can be done without hazard to public interests.

It is not to be expected even under the most favourable issue of this affair, that the temper and feelings of the Paishwa will soon accommodate themselves to this great sudden change in his conditions, or that the sentiments of hatred, mortification and disappointment, will speedily subside. His Highness's conduct and proceedings will long require your utmost vigilance and attention, on which as well as on your unceasing endeavours by every means of conciliation to remove the impression produced on His Highness's mind by past events, the Governor-General in Council confidently relies.

It is now necessary to consider the course to be pursued in the event of the Paishwa rejecting these conditions or refusing

or as is more probable, evading a compliance with the preliminary demand for the seizure and surrender of Trimbuckjee. Nothing short of your positive conviction of His Highness's actual inability to effect that purpose is to be allowed to save him from the consequence of not surrendering Trimbuckjee within the time you may specify, namely, as being considered and treated as public enemy. Should you entertain the conviction above supposed, you will intimate to the Paishwa that you will accept the surrender of Trimbuckjee's family and the punishment of the principal ring leaders of the rebellion instead, and you will, on that being carried into effect, proceed in the manner prescribed for your guidance in the event of the actual surrender of Trimbuckjee's person.

Should you have reason to believe that the Paishwa's inability to deliver up Trimbuckjee is a pretext or an evasion, or should he ultimately refuse to accede to the conditions above described, you will then at once declare him to be at war with the British Government, and direct Colonel Smith to commence and prosecute active operations against him, until his army is broken and dispersed, his country occupied and himself either captured or expelled.

There will then remain for consideration the important question of the disposal of the conquered territory and the vacant Government. You have in your former dispatch discussed the various modes of settlement which have occurred to you. Without entering on an examination of each of these plans, I shall proceed at once to state to you what has occurred to the Governor-General in Council on each of the two, to which it appears to His Lordship in Council our choice will be limited, namely, the restoration of Bajy Row with reduced power and resources, or and the elevation of one of his brothers under such conditions as we may think proper to prescribe. His Lordship in Council confines his views to these two, as he does not consider the revival of the Government of the Rajah of Sattarah, the establishment of a mixed form of Government such as is adverted to by you, the appropriation of the whole territory to ourselves or its partition among the allies as arrangements either so advantageous in themselves or so likely to be susceptible of explanation to other powers, as a plan which shall preserve a separate and substantive Government in the hands of a Prince of the Paishwa's line, accompanied by such securities and improvements in the existing relations as a just view of the interests of the parties shall point out.

After proceeding to the extremities above contemplated against Bajy Row, it can scarcely be expected that such a degree-

of confidence and neutral good-will can be restored between him and the British Government, as to render wholly free from future danger his possession of even the most circumscribed power and resources. On the other hand, his disposition will entail considerable embarrassment with reference to the disposal of his person and his future establishment. He must necessarily be placed under personal restraint, more or less strict, and even with all the precautions that can be adopted, it will be difficult if not impracticable to prevent him from engaging in intrigues, which if not attended with danger to the new settlement, will disquiet and disturb it. On a full consideration of the subject it may however be thought more expedient to incur these evils than to be exposed to what might eventually result from his retaining with the same feelings of enmity, rancour and revenge, the superior means of indulging them which the possession of power however restricted, and the command of wealth and convenient instruments of intrigue would place in his hands. On the whole, the Governor-General in Council is inclined to the opinion, that if the extremity of actual hostilities be unavoidable, the deposition of Bajy Row may become necessary. His Lordship in Council will not however at the present moment, pronounce finally on this question, since considerations may arise to lead him to form a different decision. Assuming, that he will be deposed it is desirable to consider the fittest person to be elevated to the vacant seat. *The personal qualities of Amrut Row, his talents and experience in public affairs, and his long habits of intercourse and confidence with the British Government with his knowledge of its character and principles, would strongly recommend him to the choice of the Governor-General in Council.* But there appear to be powerful objections to the passing by Chimnajee Appah the brother of the Paishwa by blood, and who cannot be supposed to have participated in the views and designs of his brother. The little knowledge we possess of Chimnajee's character, his inexperience in business and the possibility of his partaking of his brother's disposition and principles, although operating against the expediency of placing him in the office of Paishwa, cannot well His Lordship in Council conceive be pleaded against the forcible claim of birth and the advantages of making the smallest possible deviation from the strict line of succession. It is true that the circumstances which entitle the British Government to dethrone Bajy Row, give to it the right of filling the vacant Government as it may think most conducive to its own political interests, still the disposition of the body of the people to respect the line of hereditary succession, and the diminished chance of intrigue and faction in

This is the extent of concession which His Lordship in Council would think it necessary to demand, either from Bajy Row in the event of his restoration, or from Chimnajee should it be determined to establish the latter, and you are empowered to conclude a treaty with whichever of those Princes may be hereafter designated to you, comprehending these provisions and renewing such of the provisions of the Treaty of Bassein as may still be applicable.

Your instructions to Colonel Smith regarding the eventual employment of the force under his command against the Paishwa have been entirely approved. In order to place in your hands the most effectual means of bringing this affair to an early and a successful conclusion, the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay have been respectively instructed to co-operate with you to such extent as may be necessary. The Governor in Council of Fort St. George has been desired to assemble in the Ceded Districts without delay, a detachment of sufficient strength to act by itself, with a view of operating against the Southern possessions or forts of His Highness the Paishwa. This Detachment will be placed under an officer junior to Colonel Smith, and will advance as near the frontier as convenient, whence it will enter the Marhatta territory on your requisition or Colonel Smith's and from the moment of its crossing the frontier it will be under your exclusive orders. If this force should advance into the Marhatta territory, it will be necessary to distinguish between the immediate possession of the Paishwa and the territories of the Jageerdars, whom of course it will be desirable to conciliate, and not to drive into His Highness's interests by attacking them unless they shall of their own accord take part against us. This will form a particular point in your instructions to the officer commanding. A movement from the Carnatic into the Southern Division of the Paishwa's territories below the Ghauts, will also be made under the orders of the Government of Fort St. George on your intimating to the Officer Commanding in that district, that it will be expedient.

The Governor in Council of Bombay has been desired to be prepared to occupy the whole of the Paishwa's possessions in Guzerat on receiving an intimation from you that our pacific relations with His Highness are dissolved. The occupation of the Northern portion of the Concan will necessarily devolve on the Government of Bombay with whom you will correspond on that subject.

Such aid as can be derived from the force stationed in the Dominions of the Nizam, will of course be at your command.

of waiting on him yesterday. , Neither Moro Dikshit nor any person on his part was present.

As my sole object at this meeting was to avoid committing Your Excellency, it cannot be expected to have produced any material result. The circumstance in it most worthy of remark was that the Minister after making a stand for the non-existence of the insurrection and for the Paishwa's innocence, and ignorance of all Trimbuckjee's proceedings, at length acknowledged that he had been among the earliest who had heard of the banditti in the hills of Mahadeo, that if active measures had been taken against the insurgents they would have dispersed long ago, but that His Highness had had bad advisers and had neither understood the affair or if he had understood it, His Highness was like a gem that took its colour from the foil behind it. He had now changed his advisers, the past ought to be forgotten and hence forward all would be well. To this language the Minister returned whenever he was unsuccessful in his endeavours to exculpate the Paishwa, which he continued from time to time to attempt.

The rest of his discourse seemed to be intended to draw some demands or advice from me, a compliance with which (real or feigned) might give His Highness some claims on the British Government hereafter. He first said that His Highness having now come to a resolution to act with vigour against the insurgents and against Trimbuckjee himself if he were with them, he had desired him to beg that I would point out what I wished to be done and that I might be assured it would be conformed to. I declined agreeing to this request, observing that as I had nothing to offer on Your Lordship's part I would rather not ask anything of the Paishwah. The Minister said that he did not wish me to make any demand that might restrain Your Excellency, but to give my advice to the Paishwa in his present difficulties. I said my advice could afford no new lights to His Highness as I had so often given it before and as indeed His Highness knew perfectly well the conduct which it was proper for him to pursue; that it could therefore do no good but might do harm by binding the British Government. Moreover that if His Highness were not candid, he might easily fulfil the letter of my advice while he avoided the spirit and thus attempt to throw the blame of the failure on me.

The Minister next went into particulars and said that His Highness was anxious both for the good of the common cause

accommodation, or to go to war at once with the Paishwa. The Minister replied that this state of things was clearly understood, but that if the Governor General determined on war, the Paishwa would not oppose him and even if he ordered Poona to be occupied, the Paishwa would repair to Bombay. He then again inquired, if I refused to settle a plan for the present operations, what His Highness was to do? I said that notwithstanding his pacific professions the Paishwa appeared to me to be still in a state of preparation for war. His forts were now ready, his valuables were removed, and if he had discharged some troops, Trimbuckjee and his Agents had raised others: that I did not know what was to be settled with me, that if His Highness desired to put down the rebels a mere manifestation of his wish would be sufficient, that His Highness knew the course he ought to pursue, and I could tell him no more than I had often done before. This was the substance of a very long conversation the rest of which was made up of topics already discussed.

By a private letter from Colonel Smith dated the 7th and received this morning, the Light Division under his personal command consisting of the Horse Artillery, the two Regiments of Light Cavalry, the Madras foot Artillery, one Grenadier and two Rifle Companies of Europeans, two Grenadiers and 6 Light Companies of Natives with two Iron 12 Pounders and two 5½ inch Howitzers were at Mandavee on that day. My despatch of this date to Mr. Adam will have informed Your Excellency that Colonel Smith had taken prisoners a party of about 100 men belonging to Trimbuckjee and that he had confined the Chiefs and disarmed the common soldiers. He now understands that the rest of Trimbuckjee's banditti are in a woody and strong country near Jut. The Colonel is informed that there are not more than 300 men in any one place and my accounts make the whole number in that part of the country about 3000.

Colonel Smith has received no assistance from the Paishwa's officers and has found the inhabitants of the country decidedly against him. They are impressed with a belief that the Paishwa is favourable to Trimbuckjee and either from fear or inclination withhold information and all assistance as much as they can. In his letter Colonel Smith begs that the Paishwa's troops may not join him and suggests that His Highness should issue proclamations proscribing Trimbuckjee, offering a reward for his apprehension, enjoining all the country to assist against

him and threatening any villages that may receive or assist him. These measures if sincerely adopted would, he thinks, secure the capture of Trimbuckjee. I fully concur with Colonel Smith in his opinion both of the uselessness of the Paishwa's troops and of the efficacy of his orders, and am thence led to form a very unfavourable judgment of His Highness's sincerity when he so readily offers the one and so steadily withholds the other.

P. S.

I this morning received a message from the Minister acquainting me that the Paishwa had acknowledged to him that owing to the bruise in his arm he had been* obliged to neglect the affairs of his Government and he now believed that many strange proceedings had been carried on in the interval. His Highness, the Minister said, had now entrusted the settlement of the insurrection and punishment of the insurgents to him. He was about to send out an agent with 200 or 300 Horse to apprehend all the rebels and their associates and he begged I would direct a newswriter with ten Hircarrahs to accompany the party and report its proceedings. I answered if His Highness were in earnest he would issue such orders as would show that he did not wish to protect Trimbuckjee, that this measure if done sincerely, would suffice without troops and that troops were of no use without it; that I therefore was unwilling to take any share in a transaction which I knew would fail, but that the Minister was at liberty to send his agents where he pleased. I also said that if he wished to seize the emissaries of Trimbuckjee he had better begin at Poona. This proposal of the Paishwa from its own nature and from his total want of confidence in the Minister is obviously as illusory as all the rest.

*See Marathi Diary of Baji Rao II published by Rajwade p. 173. The carriage in which the Peshwa was travelling overturned near Fulgaon and this gave him a bruise.

No. 37—The Resident reports flagrant breaches by the Peshwa of the terms accepted by him and his inveterate habits of treachery and deceit.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 11 April 1817.

My Lord,

On the morning of the 12th Raghoo Punt came to me accompanied by Kishen Row. They were both charged with a message from Seddasheo Maunkaisur, which commenced by a demand in the Paishwa's name, that I would say whether I wished absolutely to quarrel with His Highness or was willing to concur in bringing about an accommodation. I answered this question immediately by declaring that I could only speak for the time that would elapse before I received Your Excellency's order, that I had no control over events after the period, but while it lasted I certainly did not wish to quarrel with His Highness.

Kishen Row said, that the Bhow had anticipated that reply and said he could not receive it. I was the Governor General's representative and I must say plainly whether I wished for war or peace. If for war His Highness would this very day set off for Calcutta or Bombay, to surrender the dominions which he had only acquired by the favour of the British Government. If I wished for peace, he desired me to meet Seddasheo Maunkaisur and concert with him the best measures for quelling the insurrection. If I had any doubts of the Bhow's being invested with full powers to put down the insurrection, I had only to wait on His Highness and he would himself invest him with them in my presence: that His Highness regretted that the bruise in his arm should have prevented his attending to business, until things had got to such a height, and that he was now sincerely desirous to restore them to their former footing, and that the British Government ought to forget the past and the states ought to be as cordial as before. I first enquired whether I was to understand by the Paishwa's demand of a categorical answer that His Highness was resolved not to await Your Excellency's decision but to quit Poona if I would not engage for a continuance of the peace. I said I certainly could not enter into any such engagement even if the past were forgotten; we were still bound to provide for the future, and I was quite unable to say what means Your Excellency would devise for that purpose, that my last instructions afforded no light in the present state of affairs as they were in fact contained in the warm and friendly

letter under Your Excellency's own signature, which I had communicated to His Highness at Phoolshehr; that you might now restore the treaty of Bassein, impose new terms, or declare war; that if His Highness wished to have a chance of the two former contingencies he ought to wait; if not, he might do as he pleased; that if His Highness quitted Poona, I should consider him to have made choice of the latter course; for amidst all his professions of peaceable intentions, it could not be denied that he kept himself in a state of preparation for war. Kishen Row explained that His Highness did not threaten to quit Poona if I would not give him a categorical answer, but only enquired whether we were resolved to take his country that he might surrender it if we were so resolved, which led me to observe, that if the British Government had harboured any such design, it would not have passed over so many fair occasions; it would not have overlooked His Highness's opposition to its demand for the surrender of Trimbuckjee at a time when our reputation would have gained more by exacting a severe retribution for the Shastery's murder, than by acting as we did; it would not have forgiven the correspondence with foreign powers then discovered, and other breaches of the treaty of Bassein: it would not have allowed Trimbuckjee to be harboured in His Highness's country without resenting, nor should I have so long and so frequently warned him of the danger he was running, and the way to avoid it; that even now, if the British Government had resolved to break with His Highness, I should not remain inactive till the approach of the rains, allowing His Highness time to form alliances abroad and Trimbuckjee time to complete the preparations at home; that His Highness might remember that nothing was farthest from Your Excellency's thought than to break with him at the time of your message at Phoolsher, and the whole world judge who was the aggressor in the subsequent insurrection and the military preparations that followed it.

Being again questioned regarding the means to be adopted for putting down the insurrection, I said I would give no opinion but Your Excellency would judge of His Highness's intentions not by any one measure, such as his giving particular powers to the Bhow but by the general tendency of his actions; that at present it was understood by the whole country that His Highness favoured the insurgents (who recruited in His Highness's name and marched under his colours) and in consequence they met with every assistance from those under his Government. If it were once known that His Highness was

adverse to them, the effect would be equally apparent in the opposite conduct of the people of the country. I added that although I had determined to forbear advising His Highness after the repeated counsels I had thrown away, yet I could not refrain from suggesting to him the possibility that Your Excellency's instructions to me might be conditional and that it might make material difference whether His Highness continued his present course or joined heartily in an attempt to restore tranquillity. This however I said was for His Highness to consider.

Raghoo Pandit said the Paishwa was perfectly sincere and cordial and as a proof of it he produced papers, enjoining His Highness's Officers to act against certain insurgents for whose suppression a demand was stated to have been made by the British Government. I observed on this order that the reference it contained to the authority of the British Government for the proof of a rebellion in His Highness's own country and to the desire of that Government that such a rebellion should be quelled, looked more like a disavowal of those sentiments on His Highness's part, than an attempt to remove the belief already established that His Highness was unwilling to have the insurgents molested. I have the honour to enclose a translation of the paper.

On the evening of the 13th Purbauker Pundit brought me a message from His Highness the Paishwa, who said that whatever dispute I might be engaged in with him on the affairs of my Government, he was pleased to consider me personally as his friend; that he wished for the more complete understanding of all matters, to have a full and temperate discussion of four hours with me, at which Purbaukur Bellal shall be the only other person present, that his meeting must be brought about with the utmost secrecy, and that he would receive me either at his palace or at one of his gardens, where I should come unattended and (I understood) in the night. I begged Purbaukur Pundit to make my acknowledgments to the Paishwa for his condescension, but observed that in the present state of affairs, I would not recommend a meeting such as he proposed, nor indeed any other meeting. I could say nothing new, until I received fresh instructions and to repeat what I had so often urged could only weary and disgust His Highness. I cannot conjecture what advantage was proposed from an interview attended with so much mystery, or what was His Highness's motive for wishing to avoid a public meeting. Probably the whole was proposed by Purbauker Bellal with the intention of raising himself into great consequence.

Yesterday Raghoo Punt brought back the letter to His Highness's officers, with the objectionable passage struck out, on which I merely remarked that I should no doubt hear the effect produced by that paper and should report it to Your Excellency.

This morning Raghoo Punt came again at an early hour, and told me that after a very long conference between His Highness and the Bhow, the former had at length come to a real sincere and hearty resolution to break up the rebellion, and that I should soon hear the result. He then asked me to visit the Minister, and concert future proceedings which I declined in civil terms observing that we had nothing to concert and it only remained for His Highness to act as he thought best.

In case His Highness should now at length keep his word, it is worthwhile to record that upto this day he has taken no steps against the rebels direct or indirect real or feigned, with the exception of the pretended expedition to Natapootta and confinement of some of Trimbuckjee's family and friends, and that except the notice sent by Moro Pundit of the party at Jintee, neither Colonel Smith nor the Officer Commanding the Detachment of the Paishwa's Brigade has been able to obtain the slightest information from the officers of His Highness's Government or the people of the country. It illustrates the spirit in which the Paishwah proceeded in the confinement of Trimbuckjee's friends, to mention that his brother Godajee Dainglia is now at the head of the banditti in Candesh, and his cousin Kunderow Dainglia retained the command of a part of the Paishwa's Cavalry, with which he went over to the rebels from the neighbourhood of Sattara.

The principal body of the insurgents, if that term can be applied to men evidently not at variance with the Government of the country, was at Muswad, between 30 and 40 miles west of Punderpore, on the 9th having moved from Jut in a north-westerly direction. This body was said to be 4,000 strong. Another party of about 600 or 700 was near Murrawe (90 miles south of Poona) on the 8th and a third said to be 200 strong was near Tausgaum, 30 miles south-east of Kurrar on the 6th. A fourth party of a few Ramoossees, apparently independent of the rest and under the former insurgent Baupoo Ramoossee, was in the vicinity of Kurraur at the same time. A party of horse amounting, according to the statement of the Bhow, who is a Jageerdar of the place, to 4,000 were plundering near Bara-mutty (45 miles south-east of Poona) the day before yesterday, but I have not heard which way they were going and consequently cannot guess whether they were a party called out

from the villages in that neighbourhood and going to join Trim-buckjee or some of the horse formerly with him who have not got into Colonel Smith's rear, and were on their way to some part of the country undisturbed by our Detachment. I received intimation of the four last parties from the Minister as well as from my own news-writers, but neither so early nor so precise as to be of any use to me. I conceived the number in all these cases to be very much exaggerated. The troops now assembling in Candeish are now headed by Govind Row or Godajee Dainglia (the brother of Trim-buckjee). He pays all his troops in Haulee Sicca the coin I alluded to in a former despatch.

It is difficult to ascertain the real state of affairs at the Paishwa's Durbar. His Highness's communications with me are now managed by Seddasheo Maunkaisur, but there is no appearance of that Minister having at all regained His Highness's confidence. Moro Dikshit though not employed at present, is said not to have lost His Highness's confidence, but his colleague Chimnajee Narraen has been disgraced and banished from Poona on some frivolous pretext. A report has been circulated that Moro Dikshit's retirement and Chimnajee's disgrace are the consequence of a demand from me and that Gokla has been forbidden to attend the Durbar in compliance with a similar requisition. These reports seem to be set on foot to excite odium against the British Government, but it is more generally believed that Chimnajee has been removed on suspicion of a connection with the Residency. This story, however unfounded the accusation it contains, is very consistent with the distrustful temper of the Paishwa and is not unlikely to be true.

Notwithstanding all His Highness's professions and the merit he claims for having reduced his troops, I am informed through several undoubted channels that his reductions were in many instances quite illusory and that he is now recruiting again. It appears that in his first alarm he did dismiss some hundred men, but almost immediately directed the same people to be secretly re-entertained by other chiefs. Since the 9th I have received lists of parties entertained, which however in all probability do not comprise the whole or even the greater part of those actually enrolled. Those I have received include from 70 to 100 men a day. This step of the Paishwa's can neither strengthen him nor injure our interests, but it is important as a breach of the terms which he accepted ten days ago and very instructive of the inveteracy of his habits of treachery and deceit.

No. 38—The Pursuit of Trimbakji Denge and his followers is reported in this return, probably despatched by the Resident.

15 April 1817.

I have just received a dispatch from Col. Smith of which a copy shall be transmitted to Mr. Adam. Col. Smith marched from Mandwa with his light division in two detachments (the right under his personal command and the left under that of Major Lushington) intending to form division at Shaitfalla (3 marches towards the South), on the 10th; the Colonel found that 4,000 of the insurgents were at Muswar not far from his own detachment. He immediately moved upon that place and finding that the enemy had quitted it 6 hours before his arrival, he continued his pursuit to the northward for upwards of 50 miles to Trimbak, where he bivouacked on the 11th Instt. He had by this time lost all traces of the insurgents. He found the people of the country everywhere decidedly against him, and at Muswar the head of a village took his intelligencers prisoners which greatly contributed to the escape of the enemy. Col Wilson was on the 12th at Kurkari (15 miles South of Gardoon on the Beema) He reports that a body of 6,000 horse had passed that place on the 10th morning in a Southerly or S. Westerly direction. This must be the party that was at Barramutty on the 11th but can scarcely be the same that was pursued by Col. Smith. I have no intelligence of the course ultimately taken by either of these large bodies and Col. Smith was equally unfortunate upto the 13th. This is a forcible illustration of the difficulty of pursuing freebooters in a country where the Government is against us and where we have neither the advantages of friends nor of foes.

No. 39—Further activities of the rebels are communicated.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 19 April 1817.

My Lord,

Since the date of my last despatches I have received daily messages from the Durbar announcing His Highness's increasing anxiety to suppress the insurrection under Trimbuckjee. No steps have however been taken for that purpose except the

despatch of troops professedly to act against the rebels, a step from which former experience does not encourage us to hope for much advantage. When this intention was announced to me, I objected to it on the ground that the Detachment would be confounded with the insurgents, and Colonel Smith exposed to the risk of attacking the Paishwa's troops on the one hand and on the other of allowing the rebels to escape under the impression of their belonging to His Highness. I said that we did not stand in any need of troops and that it was in the Paishwa's power by a single order to give us all we wanted, which was intelligence. It has been my constant care to impress on His Highness that if he is really desirous to convince Your Excellency of his sincerity, his first step must be to make some declaration that may remove the impression now prevailing among all ranks of people, of his partiality for the insurgents, but I have not perceived the least sign of his having adopted my suggestion. I do not know whether the letter mentioned in my last has been sent to his civil officers, but if it has, it has entirely failed of effect, as is apparent from the silence so carefully observed by all persons under the Paishwa's influence on the subject of the movements of the insurgents.

The troops which the Paishwah has sent out under his present professions are commanded by Naroo Punt Aphy and are said to consist of 2,000 horse and 500 foot. They were yesterday three marches east of Poona, but I do not know their destination; the Minister only acquainting me that they were to find out the insurgents wherever they might be. I have apprized Colonel Smith of their march. The troops of the Vinchoorker and the Putwurdhans which formed the Paishwa's contingent with Colonel Smith and were ordered by that officer to remain in their present position, have been directed by the Paishwah to march against the rebels in Candeish. This order was not communicated to me till after it was given; when it was mentioned I said His Highness was at liberty to employ his troops where he pleased.

Colonel Smith remained at Assoo on the 15th having been able to obtain no intelligence of the enemy. The party which he pursued appears to have crossed the Neera higher up than Assoo and to have gone by Serooley to Barramutty and thence by Jellgong and Karratty to the Beema. They crossed that river at Omargong (which they plundered) and passed by Jinty to Raisseem. They have not been heard of since they were there, though it is a week ago and the distance under 70 miles. They have hitherto plundered no villages that did

not belong to Seddsheo Maunkaisur. Another party is strongly reported to have descended into the Concan and another to be near the former ground to the south of the Mahadeo range. Those at Candeish are at Chaleesgong and are said to be 2,000 strong. The Paishwa's Government now admits that there is an insurrection, and states the numbers in this part of the country at 10,000 horse, but is silent as to the situations in which this force is disposed.

No. 40—The movements of the insurgents and the Peshwa's pretended anxiety to put them down are reported to the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 20 April 1817.

My Lord,

This morning Raghoo Pundit came to me from the Bhow and informed me that accounts had been received of the arrival of the main body of the insurgents at Merrichgong from whence they were proceeding towards the north. Yesterday I learned from the Bazar reports of Poona that this body had passed the Sirrus Ghaut 25 miles east of Ahmudnuggur and this morning I have received a report from Toka which I trust may prove inaccurate that a British soldier and 4 Sepoys were cut off by them near Soney Bamany half way between Ahmednuggur and Toka. The Sirrus Ghaut is 30 miles, and Soney Bamany about 60 miles further north than Merichgong. I mention this to shew the little decency preserved by His Highness the Paishwa in his pretended communications of early intelligence.

Raghoo Punt also mentioned that a party of 50 insurgents had four days ago taken refuge from a party of British troops at the Paishwa's village of Paubul passing themselves off on the inhabitants as His Highness the Paishwa's troops. Paubul is less than 30 miles from Poona and consequently an ordinary man on foot would walk the distance in 10 or 12 twelve hours. I remarked this to Raghoo Pundit and also observed that as the rebel cavalry had appeared in this part of the country, it would be necessary to move in some British Cavalry also.

Raghoo Pundit also showed me a paper enjoining the Paishwa's officers to give notice to Colonel Smith (not of the movements of Trimbuckjee's banditti) but of the fact of any of the horse belonging to their districts having joined the insurgents. I said I did not perceive what use Colonel Smith was to make of this information if he received it, and that I had

no great confidence in the intelligence of His Highness's officers after the specimen I had just had of his Highness's own.

Raghoo Pundit took this occasion to mention that Narroo Punt Aphy was ordered to raise as many men as he could, and to act with the utmost vigour against the rebels. I was prepared for this communication having before heard that the great object of Narroo Punt's mission was to raise men, and I therefore replied that I had warned His Highness that if he raised any men I should consider it an act of hostility and I had only to repeat that declaration now. Raghoo Punt said His Highness would raise no men at Poona and that if he did not raise them at all, he would not have the means of suppressing the rebellion. I replied that I had expressly announced in writing, that I made no distinction between Poona and any other place. I added that I had told His Highness daily for the last two months that it was not his troops that we wanted to put down the rebellion, but such intelligence as his co-operation or even his neutrality would secure from the people of the country.

No. 41—Rout of the rebels by the British troops in several places is detailed by the Resident for the information of the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 26 April 1817.

My Lord,

After the date of my last despatch I received intelligence that Narroo Punt Aphy was recruiting at the rate of from 3 to 400 men a day and that other chiefs were also recruiting in the city. I also was informed that active preparations were going on at the forts of Unky, Malegong and Mymutghur. These acts being in open opposition to the stipulations contained in my note of April 1st, it became necessary to carry into effect the declaration contained in that paper by making corresponding preparations in the part of the British Government. As the most effectual means of doing so without embarrassing Your Excellency's decision, I resolved to bring the Light Division to Poona, an arrangement which was rendered desirable by many considerations. I accordingly announced this intention to the Durbar on the 20th and next day I presented the enclosed note and at the same time wrote to Colonel Smith to advance. The Colonel had already moved with the whole force towards Gardoon on the Beema, and he

commenced his march from that place with the Light Division on the 24th and arrived here this morning.

The body of Trimbuckjee's Horse that was pursued by Colonel Smith crossed the Neera at a place to the southwest of Baramuttee and the Beema at Coomargong. Some parted and many individuals separated from them about this place and beyond it, apparently with the intention of returning to their own country. This reduced the party from 4,000 to 3,000. During this period they were closely pursued by Major Smith of the 14th Regiment Madras N.I. whom Colonel Wilson had detached from the reserve a march to the south of the Beema. Major Smith came up with the enemy on the Para (?) after the admirable march which has already been reported to Your Excellency and beat him up at Patra as recounted in the same despatch. This occasioned fresh desertions to a great extent; many of the fugitives came back to Poona and the body was now reduced to 2,000. This body was taken up by Colonel Milnes on the Godavery as reported in his despatch of the 19th transmitted to Mr. Adam, and pursued down the Rajapoor Ghaut into Candeish by a Detachment of 300 men under the command of Captain Swayne of the 13th Regiment Madras N.I. At this place they were taken up by the Vinchoorkur whose own account of his proceedings I have the honour to enclose. He states himself to have taken many horses, but does not mention any loss on either side. During the period of this pursuit the body of freebooters that had been forming in Candeish was defeated by Captain Davies. On first receiving authentic intelligence of the commencement of this part of the insurrection, I suggested to Mr. Russell that the reformed Horse should if possible be prepared to check it. The reformed Horse were then acting against the Nairs in Berár, but orders for their recall were immediately transmitted and as promptly executed so that the first division of them arrived on the frontier of Candeish just as the banditti were assuming a tangible form. The gallant conduct of the Nizam's Horse and the complete rout of the insurgents that ensued, have already been reported to Your Excellency. The fugitives from this defeat joined the party from the southward and shared in the losses it met with at the hands of the Vinchoorker.

It appears to have been the intention of both parties to form a junction after which by the accounts of the prisoners they were to have come to Poona, but probably their plan was to have plundered the Country and to have taken advantage of any opening that might afford them a prospect of success against any of our Detachments or their supplies.

SECTION II

TREATY OF POONA AND AFTER MAY 1817—OCTOBER 1817

No 42—Elphinstone requests to be supplied with information for completing the survey of the Peshwa's dominions, bearing on the character and produce of the various tracts of the country

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN

Poona, 2 May 1817

Sir,

The survey of the Paishwa's dominions under Capt Sutherland being now in progress it becomes of importance to ascertain what parts of the country have been already surveyed, and likewise to embody all the information in the possession of Government in one map. On this principle, I some time since applied to the Government of Fort St George, and was furnished with such information as could be found in the offices of that Presidency. I beg leave therefore to suggest, that any documents relating to the tract in question, that may be deposited in the office of the late Surveyor General or in any other part of the offices under

It will probably be expedient at as early a period as may be practicable to occupy the northern parts of the Concan, on which subject we request you to correspond with Mr. Elphinstone and to be prepared to act on his suggestion.

Measures will be taken by the Government of Fort St. George under our instructions for occupying the southern portion of the Paishwa's possessions below the Ghauts by a movement of troops from Canara.

No. 44—Elphinstone gives a graphic narration of the manner in which he compelled the Peshwa into submission to obtain the delivery of three important forts.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 9 May 1817.

My Lord,

I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter dated April 6th on the morning of the 25th. The Light Division was then within a march of Poona, and it occurred to me as promising great advantages to request Col. Smith to arrange so as completely to surround the city on his arrival at his ground, and then to demand that the Paishwa should give hostages for the surrender of Trimbuckjee within a fixed time: to give His Highness a certain time to consider of this proposal and in the event of his not complying, to endeavour to force his palace and seize his person. This proceeding would have been justified by my declarations to His Highness which bound neither party longer than till the receipt of Your Excellency's orders, and which had besides been daily violated by His Highness. It would have been very important if successful, by preventing the Paishwa's escaping to his numerous forts, and thus finishing the war at a blow, but some considerations induced me to give up the plan and finally to determine not to attack the Paishwa in Poona at all, if it were possible to avoid doing so.

The first of these considerations was that notwithstanding my declarations, the mere circumstance of our keeping up our intercourse with him would lead the Paishwa to expect some formal notice before we proceeded to hostilities, and that from the manner in which we obtained our footing in the heart of this country, His Highness was entitled to more delicacy than a Prince going to war under other circumstances.

Another equally powerful consideration was the probable fate of the city of Poona. The inhabitants have been so much accustomed to look upon us as *friends that the approach of our troops and all our other preparations have excited no alarm. I believe indeed that the people in the city have more confidence in us than in the Paishwa. His Highness has not less than 7,000 Arabs and other infantry in Poonah besides his cavalry, and he possesses a fortified palace in the centre of the city. It is not therefore to be supposed that he could be seized without a struggle, and in the event of resistance it could scarcely be expected of any troops that they should distinguish between that part of the inhabitants which was hostile and that which was neutral. The city therefore would be exposed to the usual calamities of a place taken by assault and it would be the more felt as none of these people have removed their families and property. In addition to other more powerful motives for avoiding those evils was the unpopularity it would bring on any Government we might have to set up and on our own measures, which at present, I imagine, are rather looked on with approbation*

For all these reasons it appeared best to allow the Light Division to occupy its old ground at Kirkee about four miles to the north of the city; to wait for full instructions from Your Excellency; to proceed gradually with the Paishwa giving him full time to correct his mistakes if so disposed, and when it became necessary to attack the town, to begin by giving notice to the defenceless inhabitants to quit it, taking proper precautions to prevent the departure of the Paishwa and of his troops, if they should have continued in the city till the period. This plan was settled in communication with Colonel Smith who came in a day before the Light Division for the purpose of concerting the arrangements to be adopted.

After the arrival of the Light Division things went on as usual for the first two or three days. I received information during this time of the increase of the insurrection in Candéish, and of the junction of a body of troops from Hindoostan with one division of the insurgents at Bareindir. Another division appeared to be forming to the north of Nassick. These two divisions were represented in the native Akhbars that came to me and to Captain Sydenham, as amounting to 10,000 men in all but this must be greatly exaggerated. The party from Hindoostan is under Gungajee Rokelah and is said to be on the part of Scindiah, but it appears to be a part of the Barra Bhye, a famous body of free troops who were formerly attached to that prince, but I believe have now quitted him. The

insurgents to the southward were said to have disappeared from the country about Jut and Maun (where indeed the presence of Major Macdowall's detachment rendered it impossible for them to remain) and were represented to be in smaller numbers than before in the south of the Conkar and in the neighbouring parts of the Western Ghauts.

On the first of May I received information of the capture of Paishwa's fort of Purcheet Ghur by the insurgents which was also confirmed by the Durbar. On the 2nd Raghoo Punt came to me and said that the progress of the rebels had now reached to an alarming height, and that it became absolutely necessary for the Paishwa to take vigorous measures against them. The first object was to recover the fort which they had taken, for which purpose a force composed of that under Naro Punt Aptey and a detachment belonging to Goklah and Waumun Row Aptey should assemble near Karraur, and that some guns should be sent to it from Poona; that as the Marattas might be inclined to the rebels, Goklah had been ordered to entertain as many natives of their countries as he could; that to prevent the capture of any more forts His Highness intended to send military stores and other necessaries to all those belonging to his Government and to increase their garrisons, and that as the fort of Wassota was of particular importance and had no guns mounted on it, His Highness intended to send some to it. Considering all that had passed on the subject of the Paishwa's forts and preparations, I could not look upon this as a very undisguised attempt to obtain my acquiescence in his open prosecution of the measures on which I had so often remonstrated. I had long supposed that the rebels would be allowed to take possession of some of the Paishwa's forts, and the improbable account given by Raghoo Punt of the capture strengthened my belief in the collusion of the Paishwa's officers in the occupation of Purcheet Ghur. The rebels were represented to have introduced themselves as countrymen carrying bundles of grass in which they had concealed arms. This sort of stratagem is often practised in towns where many country people are allowed to carry their goods unsuspected to market, but it does not at all seem suited to a hill fort, where there is probably a small garrison, where there can be no market, and in all likelihood no great consumption of grass, as they are in general difficult of access to animals. Even if Purcheet Ghur has been taken by some independent insurgents and not made over to Trimbuckjee, the same measures that were successful on a similar occasion a year ago were the most likely to have been adopted on this

without general exertions and new levies of foreign troops, and without sending guns to Wassoota which, as it has been many months preparing for a siege, can scarcely be liable to be surprised by a rabble. I pointed out these suspicions and the grounds of them to Raghoo Punt, and said that the Paishwa's proceedings could not be misunderstood, that this was indeed no more than an open communication of the preparation he had so long carried on unavowed, that His Highness was at liberty to adopt any measures he thought proper, that the British Government was equally at liberty, and that whatever might happen after this His Highness could not complain of being taken unprepared.

On the 3rd I received intimation of the stopping of the post by the insurgents in Cuttack, which rendered it entirely uncertain when I might receive the instructions for which I had been so long looking, and obliged me to come to a resolution of acting without waiting for them. I understood by a private letter from Mr. Adam dated the 7th that the surrender of Trimbuckjee was likely to be made a preliminary to all negotiation, and it was the universal opinion here justified by all appearances, that the Paishwa would stand a contest rather than give him up. In the event of war there was little doubt that His Highness would fly to Ryghur in the Concan, where it would be impossible to carry on operations after the commencement of the monsoon. That season seldom commences in this part of India later than the 1st week in June, so that there was only one month left for this important operation, and considering the difficulty of transporting a battering train down the western ghauts, few of which are practicable for guns; and the still greater difficulty of bringing it up after the rains had begun, there appeared to be considerable hazard in undertaking the siege however early, and a certainty of ill success if it were any longer deferred. On the other hand, if the Paishwa were secure in Ryghur and had carried his brother with him, as he certainly would do, we should be unable to act at all in the Concan during the rains and equally unable to adopt any settled plan for establishing a new Government in the Deccan. From this last circumstance and from the peculiar situation of the Paishwa as nominal head of the Mahratta empire, it was probable that a lengthened contest would draw in the greater part of the Mahratta powers, if not the majority of the Mahratta nation. After fully discussing those subjects with Colonel Smith, it appeared to me highly imprudent to delay longer than the 6th which would give time for my instructions to arrive, supposing a duplicate to have been sent by Nagpore,

and supposing the Post Master at Cuttack to have taken measures for forwarding them by sea, to the undisturbed parts of the Northern Sirkars. I therefore took the first opportunity of a visit from Raghoo Punt, to point out the critical situation at which things had arrived, supposing the Paishwa determined not to apprehend Trimbuckjee, and on the 5th I sent a message to the Bhow to say, that I had a proposal of the utmost importance to make to him, that I should give it to him in writing at day-break on the 6th and that if he chose to send a person in his confidence I would accompany it with full verbal explanations. My proposal I said was of such a nature as must determine the question of peace or war in one day. In the evening Raghoo Punt returned with a request from the Paishwa, that I would attend him next evening. I agreed to this request and afterwards determined to delay the delivery of my proposals and to ascertain the Paishwa's sentiments on the simple question of surrendering Trimbuckjee unaccompanied with the limitation as to time, with the demand for securities and with the prospect of further demands. I enclose the original notes of my conversation with the Paishwa, the result of which was, that His Highness even when warned that his refusal would lead to open war within one day, still refused to enter into any engagement to deliver up Trimbuckjee.

The whole of the Paishwa's behaviour at this meeting displayed a degree of firmness very unusual to him, and his language at the same time that it was perfectly conciliatory, evinced considerable ability and perfect self-possession. His Highness's coolness during the whole of the present discussions has formed a contrast to his consternation during those after the death of the Shastery. At that time he shut himself up from the sight of every one, his measures were irresolute and bewildered, and his appearance betrayed the height of confusion and terror, but of late he has held regular Durbars, has entered into all his usual amusements and has spent much time in partaking of entertainments at the house of his chiefs in discussing his preparations with them, and in conciliating them by compliments and professions of his reliance on their courage and fidelity. He showed a temporary alarm for a day or two after the measures taken to increase the efficiency of the Poona Brigade; and likewise a few days ago when he sent for Mr. Jeffreys, the Surgeon of the Residency on pretence of consulting him about his arm, he showed evident signs of alarm, and told Mr. Jeffreys, that he saw the dangers of his situation, and was willing to purchase a renewal of our friendship by any sacrifice except that of Trimbuckjee. His

Highness's confidence appears to have been fastly founded on the prospect held out to him of success in the old Mahratta warfare of hill forts and flying armies, of plundering horse, and partly on a rooted conviction that we would not proceed to extremities. These hopes will perhaps account for his conduct, especially when combined with the favourite Mahratta maxim of holding out in every negotiation to the very last moment, without caring for the disgrace of ultimate submission.

On the morning of the 7th I sent in the enclosed paper to the Minister demanding that the Paishwa should engage, before the expiration of 24 hours, to surrender Trimbuckjee within a month from that day, and should give up the forts of Singhur, Poorunder and Ryghur, as pledges for his fulfilling his engagements. It was necessary for the reasons already stated, to give a short period for consideration and a large one could not be required at the end of a discussion of three months duration. I thought it advisable to allow a liberal term for the apprehension of Trimbuckjee, and it was absolutely necessary to take some security to prevent a repetition of the same illusory proceedings which I had already so often experienced. I accompanied the first memorandum with a note to the Bhow in which I adverted to the nature of your Lordship's probable demands, but assured him that if the Paishwa acceded to the preliminaries now proposed, those demanded should not go to deprive him of his musnud.

The Minister received this paper with so much indifference and put off delivering it to the Paishwa until after dinner for reasons so very frivolous, that his message would have appeared contemptuous but for the Mahratta practice above alluded to of putting on a bold face to the last. The whole day passed without a message from the Paishwa, and with an appearance of security which seemed to be intended to conceal a design of His Highness's leaving the city during the night. This suspicion was confirmed by the preparations which were made immediately after sunset. All the horse in the city got under arms and repaired to the neighbourhood of the Paishwa's palace; powder and ball were delivered out to them, and they were desired to be prepared to move at a moment's warning. One party of 1,000 horse, belonging to Goklah was led out by that chief in person to a place on the southern side of the city where it remained during the night. The general impression in the city was that the Paishwa intended to retreat, and so strong was my conviction of this intention, that I was on the point of writing to Col. Smith to put the cavalry in motion for-

the purpose of frustrating it. I however, thought it best to run the risk of the Paishwa's effecting his escape, rather than that of driving him to extremities while professing to offer him terms.

At this time I received a visit from Prubaukur Ballaul and Bapoo Coorekur, who came to apply for a delay of four days, which I decidedly refused. I enclose a detailed account of this conference, because an attempt has been made to misrepresent it. About 1 a.m. on the 8th Kishen Row came to request a delay of five days, and to beg that I would give up my demand for Ryghur, and be contented with Singhur and Poorunder. This of course was refused and Kishen Row was desired to acquaint the Bhow that though our other measures should proceed, the city should not be attacked until the unresisting inhabitants had been allowed time to withdraw. About day break Prabauker Pundit returned with a similar request to which I gave a similar answer. Part of this short conversation was important in one point of view, but need not be detailed in this place. By this time the troops had passed the Residency and I was on the point of setting out to join them, when Jaswant Row (the principal person under the Bhow) arrived with Kishen Row. The same attempts to obtain an alteration in the terms or delay in the execution, were now made once more, and on their failing, Jaswunt Row consented to give up the forts, after which a discussion took place about the time at which they were to be surrendered, and the means of removing the property. The time was at length made to depend on the arrival of our detachments alone, and no property was to be removed after possession was taken except the private property of the garrisons. Jaswant Row then requested that the troops marching to the town might be stopped or removed if they had arrived, but this was declined until the terms should have been carried into execution. It was indeed impossible to have stopped them, for although I lost no time after Jaswunt Row's departure, I did not reach the head of the line until Colonel Smith's operations were completed.

Colonel Smith had taken opportunities of making himself fully acquainted with all the outlets of the city, and had likewise been furnished with a very detailed plan of the place, drawn up for the occasion by Mr. Coates, Vaccinating Surgeon, as well as with an excellent map of its environs by the same gentleman. He had made his arrangements in the preceding evening and marched at day-light from his camp four miles north of the city. The Brigade under Lieut. Col. Leighton

Capt. Carnac has recently been at this Presidency and returned to Baroda about a week ago to resume the duties of his station. He has been fully apprised of the state of our relations with the Peishwa, and is prepared to carry into execution any instructions which may be conveyed to him, for obtaining possession of His Highness's territories in Guzerat at the shortest notice.

No. 46—The Resident communicates the news of his having taken possession of Sinhagad, Purandar and Raigad from the Peshwa's officers.

From—THE RESIDENT,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Poona, 13 May 1817.

Sir,

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I imagine the treasures have been partly removed from those forts, which is the more likely as they were in gold, but probably much is still buried within the walls.

No. 47—Government instructions regarding the settlement of the new Poona Government.

From—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, 17 May 1817.

Sir,

You were informed by my letter of the 7th April that the Governor-General in Council would at a further period communicate to you his decision on the important question discussed in the 36th and the following paragraphs of that letter regarding the re-establishment of the Government of Poona in the hands of Bajy Row, or the elevation of Chimnaies in the

No. 45—The Government of Bombay intimate their readiness to conduct a war against the Peshwa but they have suspended operations as the Peshwa promised to deliver Trimbakji in a month's time.

From—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Bombay Castle, 12 May 1817.

My Lord,

The secret despatch of Your Lordship in Council, dated the 7th of last month, reached us yesterday, and this morning we had the honour of receiving another despatch of the same date and to the same purport.

The confidential communication which had previously been made by Your Lordship to our President and our constant correspondence with the Resident at Poona, have placed us from time to time in possession of the state of his negotiations with His Highness the Peishwa; and according to the impressions which those communications were intended to convey, our proceedings have been regulated. Since the 29th of the last month, all the preparatory measures have been arranged for an attack on the fort and island of Bassein, as well as on His Highness's other possessions in that direction, and the force selected for this service has been in a state of readiness to proceed in execution of it, the moment we should learn from Mr. Elphinstone that any act of His Highness had justified the commencement of offensive operations.

We had, however, the satisfaction of learning from the Resident on the 10th instant that His Highness after obliging him to order the troops to surround his capital, had at last acceded to his demand of surrendering Trimbuckjee Dainglia within a month and to give up three forts as a pledge for the fulfilment of that engagement; and with the knowledge of this fact all our operations are suspended.

How far His Highness has or has not fulfilled that part of his engagements in respect to the forts, we have not yet been apprised, but we hourly expect to hear from Mr. Elphinstone on this subject, and shall arrange our further proceedings in concert with him, in the event of an unfavourable issue.

The information we have obtained of the state of the fort of Bassein affords no reason to doubt that possession of it might readily be effected, and according to the information we have received, no difficulty is to be apprehended in acquiring possession of His Highness's more northern dominions.

moved at the same time, and the city which is at least five miles in circumference was completely surrounded within three hours after day-break. The troops were so disposed that it was impossible for any person to quit the city without a contest, and the whole operation was conducted by Col. Smith with so much order, arrangement and temper, that not a shot was fired, notwithstanding several embarrassing and irritating circumstances.

About ten in the forenoon the Carkoons who were to deliver up Singhur and Poorunder made their appearance, and soon after the detachments moved off. I then voluntarily offered to withdraw the troops posted round the city, which I had before said should not be done till all the places had been given up. This was done within three hours after they had taken up their positions. The reserve which had reached Wadee, within 18 miles of Poona, and was advancing, was countermanded at the earnest request of the Paishwa's Ministers. The fort of Singhur was surrendered last night and Poorunder this morning. No treasure was found in the former, and I have received no details regarding the latter. More delay was made about Ryghur, the great depository of the Paishwa's treasures. The Carkoon did not arrive till three in the afternoon. When he did come, he misled the detachment and he was so mounted as greatly to delay its progress. After furnishing him with a detachment and guides of our own, the detachment set off again and ought to reach Ryghur by tomorrow evening. About five in the afternoon Colonel Smith moved off with the Light Division to a position about four miles to the south of the city where he still remains.

The people of the city observed the first operations of the troops with the greatest appearance of security, but when they saw the dispositions put up on both sides they began to apprehend a contest in the streets and showed considerable agitation and alarm. This ceased when the troops were removed, and except where their own security was endangered, the people of the city appeared to view the contest with the most perfect indifference. Gokla and Chintamun Row alone are said to have been indignant at the Paishwa's submission, and to have stood away from his palace, though he sent them messages of explanation and apology.

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The comparative advantages and inconveniences attending each of those settlements were stated in the dispatch above

referred to, and on mature deliberation it appears to His Excellency in Council that the re-establishment of Bajy Row under the prescribed conditions will on the whole be the most expedient arrangement.

Our knowledge of the artful and intriguing character of Bajy Row and his hostility to our power, will enable us to be on our guard against his machinations, while on the other hand his means of injuring us will be so limited as to afford little or no ground for apprehensions from his designs. The re-establishment of the Government in the hands of the same individual will be attended with less degree of disturbance to the general administration of affairs and occasion a slighter sensation in the public mind than the transference of power and authority to the hands of another, who would moreover in all probability notwithstanding every precaution against it, be exposed to the factions, oppositions and covert intrigues of the adherents of the former Prince. The entire ignorance which prevails regarding the character of Chimnaje, his inexperience and incapacity for public affairs which may be inferred from the life of privacy, as exclusive from all participation in them, in which he has lived from his infancy, the want of any individual weight, talents and character which might in the exercise of the office of minister supply the personal defects of the Prince, and the great probability that Chimnaje would not be found to be exempt from many of the characteristic vices of his family and his nation, all these considerations form powerful additional motives for endeavouring, if it be practicable consistently with the security of our interests, to effect a settlement with Bajy Row in preference to setting him aside in favour of Chimnaje or any other individual.

You will be pleased then to understand it to be the wish of the Governor-General in Council that the conditions prescribed in my dispatch of the 7th April be in the case contemplated offered in the first instance to the acceptance of Bajy Row, with a distinct intimation that if they are not accepted, his claims to the Government can never again be recognised, and that he must remain in a state of restraint in some distant station while another arrangement will be made for the Government of Poona. If he should accept the conditions and conclude a Treaty on the terms prescribed in the instructions above referred to, you will proceed immediately to secure the execution of the several provisions and make in concert with His Highness, the requisite arrangements for his resumption of the functions of the Government.

In the event of Bajy Row declining the proffered conditions, and that you shall have the means of communicating with Chimnajee, you will signify to him the disposition of the British Government to establish and maintain him in the Government of Poona on those conditions, and you will proceed to carry into effect an arrangement founded on this basis and to conclude with Chimnajee a Treaty on the terms prescribed.

Should the Paishwa have placed Chimnajee for the time beyond your means of communicating with him, or should Chimnajee, however improbable the case, decline the proposal, you will make such provisions for the administration of the Government through the instrumentality of the actual Ministers and public officers as may be practicable, until either circumstances shall in the one case enable you to complete the desired arrangement with Chimnajee or you shall, in the other, receive fresh instructions applicable to the supposed state of alliances from the Governor-General in Council, directly, or from His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop founded on the instruction which he may receive in the event of his having assumed the actual direction of affairs in the Deccan

In the event of the Paishwa falling into our hands and a settlement of affairs ensuing which shall exclude him from the Government, the disposal of his person and his family will become an object of primary consideration. It would be hazardous to the new settlement to suffer a person so skilled in the art of intrigue to remain in any fort of the Dominions of the State of Poona or their vicinity; at a distance, he might be permitted to enjoy a greater share of liberty than he could with safety be indulged in the other case.

The place of his permanent residence must be a subject of future deliberation; but the principal object will be to remove him from the Marhatta territory and place him in a condition of security until a final determination be taken. The Governor-General in Council desires that you will consult the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay on this subject and that you will take such measures as may be proper either for securing his person at Bombay or for sending him with his family to Bengal by such route as may be determined on. If the latter be adopted, you will lose no time in notifying it to the Governor-General in Council and in applying to the several public authorities whose assistance may be required to facilitate the object to the utmost of their power.

Whatever arrangement may be made regarding the settlement of the Government of Poona, and under any course of events resulting from the present state of our discussions with the Paishwa, the situation and interests of the Southern Jaggeerdars is a point demanding particular attention. It is one, however on which the Governor-General in Council can furnish you only with the most general instructions, indicating views and principles to be applied by you according to your own judgment formed on a nearer view of circumstances.

You will have understood from my dispatch of the 7th April that the Governor-General in Council did not contemplate the separation of that body of chiefs from the Government of Poona under any settlement, after the larger sacrifices to be required from that Government, the loss of its authority over the Jaggeerdars and the influence and power it derives from the possession of that authority would reduce it to a scale of insignificance, incompatible with the object of maintaining it as a substantive state. On the other hand the nature of the power and influence derived by the Government of Poona from its relations with these chiefs and the separate interests of the Chiefs themselves with relation both to the Paishwa and to one another is not such as to render it a probable instrument of danger or injury to our interests. In fact the British Government is the guarantee of the relations between the Paishwa and the Jaggeerdars, and while they look to the British Government as their protector against the oppressions of the Paishwa, he on his part relies on our support for the maintenance of his legitimate authority over them and the one enforcement of their stipulated services.

On the other hand the character and habits of these Chiefs and the terms on which they held their lands are not such as to afford the expectation that a more direct and intimate connexion between them and the British Government or what their separation from the Paishwa must end in, the transfer of their allegiance to us, would promote the advantage or tend to improve the confidence and goodwill of either party. It is unnecessary to pursue this view of the question, the justness of which will undoubtedly strike you. In any settlement of the Government of Poona then, it is to be assumed as a point decided on, that the Southern Jaggeerdars will remain substantially in their actual relations to that state. Whether any advantage would result from such a revision of their actual relations with the Paishwa, and modification of the terms of service as would improve their general condition is a question.

which may be worthy of consideration and on which His Lordship in Council would be happy to receive your sentiments.

In the event of a rupture with the Paishwa the course or proceedings to be held with regard to the Southern Jaggeerdars is a subject of considerable importance. There is no reason to suppose that the Jaggeerdars in general would be disposed to side with Bajy Row from any motives of personal attachment. On the contrary, it is known that they distrust and dislike him. Their proceedings would be regulated by a sense of their own interests, and if they were to oppose the British Government it would probably be partly from the influence of that national pride and hereditary feeling which would naturally render them solicitous to maintain the ancient form and system of the Government, and might dispose them to rally round their feudal chief however personally obnoxious, and partly from an apprehension that our success would be reducing them to subjection to the British Government, deprive them of the independence they now enjoy. The first step to be taken there is to inspire them with confidence as to their future condition. With this view means should be taken for explaining to them that the quarrel with the Paishwa has originated in causes nearly personal with regard to His Highness, but such as have compelled the British Government to provide for its own security against the designs which His Highness has formed against it. That in any issue of contest the British Government has no intention of adopting any measures that can affect the interests of independence of the principal chiefs of the State, and of the Southern Jaggeerdars especially in whose welfare and prosperity the British Government has always taken the most lively and active concern. That the British Government is prepared to renew either with Bajy Row or with any other Government of Poona that may be established, its guarantee of the relations between the Paishwa and the Jaggeerdars, and that it will continue to exert its powerful influence with the Paishwa in support of the rights of the latter, in the confidence that they will not fail in the general duties of obedience and in the performance of particular conditions of their tenure; that to entitle them to the countenance and favour of the British Government, however, they must declare themselves explicitly and distinctly in support of the cause which we espouse in the event of a revolution in the Government of Poona, and must be ready to co-operate to the extent of their means in the prosecution of such measures as we may adopt in that event.

By a declaration framed in this spirit and aided by a conciliatory and encouraging line of conduct towards the Jaggeerdars, it may be expected that the majority of them will declare themselves in favour of the measures we may pursue and will unite in their support. It may not be necessary however or prudent to exact a very strict performance of this condition, for as long as a prospect remained of Bajy Row being restored to power and of these Jaggeerdars again coming under his authority, we cannot expect them to be very zealous in their efforts against him, nor is it desirable to widen the breach which such a state of affairs would create more than may be imperiously required by attention to our security and interests. When once the Government of Poona is settled however, it will be an object of great importance to obtain the early and decided appearance of the Jaggeerdars in its support under the condition of their tenure, and the security of our guarantee.

It is not intended by these observations to shackle the exercise of your discretion on a point where so much must depend on local circumstances and personal character. In applying the principles here stated therefore, you will be governed by those considerations.

The conduct of Goklah in the late discussion has been of such a quality as to diminish in a great degree the claims he has established on the friendship and favour of the British Government by his former services. It is not probable however that he will risk the loss of that friendship and favour and the other consequences of our displeasure by an adherence to the desperate fortunes of the Paishwa, if that Prince really becomes involved in hostilities with the British Government and that a timely separation from His Highness's interests and cause, may enable you to extend to him the same benefit as is to be held out to the Jaggeerdars in general. This question will be decided by you according to Goklah's conduct at the time, and the effect which in your opinion our treatment of that Chief is likely to produce on the feelings and conduct of the other Jaggeerdars.

Appah Dessye has long since forfeited his claim to consideration arising from his conduct during the War of 1803, by a series of acts of the most wanton and unprovoked contumacy and disobedience to both Governments and it seems probable that the enmity he has naturally imbibed against us on account of our exertions to enforce his obedience to the Paishwa's orders, will be made use of by His Highness to make him act against us in his support. His Lordship in Council is of opinion however,

that it will not be desirable to drive Appah Dessye to extremities, and that he might even be conciliated by the hope of recovering a part of his lately resumed Serinjaumy lands on a promise of amended conduct in future.

These are the only remarks the Governor-General in Council has deemed it necessary to add to the general instructions above communicated. You will not consider them as constituting positive rules for your guidance, but as suggesting a course of proceeding which it may be expedient to pursue in the event of it being in your judgment applicable to the circumstances of the moment.

You will exercise your judgment with regard to the best mode of communicating with the Southern Jaggeerdars whether directly or through the Officer Commanding the Troops in that quarter, or by the deputation of an officer specially charged with that duty.

A copy of this dispatch will be transmitted to His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop.

No. 48.—The confinement of the Peshwa's agent Prabhakar Ballal is recommended by the Resident to the Bombay Government.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY-WARDEN.

Poona, 20 May 1817.

Sir,

A person named Prubhaker Bulal who has received a pension of Rs. 500 monthly from the British Government ever since the war in 1803, was for some time employed at the Peshwa's request as an agent between him and the Residency. I have long had reason to suspect this person of encouraging the Paishwa to proceed with his late intrigues and assuring him of impunity if not of success. These assurances derived weight from Prubhaker Bulal's supposed knowledge of the English character, and I have no doubt had a pernicious effect on His Highness's counsels. but it is in one point only that Prubhaker Pundit's guilt is established. This is the misrepresentation of my message to the Paishwa on the night before Poona was surrounded, the particulars of which are explained in the enclosed dispatch.

It is very desirable that so notorious an act of treachery should not pass unpunished and it is particularly to be wished that Prubhaker Pundit should be kept away from Poona until

our new relations with the Paishwa are firmly established, I propose therefore to send him under a guard to Tannah, and it will be of great advantage to the public interest, if the Right Hon'ble Governor will order him to be kept in confinement until I have the honour to address you on the subject. Prubhakur Pundit will be sent off on the 27th and if the Right Hon'ble the Governor approve of this suggestion, I hope he will issue the requisite orders to the officer commanding at Tannah to whom I shall direct him to be made over.

No. 49—The reconciliation of the Peshwa and his publication of the proclamation of a reward for the arrest of Trimbakji are reported.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 24 May 1817.

My Lord,

I have not addressed Your Excellency since 9th instant because I had no change to report in the Paishwa's conduct or measures. I am happy to have it in my power at length to state that he appears to be sincerely desirous to apprehend Trimbuckjee and to recover the favour of the British Government. Up to the middle of the month His Highness continued to use every exertion to put things in train for a flight from Poona. He issued three months pay to the troops in his service and continued to add to their numbers. His forces out of Poona continued to assemble near Satara in consequence of the orders they had formerly received. His principal adherents sent their families away from Poona and their example was followed by most people in the town whose circumstances admitted of it. His Highness also brought about an entire reconciliation with his brother with whom he is said to have interchanged the most solemn oaths. His Highness's plan at that time was thought to be to retire with his brother to Satara and after arranging for the security of the Rajah to proceed with the force under Narroo Punt Aptee (10,000 horse and foot) either to Wassotta or Dharwar. On the night of the 13th it was the universal belief that His Highness was on the point of quitting Poona in company with Gokla. All his horse were ready and by every account I have received he was nearer setting out than at any other period excepting perhaps the night of the 8th. He was however prevailed on to stay, and although he has shown several signs of his former system since then, I think he has been becoming gradually less inclined

to any desperate course. One proof of the continuance of his indiscreet conduct was his issuing 5 or 6 lacs of rupees to his principal Sirdars for their troops as late as the 17th instant.

During all this time the Paishwa sent frequent messages to me through Seddasheo Mankaisur requiring a prolongation of the period assigned for the apprehension of Trimbuckjee and requesting my consent to his going away from Poona on account of an eclipse. He first mentioned Nassick as the place he was going to, and afterwards Phool-Shehr. His Highness also attempted through the same channel to draw from me a disclosure of the terms which were to be imposed upon him if Trimbuckjee were seized. I declined complying with any of these applications observing that His Highness's beginning by soliciting a prolongation of the terms before he had made any exertions to fulfil Your Excellency's demand, looked as if he anticipated and intended a failure, that his quitting Poona at such a time was altogether inadvisable and that my orders were on no account to negotiate until Trimbuckjee was given up. At these interviews with the Paishwa's Ministers I took constant occasion to impress on His Highness the value of the time he was allowing to elapse and the impossibility of his persuading the British Government to accept of his exertions as satisfactory if they happened to be unsuccessful when his own procrastination had so obviously contributed to their ill success. I likewise took pains during the period to guard against mistakes and misrepresentations by reminding the Ministers of the serious demands that were yet to come even if Trimbuckjee were surrendered and by making as public as I could the real footings things stood on between the British Government and the Paishwa.

I had the honour on the 10th instant to receive Your Lordship's instructions conveyed in Mr. Adam's dispatch of the 7th of April, but considering the state of agitation in which the Paishwa then was, I thought the immediate communication of Your Excellency's sentiments might have too violent an effect on him. On the 14th when Colonel Smith had returned to his old ground north of the town and when the Paishwa's mind had become more tranquil, I presented a note of which the enclosed No. 1 is a translation, and accompanied it by repeated and earnest recommendations to His Highness to delay no longer the adoption of measures which were necessary for the preservation of his Government.

After this the Paishwa's personal alarm appears to have been removed, but he began to see more distinctly than ever the dangers with which his state was surrounded. He began to

express great anxiety about the conduct of the British Government at the expiration of the month and respecting the terms to be imposed if Trimbuckjee were surrendered. He wavered for some days between the different courses that were before him, sometimes consulting Sadasheo Maunkaisur and sometimes his rival Moro Dixit on the best means of obtaining good terms from the British Government, but oftener consulting with his old advisers the measures to be adopted in case of hostilities.

At length about the 20th instant he appears to have determined on yielding to the counsels of Moro Dixit. He then issued a proclamation offering a reward of 2 lacs of rupees and a village worth one thousand rupees a year to any one who would bring Trimbuckjee dead or alive promising rewards for any information regarding him and for the apprehension of his adherents and granting a pardon to all his followers who should desert him except 12 ringleaders, against whom as well as those who should refuse to come in on this proclamation, the severest penalties were pronounced. Many hundred copies of this proclamation have been distributed through our numerous detachments and sent to all our news-writers and other agents as well as to the Governments of Bombay and Madras and to all the Residencies.

Besides issuing the proclamation His Highness threw all Trimbuckjee's adherents who were confined in Poona into chains and sent them to different hillforts. He also sent orders to seize the families and destroy the houses of the 12 excepted from the amnesty and apprehended some others of whose offences I am not informed and gave the most public indications of a desire to proceed with rigour against Trimbuckjee. His Highness had before gone through the ceremony of issuing orders to his officers to seize Trimbuckjee and had desired Seddasheo Maunkaisur to employ a number of Hircarrahs in searching for him, but those steps made no impression on any one, especially as the undertaking was committed to the Bhow, whom His Highness is known to regard with distrust and dislike. His present activity is a contrast to his former indifference. He personally takes a great share in all the proceedings of his ministers and although he suffers the punishment of his habitual insincerity in the distrust with which all his professions are received, yet most people are now convinced that he is sincerely desirous of recovering the ground he has lost and of purchasing the security of his own person and Government by the sacrifice of the favourite for whom he has exposed himself to so many risks.

It is not certainly known where Trimbuckjee is at present, but it is thought he is in the hills to the south of the river Paira (?). He was reported to be expected at Alundee on the 12th with strong circumstances of probability. I sent a detachment of cavalry and infantry to apprehend him which failed from various causes. On the next day Colonel Fitz-Simons who commands the reserve at Corigaum received similar intelligence and sent a strong detachment to Alundee. This also failed and though there are some strong circumstances in favour of Trimbuckjee's having narrowly escaped both times, it is still doubtful whether he ever was at Alundee.

The insurgents at Candeish are reported to have assembled near Doorub (Dhodap) to the estimated number of 3,000. Colonel Doveton has detached Colonel Walker with a light force against this body. Colonel Doveton himself remains at Borenar with the main body of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

Col. Thompson's detachment is now near Punderpore. Its presence has effectually checked all attempts at insurrection in that part of the country which Col. Smith justly considered as the most disposed to rise. Col. Milne's detachment is at Ahmednuggur. The Vinchoor Jageerdar has again had an action with the party of the insurgents near Sungumnere and has killed several. The Putwardhuns except Chintamun Row remain at Lassore where they were posted by Col. Smith. Chintamun Row is at Poona, 1,000 of his horse have joined Narroo Punt Aptee. Appa Dessye has taken no part in these disturbances.

The Ranee of Suwunt Warree has succeeded in reconciling her chiefs and has shown every intention of carrying into effect the plan alluded to in the letter intercepted by Mr. Hale, but it is to be hoped the change in His Highness the Paishwa's conduct will have a great effect on hers.

Ballajee Coonjur died at Punderpore the 17th instant.

No. 50—The Resident forwards an improved draft of a new treaty with the Peshwa, and explains the reasons for the modifications he has suggested.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
To—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
FORT WILLIAM.

Poona, 4 June 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a draft of a treaty which I have drawn up under the instructions of His Excellency the Most

Noble the Governor General and which I propose to conclude with His Highness the Paishwa subject to His Excellency's ratification.

Most of the articles are in strict conformity to the directions contained in your letter and I shall have the honour to explain the reasons of any alteration or modification that I may have introduced.

The modification of the eleventh article of the treaty of Bassein contained in the third article of the present treaty, appeared desirable from the change that has taken place in our relations to the other European Powers and from the alterations that have been made in the Company's charters. If His Excellency should conceive that it is unfriendly to the other European nations, that objection may be removed by adding after the words "any Power whatever" the words "which may be at war with the British Government," the article of the treaty of Bassein will even then be much improved.

The last clauses in the fourth article are intended to preserve the Paishwa's rights over whatever we consider as his own immediate territories, but to great part of which he has no claim, but what is founded on his character of head of the Mahratta Empire. The Punt Sucheev for example has lands and forts within a few miles of Poona which he holds of the Rajah as the Paishwa holds his lands, and who is only kept out by the superior force of the Paishwa. Of this nature also is the Pritinidhi, the Maunhee and all the Maunkarees of the Rajah of Sattara.

the lowest and which his own minister was desirous to compromise by a cession of territory yielding seven lacs of rupees. I should have wished the Paishwa to have taken 40 or 50 lacs of rupees in lieu of all demands as I understood it would have agreed with the views of the Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay, but as the Paishwa's treasure is full, ready money is no object to him and the offer of an immediate payment would be much more repugnant to his wishes than of a perpetual revenue; while the Guykwar who is obliged to borrow would have to pay for the interest of the largest of the sums mentioned, a lac of rupees more than the whole payment now imposed on him. In case the terms should not be acceptable to the Guykwar, I have left him the option of accepting a discharge from future demands only and standing an arbitration of all that relates to past times which is precisely the case directed in my instructions.

In the sixth article I thought it advisable merely to stipulate for a commutation of the Paishwa's contingent for funds sufficient to maintain an equal number of horse and foot without imposing any restraint on the British Government as to the description of troops it was to maintain and even as to the general disposal of the revenue now ceded to it. For the same reason I do not intend to raise the troops in the Paishwa's name unless I receive further orders to that effect, but in the name of the Honourable Company.

In the cession which is the subject of the seventh article I have thought it necessary to make a considerable addition to the sum mentioned in my instructions. The expense there allotted to the Infantry is perhaps that which an equal number of men forming part of our army might cost, but it is not sufficient to pay an independent corps which must have its commanding officer, its staff, its ordnance pioneers and departments within itself. The present charge of eight lacs is calculated on the actual expense of the Paishwa's Brigade. I have likewise added a lac as was done in the treaty of Bassein to secure the Government from loss and to provide for the additional expense of our civil establishment. This raises the whole amount of the cessions to 34 lacs of rupees. I had wished to take the Concan as part of the territory intended to cover this, but the great reluctance of the Paishwa and the interest of every Brahmin about this court to retain the country where most of them have their patrimonies under a government which affords peculiar protection to their order, together with the fact that nearly half of the ryots are also Brahmins.

and consequently averse to any other than Hindoo rulers, induced me to alter my intention as far as relates to the Southern Concan. The part which lies to the north of the road has no more Brahmin inhabitants than any other part of His Highness's Dominions and would be ceded with as little reluctance. The following therefore are places I wish to insert in the Schedule :—

The Northern Concan	11,00,000
The Paishwa's possessions in Guzerat	10,00,000
The tribute of Kattewaur	4,00,000
Out of Savanore including the whole country south of the Wardha the fort of Dharwar and perhaps Koosigul	9,00,000

I should have preferred leaving the Paishwa's territories in Guzerat in His Highness's possession as the ease with which he can be deprived of them in case of war adds to his dependence on our Government. My instructions also require the farm of the Kattewaur tribute to the Gykwaur, but the following reasons have obliged me to adopt a different course. As the whole of the Concan could not be taken it would have been necessary if I had rejected Guzerat to have taken lands either in Candeish or in the Carnatic or in the central parts of the Paishwa's territories. The great advantage of Candeish is that a cession combined with other arrangements, which should put us in possession of the territories of Sindia and Holkar in the same province, would effectually cut off the Paishwa from the other Mahrattas and contribute more than any treaties to break the connection between him and his former feudatories; but without those arrangements the Paishwa's share of Candeish would be of little political importance and would be very expensive, difficult to settle and to protect and intermixed with the lands of foreign powers. Half the Paishwa's share of the province is moreover assigned in Jageer and our taking it would have a double effect in strengthening the Paishwa by throwing the burden of the cessions off his own immediate revenues and by drawing on ourselves the lasting enmity of the former possessors of those lands. The Carnatic would be much less exceptionable but it also has little political importance and the Paishwa's lands there are so intermixed with those of the Southern Jageerdars that it would be impossible to find any large portion of them so situated as not to expose us to constant disputes with those chiefs. A cession in the centre of the Paishwa's country would be very inconvenient to him and almost equally so to us, as it would be insulated, difficult to defend in case of war and impossible to

keep in order during peace. I was, therefore, compelled to turn my attention to Guzerat. An arrangement more advantageous to our own immediate interests might perhaps have been adopted in that quarter by taking the Paishwa's share of Ahmedabad for ourselves instead of obliging him to farm it to the Guykwar, and this would have been more advantageous to the Paishwa from whom we should have taken it as part of the cessions at a fair valuation, whereas the Gykwaur now rents it at $3\frac{1}{2}$ lacs beneath its actual produce. But recollecting our former unsuccessful endeavours to procure the farm of Ahmedabad for the Gykwar, the demand of that prince on the murder of the Minister to receive that territory as an atonement and the actual recurrence of the state of circumstances on which his demand was preferred, the Paishwa having by his fresh protection of Trimbuckjee lost all the benefit of his former surrender of him, it seemed probable that we should expose both our consistency and our disinterestedness to misrepresentations by taking Ahmedabad to ourselves. In delivering also the Paishwa from all loss in his transactions with the Guykwar, one object of the present arrangement would be lost as it is intended to weaken him as well as to strengthen ourselves. On the other hand I thought it more than probable that the most noble the Governor General was not fully apprised of the value of Ahmedabad when he ordered the farm to be granted on the former terms and I was aware that the Right Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay attaches peculiar importance to our obtaining the Paishwa's rights over Kattewaur. I, therefore, resolved to separate that source of revenue from the rest of the farm and to take it as a part of the cessions at such a valuation as should prevent our suffering by the expense of the arrangements requisite to levy the tribute and to maintain the tranquillity of the country. By this arrangement the Paishwa will lose four lacs of rupees less than by that contemplated in my instructions, but this is more than compensated by the addition to the cessions in commutation for his contingent and by other stipulations. The rest of the cessions I wish to take from the Carnatic where part of the Paishwa's joins on particularly to our own and where as in Guzerat the revenue of the new cessions may be levied without any additional expense.

The grant of pasture lands stipulated for in the 13th article was long since promised and is necessary in order to avoid many disputes originating in the want of land where our troops can forage since the country has recovered the effects of the famine of 1804.

The Paishwa's rights in Hindoostan arising from the treaty of Sergee Angengaom are mentioned in the 15th article to avoid exciting jealousy by an appearance of wishing to obtain the right of enforcing all the Paishwa's extensive and undefined claims over the chiefs of that country. The alteration in the terms of the farm of Ahmedabad is made in consequence of some of the former ones referring to the temporary occupation of that district by the Gykwaur and being now inapplicable.

The terms relative to the Southern Jageerdars in the 17th article are the same that were entered into the treaty of Punderpore, but which have never been authenticated by the Paishwa's signature. Those stipulate for the advice of the British Government being taken on the period of the service of the Jageerdars. I have added a similar stipulation regarding their musters which have hitherto proved a fertile source of disputes, and I have insisted on previous consultation on all orders, because the Paishwa was constantly in the habit of countermanding orders that he had delivered through me, although he held the British Government bound to punish the infringement of any order issued with its knowledge. This practice was often the result of carelessness but it was sometimes designedly resorted to as in the case of Rastia for the purpose of misleading a Jageerdar and drawing on his ruin. The restoration of the whole or a part of Rastia's Jageer has long been an object of recommendation on the part of the British Government. The Paishwa's sequestration of it was in fact an evasion of the terms of Punderpore, as there is now no reason to doubt that during the time when the Paishwa was pressing me to call on Rastia to move out his contingent on pain of confiscation, his minister was secretly holding out to him that the case was not urgent and that the Paishwa had no design to injure him. The success of this strategem, I am afraid, had a considerable effect in shaking the confidence of the Jageerdars in the efficacy of our protection against the Paishwa's machinations, and I therefore gladly seize the opportunity of the present step which is at once just, politic, and popular.

The Paishwa's occupation of Mailghaut in the first instance was contrary to the Treaty of Bassein and it is advisable to discourage such irregularities. The possession of it is of no use to the Paishwa but as a favourable station for foreign intrigues and as giving an opportunity of annoying the Nizam from whose officers I receive incessant complaints of the encroachment of the Paishwa's representative in that quarter and of the derangement of the established state of things by

his intrusion. I therefore inserted in article 18 a demand for the evacuation of that place.

I had in my first draft proceeded for the indemnification of the Vinchoorkar by the Paishwa for the loss of his lands in Hindoostan, unless His Excellency should be pleased to allow him to retain them as a fief of the British Government. This last arrangement I explained to Balloba (who manages the Vinchoorker's affairs) was in all probability entirely inconsistent with the plans formed by the Governor General for the disposal of the lands in Hindoostan, but that the frequent services of the Vinchoorkur with our troops, the established character of his family, his late activity against the insurgents and above all the great share of Balloba himself in the present ministry with which I had so much reason to be satisfied, would induce me to suggest the measure for his Excellency's consideration. This message was communicated to Balloba through such a channel as enabled him to speak his sentiments in reply. His answer expressed his gratitude but decidedly rejected my offer of inserting a demand for an indemnity which he said would run him with the Paishwa. He gave no reply to the remaining part of my message.

I hope the modifications I have ventured to introduce into the treaty may meet the wishes of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General. I have endeavoured to make them as little odious to the Paishwa as was consistent with their professed object of imposing an effectual restraint on his power and at the same time to leave as few subjects for future disputes as possible: but some of the articles which are merely corroborative of the terms of the treaty of Bassein, must derive all their value from the strictness with which they are enforced and must consequently give much occasion for disgust to the Paishwa. Of this nature is the stipulation for the exclusion of Wukeels. I shall endeavour to carry these points in such a manner as to give as little offence as possible, but whatever may be done to conciliate the Paishwa, we must depend more on his fears than on his friendship for a continuance of tranquillity.

No. 51—Elphinstone communicates to the Governor General the sudden opposition of the Peshwa and his Court to the new treaty.

From—THE RESIDENT,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 6 June 1817.

My Lord,

On the 28th ultimo I communicated the details of Your Excellency's demands to the Paishwa through Major Ford. After all the care I had taken to prepare his mind His Highness was still shocked at the magnitude of the sacrifices he was called on to make. He showed great aversion to the stipulations of Gykwar and of Rastia, but his greatest disgust was for the demand of the Concan. Next day that he saw Major Ford, Gokla, Ballaba and Moro Dikshit were present. They all declared against the terms. The Paishwa's language was chiefly in a tone of entreaty acknowledging his misconduct, begging forgiveness and promising amendment. Gokla said the terms were intolerable and would break the Paishwa's heart. Ballaba said the offence did not deserve such a punishment and Dikshit observed that no native power could from its habits conduct itself with such strict fidelity as we seemed to demand, that if we insisted on these terms the world would blame our rigour and say the Paishwa had been imprudent in connecting himself with us. All admitted the Paishwa's breach of the treaty but said he never intended us any real injury.

I have since received constant messages to the same effect from the Paishwa to which I have answered that the terms, of course, must be disagreeable as their intent is to restrain, but that all things considered they are very lenient, a great part of the Paishwa's sacrifices being nominal and the rest little more than would have been required by a strict execution of the treaty of Bassein; that they were absolutely necessary for our own safety, the experiment of trusting the Paishwa having been fairly made at much risk and with no success. That it was groundless to attribute the Paishwa's present misfortune to his connection with us. It was not making the treaty but breaking it that

that it would soon be beyond my ability to assist him, that the period was now come and however I might regret the situation to which he had reduced himself, I must obey my order.

After the Paishwa gave up all hopes of setting aside the principle of the new treaty, he endeavoured to procure alterations in the terms. He begged we would take troops instead of funds for the contingent or money, instead of land we might reckon his Dominions in Hindoostan as part of the cession of 34 lacs. He made similar proposals regarding the other articles the rejection of which paved the way for more serious negotiation

The remaining discussions took place at a meeting which I had with Moro Dikshit and Ballaba, one was on the 26th of May before I had made known Your Excellency's demands and the others were on the 1st and 4th June I have the honour to enclose notes of those conferences which were taken immediately after they were concluded by Captain Pottinger, 2nd Assistant to the Residency. I hope Your Excellency will accept them instead of regular reports in the usual form as my time is much occupied in expediting the conclusion of the treaty.

The Paishwa's Government is taking measures against the insurgents. The houses of three of those excepted in the proclamation have been confiscated and some of their families put under restraint. Trimbuckjee's house at Neemgong has also been confiscated.

The rebels under Godajee must have dispersed. Colonel Walker had reached Wuni near Nassick without being able to discover their retreat, he lost all intelligence of them as soon as he ascended the Ghauts from Candeish. I intend to request him to return to Colonel Dovelon's camp. As soon as the treaty is in train of execution, he may go into cantonments at Jaulna, unless his presence should be required at Ellichpoor.

No. 52—Treaty between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Bajee Rao Rughonath Rao Pundit Purdhan, his heirs and successors, concluded at Poona, on the 13th of June, by the Honorable M. Elphinstone on the part of the Honorable Company, and by Moro Dixit and Ballajee Luchmun on the part of the Rao Pundit Purdhan, by virtue of full powers from their respective Governments,—1817.

Whereas a Treaty of general defensive alliance, consisting of nineteen Articles, was concluded at Bassein between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder; and whereas seven Articles of Agreement, supplemental to the said Treaty, were agreed on at Poona between the same powers; and whereas certain disputes have

since arisen which it is the desire of both parties to remove; with a view to adjusting the said disputes, and to the better fulfilment of the said alliance, the following Treaty has been concluded between the two States:—

Article 1

Whereas Trimbuckjee Dainglia, by the murder of Gungadhur Shastry, the public Minister of the Guickowar State, rendered himself obnoxious to public justice, and it became the peculiar duty both of the Honorable East India Company's Government and of that of His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder to inflict on him such punishment as might mark their detestation of his crimes and deter others from committing the like atrocities: and whereas Trimbuckjee Dainglia has escaped from the custody of the Honorable East India Company's Government, to which he was made over by Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder, and has since added to his crimes by assembling banditti and committing various acts of plunder and murder, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder solemnly engages never to afford to the said Trimbuckjee any countenance or protection whatever, but to use his utmost efforts to seize and deliver him up to the Honorable East India Company; and until such time as the said Dainglia may be delivered up, the family of the said Dainglia are to remain as hostages in the hands of the Honorable Company's Government. His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder also engages severely to punish all who participated in the said Trimbuckjee's rebellion, and who have not surrendered themselves according to His Highness' proclamation

Article 2

All Articles of the Treaty of Bassein, and of the Supplemental Articles concluded at Poona, which are not contrary to the tenor of the present engagement, are hereby confirmed.

Article 3

By the eleventh Article of the Treaty of Bassein, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder engages to dismiss all Europeans, Natives of States at war with Great Britain, who shall meditate injury towards the English. His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder now engages never to admit into his territories any subjects of any European or American power whatever, without the previous consent of the British Government.

Article 4

By the (17th) seventeenth Article of the Treaty of Bassein, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder engages neither to commence nor pursue in future any negotiations with any power whatever, without giving previous notice to, and entering into mutual consultation with, the Honorable East India Company's Government; in order to the more effectual fulfilment of this Article, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby engages neither to maintain Vakeels or other Agents at the Court of any power whatever, nor to permit the residence of Vakeels or other Agents from any power whatever at his Court, and His Highness further engages to hold no communication with any power whatever, except through the Resident or other Minister of the Honorable Company's Government residing at His Highness' Court; and His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby for himself, and for his heirs and successors, recognizes the dissolution in form and substance of the Mahratta confederacy, and renounces all connection whatever with the other Mahratta powers, whether arising from his former situation of executive head of the Mahratta Empire, or from any other cause. Nothing contained in this Article shall affect any rights which His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder may possess over any chiefs of the Mahratta State between the Rivers Nedbudda and Toombuddra, and to the west of the western frontier of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions, who are now in obedience to His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder. His Highness, however, renounces all claims on the Rajah of Colapore, and on the Government of Sawunt Warree, and engages to advance no claims on the lands of their Highnesses Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, and the Guickwar which may be situated within the limits before-mentioned.

Article 5

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder specially renounces all future demands on His Highness Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder, whether resulting from the former supremacy of the said Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder, as executive head of the Mahratta Empire, or from any other cause; but as various demands and papers of accounts, arising from certain unfinished transactions, subsist between the Government of His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder and the Government of the Rajah above-mentioned, which His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder agreed, by the fourteenth Article of the Treaty of Bassein, to submit to the arbitration of the

Honorable Company's Government, those demands are hereby declared to be in force as far as relates to past times ; but His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder now consents, that in the event of the payment of the annual sum of four lakhs of Rupees by Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder, the above agreement shall be set aside, and the said Rajah shall be discharged from all claims whatever on the part of the said Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder. In case His Highness Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder should not consent to the payment of the annual sum of four lakhs of Rupees, then the agreement above-mentioned, which forms part of the (14th) fourteenth Article of the Treaty of Bassein, shall remain in force and binding on both parties, but His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby distinctly renounces all future claims on His Highness Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder

Article 6

In the fourth Supplemental Article to the Treaty of Bassein, it is agreed that in time of war His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall appoint and furnish five thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores, to join and act with the British subsidiary force, and in addition thereto, His Highness agreed to employ in the war such further force as he shall be able to bring into the field. That Article is hereby annulled ; and in lieu thereof it is agreed that His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall place at the disposal of the British Government sufficient funds for the payment of a force of five thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, and the provision of a due proportion of ordnance and military stores ; on the fulfilment of which engagement the British Government shall have no further claim to the services of the contingent above-mentioned. But His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall still be bound as formerly to co-operate in the war with such a force as he may be able to bring into the field ; the Honorable Company in the same manner engaging to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the subsidiary force.

Article 7

To enable the British Government to supply the place of the contingent above-mentioned, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby assigns, and cedes in perpetuity, to the Honorable Company all the territories and rights detailed in the schedule annexed to this Treaty, and His Highness expressly

renounces all claims and pretensions of whatever description on the countries enumerated in the said schedule, and all connexion with the Chiefs and Boomeas of those countries.

Article 8

As it may be found that certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing Article may be inconvenient from their situation, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line a good and well defined one, agrees that such exchange of talooks and lands shall be made hereafter, on terms of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as the completion of the said purpose may require, and it is agreed and covenanted that the territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honorable Company by the (7th) seventh Article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated eventually in this Article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company and their officers.

Article 9

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder will immediately issue the necessary purwannahs, or orders to His Highness' Officers, to deliver over charge of the districts ceded by Article seventh to the Officers of the Honorable Company, and it is hereby agreed and stipulated, that all collections made by His Highness' Officers, subsequently to the commencement of the Hindoo year (answering to the 5th of June 1817 A.D.), shall be carried to the credit of the Honorable Company, and all claims to balances from the said districts, referring to periods antecedent to the conclusion of this Treaty, shall be considered as null and void.

Article 10

All forts situated within the districts ceded as aforesaid shall be delivered to the Officers of the Honorable Company, with the said districts, and His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder engages that the said forts shall be delivered to the Honorable Company without being injured or damaged.

Article 11

It is further agreed that if disturbances shall at any time break out in the districts ceded to the Honorable Company by this Agreement, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops as may be requisite, to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts.

Article 12

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder on his own part, and on the part of his heirs and successors, hereby cedes to the Honorable East India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the Fort of Ahmednuggur, together with as much of the adjoining country as may be within two thousand (2,000) yards of the fort, measured from the foot of the glacis. His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder engages to furnish such pasture lands as may be required for the use of the subsidiary force, at the most convenient place adjoining to the cantonments of the different divisions of the said force; and although by the spirit of the Treaty of Bassein the British Government is already entitled to send such troops into His Highness' territories as may appear requisite for the fulfilment of the terms of that Treaty, yet to remove all doubts on that point His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder further engages to admit the residence, within his dominions, of any number of British troops in addition to the subsidiary force that the British Government may think necessary, and to permit all British troops to pass through all parts of his dominions without obstruction, provided that nothing in this Article is to entitle the British Government to make any demand on His Highness for the expense of the additional troops so residing.

Article 13

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby cedes to the Honorable East India Company all his rights, interests, or pretensions, feudal, territorial, or pecuniary, in the Province of Bundelcund, including Saugor, Jhansi and the lands held by Nana Govind Rao, and agrees to relinquish all connection with the Chiefs in that quarter.

Article 14

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder for himself, and for his heir and successors, hereby cedes to the Honorable East India Company all his rights and territories in Malwa, which were secured to him by the 11th Article of the Treaty of Surje Anjengaum, and generally all rights and pretensions of every denomination which he may possess in the country to the north of the River Nerbudda, excepting those which he possesses in the Province of Guzerat; and engages never more to interfere in the affairs of Hindostan.

Article 15

His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder formerly rented his share of the City and Province of Ahmedabad, including the tribute of Kattiwar, to Bhugwunt Rao Guickwar, at the rate of four lakhs and a half of Rupees per annum, and granted a Sunnud to that effect under date the twenty-seventh Jemadee-ul-Akhir (1205) one thousand two hundred and five. The tribute of Kattiwar formerly comprehended in that farm has been ceded to the British Government by the seventh Article of the present Treaty. His Highness now agrees to grant the remainder of the said farm in perpetuity to His Highness Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder, and to his heirs and successors, on the same terms as those contained in the above-mentioned Sunnud, dated the twenty-seventh of Jemadee-ul-Akhir A.H., one thousand two hundred and five (1205), excepting the terms contained in the second (2nd), eighth (8th), eleventh (11th) and fifteenth (15th) Articles, which are hereby abrogated and annulled. In consideration of the greatness of the actual revenue of the City and Province of Ahmedabad, and likewise of the loss to which His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder has already been subjected by his renunciation of all future claims on His Highness Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder, and by his accepting an annual payment of four lakhs in lieu of all claims actually due up to the present day, it is agreed that the former sum of four lakhs and a half of Rupees shall still be paid for the farm of Ahmedabad, notwithstanding the separation of the tribute of Kattiwar.

Article 16

Whereas certain Articles of Agreement (six in number) regarding the settlement of the southern jaghiredars were presented by the Resident at Poona to His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder, on the 6th of July, one thousand eight hundred and twelve (1812), A. D., to which, after a modification suggested by His Highness and submitted to him on the seventh of the same month, His Highness gave his entire consent, those articles are hereby recognized and declared to be binding on both parties, as much as if they formed part of the present Treaty; and whereas various disputes have arisen regarding the muster of the troops of the said jaghiredars, and the manners, and periods of their service, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder hereby agrees to be guided entirely by the advice of the British Government with regard to those subjects, and to issue no orders to the jaghiredars without full concert with the

British Government; His Highness hereby agrees to restore to the said jaghiredars any of the lands included in their Sunnuds which may now be in His Highness' possession; and in consideration of the recommendation of the British Government His Highness hereby consents to restore to Madhoo Rao Rastia the jaghire formerly held by him and resumed in the year one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and to permit him to hold that jaghire as formerly, under the guarantee of the British Government.

Article 17

The fort and territory of Mailghaut having been taken possession of by the troops of His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder without concert with the British Government, and His Highness' occupation of that fortress having since occasioned various inconveniences to the other allies, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder engages to withdraw his troops from Mailghaut, and he hereby renounces all claims and pretensions to the said fort and territory, and to all other territories occupied by his troops during the expedition of one thousand eight hundred and eleven.

Article 18

This Treaty, consisting of eighteen Articles, being this day settled and concluded at Poona by the Honorable M. Elphinstone, Moro Dixit, and Ballajee Luchmun, Mr. Elphinstone has delivered to His Highness the Peishwa a copy of the same in English, Persian and Mahratta, under the seal and signature of the said Honorable M. Elphinstone, and His Highness the Peishwa has delivered to the said Honorable M. Elphinstone another copy, also in English, Persian and Mahratta, bearing His Highness' seal, and the Honorable M. Elphinstone aforesaid has engaged to procure and deliver to His Highness without delay a copy of the same, duly ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble Francis Marquis Hastings, K. G., Governor General etc., etc., in Council, on the receipt of which by His said Highness, the present Treaty shall be deemed complete, and binding on the Honorable East India Company and on His Highness the Peishwa, and the copy now delivered to His said Highness shall be returned.

(Peishwa's Signature),
Hastings.
N. B. Edmonstone.
A. Seton.
G. Dowdeswell.

Ratified by the Governor-General in Council, this fifth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, at Fort William in Bengal.

J. Adam,

Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

No. 53—A very interesting narrative is herein communicated by the Resident, detailing the various objections that the Peshwa and his agents took to the provisions of the proposed Treaty and recounting many past occurrences in the discussion. After great reluctance the Peshwa signed the treaty.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 15 June 1817.

My Lord,

I have this day had the honour to transmit to Mr. Adam a copy of the treaty drawn up under Your Excellency's instructions, signed and sealed by the Paishwa. The following is an account of the discussions that preceded the final settlement.

On the 7th of June Moro Dixit and Ballaba came to the Residency. The conversation began by my reminding them the month allotted for Trimbuckjee's apprehension would elapse the next day, and that neither had Trimbuckjee been apprehended nor had the Paishwa reduced his army, that there was therefore but one way left for His Highness to show his sincerity, which was by the speedy signature and execution of the treaty. Moro Dixit went into some details respecting the measures that had been adopted for seizing Trimbuckjee and alluded to the Vinchoorker's having overtaken another party of the rebels and cut up 40 or 50 of them. This had before been communicated to me, and I took the opportunity of complimenting Balloba in his Chief's exertions.

We then began to discuss the terms of the treaty against the whole of which Moro Dixit protested in the Paishwa's name as harsh and rigorous if not unjust. I replied that I was aware they must be disagreeable to the Paishwa, but that unfortunately it was no longer left to the British Government to consult His Highness's feelings. It must now attend to its own safety. This led to a long conversation in which the ministers attempted to show that the Paishwa had not merited such rigorous treatment, which I answered by pointing out the great lenity that had been practised towards

His Highness, and the impossibility of trusting him longer, after the solemn promises he had broken. I also showed that the little injury the British Government had suffered was entirely owing to its own precautions, and to the premature discovery of the Paishwa's designs but that his armaments open and secret, and his intrigues at home and abroad, left no room to doubt of the badness of his intentions.

Moro Dixit next said that the Paishwa objected to the expressions in the treaty implying agreement or consent on His Highness's part. He said that His Highness submitted because he saw no remedy, but that he neither agreed nor consented. I replied that His Highness was a free agent, and might withhold his consent, if he preferred the alternative. If His Highness thought it worth while to give this price for peace, he could not say he did not consent to it.

Moro Dixit then said, there were some particular parts of the treaty to which he had objections to make if I would allow him. I begged him to say all that he thought proper without disguise, and he immediately objected to the murder being attributed to Trimbuckjee in the first article. He said that His Highness was not at all convinced of that person's guilt, and consequently could not assert it in a public instrument. I then recapitulated the proofs of Trimbuckjee's guilt, dwelling on those which His Highness had selected as tests of the truth of my accusation. I reminded Moro Dixit of the frequent occasions on which His Highness had withdrawn his assertions of Trimbuckjee's innocence on being offered an enquiry. I said I had proofs still in my possession, and that I must now put it out of His Highness's power to recede on this important point. Moro Dixit declined any investigation, and said he did not deny that Trimbuckjee might be guilty, but he wished some sort of a veil to be thrown over the question. I said it was impossible, as everything turned upon that point. If Trimbuckjee was innocent, the whole proceedings of the British Government were unjust and oppressive. Moro Dixit then objected to the surrender of Trimbuckjee's family to the British Government on the ground of its notoriety, and proposed that they should be left in the hands of the Vinchoorkur, which I resisted, observing that the chief use of the surrender was to give publicity to the Paishwa's renunciation of all connection with Trimbuckjee, and that the mere confinement of helpless women and children was no object to the British Government.

Moro Dixit next requested an alteration in the article in which His Highness renounces his claims as head of the

Mahratta Empire, and talked of the sacrifices of honour that he made by releasing those chiefs from their dependence. He talked of their obedience until very late days, as proved by the attendance of Sindia and Holcar at Poona. I said the dependence of those chiefs was a mere illusion, that as early as the treaty of Salbye between 30 or 40 years ago Sindia agreed to join us against the Paishwa, or the Paishwa against us, as he or we might break that treaty, after this I said it was absurd to talk of him as a servant of the Paishwa's.

That Dowlut Row was here as a master not as a servant and Holcar as a conqueror. Moro Dixit said it was to remedy all these disorders and to reduce his servants to obedience that His Highness made the Treaty of Bassein. To this I opposed the article by which it is stipulated that the force is not to act against the Maharatta Chiefs, and Moro Dixit replied that he had it from the Paishwa's mouth, that Colonel Close at first while at Poona engaged to reduce Sindia and Holcar and all the Paishwa's other dependents into obedience on him, that the Paishwa had in consequence rejected the most submissive offers from Holcar who even after he had taken Poona, acknowledged the Paishwa for his master and offered to come to Bassein alone if the Paishwa would receive him. That after the Paishwa had broken with his own chiefs, Colonel Close altered his terms and inserted the present article; that the Paishwa was much astonished and, his Ministers said, that after such a breach of faith, His Highness ought to have broken with us and gone to Broach to Sindia, but His Highness found this utterly impossible and being thus entirely in our powers he signed the treaty of Bassein against his will. I said Holcar's submissive language while he kept the Paishwa's capital, showed exactly the difference between the allegiance professed by the Maharatta Chiefs and the obedience they paid in reality. That His Highness must have forgotten the negotiations that preceded the treaty of Bassein so far from any agreement to reduce the great Maharatta Chiefs, the first proposal of the Subsidiary Treaty contained a stipulation that the principal of those chiefs should be invited to accede to it, that a proposal had been made at one time to drive Sindia out of the Deccan and to release His Highness from his dependence on that chief, but never to reduce Sindia into dependence on His Highness. That as to the separation from all the rest of India to which His Highness represented himself to be reduced when at Bassein. His Highness must remember that he never for one moment threw himself entirely on the British Government; so far from breaking with all the world and clinging to us, he had treated with our mortal enemy Tippoo in the

midst of his negotiations with our Government; he had sent Seddasheo Maunkaisur to induce the Nizam to break with us, and he never showed a sincere disposition to close with us, till he saw he could not keep his ground in his capital. While he was negotiating the treaty of Bassein, he sent off Ballajee Conjur to Sindia, and even when he had signed it and we had gone to war with Sindia in support of him, he corresponded with the common enemy and encouraged him to hold out against us. On an opening which was afterwards afforded I once more took occasion to impress on Moro Dixit that the treaty of Bassein had nothing to do with the Paishwa's present losses which were the punishment of aggressions on his part, and would have been earlier inflicted if he had not been in alliance with us.

Moro Dixit then had recourse to submissive and personal appeals to me, which I answered by expression of concern and references to my orders; on which he asked me to lay the matter once more before Your Excellency or to suspend the negotiation till His Highness had time to send a paper to Your Excellency containing comments on the treaty, article by article, or at least to suspend the execution of the treaty after it should be signed until an answer should be received from Your Excellency. All these were rejected as equally impracticable with the request that I would alter the treaty.

The countries to be ceded were next discussed, and many attempts made to procure alterations in my demands. but I stated that I had made great sacrifices in giving up the Southern Concan, and hoped no further objections would be made to my proposals. The chief resistance was to my demand of lands in the Carnatic, especially that of Darwar and Coosigul, and of the lands south of the Warda which are almost surrounded by the British Dominions. The Ministers endeavoured to prevail on me to take Omerkair in Berar or some unsettled districts near Baugulcote, which in our hands, they said, would soon be quieted. They also proposed to give the lands of some of the southern Jageerdars which lay contiguous to our territories, granting them indemnities in some other place; and to this I said I saw no objection, provided it were as acceptable to the Jageerdars as the Paishwa. The conference ended by Moro Dixit promising to bring papers from the Paishwa's records to show the value of the lands of which I required the cession.

On the same evening the Paishwa sent for Major Ford and went over the whole of the terms with him. He complained in very strong language of the rigour of the terms, and said

they exposed him to future perils by marking out so narrow a path for him that it was scarcely possible for him to keep it without swerving. He made another effort for Trimbuckjee's family and said he was afraid if he failed in apprehending Trimbuckjee, he might get into more difficulty hereafter. To this last remark I replied through Major Ford, that if His Highness attempted to screen Trimbuckjee, he no doubt would be placed in the same situation as before, and all his present sacrifices would be thrown away; but if he sincerely endeavoured to fulfil his engagements he need be under no apprehension. His Highness's other remarks were nearly the same as those made by his ministers. The following were those on which he laid most stress. He objected to the words heirs and successors throughout the treaty. He said the maintenance of Vakeels was necessary to his honour as was his nominal supremacy over the chiefs; as to the reality he never professed it and for that reason we ought to be under no uneasiness about the semblance. In discussing the cessions His Highness expressed a great desire to collect the balances due from the countries, without which he said he would be subjected to very heavy loss. He also wished to have permission to remove his treasures and even his guns from the forts to be ceded in which I acquiesced. He objected to the cession of the land round Ahmednuggur, and to the stipulation for pasture lands, which he said was unnecessary. He expressed peculiar mortification at the demands for Bundelcund and other places in Hindostan, and said that among other bad effects, he was prevented making exchanges and other arguments which he had contemplated. His objections were equally strong to the farm of Ahmedabad. He said of the 16th article that the terms of Punderpore, though he had never agreed to them, were sufficient for all purposes; he offered to give up Rastia's Jageer of his own accord if the stipulation might be struck out of the treaty, and to conclude he desired his right to Mailghaut might be enquired into. I readily consented to his proposal regarding Rastia's Jageer on condition that His Highness would write a letter to me desiring me to consider Rastia under the guarantee of the British Government as before, but this His Highness declined as having all the bad effects of an article in the treaty.

On the 9th the Ministers came again and after a discussion of the terms in the same spirit as before produced a statement of the revenues of the countries to be ceded in the Concan and in Guzerat. This statement made the amount of revenues greater than I believed it to be and it proved to refer to the amount of revenue assessed in former times and not to that

now produced by the country. The ministers, however, assured me I should find the present amount of the collections not inferior to that assigned. I begged, however, that I might see the actual accounts for the last ten years, and these the Ministers promised to bring early the next day.

On the same evening the Paishwa sent for Major Ford, and charged him with a conciliating message to me expressing his desire to go on well with the British Government hereafter and hoping he might be treated with the same respect and attention as formerly, to this I replied by suitable assurances.

The Ministers did not appear till near evening on the 10th. Moro Dixit then came accompanied by Baupoo Currundeekur, a personal favourite of the Paishwa. Moro Dixit began by stating the revenues of the Concan to be much above my estimate. He said the receipts were the same as they had always been, but that very great reductions had been made in the expenditure, especially since His Highness's alliance with us enabled him to give up his fleet, the whole expense of which formerly fell on Bassein, and rendered it unnecessary for him to keep such strong garrisons in his forts or such numerous detachments throughout the country. My estimate of the revenues of Guzerat was not, he said, much wrong. He then produced some very imperfect accounts of the revenues of Bassein for three years only, and said that the other accounts could not then be found. On this I remarked that every settlement that depended on His Highness's records must of course be slow, and that I should therefore alter the schedule annexed to the treaty in such a manner as to admit of the territories in the Concan and Guzerat being made over immediately, leaving those in the Carnatic to be fixed on after the amount of the others was settled, only giving up at present the forts of Darwar and Koosigul. The schedule which accompanies the treaty was therefore drawn up and on its being read, Moro Dixit made another stand for Darwar and Koosigul, and at length for Koosigul alone. He also wished me much to estimate the tribute of Kattiwar at 5,55,000 rupees without deducting the expense of collecting it; but I reminded him that as the 34 lacs were meant for a specific purpose they must come into our treasury free of all deductions.

This also was my answer to a very long continued attempt to persuade me to calculate the expenses of management in the Concan at the very low rate at which they are actually carried on by the Paishwa's farmers of revenues, instead of that which is established by the rules of the Government and which appears in the official accounts of the farmers themselves. The

farmers make their collections by letting out the revenue to under farmers who repeat the operation or cover their expenses by unavowed collections and acts of extortion, and there are no courts of justice, so that the provision which suffices for this sort of management would never be adequate to our civil establishment. The Paishwa keeps up scarcely any troops in the Concan, and although it may not require many under us, it will some. On the other hand Moro Dixit urged that the former expenses were out of all proportions; that 4,000 men were allowed to garrison Bassein etc., and I therefore fixed that I would examine the former expenses and strike off what seemed superfluous before I deducted them from the gross revenue. After this Moro Dixit earnestly requested that the Paishwa might be allowed to collect the balances of last year, and on my objecting, he begged we would collect them for him, urging that nearly half the revenue remained unpaid till the Dassera and would be lost both to the Paishwa and to us. I declined complying with this request which was very much dwelt on chiefly because I was uncertain whether the 34 lacs will pay the original expenses of setting up the new military establishment and therefore was unwilling to make any pecuniary sacrifice. It was now very late and Dixit observed that in my list of the divisions of the Concan I had omitted many little districts dependent on forts, which together would considerably swell the revenue and he agreed to bring detailed information on this topic the next day.

On the 11th the former solicitations were renewed chiefly for the balances of revenue and for Dharwar and Koosigul and also for other alterations in the terms and for delay in signing the treaty until the value of the cessions should be finally settled. To these I replied that I was acting under orders and had done as much as I could to meet His Highness the Paishwa's wishes, and that in particular I could agree to no delay, nor was any necessary as the course I had proposed would not at all delay the settlement of the value of the cessions. I concluded by expressing my strong hopes the Ministers would be prepared, to sign themselves on the following and procure His Highness's ratification the next day.

On the 12th Moro Dixit was accompanied by Ballaba and on my producing the treaty both renewed their entreaties for relaxation in the terms of the treaty and for delay in executing it. After this both earnestly solicited that I might recommend the case of the Vinchoorkur to Your Excellency's consideration, to which I answered that the stipulation for granting him an

indemnity which I had inserted in the treaty showed my wishes on the subject; but that I was afraid Your Excellency's policy in Hindoostan would require a different disposal of those lands, that I would however, report the request. Darwar and Koosigul were now once more begged for and the treaty was afterwards allowed to be read article after article.

At the 3rd article Moro Dixit enquired why the Americans were now mentioned in addition to the Europeans. At the 9th a very strong stand was once more made for the balances now due from the ceded countries. The last form of the request was that I should submit to Your Excellency the Paishwa's desire that our officers should account to His Highness for the balances actually due at the time of the cession. On the 10th they remarked that we had not given the Paishwa time to injure the forts if he wished and on the 11th that it was quite unnecessary. They objected to the 12th article because the 2,000 yards would include part of the Pettah of Ahmednuggur together with the village of Bhingar. I explained our reasons for insisting on the Military limits, and said we would consider the subjects of the town and village again, after the ground had been measured. Moro Dixit said if we required pasture lands near Poona, we should occasion much inconvenience to the town; but I reminded them that many of His Highness's chiefs had already such lands. He likewise required particular explanations about the right of introducing troops into His Highness's territories. When the 16th article was read, the Ministers said the Paishwa now wished to adopt the method I had suggested regarding Rastia's Jageer, to which I said I had no objection except the time that would be lost in making our new copies of the treaty and that if His Highness was anxious about this alteration I would agree to it. The Ministers after consulting said if I would not consent to any of the more important alterations they did not care about this. I then proposed that we should sign the treaty but they observed that as the Paishwa would sign it himself the next day their doing so was unnecessary. I therefore sent the treaty to the Durbar along with a list of the orders and other papers required to put it in a train of execution and next day His Highness signed the treaty in Duplicate and received the copy under my signature.

Previously to the conclusion of the treaty His Highness summoned all his chiefs and Ministers to a council at which the terms were considered. Many amendments were proposed but when they were shown to be unattainable, the signature of the present treaty was agreed to.

His Highness has throughout shown his repugnance that is natural to a transaction that requires so many sacrifices of him, and he is now anxious to communicate direct with Your Excellency both to prove his innocence and to obtain some remission by entreaty. For this purpose he talked of sending a vakeel to Calcutta, which I encouraged, and I likewise took occasion to inform him that Sir John Malcolm with whom he was already well acquainted, would probably be here before long on his way to undertake another charge that was committed to him, that he would come straight from Your Excellency's quarters, and would be perfectly qualified to make him acquainted with Your Excellency's sentiments and to transmit his to your Excellency. His Highness has also sent many polite and concillating messages to me expressive of his sense of the distinction between act of personal inclination and public duty and of his desire that every unpleasant feeling occasioned by the late transactions might be forgotten. To these I replied by strong assurances of a wish to conciliate His Highness's favourable opinion by every act of respect or goodwill in my power. His Highness appears to be still very desirous of establishing the fact of Trimbuckjee's innocence or at least of the want of proof that he is guilty; ever since the treaty was signed he had a long conversation on this subject with Major Ford at which he displayed his usual eloquence and address and enforced his sentiments with an air of sincerity so engaging and persuasive that even Major Ford's knowledge of the falsity of all his allegations could scarcely prevent the impression his discourse was calculated to make.

His Highness is now extremely anxious to go on his annual pilgrimage to Punderpore in which I have acquiesced, provided everything connected with the execution of the treaty is completed before he goes. There is no objection to this journey, which will contribute to produce an appearance, and in some measure the reality of a reconciliation, except the chance of His Highness's going off to some of his forts and refusing to fulfil the treaty. But this is extremely unlikely to take place. His Highness might effect his escape from Poona as easily as from any other place, and if His Highness really wishes to break with us, the sooner he does so the better.

No. 54—The family of Trimbakji Denge is sent in confinement to Thana.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 18. June 1817

Sir,

The 1st Battalion being on its march to the Concan I have taken that opportunity of sending the family of Trimbuckjee Dainglia under its escort in order that the Right Honourable the Governor may order them to be confined in whatever place he may judge the most expedient. It is unnecessary for me to suggest that as these persons have been guilty of no offence themselves but are mere hostages for the conduct of another, they should be treated with the utmost consideration and indulgences that their situation admits of.

No. 55-Minute.

22 June

Ordered that the Commandant of Tannah be called upon to report what accommodation can be allotted within the Fort of Tannah for the family of Trimbuckjee Dainglia, and directed to make the best arrangement he can for that purpose. The number of persons composing the family of Trimbuckjee will be communicated to Colonel Osborne as soon as the Governor in Council may be apprized thereof.

No. 56—The surrender of territory by the Peshwa and the fulfilment of other stipulations of the treaty by him are reported to the Governor-General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 18 June 1817.

My Lord,

I have the honour to report the steps that have been taken in fulfilment of the treaty.

On the 16th the Paishwa sent me orders of surrender for the Northern Concan and Guzerat and for the districts of Darwar and Koosigul. The orders stated that these lands were granted "for the previous year as a Jageer to maintain troops". The

orders were then transmitted to Bombay with the accompanying letter. The first Battalion 4th Regiment N I. marches tomorrow to occupy the Northern Concan. I shall take that opportunity of sending Trimbuckjee's family who are to be delivered over today to Bombay or Tannah. I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter I have written on the subject to Mr. Warden.

I have received the order for the fort of Darwar and am only waiting for that for Koosigul to dispatch both to Fort St. George. I have long since apprised the Right Honourable the Governor that these cessions would require to be taken possession of.

I have received and shall forward to Bombay a grant of Ahmedabad in perpetuity to the Guicawar on the stipulated terms, and an order to the present occupant to make it over to that Government.

Orders of surrender for Rastia's lands have been made over to him. He complains of some few places being withheld but imagines his right to them is capable of dispute.

I shall forward by this post to the Secretary in the Persian Department five copies of a proclamation under the seal and signature of His Highness the Paishwa announcing the transfer of his rights in Hindoostan to the British Government. Five more shall be sent by another post.

I have received an order of surrender for Mailghaut and shall forward it to Mr. Jenkins as a less offensive method of enforcing it than through the Nizam's Government.

His Highness the Paishwa sent me letters of recall addressed to his vakeels in Sindia and Holcar's camps and at Nagpoor. I shall apply for similar letters to any other vakeels that appear to have been omitted. Holcar's Vakeel sent his Carcoon to me yesterday (being ill himself) who announced that the Paishwa had declared to the Vakeel that he had no further concern with his master and had dismissed him. The Vakeel, he said, had replied that he would report what had passed to his Government and wait its orders. The Carcoon was charged with many messages expressive of compliance with our wishes and dependence on the British Government alone. I replied that it had been settled between the British Government and the Paishwa that no Vakeels were to remain at Poona, but that I begged him to believe that Holcar's Government would not suffer by the change and that nothing in it was designed against that Durbar. I concurred in the propriety of his reference to his court. The Carcoon then stated the Vakeel's old age, his long residence at Poona, his frequent business with me about his

Master's lands in the Deccan, the state of the season and other reasons for his remaining at Poona and I recommended his withdrawing to some of Holcar's possessions or to his native village which is 40 miles off. I professed myself perfectly satisfied in the Vakeel's conduct and said the present measure originated from no distrust of his Government, but in fulfilment of a general arrangement. On this the Carcoon enquired whether if Holcar's orders admitted of it, I would allow the Vakeel to remain at Poona. I said one exception would authorize others and the whole agreement become nugatory. I have received a similar visit from the Raja of Berar's Vakeel to whom I held the same language allowing for the difference of the relation between his Government and ours. Sindia's Vakeel is to be here this evening.

I yesterday evening waited on the Paishwa who received me in company with Moro Dixit, Balloba, and Gokla. I addressed him on the disagreeable occurrences that had taken place assuring him of my conviction that Your Excellency would again regard him with as friendly sentiments as ever, and would take the same interest in the preservation of his dignity and the increase of his prosperity. I also said that although I had been so unlucky as to represent Your Excellency's Government during unpleasant times, His Highness might believe that I anxiously wished for the welfare of his state and that it would give me great pleasure to be the instrument of anything that contributed to his gratification. The Paishwa in person as well as through Dixit and Gokla replied by assurances of the permanence of his friendship for the British Government and of his dependence on it for the future. He also made use of expressions of personal civility to me. This language was repeated in various forms on both sides. His Highness though he showed no want of cordiality, was more moderate in his professions than he often is, and on the whole bore some appearance of depression.

His Highness marched for Punderpore this morning. At His Highness's request I have taken measures to prevent any of our troops entering the town while he is there. The ground of His Highness's application was the fear of disputes between his people and ours.

No. 57—The Commandant of Thana reports what sort of accommodation was available in the fort for Trimbakji's family.

From—H. S. OSBORNE, LT.-COL., COMMANDANT
AT THANA,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Thana, 24 June 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date the 22nd instant and also that of the 23rd with its enclosure from the Resident at Poona, all of which arrived at the same time this morning. In obedience to the directions of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council I beg to report that the quarters which have been hitherto allotted to the Sergeant Major of the garrison consisting of a front verandah, a hall with two bedrooms and a few outhouses appear to me as the only accommodation which could be immediately adapted to the reception of Trimbuckjee's family. This report is given under the idea that the family consists of women and children and that one sentry by day and two at night will be adequate to watch over them, but if men are also to accompany them I should conceive it advisable to place them during the night in some separate and more secure apartment.

If men are mixed with the women, one end of the bomb-proofs at present under charge of the commissary of stores and containing a fireplace might be allotted to the reception of the whole; in that case it would be required to build a small necessary within the limits of the railing.

I beg leave to add that the quarters allotted to the Sergeant Major are not at present occupied, no one having yet been appointed to that situation; but should any person be appointed I would provide quarters for him temporarily in another part of the fort.

In case of the family being attended with followers I should be happy to be furnished with instructions respecting them. The prisoner now under my charge has three followers, two Brahmins and a Mahratta, the latter of whom is only allowed to quit the fort under charge of a sentry for water and the provisions daily required by the prisoner are brought from the bazar for him by the Havildaur on duty.

No. 58—Elphinstone presents to the Commander-in-Chief an epitome of the Paishwa's resources, revenue, army, his character, and that of the various Chieftains, together with their feelings towards the British Government.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—SIR T. HISLOP, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Poona, 28 June 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for Your Excellency's notice a copy of a dispatch to H. E. the G. G. dated Novr. 20th 1815 containing an account of the resources and character of the Paishwa's Government. I have likewise the honour to enclose an account of the principal persons in H. H.'s Govt. and three letters on the state of our relations to the Paishwa during the late discussions.

These papers may be useful for reference, but it will save Your Excellency's time to give the results of them in as few words as possible.

H. H.'s revenue used to be something under two crores and 30 lacs of rupees, his late cessions have reduced it about 60 lacs but this loss is greater in appearance than reality as 20 of the 60 lacs have reached H. H.'s treasury. The remaining sum of about one crore and 58 lacs is actually received by H. H. or his officers; of this, 75 lacs is at his own disposal and about 83 lacs are allotted to Jageerdars for the maintenance of troops. The Paishwa's expenditure used to be about 65 lacs of rupees. He will probably reduce it now, but at all events his expenses will always be much within his income. He is said to have treasures amounting to from 2 to 5 crores of rupees.

Most of the Paishwa's revenue is farmed, which occasions much extortion from the people but on the whole his country is as well governed as most others under native governments.

In ordinary times the troops in the Paishwa's immediate pay amounted to 5,500 horse and 12,000 foot and those paid by Jageerdars to about 20,000 horse and 6,000 foot, but of these last he could not except in particular circumstances command the services of more than 10,000 horse and 4,000 foot. His own troops have been greatly increased of late and are now again reducing so that it is difficult to fix their numbers; but I do not think by any exertion he could raise more than 25,000 or 30,000 horse and 20 or 25,000 infantry within three or four months. His troops are all very indifferent. His great strength is in the number of strong forts that he possesses. Most of them are hill forts in the western ghauts of the chain in which

Chandore is situated. These owe their principal strength to nature, but Bailgaum and Nepauny in the Carnatic and several other places belonging to the Paishwa or his chiefs are situated in the plain and are well fortified.

The Paishwa himself is by nature ambitious and imperious, though the gratification of his passions is frustrated by his extreme personal timidity. He is false and deceitful to the last degree and consequently suspicious and distrustful. These contradictory qualities give him an appearance of inconsistency, but he is in reality most obstinate in his pursuit of any object on which he has once determined, especially when he has an injury to revenge. Though indolent and voluptuous, he is active in intrigue and attentive to his pecuniary concerns. He is as strict in religion as he is lax in morality. He was hostile to the British Govt before the treaty of Basseen and even after it, until the success of the Maratta war. He was well affected for several years after that event till he had settled his own country and began to look to combinations abroad and to restoring the Maratta empire. He is now of course our mortal enemy, but as he is in the habit of submitting to fortune and waiting patiently for the success of plots and intrigues, he will never show his hostility while we can work upon his fears. His operations against us, open or secret, will probably never be entirely laid aside and the degree to which they are carried on will depend entirely on the prospect of danger resulting from them.

H. H.'s present minister is Moro Dixit. Scddasheo Maunkaisur who long held that office probably lost H. H.'s confidence. Moro Dixit appears attached to H. H.'s and aware of his true interests, and it would probably be fortunate for the Paishwa if he retained him in administration, but as he has no power or influence and not much talent, he depends for his office on the Paishwa's favour, which is seldom of long continuance. He is besides opposed by H. H.'s secret advisers whose councils though they tend to the ruin of the state are supported by H. H.'s wishes and consequently by the applauses of all his courtiers. The state of the Paishwa's Durbar is explained at length in the enclosed letter of May 27th to Mr. Adam

The next person in rank to the Paishwa is his brother Chimnajeo Appa, who though a quiet and inoffensive man, is regarded by H. H. with jealousy and aversion. H. H. has, however studiously and to all appearances successfully conciliated him since he was threatened with a rupture with the British Government. He has also been very vigilant about the imprisoned Raja of Sattara from whose investiture the Paishwa

derives his pretensions to the supreme authority, but who seems to be an object of indifference to his nominal subjects. Amrüt Row, the Paishwa's adoptive brother and for a long time his rival, now resides under our protection at Benares and is regarded by the Paishwa with hatred and alarm.

The greatest of the Paishwa's military Chiefs at present is Gokla who has a Jageer for 3,000 cavalry and 2,500 infantry with guns. He also commands a great part of the Paishwa's new levies and is more consulted and trusted by H. H. than any other man in his Darbar. He owes his greatness to the Duke of Wellington and has never been thwarted or disobliged in any respect by the British Government. Yet he was the Paishwa's principal adviser in his late hostile proceedings, and is said to have been much discontented with H. H.'s subsequent submission. His interest is to keep well with us and he seems to bear us no enmity. It is probable therefore he was led on by a wish to please the Paishwa and to make money by his levies which he probably knew would end in nothing, but it is not impossible that when he was once engaged he may have felt or affected some shame at the Paishwa's dastardly retreat from the conspiracy which he had taken so much pains to form. He now professes great attachment to the British Government. But it is impossible to say whether he would adhere to the Paishwa or to his own interest in any dispute that may take place with us. He is a steady, brave and respectable chief and one of the ablest men in the State of Poona.

Appa Dessye was also raised by the Duke of Wellington, though an old adherent of Sindias, but he has since been disgusted by our protection of the Raja of Colapore whom he had destined for his prey. He kept aloof in the late discussions and probably hates us and the Paishwa equally. He is now raising men in the hope perhaps of some disturbance by which he may profit. His Jageer is small and his contingent only 2,000 horse and 500 foot, but he has two strong forts and his reputation is high. He is violent, oppressive and unruly, but active, energetic and much dreaded by his neighbours.

The family of Patwardhan have Jageers amounting to 21 lacs of rupees for the maintenance of 6,000 horse. One-third of the whole belongs to Chintaman Row, a capricious and irritable chieftain who has quarrelled with the other members of his house and connected himself in the late disturbances with the Paishwa, hitherto the implacable enemy of the whole family. His fidelity could not however be reckoned on. The other 7 chiefs are a good deal influenced by Madhoo Row

Dadjee, the son of Perseram Bhow. They distrust the Paishwa and depend on the British Government. They would probably be neutral in a war between us and the Paishwa but as they are also nearly neutral in our contests with the Pindaries we do not gain much by their friendship.

Rastia having been persecuted by the Paishwa and protected by the British Government is probably well disposed to us, but his resources are exhausted and his talents insignificant.

The Dessye of Kittore is a tributary Polygar as well as a Jageerdar; in the latter capacity he is under our guarantee. The Paishwa wishes much to seize on his territory for which he has afforded some pretence by withholding his tribute. His country is strong, but he is of no consequence out of it. He would probably be glad to see us embroiled with the Paishwa, as giving him a chance of asserting his own independence.

All these Chiefs are under our guarantee. None of the other Jageerdars are of much note, except the Vinchoorkar. The present Jageerdar is a fine young man and gave much satisfaction to Col. Smith with whom he served; but he is a mere cypher, his Dewan Balloba being supported by the Paishwa in the entire control of the Jageer. Balloba is a prudent, sensible old man, always inclined to moderate measures and now entirely dependent on us as half the Jageer being in Hindostan, has been ceded to us by the late treaty and he hopes to be allowed to retain it under the British Government. His situation in Hindostan connected him much with Sindia and Holkar and he thus became a principal channel of the Paishwa's intrigues at the courts of those Chieftains. If his lands are not granted to him he will probably employ those connections against us.

By this statement it appears that there is no party in the state particularly attached to our interests; on the other hand independent of the Paishwa's enmity, we have no party decidedly hostile to us, and no part of the people feels that rancorous ill-will towards us which is or was at one time common about Mahommedan capitals. The soldiers probably look on us with an evil eye as lessening the call for military service and narrowing the field for plunder. The men of business who are out of employ are disposed to intrigue against us and the number of this description will be increased by the late cessions which are also unpopular of themselves.

There are at present disturbances in different parts of the Paishwa's country especially in Candeish and in the Ghauts to the

S. W. of Sattara. These are the remains of the late insurrection and their extinction will depend on the Paishwa's sincerity in his professions of amendment and on our own vigour. We may leave the disturbance to the southward to the Paishwa as it seems really to be directed against him, but we must depend on our own exertions for quelling that in Candeish.

The late treaty provides against all intercourse between the Paishwa and foreign states and all avowed agents may be easily removed, but it is impossible to cut off all private channels of communication, and in the event of any war or prospect of war beyond the Narbudda they will require to be watched with more vigilance than ever. All the principal persons at the courts of Sindia and Holkar are natives of this country with which no treaties can break their connection. There is also a national feeling amongst all the Marattas which disposes them to confederate and which might prove powerful if there were a man of genius at their head or if they were driven to make common cause by common injuries; but it is not strong enough to hold together the discordant tempers and jarring interests of the various princes among whom the Maratta nation is now partitioned.

There are two states in this neighbourhood independent of the Paishwa, that of Colapore which has been for five years connected with us by treaty and which seems sensible of the advantages that have resulted from our protection, and that of Sawant Waree where the hostility of the Govt. and the turbulence of the chiefs keep up an unceasing spirit of encroachment on our neighbouring possessions. These encroachments must be put up with for the present but we shall probably be obliged at the first moment of leisure either to settle that country effectually or to conquer it altogether.

No. 59—Instructions are issued to the Bombay Government about the management of the Ahmedabad farm transferred from the Peshwa's control to that of the Bombay Govt.

From—SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,

To—THE PRESIDENT AND COUNCIL, BOMBAY.

*On the Ganges, near Rajmahl,
15 July 1817.*

Hon'ble Sir,

On the 5th of this month the Governor General in Council had the honour to notify to Your Hon'ble Board the ratification

of the treaty concluded by Mr. Elphinstone with His Highness the Paishwa on the 12th of June and to signify his request that you would take the necessary steps for occupying the cessions in the Concan and Guzerat stipulated in the treaty, and for giving effect to such of the other provisions of that engagement as referred to your authority or influence.

Having since my departure from the Presidency entered into a detailed examination of the several provisions of the treaty, and having communicated to the Resident at Poona his sentiments and instructions arising out of it, I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the treaty and of the dispatch addressed under my authority to Mr. Elphinstone, and to request your attention to those parts of them, the execution of which will devolve on Your Honourable Board or the officers under your immediate orders.

Your Hon'ble Board will concur in the sentiments I entertain regarding the advantage of having obtained for the Guykwar the option of commuting the Paishwa's claims on him for the annual payment of four lacs of rupees per annum, and in my hope that the Guykwar will accept this settlement. You will of course have instructed the Resident at Baroda to commence a negotiation with the Guykwar for this purpose. Should it fail through the perverseness or unreasonable expectations of the Government of Baroda, it will be necessary to bring to a close without delay the long pending arbitration of the Paishwa's claims, so far as they relate to time past. With regard to His Highness's prospective claims, their absolute and unqualified relinquishment must be considered as an important advantage to the Guykwar, not merely with reference to their estimated pecuniary amount, which at the lowest value is equal to three lacs of rupees per annum, but to the complete exoneration of the Guykwar from every specie of dependence on the Government of Poona, a circumstance which cannot fail to afford the highest gratification to the former Court. The Guykwar has been a material gainer too by the renewal in perpetuity of the farm of Ahmedabad at a rent of four lacs and an half of rupees, being not more than half of its actual produce. For my opinion generally on the subject of the advantages acquired by the Guykwar under the new treaty, I have the honour to refer you to the remarks on the 5th and 7th articles of that engagement in the instructions, of which a copy is enclosed.

I request your attention to the suggestion contained in the 19th paragraph of the enclosed instructions relative to the probability of our being able by exchanges of territory with the

Guykwar to improve the continuity and compactness of the territories of both States. You will be pleased to take this subject into your immediate consideration, and to adopt the necessary measures for effecting an arrangement of the nature proposed if you shall deem it to be expedient and practicable.

Your Honourable Board will, I conclude, without awaiting the receipt of my instructions, have taken such steps as you deemed requisite, founded on the cessions to the Hon'ble Company of the Paishwa's tribute from Katteewar which has been transferred at an estimated clear profit of four lacs of rupees per annum. This arrangement combined with the other provisions of the treaty regarding Guzerat and the neighbouring provinces for the exclusion of the influence and authority of the Paishwa's Government, cannot fail to produce results highly beneficial to the interests of the Chiefs and people, and of the British and Guykwar Governments.

I have instructed Mr. Elphinstone to correspond with you relative to the appointment of officers to raise and discipline the troops to be raised under the sixth article of the treaty, and I request you to comply with any application you may receive from him to that effect, until a permanent arrangement shall be made on the principle stated in the 12th paragraph of the instructions to Mr. Elphinstone.

You will observe that I have desired Mr. Elphinstone to communicate with Colonel Smith with regard to the comparative urgency of the repairs required for the fort of Ahmednuggur which, now that it has become a permanent possession of the British Government, ought to be placed in a respectable state of defence. Mr. Elphinstone will communicate to Your Honourable Board the result of his reference to Col. Smith, and I request that you will give orders for the immediate commencement of the most urgent repairs or alterations as they may be pointed out by that officer, and for executing the rest in succession according to their relative importance. I shall hereafter have the honour to communicate to you my decision regarding the rendering Ahmednuggur a depot for the military stores of all the troops in the Deccan, excepting the Nagporé Subsidiary Force. In the meanwhile I shall be happy to receive any suggestion that may occur to Your Hon'ble Board on that subject.

Mr. Elphinstone has reported to me, that he has placed at your orders the family of Trimbuckjee Dainglia, who have been delivered up as hostages under the terms of the treaty. It is superfluous to observe that as these persons have not parti-

icipated in Trimbuckjee's guilt and are merely hostages, every practicable consideration for their situation will be manifested by the officer who may be charged with their custody.

Mr. Elphinstone has already been instructed by the Governor General in Council, in the event of Trimbuckjee's surrender to concert measures with Your Hon'ble Board for sending him to Bengal.

No. 60—The visit of Sir John Malcolm to the Peshwa and the discussion in his presence between the Resident and the Peshwa's ministers on several subjects is reported to the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, August 10, 1817.

My Lord,

Sir John Malcolm arrived here on the 5th instant. I had met him about 20 miles from Poona on the 4th and he was received by Ramchunder Punt Kurrundeekur on the part of the Paishwa about four miles from the city. The Paishwa having requested to see Sir John at Maholy near Sattara he set off for that place on the night of the 7th in company with Moro Dixit and Major Ford.

He was received with great cordiality and he took advantage of the footing on which he appeared as an old friend and well-wisher of the Paishwa's to impress on him every consideration that could reconcile His Highness to the past or turn his mind to hopes for the future. I have no doubt this interview will have the best effect in conciliating the Paishwa and in diverting his thoughts from the gloomy reflections in which he appeared to be indulging. Sir John returned on the morning of the 10th and left Poona for Hyderabad on the 12th.

While Sir John Malcolm was here there were two conferences on business with Moro Dixit. The first was chiefly taken up in complaints by Dixit regarding the want of attention by the British Government to the Paishwa's affairs and urged entreaties that certain demands might be complied with. The same topics were taken up again with equal earnestness at the second meeting. They related to our promise to take Soondoor for His Highness on which the Paishwa's Ministers testified the utmost impatience, while I had no excuse to offer but that which has been so long made use of, that the time is unsuitable, and to this the Minister replied that if the present was unfavourable the approaching one was still more so. He

therefore took this opportunity of calling on us to fulfil our promise while it was practicable. Every attempt that either Malcolm or I could make to prevail on him to include this place in the 34 lacs was unavailing, he declaring that it was a point on which His Highness had set his heart and which nothing but the most peremptory demand on our part would induce him to forego * *

The most important point on which he expressed his anxiety was the adjustment of the Paishwa's claims on the Nizam, regarding which Sir John Malcolm assured him he would make enquiries as soon as he returned to Hyderabad. * *

Before we separated I repeated to Moro Dixit the arguments Sir John Malcolm had used at Maholy against the Paishwa's remaining away from his capital, but on Dixit's informing me he would be back within a month I said I did not mean to hurry him or to interfere with his convenience, but only to point out that besides the delay in all business, His Highness's absence had an appearance of discontent calculated to encourage our enemies and to delay that perfect confidence on Your Excellency's part which was necessary for the restoration of His Highness's prosperity.

At this meeting Moro Dixit gave an entertainment and presents to Sir John Malcolm who was also visited and complimented by the Vakeels of all the principal chiefs of this state with many of whom he had formerly been on intimate terms.

His Highness the Paishwa continues at Maholy. He has made great reductions in every branch of his expenditure. He has secretly retained some of the troops he formerly discharged and has ordered them to remain at home but to be ready at his call. He has not however more than 7,000 horse and 6,000 foot in his immediate employ. It has for some time been reported that he meant to restore the lands of the petty Jageerdars which he lately confiscated and make them keep up their contingents. Moro Dixit's remark on the necessity of encouraging that class confirms this rumour. Whether the Paishwa makes these military arrangements to assist us in the Pindarry war, or (as the time when he began and the secrecy he observes make more probable) to have some force at his hand to profit by events, the effect is equally favourable to us, as it will employ and neutralise a body of soldiers who might otherwise either join the Pindarries in Malwa or take advantage of their incursions to disturb the country.

* * Paragraphs 4 to 6 and 8 to 19 have been omitted. They contain discussion about the cessions to be made by the Peshwa in Karmatak and Hindustan and the dispositions of his force for the coming war with the Pindaris.

No. 61—Malcolm recommends the restoration of the forts to the Peshwa.

**From—JOHN MALCOLM, POLITICAL AGENT TO
GOVERNOR-GENERAL,**

**To—J. ADAM, ACTING CHIEF SECRETARY TO
GOVT.**

Hyderabad, 24 August 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit for the information of the G. G. the copy of a letter which under the instructions of His Excellency Sir T. Hislop I have addressed to the Resident at Poona, and am desired to express a hope that His Lordship will approve of the considerations which have induced His Excellency to recommend the immediate restoration to His Highness the Paishwa of the fortresses which had been ceded as security for the fulfilment of his engagements with the British Government.

No. 62—The transfer of the Ahmedabad farm from the Peshwa to the British hands is approved by the Government of Bombay.

**From—EVAN C. NEPEAN, GOVERNOR IN
COUNCIL,**

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Bombay Castle, 27 August 1817.

My Lord,

By our other despatch to Your Lordship of this date, prepared several days since, you will perceive the impressions we had formed on the proposition submitted to our consideration by the Resident of Baroda from the Guicawar Government of the transfer to the Hon'ble Company of the rights acquired by His Highness the Guycowar under the late treaty of Poona, from His Highness the Paishwa of the districts dependent on Ahmedabad, for the payment of the augmentation we had suggested of two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry to the Baroda Subsidiary Force subject to Your Lordship's approbation.

While that despatch was preparing for our signature, a private intimation reached us from Mr. Elphinstone, that difficulties had been felt in prevailing on the Poona Government to accede to the transfer of any further position of territory for discharging the amount still to be provided for to make up the sum required for the payment of the reformed

investiture from the Peshwa as his master. I told Malhar Pandit that the relation between the Holkar and the Peshwa had long been dissolved in reality. It was even dissolved in name when Jaswant Rao inscribed the name of a foreign potentate, the King of Kabul, on his seal; but that if it were in force upto the late treaty, the Peshwa if he were the master and not the servant, had a right to dissolve it and that I could not conceive on what pretence Malhar Rao Holkar could insist on tendering his services to a prince who had declared all connection between the parties to be at an end.

No. 64—The death of the Peshwa's Minister Sadashiv Mankeshwar and the appointment of Bapu Gokhle as the Peshwa's sole adviser are reported with the probable consequences.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 15 October 1817.

My Lord,

His Highness the Paishwa returned to Poona three weeks ago, but was prevented from receiving me by various causes till yesterday evening when I waited on him at the palace. Moro Dikshit, Gokla and Balloba Vinchurkar were present. His Highness appeared to suffer under great depression which he was at no pains to shake off. I took occasion to beg to see His Highness alone and then told him that I had nothing particular to say but wished to give him an opportunity of communicating any demands he might have without reserve, especially as I had received some private messages from him desiring to see me alone. His Highness admitted the messages but said he had nothing new to impart; I knew his wishes and it rested with the British Government to accomplish them. He afterwards expatiated in his usual language on the long friendship between his family and the British and dwelt with much warmth on the obligations he had received from the nation. He afterwards contrasted his former tranquillity and prosperity which he described in glowing language, with the affliction which he confessed he suffered now. He said that from being proverbial for the unmixed felicity of his situation under the Company's protection, he was now become wretched, that his rest was disturbed by melancholy reflections and that he had no enjoyment in his waking hours, that the British Government alone could alleviate his distress and that to it alone he looked for relief. He said though these sentiments were always present

to his mind it did not become his dignity to express them to his courtiers and that it was to me only as his best friend that he could open his heart. I answered this complaint by entreating His Highness to entertain better hopes. I said disagreements did constantly occur among states, but that when there was a real union of interests the displeasure of a few days was succeeded by the cordiality of years. His Highness's losses were as little desired by Your Excellency as by himself, and that your greatest wish was to promote the prosperity of his Government by every means within your power. The time and manner in which this was to be done rested I said, on circumstances beyond human control; but that such was Your Lordship's disposition, and it was His Highness's fault if he did not profit by it. I reminded him of the prospects held out to him by Sir John Malcolm and of the facility with which he might acquire Your Excellency's good opinion while in direct pursuit of his interest by a vigorous co-operation against the Pindarries, I entered on this last subject at some length, explained the movements of the troops in the Deccan and their probable employment as far as related to the operations against the Pindarries and pointed out the great advantages that would accrue to His Highness by the extirpation of these destructive hordes even if no other benefit should result from this enterprise. His Highness listened to all those without the smallest interest and soon renewed his complaints without affecting any zeal or even claiming merit for the activity of his military preparations.

While waiting for His Highness I discussed with the three ministers a variety of points of business without obtaining a satisfactory answer on any of them. The chief were the sunnud for Ahmedabad, the completion of the cessions in the Carnatic, especially the admission of a deduction for the expenses of Darwar and Koosigul; and orders for making over the lands within the military limits of Ahmednuggar.

The Peshwa has shown the utmost anxiety for the formation of his army, there is not now a single horseman in his country out of employ. He allows liberal pay and makes no difficulty about the qualities of the horses or men entertained. There are said to be instances of ponies which were usually hired out to carry baggage being enrolled the horses of Silladars.

It is very satisfactory to see by the result of these exertions the degree to which the cavalry of this country formerly the best of India, has declined. The whole of His Highness's cavalry of all description does not exceed 25,000, his infantry

may be about the same number but half of it is distributed in posts and garrisons so that 12,000 is the most that is disposable.

The motive assigned for all this preparation is a desire to execute the plan recommended by Sir John Malcolm, but the troops already raised are double the number required for that service, and His Highness has besides taken steps otherwise connected with the defence of his country against Pindarries. Of this nature is his studied conciliation of the Raja of Sattara to whom he has paid attentions such as have not been thought of since the power of the Paishwas was first firmly established and whom he is said to intend removing to the Fort of Wassota. He is also conciliating his brother and his principal Chiefs and he and all his immediate dependants are careful to keep their property away from Poona.

The natives naturally put an unfavourable construction on his proceedings and represent him as about to set an example to the other powers of India by breaking with the English as soon as he shall have secured his personal safety by a retreat from the capital. Others more rationally represent him as intending to withdraw on pretence of a pilgrimage to Kartick Suamy and to wait for succours which he has solicited or purchased from Meer Khan; all accounts concur in representing him as actively employed in stirring up enemies to the British Government.

His real policy is that which might be expected from any prince in his circumstances, to be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity to revenge his degradation and to recover his possessions, but his timidity will probably lead him to wait for some very decided advantage before he appears our open enemy and his taking all the soldiery of the country into his pay, seems rather to obstruct than facilitate any attempt to disturb us by false insurrections or other unavowed hostilities.

In consequence of the frequent reports from Mr. Metcalfe and Capt. Close regarding the proceedings of Govind Kaishoo Joshee and Govind Punt Kailkur, I lately spoke to Moro Dixit on the subject, who denied that any such persons had been heard of by His Highness. I objected to this defence as being inconsistent with a clear and unbroken chain of testimony by which they had been traced from Poona to Marwar and as too much resembling that set up during the insurrection near Mahadeo, but he persisted in denying all knowledge of those persons and offered if I would give him passports to send four pairs of Hirkaras in quest of them. I said it would be more

effectual if he would give me a letter discovering them and ordering them as His Highness's subjects to repair to Poona and would allow our officers to enforce the order. This order was promised a month ago, but has never been given.

The Raja of Berar's Vakeel has at length marched for Nagpoor but I understand he has left an inferior agent whom he introduced to the Paishwa at his departure. Holkar's Vakeel is to leave this place in a few days. Sindia's Vakeel's nephew who acts for the Vakeel has never fixed any time for his departure and I have not lately seen him.

I shall take care all public Vakeels are dismissed, and if I learn from the Residents at other Courts that His Highness has Vakeels there, I shall immediately apply for their recall. Secret agents continue to be employed and must continue to be so, as long as the Paishwa is disposed to venture the existence of his state in endeavouring to form confederacies against us, but his intercourse with foreign states is no longer a safe proceeding, and it will probably cease when circumstances shall induce him to renounce his present desperate councils.

The death of Seddasheo Maunkaisur* has made no change in the actual administration of the Government. The Paishwa is himself as he always was, the grand mover of every thing and Gokla is his real minister though without the title. He openly conducts almost all the internal affairs of the Paishwa's Government and is his secret adviser in his intercourse with us, though that is ostensibly the province of Moro Dixit. Gokla's interest lies in flattering the Paishwa's hopes and in persuading him to keep up troops (which last is equally a source of power and riches to Gokla); both of these purposes require him to maintain a tone hostile to the British Government, but he is probably too well acquainted with our strength to be in any haste to bring on an open contest. It seems to be Moro Dixit's (idea) to keep up our ascendancy, but he is not a man of much ability and is of an obstinate and petulant temper which will probably prevent his even acquiring any great ascendancy over his master. Ballaba is said to be the channel of some of the Paishwa's intrigues in Hindoostan which his situation renders probable, but by natural inclination he is cautious and disposed to tranquillity and is by no means likely to advise His Highness to any hazardous enterprise.

* The event occurred on 8th October 1817.

No. 65—The Resident communicates to the Commander-in-Chief the hostile attitude of the Peshwa and seeks advice as to the way he was to act in case of a crisis.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—MAJOR AGNEW, FIRST ASSISTANT, C-in-C.

Poona, 23 October 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for the notice of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop a copy of a letter from Brigadier General Smith on the subject of the numerous desertions in the Force under his personal command, occasioned by the measures of intimidation employed by the Paishwa's Government against the families of our sepoys.

I have received nearly similar reports from Lt.-Col. Leighton commanding the Brigade here and from Capt. Betts commanding the Auxiliary Battalions at Seroor, the former had lost 42 men in the first fortnight of this month and the latter 25 men in the 3 days preceding his report. Both attribute the desertions to the measures of the Paishwa's Government and Captain Betts had obtained possession of a letter from the family of one of the deserters entreating him to come away if he wished to save them from ruin with which they were threatened by Gokla's officers. Gokla is on all hands represented as the author of the menaces.

I just received intelligence of a design on the Paishwa's, part to seduce our sepoys about the middle of August. It was coupled with information that the Paishwa intended to put his army, forts and country into a state of preparation which might enable him to take advantage of any opportunity that should be afforded him in the course of the approaching war to act against the British Government. This last fact was too obvious to require any particular report, and the seduction of the sepoys having been agitated without apparent effects during the disputes in 1815, and at the beginning of this year, I did not take any notice of it at the time.

The report gained ground "till the beginning of October," when it became more distinct and when the desertions became particularly numerous. The intelligence I received pointed at intrigues to seduce the Native officers and sepoys to act against us by offers of advantage rather than at deterring them from our service by threats, but both methods seem natural parts of one design. It also alluded to the corruption of the Hyderabad Force as part of the plan, but this seems likely to be circulated by the Paishwa's agents for the purpose of exciting distrust and suspicion.

About the middle of this month I was informed by Jeswunt Row Gorepura (who was Vakeel from Scindia to the Duke of Wellington in 1803 and who now receives a pension of Rs. 1,000 a month from the Company) that he had been more than once requested to visit the Paishwa. On the 15th he met His Highness in the presence of Gokla and another person when His Highness after many appeals to his feelings as a Mahratta after a profession of profusion of promises and after obliging him to take many oaths disclosed to him a plan which His Highness said was formed with Sindia, Holcar, Meer Khan, the Raja of Berar, Baupoo Sindia and Jeswunt Row Bhow to overturn our power. His Highness said that among other parts of this design was a plan to corrupt our troops in which His Highness expected great assistance from Jeswunt Row. He said he would immediately advance him a large sum of money and contribute further as might hereafter be required to debauch the sepoys, the Native Officers and even the European Officers, if in any case it should be found practicable to do so. The object was to seize the superior officers and bring over the force to His Highness. Jeswunt Row pretended acquiescence in this proposal. The whole proceeding is, however, improbable in itself and inconsistent with the cautious character of the Paishwa and so little dependence can be placed on the veracity of a Mahratta of whatever rank, that I am inclined to consider the story as an invention of Gorepura's and I only mention it because it agrees with actual appearances.

The fact of an endeavour to induce our sepoys to desert, is however incontestible and it is important in many respects especially as it shows the inveteracy of the Paishwa's enmity and his boldness in making an open attempt to wound us in so vital a point. It leaves no room to doubt the motive of His Highness's notorious intrigues in Hindostan or of his preparations here, and the only question that remains regards the time when he is likely to avow his hostility. The general opinion of the country is that if the Paishwa does not set an example by breaking with us before any of the other Marattas, a war with any of them will be the signal for his declaring himself. This belief appears to me to be set on foot by the Paishwa himself with the intention of encouraging the other powers to resist us in the hope of his co-operation. To this intention I attribute the ostentatious preparations which he has made since the Subsidiary Force marched and likewise the studied appearance of dissatisfaction with us which has been displayed among other ways in evading all my applications for interviews not only with His Highness but with all his

ministers. I still think that His Highness intends to act on the plan, the probability of which was suggested in my despatch to the Governor General, dated August 6th—to wait events and be prepared to profit by any derangement of our plans. My belief that the Paishwa will act this secondary part is founded on His Highness's character rather than on his circumstances; for his former failures will have shown him the hopelessness of endeavouring to elude us by underhand operations and the necessity of recovering the confidence of his friends by some decisive steps, when he next acts against us. On the other hand his power is in many respects equal to that of Scindia. He is likely to be more remote from the control of our armies and he is incomparably more inveterate in his hatred to our cause.

In these circumstances I beg to be honoured with His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop's instructions regarding the conduct to be observed towards the Paishwa. I conceive that it must be His Excellency's wish to continue the appearance of confidence at present assumed until the crisis of our negotiations with Scindia, but I wish to be informed of the plan to be adopted after that crisis shall have passed, especially in the event of war. The principal points on which I require instructions are the continuance of His Highness's machinations against the fidelity of our sepoys and his continuing to push his preparations and to keep his force collected instead of distributing it as concerted with Sir John Malcolm.

The steps I have already taken on these subjects are as follows. On hearing of the desertions, I presented a written paper to the Durbar representing the reports that had been set about by designing persons among our sepoys and requesting His Highness to give orders to his officers to protect the families of our Sepoys and likewise to furnish a Carkoon to accompany an officer whom I intended to send into the Concan to encourage the families and to apprehend the deserters. Moro Dixit returned a verbal answer refusing the Carkoon on the ground of the expense and the orders on some other pretence. I replied to this by a serious though friendly remonstrance and I am now promised the Carkoon but not the orders. Neither will be of permanent use unless the Paishwa is in earnest, but a temporary good effect will be produced on the minds of the sepoys by the appearance of co-operation.

With respect to the troops I long urged the expediency of sending them all to their stations at once instead of assembling them at Poona, but this being overruled I afterwards pressed the Ministers to despatch the First Detachment that should be

ready towards the east and to send out the others as they should be prepared. This was promised till lately, but was yesterday refused on the ground that there were troops enough to the eastward already. The other divisions are not even talked of though a great force is assembled and I am unremitting in my instances for the completion of the original plans. It would be so decided a proof of hostility to persevere in the present line of conduct that I hope to be able in time to get parties sent out, but they will probably be small and inefficient and all the good Horse will remain idle with the Paishwa.

Another question that I would submit to His Excellency regards the expediency of acquiescing in or discouraging the Paishwa's journey to Cartik Swaamy in Sondoor, if that intention should be renewed. His Highness has not lately mentioned it, but he will probably take it up again if he should wish to wear away a portion of time without being obliged to take any decided part in the approaching contest.

SECTION III.

WAR WITH PESHWA AND HIS PURSUIT.

NOVEMBER 1817-JUNE 1818.

No. 66—Col. Burr gives a graphic account of the battle of Kirkee fought on 5th November 1817.

From—LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURR,

**To—CAPTAIN H. TOVEY, DEPUTY ADJUTANT
GENERAL.**

Camp Kirkee, 6 November 1817.

Sir,

My letter of yesterday's date would have informed you of my having removed the whole of the stores, treasure and provisions from our late cantonments to the village of Kirkee and their being lodged in security therein, and of the Brigade being in a state of preparation to move out as circumstances might require.

I have now the honour to report for the information of the General Officer Commanding this Force, that soon after I had

dispatched it, I received an intimation from the Resident of the probability of an immediate rupture with the Paishwa followed by a requisition, to move out and attack the Mahratta force, which was then visible and advancing to the attack of the camp.

In consequence I formed the Brigade and leaving the Headquarters of the 2nd/6th Regiment who were previously weakened by several strong detachments in charge of the post of Kirkee, together with the Drill, sick and unfits and 2 Iron 12 pounders under the command of Major Roone, advanced to meet the enemy, a part of whose Horse hovered near the column and preceded our march.

Having chosen a situation in advance of our position at a distance of about 1 mile, we formed line awaiting the junction of the Dapooree Battalion under the command of Major Ford. At this period I was joined by the Resident, who most gallantly exerted himself throughout the day in setting a distinguished example of zeal and animation to the troops, encouraging the men whenever it became necessary and by his suggestions and information aiding my judgment in the execution of the measures, it became necessary to adopt. On the approach of Major Ford's Division and being reinforced by the Resident's escort and troops which had been stationed at the Sungum under the command of Major Cleveland who had handsomely offered his services to me, I ordered the line to advance which we continued doing for near half a mile. The Mahratta army which was drawn up with its left resting on the height in front of Gunnis Khind, where a large body of the Vinchoor Rajah's Horse was posted, extended its right to the Moola river in which direction the principal masses of their cavalry were formed, the total amount of which is supposed to have been 15,000. The intermediate undulating plain being occupied by a long line of cavalry and guns supported by successive lines of Horse, as far as the eye could reach, who seeing us advance moved forward from their position, and at the very moment we were unlimbering for action, commenced a brisk cannonade from their flanks endeavoured to turn ours and succeeded in getting in our rear.

The action now became very interesting. A body of Gokla's regular infantry made an attack in solid column on the 1st/7th Regiment which was on the left of the line and who scarcely succeeding in repelling it and a number of horse when a select body of the enemy's Cavalry seeing their Infantry repulsed

and pressed by the Battalion who could with difficulty be restrained from pursuing them, made a determined charge on the corps, some of the men wheeling round the flank and repeating their attack from the rear. The bravery of the men however compensated for the disorder into which they had been thrown by the previous attacks and enabled them under circumstances of great difficulty, with the powerful co-operation they derived from the left Brigade of guns and a part of the Bombay Regiment, to beat off the assailants who left many men and horses on the ground, withdrawing to a distance and never afterwards hazarding a repetition of their attack. By this time Major Ford with his troops and field pieces from Dapooree had joined us and formed line on our right, when we again immediately advanced near half a mile, the left of the line being thrown back to check any attack of the enemy's who were in great force between them and the river, while of the Light Company's of the 1st/7th which had at first preceded the line, were sent to the rear to keep in check a large body of horse who had watched Major Ford's movement to our support and who now came down in rear of our right flank.

Soon after the enemy withdrew the greater part of his force to a distance retiring and drawing off his guns towards the city as we advanced, and the greater part of his Infantry computed at 8,000, part of whom had been posted in advance of his guns and centre in the bed of a nullah and in walled gardens extending along the front of our position, now sent out their skirmishers which, with others on the right of the line and rockets from both front and rear, continued to occasion us a few casualties. The light companies of the line however under the command of Captain Preston easily drove them off and it being near dark I submitted to the Resident as they were evidently in full retreat the expediency of withdrawing the troops to camp as soon as it was dark, having fortunately succeeded in our principal object, meeting and driving the enemy from their position and occupied the ground they had originally taken up. This was accordingly done and the whole returned to camp soon after 8 o'clock.

I am happy to say the casualties during the action have been less than could have been expected. The greater part have however fallen on the 1/7th Regiment only one European officer (Lieut. Falconer 2/1st Regiment) is among the wounded. Accompanying I have the honour to forward a return of the number.

I have not yet heard a correct statement of the loss the enemy suffered. I should imagine it could not be less than 3 or 400 killed and wounded. Native reports make it amount to treble the number. Among the latter are said to be the Minister and some officers of distinction.

A more pleasing duty now arrests my attention, the rendering that tribute of grateful acknowledgement due to the exertions of the gallant force I had the honour to command and of those individuals to whose official rank and situation, I feel so much indebted for their cheerful support and devotion to promote the success of the day.

On my return to camp finding Lieutenant Colonel Osborne had arrived, I delivered over charge of the Brigade to him, having solicited his permission to express my acknowledgements to the gallant force which I had the distinguished honour of commanding on an occasion of such peculiar interest.

No. 67—The action of the 5th November and how it came about are explained in this letter in detail.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp at Kirkee, 6 November 1817.

My Lord,

The pressure of business for these several days and the uncertainty of the result have prevented my hitherto reporting to Your Excellency, but as we are now in a state of open war with the Paishwa, it is necessary to acquaint you with the manner in which the rupture was brought on, leaving all details to a subsequent despatch.

The great military preparations of His Highness the Paishwa, his distinct refusal to send a part of the force he had collected away from Poona, the threatening position he had occupied in the neighbourhood of our camp, and above all his unremitting endeavours to corrupt the fidelity of our Native Troops, rendered it absolutely necessary in my judgment to remove the Brigade from the very bad position it occupied at the town to that selected by General Smith for it.

This circumstance and that of the Cantonment being on the alert on the night before the arrival of the European Regiment removed the appearance of confidence which had in some measure been kept up between us and the Paishwa.

This appearance had afforded no advantage except that of protracting an open rupture; for His Highness proceeded in all respects as if he were at open war, and all his subjects spoke of his declaring against us as an event in which nothing was uncertain but the time. The effect of our withdrawing was to encourage the Paishwa's people who plundered our cantonments without any obstruction from their own Government and who talked openly of the impending destruction of our detachment. An officer on his road to Bombay was also attacked, wounded and plundered in open day about two miles from Poona and as far from the Residency, and the language of the Paishwa's Ministers was that of perfect estrangement and disregard. His Highness also continued to push his troops up towards ours as if in defiance. It was announced that he intended to form a camp between our old cantonment and our new position and 1000 or 1500 Horse moved down for that purpose. On this I sent a message begging that the motives of our movement might not be misconstrued, but that the Paishwa might forbid these aggressions, at the same time announcing that if any troops attempted to press on us as in our old position, we should be obliged to treat them as enemies. The Paishwa replied by a promise to restrain his troops.

On hearing the first intelligence of the preparation in our Cantonment and the intended removal to Kirkee, General Smith who had been prepared for a rupture on the Paishwa's part, concentrated his force at Fooltaumba, recalling his detachment from the Ghauts. He likewise ordered his Light Battalion which was on its route to join him to return to Seroor. These proceedings having attracted the Paishwa's notice and being likely to bring on a crisis which indeed was rapidly approaching of itself, I wrote on the day before yesterday to order the Light Battalion and 1000 Auxiliary Horse that were at Seroor to march to Poona. They had made one extra-ordinary march of fifteen miles when the intelligence of their approach reached the Paishwa. His Highness immediately got under arms and all sorts of preparations were made in the city. This sort of agitation was by no means uncommon for the last ten days, and I therefore merely sent a message to enquire the cause without making any corresponding preparations. The answer brought by the Paishwa's Vakeel at the Residency was that our line at

I was to consider him at war. Wittojee Naik said he had no message on that head but that His Highness would square his actions by ours. He was afterwards a great deal more distinct, for he repeated his demands, declaring if I did not comply with it, the friendship would not last and warning me of the bad effects of a rupture. I then renewed my assurances of our wish for peace, and said that if His Highness moved to his army I should withdraw to the camp; that if he remained quiet and receded, we should still consider him as a friend and should be careful not to cross the river that separated our camp from the town, but that if his troops advanced towards ours, we should be obliged to attack them.

Immediately after Wittojee Naik quitted, the Paishwa left the town and retired to Parbutty, and within less than an hour large bodies of troops began to move in the direction of our camp and in such a manner as to cut off the Residency. On the receipt of Wittojee Naik's message I had withdrawn a company that had been left in the old cantonment, and as soon as it reached the Residency, the Detachment there marched off to camp keeping a river between them and the Paishwa's troops who were moving in the same direction. The Residency was immediately plundered and burnt.

As the Paishwa's troops advanced Lieutenant Colonel Burr fell in and very judiciously moved out to meet them. It was joined by the Battalion in the Paishwa's service from Daupooree. As he advanced a cannonade was opened from the Paishwa's guns which did little execution. Soon after the line was surrounded by vast bodies of Cavalry coming out at speed. The 1/7th which was drawn off in the left (of) the line by the eagerness of the men to attack a Battalion of Gokla's, was charged while separated, but beat off the attack and the derangement was promptly repaired by Colonel Burr who immediately joined the Battalion and displayed equally gallantry and coolness in extricating it from its perilous situation. The Horse continued to hover round us in large masses until the end of the affair, but were deterred by Colonel Burr's skilful arrangements from any more attempts to charge. After firing some rounds from the Field Pieces, the line moved forward. The Paishwa's guns were drawn off rapidly and soon after the whole field was cleared of his troops, on which the Colonel returned to his camp, it being now dark.

The loss in our Brigade in this affair amounts to upwards of 90 men. That of the Paishwa's troops is said to be about 500. I am sorry to learn that Moro Dixit is among the killed. The

Paishwa is now on the hill of Parbuttee immediately on the south of Poona, and his troops are on the side of the town opposite to his place and much disheartened. There are so many objections to attacking the town and so little now could be done by pursuing the Paishwa's troops without attacking it, that Lieutenant Colonel Osborne who arrived yesterday evening and took the command of the Brigade had determined to remain in his present position until the arrival of General Smith who may be expected in a week or ten days. Unfortunate as a quarrel with the Paishwa may be at this moment, I have no doubt Your Lordship will think it was inevitable. It was evidently meditated at the time of the Paishwa's promises of cordial aid to Sir John Malcolm and had lately been advanced too far to leave His Highness any hope of averting it by professions or explanations. It is therefore a happy circumstance that His Highness should have thrown off the mask before the force under General Smith had quitted his dominions and likewise before he had made any progress in his intriguing with our little army. Nothing could exceed the zeal of our sepoys in the affair of yesterday.

I shall have the honour of transmitting Lieut. Col. Burr's report as soon as I received it. I beg leave to point out to Your Excellency the great zeal and exertions of that officer in removing the ammunition, stores and provisions to the new ground, and in all the preparations requisite for opposing the Paishwa's army. Your Excellency will judge from his own report of his conduct in the action that followed and will, I hope no doubt be of opinion that it was owing to his great coolness and judgment, that he was able to give so serious a check to the Paishwa and so great a change to the public opinion in this part of the world.

No. 68—Full details are herein supplied of the antecedents of the Peshwa's aggression, and his long preparations to precipitate war upon the English.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

**To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,
K. G.**

Camp at Kirkee, 7 November 1817.

My Lord,

After my letter of the 23rd ultimo to Sir Thomas Hislop the Paishwa's plans went on towards their development with

increased rapidity. His intrigues abroad, his eagerness to assembling his army, his earnest calls on all his chiefs to repair to Poona, his lavish expenditure and his undisguised attempts to tamper with our servants and dependents, have all shown an impatience for the attainment of his object and a disregard of our suspicions that could not be explained, but by supposing that his plans were early enough advanced for him to throw off his mask.

Besides the most strenuous exertions to remit through every man of influence in all parts of His Highness's country, and in the nearest parts of the Nizam's, His Highness has not scrupled to employ on the same object persons who are in rebellion against the Nizam's Government and even professed Chiefs of banditti. Of the first description is the rebel son of the Rajah Row Rumba, who is said to have engaged to bring a very considerable force; and of the latter is Dhurmajee Purtaub Roy, a notorious free-booter against whom His Highness formerly applied to the Nizam to co-operate, and whose gang was at that time, dispersed by the Battalion under Captain Freeman. To this person His Highness is said to have sent a standard with orders to raise 5,000 men in Balla Ghaut and it seems certain that Dhurmajee is acting in concert with Dadjeeba Attoly an avowed officer of the Paishwa. His Highness long since put his forts into a state of defence and he lately entrusted others to particular persons about his Court intending them as retreats for their families and committing the defence of them to their care. Among these he gave the strong fort of Reodunda to Angria's Dewan with an injunction to hold it bravely in the time of need, which injunction was communicated to me by the Dewan himself.

Trimbuckjee after a long concealment at length began about the middle of October to show himself about the hills of Sungunneer where the Bheels assembled and stooled the roads and from whence it was sometime since reported that they were to invade our new possessions in the Northern Concan. This invasion has since taken place. It must have commenced about the end of October, and it seems to be of an extensive nature, though as yet I have no distinct accounts of it. There was a great assemblage of Ramoses on the hills of Mahadeo.

The effects of all these preparations on the mind of the nation is not easily described. The most confident reports of an immediate war between us and the Paishwa and of plans laid to ensure our destruction, prevailed among all ranks and description of men, and numbers in consequence removed their

families and property from Poona during the whole of the month of October. The openness and vigour of the Paishwa's operations joined perhaps to some pity for his losses and to some hope of the restoration of the Mahratta greatness, rendered H. H.'s cause more popular than it used to be, and H.H. spared no arts to foster these feelings, excite up odium against us. His success appeared in the felicity with which all rumours disadvantageous to the British Government were received; continual reports of combinations in Hindoostan, of defeats of our armies, disaffection of our Troops and defection of our allies were studiously circulated and readily believed. I took all the means I could without showing an over-anxiety on the subject to counteract the effect of these stories, and especially to convince the Durbar of the real state of affairs in Hindoostan. The manner in which this information was received satisfied me that the Paishwa was less influenced than I supposed, by the conduct of his neighbours and that he felt he had advanced too far to admit of a retreat in any circumstances.

This opinion was confirmed by the intimations which I received from the principal Chiefs with whom I was connected. Balloba with his usual anxiety to be well with all parties personally acquainted my Moonshee that the Paishwa was determined to go to war, that he no longer attended to his advice and that God knows the result. Madheo Row Rastia informed me about the same time that the Paishwa had appealed to him, had told him that the disgrace of the late cessions fell on every Chief as well as His Highness, and that now was the time to show that he was a faithful servant. I have before reported the intelligence communicated by Jeswunt Row Gorpoorra which has been fully confirmed as I shall afterwards explain.

The information afforded by Moro Dikshit to Major Ford was even more explicit. After a long course of mystery and reserve which of itself was sufficiently intelligible, he told Major Ford that he had lost all sorts of influence with the Paishwa, who was mere a tool in the hands of Gokla; that Gokla's ambition was insatiable, that he was watching an opportunity to act against us, and that if anything went wrong in Hindoostan we had nobody to rely on in the Deccan. At a later period he told Major Ford under the strongest injunctions of secrecy that there would speedily be a night attack on our lines; that all the Mahrattas were inveterate against us, that everything was settled with our own Sepoys who would desert us on the field of battle, that Major Ford's own Battalion was already secured

and that there was no chance of safety for him but in separating himself from our cause. Moro Dikshit said he was the Paishwa's servant and was resolved to be faithful to him; that it was uncertain what might be his fate in the approaching contest, but that if Major Ford should have it in his power, he would rely on his protecting his wife and family while he promised on his part that if Major Ford would keep to his own house, when we were attacked he would undertake for his safety and that of his family. He delivered this warning with every appearance of sincerity and with strong professions of attachment. But the strongest proof of the Paishwa's hostility was afforded by his attempts to corrupt our native army. I stated in my despatch of October the 23rd to Major Agnew that I had received reports as early as the middle of August of the Paishwa's endeavours to induce our Sepoys to betray their officers. My confidence in the Sepoys and my conviction of the impolicy of showing apprehension from attempts to corrupt them, led me to neglect this information. In the beginning of October a native of Duboy who desired his name to be concealed, gave me further accounts of these plots, with the names of some agents who have since been proved to be engaged and soon after the desertions of the Sepoys and the Paishwa's undisguised efforts to deter them from serving us, obliged me to turn my attention to this part of his design. About this time also Jeswunt Row Gorpoora acquainted me with the offers that had been made to him and soon after the native of Duboy already mentioned warned me of the communication between Gorpurra and the Paishwa, supposing as he continued to do to the last, Gourpurra had really entered into the project proposed to him. On the 23rd Gorpurra brought a person named Junaba Mahaiskur who gave me some detailed information of the Paishwa's intrigues with our Sepoys. He named a person connected with the Ordnance Department and gave the name and residence of a Fakeer who was chiefly employed in this conspiracy. He also mentioned several particulars of my communications with the Paishwa which could only be known to a person well informed. It was impossible without attracting notice to make enquiries regarding the person supposed to be in the Ordnance; but I employed my Moonshee to find out and watch the Fakeer and he succeeded in discovering his residence and his intercourse with Ramchunder Venkataish the chief man under Gokla.

On the 7th of October Lieutenant Bellamore, Adjutant of the 2/6th, a very intelligent Officer, brought information to Captain

Grant of offers made to Shaikh Hoosen a Jamadar in his Battalion who had instantly imparted them to Mr. Bellamore. The Jamadar was invited to bring over as many men as he could to the Paishwa, but not to join until the movement of an attack which he was apprised was soon to take place. I requested Lieutenant Bellamore to promise the Jamadar the most liberal reward for his fidelity and to desire him to encourage the overtures. On the night of the 28th the Jemadar was conducted into the city by two of the Paishwa's peons after the hours when common passengers are not allowed to go about. He was introduced to two Brahmins, the name of one of whom (Succaram) corresponds with that communicated by the native of Duboy. On the night of the 3rd of November Jemadar Shaikh Hussein was again carried to Poona, conducted to one of the Paishwa's Palaces where he was presented to the Paishwa with Gokla and Ballaba. After much conversation and many promises the Jemadar was sworn to fidelity and pressed to desert with as many men as he could bring. The desertion was to take place at the moment of attack of which the Jemadar was to be apprised and he was told he should receive 4,000 rupees in advance and any money he wished after he had performed the service. The action with the Paishwa's troops took place the next day but one, and on that morning the Jemadar was sent for into Poona. He was told that the attack was to commence and was paid 5,000 rupees which he immediately brought to Lieutenant Bellamore and in his hand it still remains. On the 30th of October previous to the last interview of the Jemadar, Hurrybye, a Native of Kattywar and a private in 1st/7th, who was sent out by his officer to observe what was doing in the Mahratta camp, was accosted by some emissaries of Gokla's and conducted to the outside of the tent of that Chief, where some of his Officers used every sort of persuasion to induce him to come over with his arms and to bring as many of his comrades as he could, promising to make him a Sirdar if he succeeded. Hurrybye immediately reported this circumstance to his officer, was directed to go over as a deserter and to endeavour to ascertain what progress had been made in this system. He accordingly went off with his arms, but mistaking the part of the Camp he went into the lines of Moro Dixit whose men refused to let him proceed to Gokla and wished him to enlist with them. On this Hurrybye returned to camp and was wounded when charging gallantly with his corps in the action of the 5th. Except the last interview of the Jemadar the whole of these plots against the existence of our army were carried on not only in the time of profound peace, but under the mask of

the closest friendship and alliance. I did not think it necessary to take any steps in consequence of them till near the end of October. I was long before convinced of the Paishwa's treachery, but I conceived that the manifestation of it would depend on the failure of our negotiations with Scindia, and I was anxious that nothing that occurred at Poona should encourage that Prince to reject the terms which I knew to be proposed to him. The crisis of that negotiation from Your Excellency's instructions to Captain Close, would occur about the 26th, and nearly at the same time affairs at Poona had arrived at a point that made imprudent any longer to risk the public interests by preserving an appearance of confidence and friendship, which after all was confined to our side, as the Paishwa's hostility was the talk of the whole country. The most pressing danger appeared to me to arise from the corruption of our Native troops. I had full proof of the Paishwa's exertions for this purpose and was only in doubt regarding the extent of his success. Notwithstanding the advantages he possessed from his means of bribery and from his being Sovereign of the country to which many of the Sepoys belong and where most of their families reside. I felt confident that he had not made much progress in corrupting them. The danger, however, was sufficiently great to render me very anxious to check the increase of it and for this purpose no means seemed more effectual than the immediate removal of the Brigade from its Cantonment in the neighbourhood of the town, but the same reasons that rendered this desirable, rendered it difficult to accomplish. In pursuance of the system of confidence which seemed necessary to make the Paishwa an useful ally and even to prevent our enemies from calculating on his assistance, I had allowed his troops to occupy their usual stations round our Cantonments which in their increased numbers rendered the situation of the Brigade somewhat dangerous. His Highness had always strongly opposed the removal of the Cantonment and it was evident, that such a measure could not be carried through in the existing state of things without at once disclosing to him my distrust of his intentions. The moment of our removal would, therefore, in all probability be the one in which His Highness would proceed to carry his plans into execution, especially if he had, or thought he had gained many adherents among the Sepoys. This consideration and a wish to assist our negotiations in Hindoostan by keeping off to the last a rupture with the Paishwa, induced me to postpone the removal of the Cantonment till the arrival of the Bombay European Regiment which was expected on the 2nd of November. Previous to that period, however, the Paishwa's

preparations seemed so far advanced and he himself so little desirous to conceal his operations, that I was persuaded that the time for action could not be remote, and I therefore resolved no longer to allow the Brigade to remain in a condition that exposed it to the constant danger of a surprise. The Cantonment adjoined to the town into which after a certain hour no person is admitted. It was therefore easy to assemble any body of troops close to the Brigade without our having the least notice of their preparations. The woods which have grown up round the Cantonment were well calculated to conceal the approach of an enemy, while the distance between the Corps and between the officers and their men, offered great advantage to sudden attack and it was quite impossible to keep up at all time a state of vigilance sufficient to guard against these dangers. For this reason it has always been necessary on the probability of any disturbance at Poona to put the Brigade on the alert and the same became necessary now. There was indeed every indication of an intention on the Paishwa's part to attack it before it should be joined by the European Regiment. Besides the obvious advantages of such a decision there were other grounds for supposing that His Highness had actually found that his preparations were now too open to be explained away even if Scindia should enter into our views and the expense of them was too great for him to support for any length of time. He became bolder in his intrigues, both with our Sepoys and dependants and I received information from a source which is generally accurate of his sending 50,000 rupees and some dresses of honour into our camp on the night of the 27th as if on the conclusion of a bargain. His troops crowded in more than ever to the Capital. Those in Poona were urged to move immediately out of the City. His camp pressed more upon ours and at once attempted to pitch close to the Magazine which my information had before pointed out as an object of great attention in case of an attack. This presumptuous attempt was checked by Colonel Burr, but the Detachment still encamped within 200 yards of the Magazine. Large bodies of horse and foot continually passed through our Cantonments, a great impression began to be made on the troops and the general conversation both in Poona and Cantonments was directed to the Paishwa's designs to surprise our lines.

In consequence of this state of things I wrote on the 29th to Lieutenant Colonel Wilson commanding the European Regiment to hasten his march so as to arrive on the 30th and I requested Col. Burr to keep the Brigade on the alert. At the same time I sent a message to the Paishwa representing what

I did as a mere military arrangement adopted (as was the case) at the instance of the Commanding Officer, intended solely to maintain that state of security which is essential to disciplined troops in the immediate neighbourhood of another army and was unconnected with any design against him, as he might be assured at a time when we had no demands against him and no discussions of consequence at his Durbar except those relating to our co-operation against the Pindarries. At the same time I recommended to His Highness to withdraw his troops that were nearest ours. This message was received with some displeasure. The Ministers complained that His Highness could not keep what troops he pleased at his own capital, but declared that his intentions were friendly and that there was no need for our vigilance.

At night the Paishwa's troops got under arms in all directions and seemed-as if they intended to attack us, but the movement appears to have been of a defensive nature. Next day the European Regiment marched in, and those of the Paishwa's troops that pressed most on our Brigade were reluctantly withdrawn a few hundred yards. On the 31st we began to move our stores and provisions. On the 1st the Brigade moved to its new ground. The Paishwa sent a message to me on the night of the 31st to request it might be allowed to remain for a time at least, to which I replied by reminding His Highness that the Brigade was moving by orders from Sir Thomas Hislop, but I said, if His Highness was anxious that it should hereafter return, I would communicate his wish to His Excellency.

I have already reported the offensive proceedings of the Paishwa's troops on the removal of our Cantonments. So far was the Government from checking them that it allowed its principal Chiefs to set the example of encroachment. The Vinchoorkur sent a detachment of 1500 horse to skirmish towards our camp and close to the Residency. Another party of some hundred belonging to Gokla came to the river-side within pistol-shot of the Residency and remained there for upwards of half an hour coolly examining the place, and a much stronger party moved towards our Camp and declared their intention of encamping there. This conduct after my remonstrances was hostile in itself and it had such an effect on the common people that it was not safe for English Officers to ride out on the roads. In consequence I sent the message I reported in my last letter to the Paishwa which drew from Ballaba a variety of remarks which I omitted to state. He not only renewed his complaints at our not permitting the Paishwa to have what troops he pleased at his own Capital, but reproached us with our usage of

His Highness. He said we had purposely dishonoured him without advantage to ourselves by compelling him to give up Trimbuckjee's women, that we had forced a cession of territory from him on pretence of maintaining troops which we never maintained (alluding to the Auxiliary horse), and that if we wished to conciliate His Highness, we must restore those cessions and allow Trimbuckjee to return. Major Ford remonstrating with Ballaba on the impropriety of his message, that Minister retracted and substituted a civil answer to my application, but his language was not the less a sign of what was passing in the Paishwa's councils. Ballaba likewise enquired of Major Ford whether His Highness's retiring to Maholy with his troops would be considered as a proof of his wish to prevent disputes, and Major Ford aware of my desire to avoid any immediate dispute took upon himself to reply that it certainly would.

All that passed since this visit is fully detailed in my last dispatch.

It appears that I have been mistaken in the opinions I have all along held, that the Paishwa would wait some derangement of our plans in Hindoostan before he stood forth as an enemy. I cannot even now divest myself of the belief that such was at one time his plan, but it is certain he has delegated the whole powers of his Government to Gokla who is everywhere represented as full of ambition and anxiety for military distinction, as well as desperate from the consciousness of his ingratitude to us and his conviction that we can never forgive him; and the eagerness of that Chieftain led him to a system of preparation, which although for the time it was managed with address as well as vigour, yet insensibly drew the Paishwa into a situation from which he was no longer able to retreat. When once reduced to this desperate predicament failure of his intrigues with Scindia tended rather to urge on than retarded his plans, since it was apparent that he was involved beyond retreat and that without some decided step on his part there was no chance that any other power would join his cause.

No. 69—The Resident reports to the Secretary to Government the particulars gathered by him from informants regarding the Peshwa's secret efforts to corrupt British sepoy.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Camp at Kirkee, 10 November 1817.

Sir,

For the more complete elucidation of the Paishwa's late proceedings I have the honour to enclose extracts made by

Captain Grant from his notes of intelligence. They contain several statements not mentioned in my letters and the particulars to which I have referred. They are however for the most part taken from Captain Grant's own books and do not contain such information as was communicated to me alone.

No. 69A—Extracts of secret intelligence principally relating to the plan for corrupting sepoys.

21st August 1817.—Gopauljee a native of Ahmedabad in Guzerat came secretly and mentioned to Mr. Elphinstone that there was a plan in agitation for corrupting our sepoys through certain agents about Poonah and Serroor, and that the Paishwa was instigating them to give up their European Officers. No attention was paid to this, nor had the man encouragements to bring further intelligence on the subject; a note of what he had reported was taken at the time.

28th August.—Jeswunt Row Gorepura came and mentioned the extraordinary exertions the Paishwa was making to collect an army (reports of which we had from all quarters) but that independently of those enlisted openly, he entertained others in a secret manner who received pay but who were directed to remain quiet in their respective villages until called upon to turn out. This communication was discouraged, and Gorepura was told that His Highness was raising forces at our request. He replied that "he had heard so too, but that he also heard what was really going forward and he well knew that His Highness was not so alert on most occasions". The report of His Highness's having secretly entertained numbers of men had often been mentioned by the recruiting parties sent out to raise men for the auxiliary horse as well as by our news-writers. Our intelligence through-out this month represented His Highness paying great attention to the Rajah of Sattara, continuing the preparations of the Fort of Wassota, conciliating his Jagheerdars, and raising troops. His Counsels were entirely guided by Bappoo Goklah. In September came the same general accounts, but all reports dwell on the prodigious exertions made in recruiting all over the country.

On the 23rd of September, a private agent at Punderpoor mentions that Darmajee Purtabrae Wimjarry (a person well known as a troublesome character who was chief of the banditti formerly attacked by the Vizeer's troops under Captain Freeman), had received orders from the Paishwa to recruit and had been assisted with money for the purpose of collecting all the men he could. This information had been

repeatedly confirmed, as his recruiting advanced, and the report is, that he is thus encouraged with a view to his joining and assisting the Pindharies, when they come down.

Agents of Trimbuckjee Dainglia were reported to be carrying on intrigues in the city. They were watched and one of them apprehended, Tattya Purtabrae by the Poona Government at Mr. Elphinstone's desire, whilst another was taken up and delivered over by our own people. The Paishwa's Government demanded that they should be confronted with their accusers, but put off the day when a promise had been given to comply with their wishes. Tattia Purtabrae is still in custody, but the other whose name is Cundaroe made his escape, as had been foretold, and he has rejoined Trimbuckjee Denglia.

The foreign Akhbars and information from various quarters mention the Paishwa's having agents in Hindoostan, Govind Punyashaur and various others; and the news-writers in His Highness's camp at Mahulle mention the receipt of two letters from Scindia. The agents belong to Goklah.

4th October.—Jeswunt Row Gorepura again came with intelligence of the Paishwa's hostile intentions, that he was sending for all the old confidential counsellors, Govind Row Calley, Dada Gadre, Bajaba and some who had been in confinement; and that he was doing everything in his power to conciliate them and his Jagheerdars; that the excuse of raising men to assist against the Pindarris, would enable him to assemble a large army before we were aware of it, and that he was busy plotting all sorts of mischief.

5th October.—A native of the town of Dubay (Dabhai) in Guzerat whose name is omitted at his earnest request, gave information of a plan to corrupt our sepoy's at Seroor, Poona, and Jaulnah; that 4 lacs of rupees was issued for this purpose, in the mountains, and this whole to be afterwards retained in His Highness's service; and about a month ago a Sirdar of sepoy's came to Poona who had a meeting with some of the agents in the city, and promised to come back after returning to consult with his friends in camp. Informant did not know his name but one Luximon Sing was the first person they got to engage in their plans about the time the Light Division was here; some of the Jaulna people were also somehow concerned. Informant does not know the business fully. Venack Mara-Oreavly, Lookram Bhye Guzer and Waman Bhutt Kurway are the principal agents in Poona; he heard what he has related from

a friend of his, named Workén Bhutt Tatiya, a person in the confidence of the above mentioned people, and informant adds that there are several Parsees and Mussulmans who are emissaries. A few days immediately preceding this and also at a former period Mr. Elphinstone had this information from his secret intelligencers, and now ordered the progress of the report to be watched narrowly.

13th October.—Jeswunt Row Gorepura having for the second time within a few days mentioned to Mr. Grant that His Highness had sent for him privately, Mr. Elphinstone consented to his going, and on the 16th he returned, mentioning his having had a secret intercourse with the Paishwa, the night before, "that after many expressions of goodwill and appeals to him in every way, His Highness told him that if he would be true to him and his interests, he would enrich him and his family. Gorepura replied that he was his servant, and faithfully promised to obey his commands. The Paishwa then made him take a solemn oath that he would never divulge what he was about to communicate, and proceeded to inform him of his being promised assistance by Sindia, Meerkhan, Jeswant Row Bhow and others; but to ensure his success against the English, he begged Gorepura's assistance in a plan for corrupting the sepoys, and even the European officers if possible, that whatever gold could purchase he was ready to give in aid of this design.

18th October.—The Duboy man returned and gave information of Jeswunt Row Gorepura's having had an interview with the Paishwa, and that he had engaged in the plan for corrupting the sepoys. He is to receive 50,000 rupees immediately.

21st October.—Jeswunt Row Gorepura came, called Captain Grant aside, and in considerable agitation begged he would entreat of Mr. Elphinstone not to disregard his information that the plot was advancing rapidly, whilst he was slumbering, that the Paishwa meditated something immediately, and entreated he would be prepared.

Before carrying this message to Mr. Elphinstone Mr. Grant asked Jeswunt Row to communicate some of the particulars of this design we were to be prepared for, he said he could bring a person named Jenoba Myhisker who could bring particular information of some of the Paishwa's plans, that Baji Row's designs extended to corrupting our troops at Seroor, Jaulnah, and Hyderabad, and that the irregulars under Captain Davies were also tampered with at Hyderabad.

Mr. Elphinstone saw accordingly Gorepura when he repeated what he had told Mr. Grant, and also detailed circumstantially the particulars of the Paishwa's conversations at the interview of the night of the 18th.

24th October.—Cundur Daboy, a Patell who was introduced by one of the old servants of the Residency and who says he was employed as an intelligencer by Colonel Clive, mentions some intrigues of Trimbuckjee and that his adherents are assembling in some force near his person in the Ballora Hills, which information proved correct. Cundur likewise mentioned that Mahadajee Punt, Godajee Dainghia and others were assembling men in Candesh, and that four Ramoose backs, Hoaska, Sheta, Bhima and Bheroanee, were assembling men for the purpose of raising an insurrection near Mahadeo. Cundur Daboy says that from what he can pick up, he believes that Trimbuckjee with Bheels and Ramooses is expected to make a night attack here (meaning the Sungum).

4th November.—Lieut. Adjutant Bellamore of the 2/6 says, Jemadar Shaik Hussein was, as preconcerted, taken into town last night and introduced to Bajee Row, Gokla and Balloba Vinchoorkur. The Jemadar went when it became dark to the town of Poona, with his Regimentals under his arm; he was carried to Moroba Furnavees's Warra from whence he went to Bajee Rao's house in Bhoodwar Peith full dressed. Shortly after he arrived there, Baji Rao came in a palanquin and after him came Gokla and Ballaba Vinchoorkur. They commenced the conversation by asking him what his authority was in his Battalion; he replied he was a Jemadar in charge of the drill, and from instructing the men had considerable influence with them. The Paishwa asked him if he had not a parcel of Topeewala Sirdars who would prevent his bringing over the men. The Jemadar said, "Oh, they are an indolent neglectful set of fellows, who are seldom out of their tents. I will manage everything as I have now entered your service. I will execute your orders, but as I understand there is some attack to be made upon us, all I wish is, that you will give me some sign that I and my party may not be cut up with the rest". At this Bajec Rao laughed and assured him that notice should be given, and that he should send people before to warn him. Some of the persons present proposed that the Jamedar should take another oath to abide by his agreements. The Jamedar told them that he could only swear on the Koran and there is none here. Upon which Gokla said, "Oh, he is a soldier, make him swear upon his sword," which he did accordingly. The

Jemadar told the Paishwa to recollect that it was reputation he desired, that the Company gave him about 100 rupees per month. Bajee Row immediately replied by assuring him, that he should be a very great man, that he should have 4,000 rupees that day, and any money should be given for his success.

5th November.—Jamedar Shaick Hussein was sent for in the morning into town. He went in the forenoon and received Rs. 5,000. He was enjoined to walk back to his friends in the English camp and let them know that their whole army was about to fall on the English and to come over immediately they came to the attack. The Jemadar arrived in camp just as the line was getting under arms, reported what had taken place to Mr. Bellamore and gave him the Rs. 5,000 he had just received.

No. 70—Elphinstone continues his narration of the war and gives pertinent details of further developments.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,

To—THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS, K. G.

Camp Kirkee, 11 November 1817.

My Lord,

Since the Brigade has been in this position we have experienced the good effects of the forward movement made by Colonel Burr on the 5th and of the impression he then struck on the timidity and inertness of the enemy and the tranquillity we have enjoyed in consequence.

The Paishwa's army appears to have been in great confusion; on the 6th Moro Dixit was certainly killed, as was Sirdar Khan, a Pathan Chief who had been discharged from the Nizam's reformed horse and whom the Paishwa ordered to raise 2,000 men for his service. Bulwunt Rao Rastia, Nana Gokla, a relation of Gokla's and Narrain Dikshit, the brother of Moro Dikshit were wounded and Abba Poorunder had a horse killed under him. The Vinchoorkur was suspected of treachery. The Paishwa himself was about to set off for Poorunder and was with great difficulty persuaded to remain in camp by Gokla, who declared, that his flight would be followed by the dispersion of the army. In the course of the succeeding days the Mahratta army was concentrated on the side of Poona most remote from our camp, and His Highness encouraged the Sirdars, paid for the horses

that had been killed in action, and bestowed presents and distinctions to such men as had been wounded. Yesterday evening the whole army moved out from behind the town and encamped to the east of our old cantonments in open view of this camp at the distance of about four miles.

The only signs of activity which the enemy has displayed, have appeared in his attempts to cut off supplies and to shut the roads. In this he has in some measure succeeded as some officers and some convoys were advancing on the faith of our alliance with little or no escorts. Cornets Hunter and Morrison escorted by a Havildar and 12 sepoy had arrived at Woorlee within 20 miles of Poona, when they were surrounded by some hundred Horse and some Arabs and after a fruitless resistance were compelled to lay down their arms. The Sepoys were not detained and one of them has arrived in camp, but the officers were made prisoners and are stated by one report to have been murdered in cold blood, but some authentic accounts represent them to have been carried into Poona. Captain Vaughan of the Madras Native Infantry and his brother were seized at Tullygong on their way from Bombay and altho' they offered no resistance, they are stated by a negro servant who brought the account of their capture to have been put to death in the most ignominious manner. The Negro is so distinct in his relation of their execution, that there is no reason to doubt the fact, except what arises from the atrocity of the action. The Paishwa's conduct has in some instances borne more of the character of a civilized war. A conductor and a Naique's party that was in charge of some stores belonging to the Paishwa's Battalion, in a suburb near the Residency were induced by assurances of safety, to quit a defensible house which they occupied and the promises made to them were faithfully observed. Mahomed Koreis the Moonshee of the Residency had also defended his house with Arabs, was invited to quit it, and sent out of the town unmolested. He had an interview with Gokla before he came, which was interesting in many respects, especially from Gokla's producing a paper under the Paishwa's seal, investing him with all the powers of the Government, and from the avowal of Wittojee Naik that the Residency and the Cantonments were burnt by the Paishwa's own orders, I had before supposed this wanton outrage to be the work of some of the rabble that compose His Highness's army. On the other hand Gokla has shown the utmost activity in seizing and plundering all persons, who are themselves or who have relations in our service.

The stores belonging to the Paishwa's Battalion carried off on the surrender of the conductor and his party amounted to 250 muskets, and a large quantity of gun ammunition and powder in casks; 150 muskets for the 1/4 Madras Native Infantry were taken on the 6th from the Havildar and 12 sepoy in charge of them at Hurrupsair 5 miles from Poona; some gunpowder and a large quantity of Arrack on their way from Bombay are likewise supposed to have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Detachments have been sent to stop the Ghauts between this and Bombay, to shut up the Seroor and Hyderabad roads, and to plunder the villages round Poona, to prevent them affording any subsistence to us. One of these parties consisting of 400 Horse were discovered by a detachment commanded by Captain Whitehill of the 1/7th Native Infantry consisting of two Companies of that Corps, and 200 Auxiliary Horse under Captain Swanston which had been sent to Tullygong to endeavour to bring in the stores on the Bombay road. They were gallantly charged by Captain Swanston (whose men supported him well) and notwithstanding their superior numbers, were put to flight with the loss of several men and horses. Captain Swanston and his detachment have distinguished themselves in several other skirmishes and have been useful in bringing provisions into camp. This party of the Auxiliary Horse was raised by Captain Swanston with the assistance of the moneyed men among the Madras Contractors at Seroor. They are mostly natives of our provinces and of Mysore, and to this it is to be ascribed that they have so well answered to the care bestowed on their discipline and the example set to them by their officer. The rest of Major Cunningham's Horse which are in camp to the number of 600 were raised at Poona and are many of them Mahrattas. With a view to encourage recruiting I had strictly enjoined Major Cunningham to forbear from any attempts to discipline them, and I rather hoped they would do well against Pindarris than that they would face superior numbers of their countrymen in a war with their own sovereign. On his arrival with the Light Battalion Major Cunningham told his men that any who wished to leave him in consequence of the change of circumstances would immediately be paid up and discharged. None of the men took advantage of this offer and Major Cunningham took the earliest opportunity of leading them against the enemy. He first moved against a party that had approached our camp and drove it into Poona, with some little loss. Next day a foraging party of Major Cunningham was overpowered and beaten with the loss of 9 men wounded and soon after a body of 3,000 horse appearing, Major Cunningham marched out against them, but

although he and Lieut. Clark and the officer with them used every exertion to set an example to them, the party shewed so much reluctance to engage, as to lead Major Cunningham to suspect disaffection. The great disproportion of the numbers being five to one, might have accounted for such backwardness, but 25 men went over on the field, and yesterday when an attack was expected, 100 more Mahrattas demanded their discharge. This was granted but as some of them began to plunder immediately on leaving the camp, the rest were set on by the faithful part of the detachment and with difficulty rescued by Major Cunningham, and even then some of their horses were seized and detained. About 150 of 1000 Horse that were in the camp have quitted us, and the rest may, I hope, be relied on. The deserters have been almost all Mahrattas.

About 70 Mahratta sepoy's have deserted from the battalion formerly in the Paishwa's service. The rest are mostly Hindoostanees and are rejoiced at the change of masters. To prevent any further desertions among the Mahrattas, I have authorized Major Ford to assure the men of that caste, that the British Government will engage to compel the Paishwa to make up any losses their families may suffer in consequence of their remaining in our service. No assurance of any kind is required to the Company's Sepoy's, otherwise I would not hesitate to give it. In consequence of the anxiety among the men of the Detachment that was at the Residency on account of the loss of their baggage, I have authorized Lieut. Col. Osborne to promise them compensation. It was quite impossible to have removed anything before the Paishwa's message without the risk of bringing on a crisis which I still hoped to avert. There was barely time afterwards to avoid being cut off from the Brigade by the Paishwa's whole army and it was altogether impossible to have defended the Residency as it could be penetrated in many points and could be cannonaded on two sides from the opposite banks of the river without the smallest risk of disturbance to the assailants. On the other hand the result has shown that no support could be afforded, as even the entire success of the 5th has not rendered it prudent for the Brigade to approach so near the city.

General Smith was at Ahmednuggur on the 8th at noon, since which time I have not heard of him. He will be impeded by his battering train and stores, and will be further obstructed by a strong corps of Cavalry that has been detached by the Paishwa under Narro Punt Apta for the purpose of harassing his march. He may, however, be expected by the 14th.

P.S. November 12th 11 a.m.

I have just heard from General Smith who was last night at Cunderpore 28 miles from this place. He took possession of the Pettah of Ahmednugger on his way and found an immense supply of grain. He then proceeded to Seroor unmolested, but on this side of that Cantonment he was met by the detachment of the Enemy above mentioned. An advanced party far superior to his own was most gallantly charged by Capt. Spiller with his detachment of A. H. and put to flight with the loss of 56 men. Capt. Spiller personally distinguished himself and was slightly wounded.

No. 71—The Resident at Bankot reports the journey of the Peshwa's wife to Mahad and Raigad.

**From—J. H. PELLY, RESIDENT AT BANKOT,
To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.**

Fort Victoria, 14 November 1817

Sir,

I have just received accounts which may be relied on that the Paishwa's wife with 1,500 horse and 500 foot will be at Mhar (about 20 miles from this place) today. They then proceed to deposit their charge at Rayghur, and thence have orders to proceed to the plunder of all villages of Dassagaum and to the attack of this place.

You will assure the Right Honourable the Governor in Council that this post will not be delivered unless we are wholly overwhelmed by numbers. With our slender means, however, much cannot be expected, and I consequently regard it as my duty to represent the number that are likely to assail us, in order that Government may be aware of the necessity of reinforcing this garrison if they possess the means of doing so.

No. 72—The Resident reports further fighting with the Peshwa's troops and the capture of the city after the Peshwa had left it.

**From—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT POONA,
To—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.**

Camp Poona, 17 November 1817.

My dear Sir,

General Smith arrived here on the 13th. He last night made his disposition for attacking the Paishwa. In consequence one

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division under Col. Milner was yesterday evening advanced to a position on the right flank of the Paishwa's army from whence it was to have co-operated in an attack which General Smith was to have made this morning with another division under his personal command. Colonel Milner met with great opposition but repulsed the attacks made on him so effectually that the Paishwa lost all heart and fled to Porunder. His army remained till morning, but on the approach of our troops it fled with precipitation, leaving its camp standing. General Smith cannonaded the fugitives as long as they were in sight. We then sent on a flag of truce into Poona which was evacuated by the Arabs and other infantry that remained in it, and our flag is now flying on the Paishwa's Palace. General Smith has hitherto succeeded in saving Poona from the men who are greatly exasperated by the burning of the Residency and Cantonments, and the murder of their officers as well as by the loss of their own effects suffered by some of them and by the cruel usage of some of their women who fell into the enemy's hands. Every care will be taken to establish a regular Government to protect the inhabitants. General Smith will soon march to disperse the remains of the Paishwa's army and to besiege Poorunder which with another siege or two will, I hope, finish the war. Means will soon be taken to open the communication with the Ghaut, and from that to Panwell is I suppose already kept up by the troops in the Concan.

No. 73—The flight of the Peshwa is reported.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

Poona 18 November 1817.

My dear Sir,

The accompanying letter came in a large packet which I took the liberty to open as there was little chance of its passing safe entire. It contained besides the enclosed a large letter for Mr. Canning and another for the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. I shall beg Gen. Smith to send them with a detachment that is to move in a day or two to clear the Ghaut and as soon as the Detachment shall have passed the most pressing danger, they shall be sent on with a small party of horse. The Paishwa has continued his flight beyond Porrunder. He was yesterday near the river Neera and is thought to be going to Wassota. The city of Poona is quite quiet and we are organizing the police.

No. 74—Elphinstone is declared to be the Chief British Authority in the territories of the Peshwa and to be obeyed as such.

Camp at Poona, 18 November 1817.

Sir,

The Commanding Officer deems it necessary to publish in orders that in consequence of the present rupture with the Peshwa and the situation of the British Resident at his Court becoming [vacant] that gentleman is still in all respects to be considered and obeyed as the Chief British Authority in the territories of His Highness the Peshwa as the Representative of the most noble the Governor General. All requisitions therefore preferred by the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone for troops, Military Stores, etc., to be promptly obeyed by all officers whatsoever.

The usual honours are to be paid to Mr. Elphinstone by all guards and sentries as heretofore.

The troops to be kept in readiness to march at the shortest notice.

While the force continues on a field-footing, the Deputy Commissary General is to have the general control of the whole of that Department and all his arrangements and orders are to be executed accordingly. He will immediately give means to render the branch of the Department with the Poona Division as efficient as possible.

The Deputy Commissary General will immediately as far as his means permit, provide carriages for the camp equipage of the Bombay European Regiment the 2/11/7 and 2/6th.

Lieut. Robertson, Persian Interpreter to the Commanding Officer, is appointed to the command of all the guards in the city of Poona and to the charge of the City Police, subject only to the orders of the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, or the officer officiating in his duties as the Governor General's Representative in case of his absence from Poona.

Lieut. Bellamore of the 2/6th Regiment is appointed to act as Interpreter to the Commanding Officer until the pleasure of Government and of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is made known.

No. 75—The Resident forwards a graphic account of the war with the Peshwa, his flight from Poona and the capture of that city.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp Rajawaree 23, November 1817.

My Lord,

General Smith arrived at Kirkee on the 13th. He had been annoyed by cavalry on his march of that day, but had lost no baggage, and had killed many of the enemy. Their loss on these attacks and the death of the Rajah of Akulcott's son, who was killed in Captain Spiller's camp before noticed made a great impression in the Paishwa's camp.

General Smith brought in his whole force in high order, notwithstanding the rate at which he had marched from Pooltamba, and the interruptions he had met with from the Paishwa's detachment.

Nothing had been done to disturb the camp at Kirkee previous to General Smith's arrival, except a very feeble attempt to rocket the village where the ammunition was lodged, on the night of the 12th. Afterwards there were constant attempts to carry off cattle. On the 15th General Smith established an 18 pounder on a hill near the village of Ellora, that commanded the plain up the Paishwa's camp; next day he sent the pioneers to improve a ford immediately below the hill; they were opposed by a body of Arabs between whom and General Smith's light infantry there was a good deal of skirmishing which ended in a partial manner on both sides. In the evening, General Smith ordered a division under Col. Milnes to take possession of a village, a little in front of the enemy's right flank. The division was to have co-operated with another under the personal command of General Smith in an attack on the camp, which was to be made next morning, but the enemy having failed in all his attempts to check the progress of this division, which was opposed by most of his Infantry and guns and some of his cavalry, drew off the greater part of his army in the night, and the rest retired on the approach of General Smith, leaving much of the camp standing. The loss of Col. Milnes' Division was about 60 killed and wounded. The exact number with all the details of military operations will be reported by General Smith to Sir Thomas Hislop. I only give an outline to explain subsequent transactions. The Paishwa shewed more firmness than might have been expected of him; he remained in camp during

the night of the 16th, and exerted himself to support the party opposed to Colonel Milnes. He found great difficulty in prevailing on his troops to move out on this service. The cavalry were particularly backward, and about 2 o'clock, some of Colonel Milnes's shot coming into his own tents, His Highness hastily retired, his guns were soon after drawn off. Gockla was with the party that remained, but on the advance of both divisions he fled with precipitation and joined the Paishwa at Sassore. They afterwards proceeded to Maholy and are now in that neighbourhood waiting for Appa Dessye.

After the flight of the army, General Smith took measures for retaining the city if necessary, and for saving it, if practicable from the fury of our troops. This had long been an object of great anxiety to General Smith, and the consideration of it had entered into all his plans for the defeat of the enemy. The plunder and destruction of our Residency and cantonments, the losses of many of the sepoys, the disgraceful circumstances of the murder of the officers at Tallegaum, the massacre of some of the wives of the sepoys that had fallen into the enemy's hands on the 5th, the mutilation of a sepoy who had been taken prisoner while straggling from General Smith's line of march, and many other acts of impotent rage on the part of the Paishwa's court, had raised the indignation of the men to the highest pitch, and they did not conceal their eager desire to revenge themselves by sacking and plundering the enemy's capital. In this state of the feelings of the army, it appeared difficult to save Poona in any circumstances and impossible in the event of resistance. To obviate the last danger, General Smith and I sent letters in duplicate by flags of truce, to the Paishwa and Gockla, offering to protect the town if evacuated, and warning them of the consequences of holding out. One copy was carried on to the Paishwa and Gockla who promised an answer but never sent it; the other was given open to the person in charge of the Paishwa's fortified palace who promised an answer by noon. Before he arrived, Hurraisur the banker generally employed by the Company, came to solicit protection for the bankers and merchants, and offered to establish our guards in the city. In this he succeeded, though some contemptible preparations had been made for defence. Guards were posted at the four principal public offices and the Paishwa's palace, which may be considered as the citadel of Poona. Every arrangement was made by General Smith for the security of the place. Some trifling excesses were

committed in the suburbs before there was time to take precautions; but the city suffered no injury and the loss of property was quite insignificant considering all circumstances. The forbearance of the troops deserved high admiration. General Smith's success in protecting Poona is attended with very important advantages, as tending to maintain our general reputation and to conciliate friends in the present contest, and as preserving a very fertile source of supply, both of money and commodities for the army.

The selection of an officer to command in the town was an object of much importance, as the care of the police and in fact of Government of the city were necessarily vested in him. I recommend General Smith to appoint Captain Robertson, his own Persian interpreter, who understands the language, knows the natives, is accustomed to business, and is of a conciliating temper. Mr. Coates superintending Surgeon to the Auxiliary Force, came forward with his usual zeal and offered his services to aid Captain Robertson in settling the City. *His general acquaintance, and influence among the inhabitants, and his knowledge, of their opinions and prejudices, as well as in concerting the means of their future Government.

On the day when the city was taken possession of †a proclamation was sent round to assure the people of protection. It was at the same time announced that all imposts were taken off. This was done because the amount realized by the Paishwa's Government was too small to compensate for risk of the unauthorised exactions that would be made under pretence of collecting it. The chance of such exactions is always great, especially during a temporary Government administered by untried agents chosen from among a very corrupt people. The great importance of encouraging bankers and traders of all descriptions to return to Poona and to make that city a place of refuge, as long as the war may rage in the Paishwa's country, was an additional motive for this exemption.

Next day all the principal bankers and traders that remained at Poona to the number of from 50 to 100 waited on General Smith and me, and were assured of the intention of the British Government to protect them. In the meantime Captain Robertson went to organize an establishment for the Police of the town, and for the administration of justice. In the Police I recommended his adhering closely to the practice of the Paishwa's Government, to which the people were used, and which was really efficient. Criminal cases he was himself to

*The sentence in the Mss. itself appears to be incomplete.

†Oa 17th November 1817.

investigate and decide on summarily, and civil cases were to be enquired into by arbitrators chosen by the parties subject to Captain Robertson's approval, and guided in points of law by the opinion of a Pundit, who should be aided in all disputed points by the principal Pundits of the city. I requested Captain Robertson to take the greatest care of all the Paishwa's property; and to prevent all intrusions into his palaces, employing Bramins when it was necessary to examine them; to take the same care of the property of Gockla, and others of the Paishwa's chiefs; to make inventories of the property left or seal it up when there were none such. I however requested him to call on all inhabitants to deliver up any fire arms they might possess, which would deprive them of the means of acting with effect against us, while it left swords for defence against robbers. Captain Robertson was desired to give cowle to the village and settle the country within one march round Poona, and it was settled with Colonel Burr that he should send out detachments to that distance to disperse banditti and to protect the country.

When the force marched, the city was quite settled, and everything was succeeding to my wish. I have no doubt that the inhabitants who have fled will soon return, as the principal motive of their flight appears to have been their dread of our retaliating for the outrages committed by the Marhattas; This opinion appears to have been studiously circulated by the Paishwa. General Smith has reported his occupation of the Pettah of Ahmednuggur. He placed it under the administration of Captain Gibbons the fort Adjutant, and he has since at my request desired him to settle the country, as far as may be within reach of the garrison. Kishen Row who gave much satisfaction in the office of Dewan to the Collector during our former occupation of the district of Ahmednuggur, has been despatched to assist Captain Gibbons.

On our obtaining possession of Poona, correct accounts were obtained of some particulars which were before imperfectly known. It appears that the attack on our troops on the 5th was chiefly brought about by the persuasion of Gockla, that the Paishwa took the alarm after he had given the order, and even sent to Gockla on the eve of the action, to desire that he might not fire the first gun; but that the message was too late, or rather that Gockla hearing of its approach, anticipated it by beginning to cannonade. Moro Dixit has been entrusted with Zerree Putka, the standard of the Marhatta empire, and had,

5,000 horses attached to him, besides his own 2,000. He is however represented as having been very averse to the war, and as being accused by Gockla of intrigues with us. Rastia was one of those attached to Moro Dixit's party; being strongly suspected of disaffection he was compelled to charge first but acquitted himself with courage and fidelity. Gockla avowed to Appajjee Luckmun, Appa Dessye's vakeel, immediately before the action, that his confidence of success and impatience to engage were founded in the certainty that our sepoy would come over by companies or battalions on the field.

After the affair of the 5th, the Paishwa's army was dismayed. His Highness sent for Hurraisur the banker, lamented the breaking out of the hostilities, and with his usual insincerity professed his wish to have remained at peace, and threw the whole blame of the war both plan and execution on his sidars. On this occasion he disavowed the burning of the Residency and said, he would be very glad to build a new one, but his whole discourse appears to me to be merely a specimen of his accustomed double-dealing and his wish even in the worst of times, to keep open some separate channel of intrigue for his own use.

Some days after the action, the Paishwa's officers picked up some spirit, and set about circulating the most absurd reports of their successes and of the defection of our allies. They were joined by Dhurmajee Portub Row (the freebooter) and it is said by the son of Row Rumbha. Chintamun Row also joined before their flight from Poona. Gockla set up a white flag as an asylum for all who should desert us before a certain time; after that no pardon was to be given to any man who had served us. All the servants of English gentlemen who happened to live in Poona, were hunted out by Gockla and many treated with great severity; the houses of most of them were given up to plunder, but none of them were put to death. Amrut Row's vakeel and the Guycowar's vakeel were sent for and desired to call their masters to Poona. The Guycowar's vakeel was desired (to accept) a sunnud under His Highness's hand for all the Guycowar possessions. Some time before the breaking out of the war, the Peishwa had concerted with the Bheels and Ramoossees and other predatory tribes in his country, to shut up the roads and plunder effects belonging to us. They have readily obeyed an order so much suited to their inclination and have not confined their depredations to British property. They have, however, shut up roads: that to Bombay is further obstructed by the garrison of Lohgar, and by a detachment which

has taken possession of and stockaded the Bhoze Ghaut. No dawks have been received from Bombay since the 5th. General Smith however has sent a strong detachment to open that road and one of less strength to keep open the communication with Ahmednagar. No more convoys have been cut off since the first few days after the war; but I am greatly concerned to state that Lieutenant Ennis of the Bombay Engineer has been cut off near Sakoor Mandaava where he was employed on survey. He had been recalled, but from an over confidence in the strength of his guard, he did not fall back on any station. He was attacked in the night by the inhabitants of Sakoor Mandava, and next morning was surrounded by the Bheels and other adherents of Trimbuckjee, who is still in that neighbourhood. Lieutenant Ennis was shot while engaged with the enemy and his detachment of a Jummadar and 25 men fought their way to a more friendly part of the country; they were received, fed, and sent off in disguise by the Puttail of a village whom I shall not fail to discover and reward. Cornets Hunter and Morrison were in Gockla's custody. They were at first in charge of Major Pinto, who is said to have treated them well and resisted Gockla's orders to use them with severity, but before the Paishwa's flight they were put in chains and sent to Gockla's fort of Kangoree in the Concan.

In consequence of the execution of Captain Vaughan and Mr. Vaughan, I have addressed letters of remonstrance both to the Paishwa and to Gokla; to the former I only threatened retaliation in general terms for any repetition of such atrocities, but to Gockla I declared explicitly, that any individual, however exalted his rank, who should order the death of a British prisoner, should answer for the crime in his own person.

I omitted to state that on the 18th General Smith sent out a detachment to take some guns which with a body of infantry had got off to the neighbourhood of the fort of Singhur, 15 guns were taken without any loss; besides these, 46 were taken in Poona, and one in the Paishwa's camp. Large quantities of ammunition have likewise been taken.

The army is now in full march after the Paishwa, who it is rumoured intends to return to Poona or rather holds that language to encourage his troops. Trimbuckjee has not yet joined him, whether from distrust on his part or policy on the Paishwa's is not known.

No. 76—The Resident communicates to the Secretary to Government the measures he was taking to persuade the southern jagirdars to desert the Peshwa and join the British in the war.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Camp Rajawaree, 24 November 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of letters, which I have addressed to the southern Jagheerdars except Gockla, which, I hope, will meet the wishes of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General.

While at Poona, I was visited by the vakeel of Madhoo Row Dadjee and Row Saheb Puttwurduns the representatives of Purseram Bhow and by those of Kittore, Appa Dessye and the Dessye of Kittore. The former only mentioned that both Madhoo Row and Row Sahib had stayed at home, and intended to remain there, and that they desired to know my wishes regarding Nana Sahib, a younger branch of their family who had joined the army with part of their contingent. I answered by expressions of confidence and advised Nana Sahib to watch his opportunity, and come away when he could do it with least injury to himself. Rastia's vakeel said his master was detained by force but was ours at heart, and I advised him to take the first opportunity of withdrawing from the camp and setting an example of prudence to the other chiefs. This course, I said, was the only one by which the State of Poona could in reality be preserved. Appa Dessye's vakeel owned that his master had crossed the Kistna to join the Paishwa, but he read a letter from Appa Dessye professing a resolution to adhere to us, and declared that he would spare no pains to confirm his master in this determination. He said he thought his master knew the Paishwa too well even to trust him. I took some pains to explain to the Vakeel the arts by which the Paishwa had so often contrived to embroil Appa Dessye with us, and to convince him of the wisdom of avoiding so dangerous a connection and of returning to the friendship with us under which he had so long prospered. I likewise promised to guarantee anew the third of his Jageer that had been resumed. Both Rastia and Appa Dessye appear to be waiting to see the progress to the westward of the conduct of foreign powers before they take a decided part. I therefore,

pointed out the chance of our offering worse terms if obliged to push our successes against the Paishwa before we settled with the Jageerdars. Both Rastia and Appa Dessye offered their service to negotiate a peace, but I declined the offer not more from uncertainty of the Governor General's wishes than from a conviction that the best way to command a peace is to seem indifferent to it. Appa Dessye's Vakeel is also Vakeel for the Kittore Dessye of whose country he is a native. He promised that the Dessye would withhold his troops and his tribute, and that he would withdraw a small party of horse he has with the Paishwa. I doubt his sincerity in this last promise, but I gave him a letter to Col. Munro recommending that he should be treated as a friend unless he shewed himself an enemy.

I have brought one of the Raja of Colapore's Vakeels with this army, having requested the Raja to remain quiet until I acquainted him that it is time for him to begin. If Appa Dessye should cordially join the Paishwa, the Raja will create a powerful diversion in his jageer. Chintamun Row is with the Paishwa, but I have little doubt his petulance and levity will soon lead to quarrels between him and Gockla, and to his separation from the army.

No. 76A—Translation of a letter from Mr. Elphinstone to Madhoo Row Rastia.

From the treaty of Bassein till the murder of Gungadher Shastry, there was uninterrupted friendship between the British Government and the Paishwa. The only wish of the British Government connected with His Highness was for the increase of his prosperity. This is known to all. After the murder of the Shastry the ancient friendship was restored on Trimbuckjee's being surrendered without any demand being made on its own behalf by the British Government, but when the Paishwa instigated a rebellion and endeavoured by his intrigues with foreign courts to raise the whole of Hindoostan and the Deckan against the British Government, the alliance received a severe shock and a new treaty became necessary. From that time there was not the least interruption to the friendship between the states till the expiration of 5 months, when the Paishwa at a time when there was no dispute nor discussion on foot, suddenly broke the treaty and began war. You will have heard of the subsequent assemblage of the British troops at Poona, and of the events which followed. The Hon'ble Company's Government is now established at Poona, and the Paishwa

has betaken himself to flight. It does not appear probable that His Highness's army will long be able to keep the field. There is no quarrel between the British Government and the Jageerdars. The Paishwa's hostility originated in his wish to screen the murderer of Gungadher Shastry, and it would be unbecoming in the Jageerdars to take part in such a cause. I therefore recommend that you should remain at home and should recall your troops. I need not remind you of the exertions that were made to procure the restoration of your lands when seized by the Paishwa. That proof of friendship for you must be fresh in your memory. I have therefore only to add that if you adopt the course pointed out in this letter you may be assured that you will retain your possessions on the same footing on which they were, and that you shall suffer in no way under any settlement of the Government that may be made. On this you may rely. (Letters to the same effect have been written to :—

Madhoo Row Dadjee of Chinchnee and	}	Putwardhans
Gopal Row of Jumkundee,		
Madhoo Row of Merich,		
Gunput Row of Tausgaum,		
Chintamun Row of Sanglee,		
Trumbuck Row of Koorundwar,		
Gunput Row of Serwaul,		
Appa Dessye of Nepaunce,		
The Dessye of Kittore,		
Madhoo Row Rastia		

No. 77—Lieutenant Robertson communicates to the Bombay Government the situation at Poona.

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON.

To—SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 1, December 1817.

Sir,

In compliance with the orders of Mr. Elphinstone that I should intimate to you occasionally the state of affairs at this place, I have the honour to acquaint you that the most perfect tranquillity prevails in the city; that there is no body of the enemy in the vicinity in any direction, but that the roads and hills to the southward and eastward are overrun with Ramoosces who plunder travellers and villages.

The last accounts from General Smith's force are dated the 27th ultimo. The force was then at the bottom of the Salhpy pass and was to ascend it on the 28th. The enemy had been hovering about the force on its march from the top of the Bore Ghaut to the bridge across the Neera. Some skirmishing had taken place but no occurrence of any importance had happened. It is generally believed here that the Paishwa's army will oppose the British Force in ascending the Saulpy Ghaut and stand an action in its neighbourhood.

No. 78—Lieut. Robertson informs the Bombay Secretary of the confusion prevailing in the Peshwa's army.

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 3 December 1817.

Sir,

No accounts from the British Force have been received since I had the honour of addressing you on the 1st instant. Natives who left the Paishwa's army on Saturday morning the 29th ultimo state that General Smith had arrived at Golegaum a village within 6 coss of Poossasowley, that the Paishwa's army was encamped at Poossasowley and that the greatest confusion prevailed during the whole day of Friday and that His Highness with about 5,000 followers left the main body a few ghurries before day on Saturday morning, and proceeded in the direction of Meritch. Gokla is reported to have remained with the main body with the design of opposing our army, but if the description I have received of the confusion and disobedience of his troops be correct, it is highly probable he would change his intention and follow the Paishwa. There is no body of the enemy in our vicinity, but the excesses of the Ramoosses are distressing.

No. 79—Lieut. Robertson describes the situation of the two forces, the British and the Peshwa's:

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 4, December 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you with the information communicated to me by a cossid who left the armies on Monday morning, the 1st of December.

The British force marched from Rehmutoor on the morning of the 1st December, taking a road to the right of the Naivee Pass, and proceeding by Tasgaum and Mussor in the direction of Kurrur. Bapoo Gockla, Vinchoorkur and the elder Gorparah marched at the same time from the ground of their bivouac near Pailee a village in the rear of Rehmutoor. They hovered as usual on the flanks and rear of the army occasionally cutting in on the baggage but without doing an injury. Gockla had posted himself on the top of the Naivee Pass expecting our force to come through it. His Highness, the Paishwa, who was at Poosa-Sowlee with the troops of Nepauneekur and Putwurdhun, set out for Meritch and intended to reach it in one march on the morning of the 1st December. There was no account of General Doveton. Sir Thomas Hislop is advancing rapidly in this direction with 5 or 6,000 Horse and a Light Battalion of Infantry. These Battalions left Dharwar on the 26th of November for the northward.

The enemy's horse so completely encompass General Smith's army that the communication is cut off. The whole of the villages above the Katrass and Deo Ghauts have been plundered by the enemy who carrying no supplies with them are dependent on the country for subsistence. The Paishwa lives in the most uncomfortable manner and is said to be perfectly tired of the war. There is no alarm, nor has anything extraordinary occurred in our vicinity since I had last the honour of addressing you.

No. 80—Elphinstone writes to the Secretary, Bombay Government an account of an engagement between Gen. Smith and Gokhale.

Private letter from Mr. Elphinstone to Mr. Warden.

Dated about 1, December 1817.

We are now about South East of Sattara. Gockla made a stand today as we were coming to our ground and gave General Smith time to advance the horse artillery at speed, gave him a few rounds at the distance of half a mile. The shot must have been destructive, for never was there such a scamper. We have not heard of Goklah since, but shall probably see him tomorrow or next day. The Paishwa was at Poossa Sowly on the night before last; he is going south. We go on very well, but I hope you got my letter, begging that all the bullocks that can be collected in the northern Concan may be sent as soon as possible to Poona.

No. 81—Lieut. Robertson reports the distressful condition of the British forces, who were suffering from want of provisions.

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 5, December 1817.

Sir,

I am sorry to acquaint you that His Highness the Rajah of Berar has declared war by commencing hostilities against the British forces at Nagpore.

I beg particularly to call the attention of the Right Honourable, the Governor in Council to the nature of the war waged by Marhatta states. The Paishwa after his first effort seems to have determined not to risk his army in any general action. His plan is evidently to harass and reduce our armies to the utmost distress from want of provisions. The accounts I had yesterday the honour to transmit, would convince the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of the truth of this remark. General Smith is literally surrounded by the enemy's horse. The whole country in his rear and for some distance in front, is completely plundered and laid waste and divisions of Horse are posted to intercept convoys of supplies. General Smith will soon be in great want of provisions. He has already written in pressing terms for supplies. I am truly sorry that all my efforts to obtain a sufficient number of cattle to carry on the grain now ready to send him from this via Serroor, have been unsuccessful, and as there is no other remedy I am afraid, I will be obliged to seize every beast of burden in the city of Poona by force, to meet the public exigency. This will destroy public confidence and injure the character of our Government as well as prevent merchants from attempting to bring in grains on bullocks to the city in future.

Under the circumstances, I beg to draw the attention of Government to the absolute necessity of our being constantly supplied from Bombay. If our communication with Bombay be cut off, the force here may be obliged to retire to Ahmednuggur. Bullocks and camels should, if possible, be purchased at any rate, since our chief difficulty is in obtaining means for transporting grains. If I be successful in my endeavours to purchase Singhur from the Killadar before the news of the war with the Rajah of Berar should be generally known, I can purchase a great supply of grain in this city and place it in that fort.

towards the evening in carrying off from 15 to 20 bullocks and some private baggage also. In the course of the day's skirmishing the enemy lost about 20 men and horses; our loss was 2 Auxiliaries killed and 4 wounded. I crossed the Neera the same evening and on the 26th reached the bottom of the Salpee Ghaut. On the 27th we halted to refresh, the enemy threatening to defend the pass.

The following morning we ascended the Ghaut perfectly unmolested till we reached the top when the enemy shewed about 6,000 Horse and threw a few rockets. The advance drove them back with loss, but they gathered strength as they reappeared in our front, and towards the close of the march shewed about 3,000 while a larger body which had ascended by another pass hung upon the rear. The Horse Artillery Galloper drove them from the front with great effect. The rear guard consisting of 2nd Battalion 9th Regiment under Major Thatcher took an opportunity of masking a Galloper under a Division of the Auxiliary horse, which the enemy threatened to charge which did considerable execution. We had no casualties. On the 29th the enemy was cautious and distant till the close of the march, when he shewed about 5,000 Horse formed as disposed to stand.

The advance was thrown forward and the enemy slowly retired to keep out of range. The nature of the ground however enabled me to push upon them rapidly and unperceived when all the Gallopers and a 5½ inch Howitzer opened upon them with great effect and they immediately dispersed in confusion and retired several miles.

They disappeared altogether from the 30th of November to the 6th instant when they came upon our rear again at Moze in considerable strength, but were baffled in every attempt upon our baggage by the rear Guard under Lieut. Col. Cox of the 1st Battalion 2nd Regiment.

On the 7th during the march upon this town, he again shewed from 6 to 7,000 horse in our rear and at first seemed inclined to attack, but afterwards kept in very dispersed order. The rear Guard was strengthened during the march and towards the close of it, the enemy annoying us with rockets, I directed three troops of the 2nd Regiment of Cavalry, and a few infantry of the rear Guard with a Galloper to drive them off which was immediately accomplished.

I have been obliged to halt here two days to refresh and pay off the troops.

No. 83—Elphinstone offers a few suggestions to General Smith in order to bring the war to a speedy end.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH.

Camp Punderpore, 9 December 1817.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for your information, a copy of a letter, which I have received from the Secretary to His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General. You will observe that it is His Excellency's wish that the force under your command should be withdrawn for the present from the army of the Deccan and applied to the special purpose of the war with the Paishwa. I therefore, proceed to communicate my sentiment on the course which it is expedient to adopt towards His Highness.

In the first place it appears of the highest political importance to shorten the war. The example of protracted opposition to our arms by the Paishwa could not but have a very unfavourable effect on such of our allies as are either wavering or disaffected; and from his former station of head of the Mahra-tta confederacy a continuance of hostilities with him is very likely to unsettle the minds of all the other chiefs of that nation.

For the speedy termination of the war it appears more effectual to act against His Highness's person than to take his forts; reduce his country or detach his Sirdars by separate opposition. If the Paishwa can be taken or so pressed as to be induced to submit, we shall be able at once to dictate our own terms and even if our pursuit of him should not be attended with this complete success, it will greatly contribute by reducing his power and lessening his reputation to the attainment of the other objects just alluded to.

It is therefore, of primary consequence to form a force so constituted as to enable it to overtake the light army with which the Paishwa now moves; this will be most effectually accomplished by uniting the Cavalry and Light Infantry of the Division under the command of Brigadier General Pritzler (which is also rendered applicable to this war) to that of your army,

by which means an adequate force will be provided for pursuit while another force will remain for the conduct of any sieges which the operations of the war may render necessary. I have already requested General Pritzler to march to Punderpore, and if he should arrive before you are required to leave this part of the country, it will be easy to carry the arrangement just mentioned into effect.

But as General Pritzler's arrival may not take place for some time and as the Paishwa's retiring towards the north may draw you to a distance from the force under that officer, it is necessary to provide for your undertaking the pursuit of the Paishwa with the means now at your disposal. You will be the best judge of the manner in which this is to be effected. If your force would admit of it, it would evidently be desirable to form your Light Division in such a manner as to allow of your battering train moving after you, as the Paishwa may otherwise retire to a fort whenever he is pressed by your pursuit and leave it again before you can obtain the means of besieging it. If it should not be advisable to form both Divisions I would then recommend your placing your train and heavy baggage at the nearest place where you think it would be secure and immediately commencing the pursuit with the rest of your army. Your baggage could then be taken charge of by General Pritzler, and either brought after you or removed to some position from which it might easily reach any fort in which the Paishwa might take refuge. With a view to this case I beg leave to suggest to your consideration the expediency of making such an arrangement regarding the 15th Madras N. I. and the detachment under Capt. Watson, as may enable General Pritzler to send on the Cavalry and Light Infantry of his Division to you, without too much weakening the force which is to remain with them.

The above are all the suggestions that occur to me in the present state of the Paishwa's country. I shall have constant opportunities of making you acquainted as they arise with any alterations in my views that may be produced by changes of circumstance. The constant communications of our opinions on all subjects of this nature, would indeed render this letter unnecessary, were it not requisite for the information of Government to record the plan on which we are about to act.

No. 81—The Governor General appoints Elphinstone sole Commissioner of the Deccan territories and states for his guidance the general principles forming the basis of the settlement to be effected after the defeat of the Peshwa.

From—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

To—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT.

Camp Senara, 15 December 1817.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, enclosing the copy of one of that addressed by you to Major Agnew.

You will hereafter, and with the least practicable delay, receive a full exposition of the sentiments and views of the Governor General connected with the recent transactions at Poona, together with His Lordship's resolutions and instructions regarding the future settlement of the country lately held by Bajee Rao, and the establishment of an order of things adapted to the new and unexpected condition of affairs in the Deccan, produced by that person's atrocious violation of the law of nations and the established usages and observances of all civilised states.

The object of this letter is to state, in a few words, the basis of the settlement which, under the supposition of the entire success of our arms against Bajee Rao, of which the Governor General cannot permit himself to doubt, after being apprized of the able and vigorous prosecution of operations against his power and the effect they have already produced, will, in His Lordship's judgment, be justified and required for the security of our interests in the Deccan.

I am directed to premise, that the terms detailed in your letter to Major Agnew are such as His Lordship would deem it indispensable to require from any individual whom we might think fit to establish in the authority of Paishwa (should it be deemed advisable to continue that designation) or in the Government of Poona under any other title. The conduct of Bajee Rao, however, has been such as entirely to preclude his restoration to the Government of Poona on any terms, and even to render all negotiation with him inadmissible: while political considerations of the first importance appear to His Lordship to dictate the arrangement, of which I now proceed to state the fundamental principles.

1. The occupation of the whole of the territory, lately forming the possessions of the Paishwa, by the British Government and its annexation to the dominion of the Honourable Company, with the exceptions hereafter stated.

2. The perpetual exclusion of Bajee Rao and his house from all sovereign authority.

3. The expulsion from the Deccan of Bajee Rao, or the seizure or detention of his person in the custody of the British Government, in such degree of restraint as circumstances may suggest.

4. Such of the southern Jageerdars, and the other Jageerdars of the Peishwa's Government, as may not have taken part against the British Government in the late contest, or may speedily submit and be admitted to terms, to be taken under the direct protection of the British Government, and to hold their lands from that Government in the same manner as heretofore from the Peishwa, with such modifications in the conditions of their tenure as may hereafter be settled on the basis of the articles of Punderpore. A proper distinction to be made in the adjustment of those conditions, between the Jageerdars whose conduct may have entitled them to favour, and those whose tardy submission may have deprived them of pretension to the consideration of the British Government.

5. The lands of Gokhla, and any other of the Jageerdars not coming within the description of those referred to under the preceding head, to be annexed to the British dominions, or otherwise disposed of at the option of the British Government.

6. The murderers of Captain Vaughan and Mr. Vaughan, or the abettors or authors of their murder, or that of any other English officer, to be publicly executed.

7. Gokhla, and any other chiefs who are known to have been active in exciting the Peishwa to war with the British Government, or the subsequent prosecution of hostilities, to be seized, and their persons to be detained in custody, at the disposal of the British Government; unless it shall be established that any of them have been concerned, directly or indirectly, in the murder of any English officer, in which case they will, of course, be liable to the penalty of that crime.

8. Provision in land to be made eventually for the Rajah of Sattarah. The provision for the Rajah of Sattara may be made either by an assignment of land in jagheer, or by establishing him in a small and compact sovereignty, under such stipulations

as shall secure the supremacy of the British Government. You will decide between these two arrangements, or on the adoption of any other calculated to secure the same object, namely, the conciliation of the tribe of Mahrattas to the new order of things, and the establishment of a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the former Bramin Government.

9. The establishment of a provision, in land or money, for Chimnajee, and such of the members of the family of Bajee Rao as may not have been too seriously implicated in his crimes and for whom some permanent and honourable retreat will be necessary. The nature and extent of these provisions cannot be here prescribed, but must be determined by you on the spot. It may be necessary to provide, in like manner, for such of the principal officers and Sirdars of the former administration as cannot be employed under the new Government. It will be a question however, whether pensions in money, on the condition of their removal beyond the limits of a territory so recently under the Paishwah's authority, will not be a preferable form of provision for the whole or a portion of these persons, especially the members of Bajee Rao's family.

10. The Governor-General entertains doubts of the expediency of establishing Amrut Rao in a jagheer in any part of the conquered territory; but you will have the means of forming a more accurate judgment of the advantage or otherwise of such an arrangement, and will report your opinion for the consideration of the Governor-General.

The Governor-General has, in the preceding paragraphs, stated the general principles which are to form the basis of the settlement of the territory conquered from Bajee Rao by the British arms. You are particularly requested, however, to consider yourself at liberty, in the application of those principles to the actual condition of affairs, to exercise your own judgment and discretion, in carrying into execution the measures now prescribed, and to modify and adjust them according to the results of your local experience and knowledge as long as the primary and indispensable objects of the arrangement as designated in the foregoing instructions, are steadily kept in view.

The Governor General does not deem it necessary to delay the despatch of this letter, for the purpose of adding any instructions regarding the provisional settlement of the country occupied by our arms. You will make such temporary provision as may be in your power for that purpose, employing any officers whom you may find qualified for the administration of the revenue and

police of the country. You will naturally apply for aid, in these respects, to the Governments of Bombay and Fort St. George. It will, no doubt, occur to you to avail yourself of the talents and experience of Brigadier General Munro, by requesting him, in the name of the Governor General, to assume the task of introducing the British authority into the southern territory, and to carry on such communications with the Jageerdars in that quarter as may not be so easily accessible to yourself. You will be regulated by your own sense of expediency, as to requesting the Governments of Fort. St. George and Bombay to assume the immediate charge of the territories contiguous to the provinces subject to those Presidencies respectively.

I am directed to inform you, that the Governor General is pleased to appoint you sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territory conquered from the Peishwah, and to vest you with authority over all the civil and military officers employed in that territory, to be exercised according to the established principles and rules of the service, and all such civil and military officers will be required to conform to your instructions.

You are authorized to nominate a Secretary, or such other establishment as may be necessary to assist you in the execution of the functions of your office.

No. 85—Lieut. Robertson describes the movements of the Peshwa and his British pursuers.

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON,

To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, 16 December 1817.

Sir,

His Highness the Paishwa halted at Seedy-Tek on the river Beema on 12th and 13th, and the day before yesterday took a north-west course with the design of passing through his favourite town called Phoolshair on the river Beema, and about 18 miles nearly north of Poona, on his road to Nassick-Trimbuck where he probably expects to meet Trimbuckjee Dainglia, who is at present between Joonere and Seroor with about 2500 horse, and 2,000 Bheels. He is today said to have arrived at Pimplegaum Rahoo, a village on the Beema about 37 miles from Poona and about 28 miles from Phoolshair. General Smith was at Auklooz

near Sirolly on the river Nyra on the 11th and marched to Nimbgaum on the Beema on the 12th. Not a man of the enemy was seen on the march of the 12th.

The most perfect tranquillity prevails in Poona; nor has the near approach of the Paishwa, nor the terrifying reports spread abroad by our secret enemies been able to shake public confidence.

His Highness the Raja of Sattara passed under the escort of three thousand horse, commanded by Waman Row Apta, to the eastward of Poona about 25 miles, on his way from Wasota to the Paishwa's camp three days ago.

The last northern newspaper states that Capt. Davies had very nearly surprized a body of Pindarrees, and that he is gone from Ankye-Tunkye in the direction of Nassick Trimbuck. Captain Watson's convoy arrived here safely the day before yesterday. Col. Doveton was at Omrawuty and would arrive at Nagpore by the 13th instant. General Malcolm is near to Cheeto Pindarie's and had made a successful attack on a small *garhi* near Ashta and captured Namdar Khan a Pindarie Chief of considerable consequence.

No. 86—Intelligence.

19 December 1817.

General Smith arrived at Seroor the 17th and Gokla with his force reached Moulkan (Malthan?) the same day. It is 8 miles west of Seroor.

The Paishwa had preceded him, passing with his force via Telligaum on the Beemah near Gorygaum, where he halted, to Pabul, and thence pursuing his route to Joonnair where it is supposed he will make a short halt and be joined by Trimbuckjee, who has 4 or 5,000 men with him. From Joonnair, it is expected His Highness will proceed to Coppergaum via Nassick, and Sindiah's vakeel at this place having told Captain Robertson, that his master had sent an invitation to the Paishwa, to come to Ougein, and the general report being that the Paishwa meditates an excursion to Hindoostan, to throw himself into the hands of Scindiah, (or as they express it, *gulla puckrana*) it is probable that future accounts may verify the present rumours.

Since the Paishwa proceeded to Pabul it is reported, and I believe with some foundation, that Nepankur who was with him has gone to join Gockla. The Sirdars who were with the

Paishwa, and advanced corps, were Chintamun Row, Nepaunkur, Mahadoo Row Rasta, Poorunderry Dumdoorah, and his own brother Chimnaje Appa. He had about 5,000 chosen troops with him, all the elephants he took from Poona with him, except two which had been sent sick to Merritch, and a few Sooternals but no guns. Gockla had two Horse Guns with him, I don't hear of his having any others. General Smith intended leaving his battering train and heavy stores at Seroor, with a view I believe, of forwarding them on to Nuggur. A report prevails of the Nagpore Rajah having gone to Chanda but it is not corroborated by the accounts from that quarter so late as the 6th which mention nothing of it.

The last dispatches from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief after adverting to the advantage he would derive from the possession of Asseerghur, adds, "I have in anticipation of Your Lordship's orders, directed Brigadier General Doveton, after sending the reinforcements to Nagpore, and providing for the complete safety of Jaulnah and our supplies, to demand the surrender of Asserghur, agreeably to the treaty, and if not given up, to besiege it."

No. 87—Elphinstone reports to the Governor General the progress of the war, the distressful condition of the Peshwa and the visit of the latter's agent Balkrishna Shastry to negotiate peace.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp near Seroor, 21 December 1817.

My Lord,

General Smith's report will have informed Your Excellency with the operations of this force since its march from Poona. The Paishwa kept a considerable distance and made moderate marches merely sufficient to prevent our going on him. The troops with him amount to about 10,000 Horse of which the greater part belongs to the Southern Jageerdars who refuse to quit his person, and the rest are the remains of his own force after the best have been selected by Gokla. He has likewise 2,000 or 3,000 Infantry. He was lately joined by 3,000 Horse under Narro Punt Apty who had been detached to bring the Rajah of Safara to Wassota when General Smith was in the neighbourhood and who arrived with him in the Paishwa's

camp five days ago. The Paishwa has his tents as usual and is accompanied by his wife Gokla remains in the rear with a light force of about 7,000 Horse who have neither tents nor baggage of any description but sleep by their Horses which are always saddled, and generally shift their ground once or twice in the course of every night. This force consists of part of Gokla's own troops and those of the Vinchoorker and Poorunderry. Their object is to hang on the rear of this army to plunder the baggage, to cut off supplies, to intercept communications, and generally to cramp General Smith's operation. In the first mode of annoyance they have been totally unsuccessful and though they prevent supplies coming in unless under strong escort, yet as they have the grain in the villages, no great inconvenience is occasioned by the prevention. They are no more successful in stopping communications, but the effect of them is chiefly felt in obliging the light and heavy parts of the army to move in one body and in the delay occasioned by the necessity of guarding against their possible enterprizes. Notwithstanding those obstructions General Smith has marched on an average 15 miles a day ever since he left Poona, and as he is about to leave his battering train at this place, he will henceforth be able to press the Paishwa much closer with much less exertions to his army. The Paishwa's course was first directed to the southward, but from Possasowlee, he turned east and marched in that direction to Punderpore from whence he moved first north and then north west towards Poona. He passed within 20 miles of that capital and he is now near Joonere 50 miles North West of this cantonment. He is said to have lately been joined by Trimbuckjee with a body of Bheels and Ramoossees and some Arabs and it is believed that he intends to retire into the hills north of Joonere which are impossible for guns and there to endeavour to defend himself. Both the Paishwa's force and Gokla's are represented to be harassed and disheartened, of which the best proof is afforded by the reduction of their numbers.

Brigadier General Pritzler was at Beejapoor on the 12th instant on his march towards Punderpore from whence I have recommended his advance towards Kasigaum on the Beema.

I had formerly the honour to report my having addressed letters to the Paishwa and to Gokla threatening retaliation if any other British prisoners should be put to death. After some time I received answers both of which disavowed the murders of Captain Vaughan and Mr. Vaughan. Gokla promised

an enquiry regarding the murders and the Paishwa professed a strong desire to be at peace with the Company under whose protection he had lived so happily.

Two days after two Hircarras of Gokla's brought letters from Messrs. Morrison and Hunter stating that though rather roughly treated at first they had since their arrival at Poona been well treated, and were in charge of Major Pinto. The letter though however not delivered till the 3rd December, was dated the 9th November only two days after their capture before they were sent to Kangoree. Their treatment there is represented to be harsh. These letters were delivered without any message from Gokla, but the delivery of them after so long a period had of itself the appearance of a wish to conciliate and agrees with popular reports at the time that the Paishwa wished to treat. This intention, if it was ever entertained was probably altered by the intelligence of the war with the Rajah of Nagpore.

Yesterday, a Brahmin calling himself Balkrishna Shastry and professing to be an agent of the Paishwa's arrived in camp in disguise. He represented himself to have been sent to Poona by the Paishwa from Paudlee (where His Highness was about the last week in November) but ordered to remain quiet until further orders. These orders arrived about a fortnight ago, when Ball Kishen waited on Lieut. Robertson who has remained in charge of Poona. He opened his mission to that officer, and the object of it appeared to be to persuade us that the Paishwa was himself our friend, but was not a free agent, being borne away by the violence of Gokla and Ballaba, to prevail on me to apply for an armistice, and finally to ascertain whether we were likely to direct our attention to the person of the Paishwa or to that of the Rajah of Sattara. Captain Robertson very judiciously ridiculed the idea of our asking an armistice, recommended the Paishwa to come forward openly and throw himself on our mercy as the only means of keeping his musnud and pointed out the ease with which we might set up a new Paishwa. Ball Kishen held nearly the same language to me, that he had to Captain Robertson, except that he did not mention the armistice, and spoke of the Paishwa's coming alone into camp if he received encouragement. He did not specify what encouragement was expected, but as he spoke of our behaving as formerly and not as for the last year, I conceive he has no thoughts of unconditional submission. My answer was that I did not know that he was sent by the Paishwa, but what

What I had to say was no secret and I would therefore communicate. It was that I had received no orders and did not know whether Your Excellency would treat with the Paishwa even now, that I was sure you would not if he pushed things to extremities, that he must be sensible how much we lost by not setting up a new Government to which the Sirdars who disapproved of His Highness's measures might repair, and that he had better endeavour to obtain terms before it was too late. Ball Kishen Shastry was desirous of remaining a day first to allow me time for consideration and afterwards for his own convenience, but I thought it best to send him immediately out of camp. If these overtures come from the Paishwa, they are probably insincere. It seems his plan to throw the odium of the war on his Sirdars and to endeavour to maintain a sort of neutrality for himself, but his reception of Trimbuckjee if true, is a proof that he has no immediate thoughts of peace, or he would not throw so great an obstacle in the way of an accommodation. Some time ago I received a letter from Madhoo Row Dadgee, the son of Purseram Bhow, explaining that he had been obliged to send his nephew Row Sahib to join the Paishwa but that he was still ours at heart. As nothing better can be expected of the Jagheerdars while we can neither secure them by setting up a new Government, nor alarm them by overrunning their Jagheers, I thought it best to say that I was sensible that Row Sahib's joining was the effect of necessity, and that I should wait for any demonstration of his attachment until Your Excellency should determine on some plan for settling the Government. I used this language in the belief that it would have an equally good effect on the Paishwa and the Jagheerdars to be reminded of the possibility of our effecting a revolution. The Chiefs of Meritch, Koorundwar and Sirwell (?) sent verbal answers. No reply has been received from the other Jagheerdars.

While General Smith was marching to the southward I received a Vakeel from the Rajah of Colapore professing his attachment, reminding me of his claims to Chikoree, and Manowlee and offering his services in collecting grain and providing for depots if they should be required. He said any of his forts including Colapore was at our service.

General Smith marches tomorrow in pursuit of the Paishwa whom he will probably now be able to press with more effect than ever. The presence of the Rajah of Sattara in the Paishwa's camp is a proof of his want of confidence in his forts and it will be an additional encumbrance to his flight in the plain.

No. 88—Lieut. Robertson weighs the pros and cons of the present position of the two armies.

From—LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON, POONA,
To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.

Poona, (January ?) 1818.

Sir,

There are also late authentic accounts of General Smith's movements. The Paishwa continues to occupy a position a little to the northward of the Bamorda Ghaut and of Bhaunsunwarra (?). He himself is encamped on the banks of a small river. His troops said to amount to 20,000 men are posted in the passes leading to his position. It seems to be the opinion of all the Vakeels of the Sirdars and of others that General Smith will be opposed by the enemy at Bhaunsunwarra (?). The position as it is described to me seems to be admirably calculated for the designs of the enemy and adverse to the operations of our troops. The part is only to be approached after surmounting Ghauts strong by nature and considered impracticable for wheeled carriages and rendered more secure by the obstructions recently placed in them by the enemy. The country is highly favourable for the operations of light troops being covered with low jungle in some places and of a very irregular and rocky surface in others. The Paishwa has a Battalion called Roopram Chowdry's dressed in red and one called Gokla's in blue with 2,000 Arábs and upwards of 2,000 Bheels posted in situations favourable for opposing the attempt of the English army in forcing this position.

As far as I can judge of the feeling in the enemy's army from what I can pick up from the agents of the Sirdars in Poona, I am inclined to believe that it is considered to be a point of honour to give us a battle of as long duration as that of Nagpore, and that having thus saved their character they will, if beaten, disperse and if victorious treat for peace on better terms. The Southern Jagheerdars have become very impatient to return to their Jaghires and to be on good terms with us to prevent the loss of their possessions.

We may therefore expect to hear of more desperate effort being made against General Smith than has hitherto been shewn, but I have no doubt that as soon as the General surmounts the barriers of the position and drives away the Arabs and Bheels, the horse and the Paishwa will immediately

take to flight, the first to their own homes and the latter to some fort to the southward. If there be equal generalship displayed in the defence as has been shown in the occupation of the present encampment of the enemy, General Smith will suffer heavy losses.

No. 89—Col. Burr apprehends an attack on Poona by the Peshwa's troops.

**From—COLONEL BURR, COMMANDING AT POONA,
To—CHIEF SECRETARY WARDEN.**

Poona, 1 January 1818.

Sir,

Some bodies of the enemy's horse are moving about and thence stragglers have approached this morning within that of our position. They have a large force within a short distance, having been reported to have encamped at Aloondy yesterday (about 6 coss hence). The native report is that they meditate an attack on this city. The advance of this force is said to consist of Trimbuckjee's and Gokla's troops. The Paishwa himself is said to be a few miles in the rear. These accounts which I received from a variety of quarters the day before yesterday and sent off express to General Smith and Pritzler and which are further corroborated by reports from Seroor which have reached me this morning, led to my sending off Col. Fitzsimon for the 2nd regiment and remainder of the Regular Horse, which General Smith had placed at my requisition, and as these appear to be a body of troops now approaching Wagowley, it is probable it may be them. Major Cunningham's Horse at least about 1,700 of them arrived here a few days ago to be mustered and paid, which fortunately places at my disposal a body of troops that the enemy's may not have expected to meet them.

No. 90—Col. Burr reports the sufferings of the British force at *Koregaon.*

**From—COLONEL BURR, COMMANDING AT POONA,
To—THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.**

Poona, 2 January 1818.

Sir,

As I am conscious my letters of this morning must have excited the greatest anxiety in your quarter, I lose no time in

informing you that notwithstanding our effort to assist, their junction proved abortive. They, thank God, are relieved from a portion of their sufferings by the departure of the Paishwa's army, which has proceeded further down the Beema and from a variety of letters which have reached me and Cunningham, I am happy to say that there is some hope of getting them off, though it is but a cheerless one, as they have an immense number of killed and wounded and are in want of ammunition, provision, dooleys, carriages, draft cattle, and in fact everything, all of which it is out of my power to assist them, situated as we are, menaced every moment with an attack on our position and the city by the numerous bodies of the enemy which surround this place. I have, however, written to Captain Staunton to assure him if he can get on to Lonee and thence to Wagolee. I will at all hazards send a strong detachment and use every means in my power to bring him in. I am afraid the list of killed and wounded will exceed three hundred, besides twenty out of twenty seven artillery with Lieut. Chisholm who is killed, and a very fine young man Dr. Wingate, Captain Swanston, Lieuts. Pattison and Cormellan are dangerously wounded. Capt. Staunton, Lieut. James and a medical gentleman are the only officers untouched. By a letter I received this afternoon from Mr. Elphinstone dated the 28th not far from Sungumnair. I find the Paishwa's movement south at that time was not known in General Smith's camp, so that he cannot expect the General in this quarter for some days. I understand the Vinchour Rajah who was left to watch General Smith marched upwards of 30 coss in one day and the next upwards of 20. The enemy has since their arrival in this neighbourhood drawn some guns out of Loghur. The enemy followed Cunningham nearly into camp rocketing and sniping at them all the way and during his halt at Wagolee, his casualties were but few and he succeeded in killing a few of the enemy and their horse and bringing in some Ramosees.

I am informed a body of the enemy is collected near the Parbutty to assist in the attack this night on us, and the city; in addition to the guns the enemy have lately got out of their fort, they have received considerable augmentations to their numbers.

No. 91—Capt. Staunton reports the sanguinary action at Koregaum.

From—CAPTAIN F. F. STAUNTON,

To—LIEUTENANT GENERAL FITZSIMON,
COMMANDING AT SEROOR.

Seroor, 3 January 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that in conformity to your instructions. I marched from Seroor at half past 8 P.M. on the 31st December in command of the following detachment 2/1 Regt about 500, two six pounders and about 250 auxiliary Horse under Lieut. Swanston. Having proceeded on my way towards Poona as far as Corrygaum by 10 A.M. on the 1st January, my further progress was arrested by the appearance (according to information than obtained) of the Paishwa with a very large army supposed to be about 20,000 horse and 8,000 Infantry with two heavy guns. The whole formed on the opposite side of the river Beemah ready to attack us. I continued my march till I reached the village of Corrygaum, in which I determined to make a stand and accordingly took post selecting a commanding situation for our two guns. The enemy perceiving my intention sent 3 different bodies of Arabs consisting of about 1000 each, under cover of their guns and supported by large bodies of horse for the same purpose, and, I am sorry to say from their superior information of the nature of the village, succeeded in getting hold of its strongest post and from which I was unable to dislodge them during the day. We continued incessantly engaged till 9 P.M. when we finally repulsed them.

At day-break on the morning of the 2nd we took possession of the post the enemy had occupied the day before, but they did not attempt to molest us. On the evening of the 2nd despairing of being able to make my way good to Poona and my men having been 48 hours without food and no prospect of procuring any in the deserted village we had taken post in, I determined upon the attempt to retreat and having collected the whole of the wounded, secured the two guns, and one tumbril for moving. I commenced my retreat at 7 P.M. being under the necessity of destroying one empty tumbril and leaving the camp equipage. Under this explanation I trust I shall be deemed justified in the steps I have taken. Our loss has been heavy indeed, but not more so than might naturally be expected in a struggle like this,

and is as follows—killed Lieut. Chisholm, Arty; Asstt. Surg. Wingate 2/1 Regt. N.I., wounded, Lt. Pattinson, 2/1 dangerously.

Wounded Lt. Cornellan. }
 „ Lt. Swanston. } badly but not dangerously.

50 men killed—2nd Battalion 1 Regiment.

12 do do artillery.

62 Killed, auxiliary horse not included.

105 men wounded 2nd Battalion 1 Regiment.

8 do auxiliary.

113 Wounded. Total 175 men, auxiliary horse not included.

In concluding this report I beg to assure you that it is utterly impossible for me to do justice to the merits and exertions of the European officers commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and privates, that I had the honor and good fortune to command on this trying occasion.

No. 92—Elphinstone forwards details of the movements of the Peshwa and the British armies.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Corygaum, 4, January 1818.

My Lord,

About the time of General Smith's arrival at Seroor on the 17th December the Paishwa reached Villoor near Joonere; from this place he moved up the Lug Ghaut to Baunsunwarra about 10 miles and thence to Lingdes; about 7 miles between these three places he spent the time from the 17th to the 27th. The more eastern Ghauts being difficult for guns General Smith moved by the Nimba Dewra Ghaut. He left Seroor on the 22nd and on the 26th reached Hunwunt Garh nearby on the direct road from Ahmednuggur to Copargaum. From Hunwunt Garh he made a long march further west to Tongong. The Paishwa appears to have calculated on the General's proceeding towards Copergaum; for he sent his tents to the Nasseera pass on the 27th as he intended to cross the valley of the Paira(?) near Akola and proceed by the great road to Nassick, but on hearing

country and occasionally send friendly messages, and it is all they can be expected to do at present. Appa Dessye is particularly warm in his professions.

No. 93—General Smith describes his pursuit of the Peshwa.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Siroor, 7 January 1818.

Sir,

I have the honor to report to you for the information of the Most Noble the Governor General that the Division under my command, leaving its heavy park in Seroor, marched on the 22nd ultimo in pursuit of the Paishwa's army which had gone north, and entered the Ghauts. His Highness had taken the direction of Kullum and Jooneir (Kalamb and Junnar?) and by report had taken pains to break up the passes to prevent my following him. I therefore best to avoid impediments and to keep between His Highness and the more Eastern Ghauts which overlook Candeish, directed my march by Ahmednuggur, Rahoory and Sungumnair and as far north as Akowla on the Paira where I arrived on the 28th ultimo.

This brought me to the northward of the Paishwas' army within the Ghauts and His Highness who was on the point of proceeding on a religious ceremony to Nassick immediately retraced his steps to the southward.

I entered the Nusseera Ghaut with great difficulty on the 29th ultimo. The passes having been blocked up and trenched by the enemy, the guns could only be dragged by great labour of the troops and my rear guard did not reach camp till 12 o'clock the following day.

Finding the Paishwa continued in rapid flight, I now formed two detachments proceeding myself on the 30th ultimo in direct pursuit with the horse artillery the 2nd Madras Cavalry H.M.'s 65th Regt. the Light Battn. and the 1st Battn. 2nd Regt. Bombay N.I. and directed Col. Bales of the Madras Establishment with the foot artillery the Bombay European Regt. and 2 Battns to descend the Ghauts and keep parallel marches with me to prevent his escape towards Candeish.

of General Smith's approach to Sungumnair he changed his route and moved to Catool on the more western road through Rajoor : On General Smith's reaching Toogong he seems to have thought he could not pass to the northward without the risk of being entangled in the hills and overtaken by our troops, in consequence of which he retraced his steps on the 28th and arrived on the same day at Wuttora a distance of near 20 miles through Ghauts, from whence he proceeded to Chaukun about 40 miles 2 marches. As Chakun is a strong little fort, from which he drove out at a party of peons belonging to Captain Robertson, Superintendent of Police at Poona and leaving 100 Arabs for a garrison, proceeded to Phoolsbehr two miles from this place. Next day he was surprised by the appearance of the small Detachment under Captain Staunton and spent the 1st on repeated attacks on it with his whole force. His Highness himself looking on from a distant hill. The Detachment though distressed in provisions and water, maintained its post against such unequal numbers till the 2nd when the Paishwa heard of General Smith's approach and continued his flight to the southward. He ascended the little Bore Ghaut on the same day and was followed by his whole army in the course of the night.

The details of the gallant defence of Captain Staunton's Detachment shall be forwarded as soon as received.

On the Paishwa's return to the south General Smith set out in pursuit of him and ascended the Nusseera Ghaut after which he left 3 Battalions with his heavy guns and stores under the command of Lieut. Boles and proceeded over the Muneera and Log Ghauts to this place, where he arrived yesterday and halted today the first time for a fortnight during which he had marched upwards of 200 miles.

A few days ago my mounshee received a letter dated the 28th ultimo from a confidential person in the service of Govind Kishan Kally who says that he and another person believed to belong to Balloba Vinchoorkur, have something of great importance to communicate and requesting that passports and a chup-rassee might be sent to conduct them to camp. Having no doubt that these were agents of the Paishwa I made my Munshee reply that if they were so, they must come openly, otherwise I could not recognise them. His Highness's plan is said to be to wear away the time in the hopes of some effectual assistance from Scindia, Holkar and the Pindarries.

Most of the Southern Jageerdars remain on the same footing as formerly. They do not molest our Dawk runners in their

country and occasionally send friendly messages, and it is all they can be expected to do at present. Appa Dessye is particularly warm in his professions.

No. 93—General Smith describes his pursuit of the Peshwa.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Siroor, 7 January 1818.

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I lament to say that all our exertion to get up with the enemy failed, though I had continued marching upon him for 13 successive days without a halt averaging upwards of 17 miles a day including the passage of 3 Ghauts. His Highness kept in rapid march till he reached Phoolsheir on the Beema near Poona, where he arrived with the whole of his army on the 31st Ultimo augmented by that of Trimbuckjee's Infantry which had joined him to the northward.

Lieut. Col. Burr Commanding the Troops at Poona, uneasy at the proximity of His Highness's army on its march to Phoolsheir and not adverting unfortunately to my pursuit of him, which allowed him neither means nor time to attack the Capital, had under these circumstances pressingly called for the assistance of a Detachment from Seroor and which marching on the 31st reached Korrygaum on the Beema at the very time the enemy had assembled at Phoolsheir.

This gave rise to one of the most brilliant affairs ever achieved by any army. The European and Native soldiers displayed the most noble devotion and most romantic bravery, under the pressure of thirst and hunger almost beyond human endurance.

I have the honor to enclose the official report of this affair and I shall tomorrow forward a copy of my Division-orders detailing the particulars of the exemplary conduct of the troops engaged. My advances upon Corygaum the moment I became acquainted with the critical situation of the Detachment and which I reached on the 3rd Instant, enabled me to save several of the wounded who could not be carried off and I have in consequence the honor of enclosing an amended return of the killed, wounded and missing.

No. 94—Particulars of the sanguinary action at Koregaum are reported.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

Camp near Seroor, 7, January 1818.

Sir,

The Commanding Officer having received the official accounts of an attack made by the Peshwa's army on a small Detachment commanded by Captain Stauton of the 2 Battn. 1st regt. B.N. I at the village of Corrygaum, has great satisfaction in publishing

the particulars for general information, and in holding it up to the force as one of the most brilliant examples of gallantry and perseverance recorded in our Indian annals.

This Detachment consisting of a detail of Madras artillery and two six Pounders, the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment Bombay Native Infantry about 600 strong, and about 300 auxiliary horse, the whole under Captain Staunton marched from Seroor for Poona at 8 P.M. on the 31st December and reached the heights overlooking Corrygaum about 10 o'clock in the forenoon of the 1st January, from whence the whole of the Peshwa's army estimated at 20,000 Horse and several thousand Infantry were discovered in the plain south of the Beema river. Captain Staunton immediately moved upon the village of Corrygaum with the intention of occupying it, and had scarcely succeeded in reaching it with his Detachment, when he was attacked in the most determined manner by three Divisions of the Peshwa's choicest Infantry supported by immense bodies of horse and the fire of two pieces of artillery. The enemy's troops were stimulated to their utmost exertions by the presence of the Peshwa on a distant height attended by the principal Mahratta Chiefs, who flattered His Highness with the prospect of witnessing the destruction of this gallant handful of British troops.

The enemy obtained immediate possession of the strongest parts of the village from which it was found impossible to dislodge them, and the possession of the remaining part was most obstinately contested from noon till 9 P.M. during which time almost every Pagoda and house had been repeatedly taken and retaken and one of the guns at one time was in possession of the enemy. Towards the close of the evening the Detachment was placed in a most trying situation. At this period nearly the whole of the artillery men were killed or wounded, and about one third of the Infantry and auxiliary horse. The exertions which the European Officers had been called upon to make in leading their men to frequent charges with the bayonet, had diminished their numbers. Lieut. Chisholm of the artillery and Mr. Asst. Surgeon Wingate 2/1 were killed; and Lieuts. Swanston, Pattinson and Cornellan were wounded, leaving only Captain Staunton, Lieut. Jones and Mr. Asst. Surgeon Wyllie nearly exhausted to direct the efforts of the remaining part of the Detachment who were nearly frantic from the want of water, and the almost unparalleled exertions they had made throughout the day, without any sort of refreshment after a fatiguing march of 28 miles.

Under cover of the night they were enabled to procure a supply of water and at 9 P.M. the enemy were forced to abandon the village after sustaining an immense loss in killed and wounded.

The British character was nobly supported throughout the whole of this arduous contest by the European Officers and small detail of Madras artillery. The medical officers also led the sepoys to charges with the Bayonet, the nature of the contest not admitting of their attending to their professional duties, and in such a struggle the presence of a single European was of the utmost consequence and seemed to inspire the native soldiers with their usual confidence of success.

At day-light on the 2nd the enemy were still in sight but did not renew the attack although it prevented the troops whose ammunition was nearly expended from procuring any supply of provisions.

Captain Staunton, however, made preparations for moving according to circumstances and the manner in which that officer availed himself of the few resources which remained to him after such a conflict, to prosecute his march and bring away the numerous wounded of his Detachment, is highly praiseworthy.

The detachment moved during the night of the 2nd upon Seroor which they reached at 9 o'clock on the forenoon of the 3rd having had no refreshment from the 31st December.

Captain Staunton brought in nearly the whole of the wounded and both guns and colours of the Regiment, which the enemy had vainly hoped to present as trophies of the Peshwa.

In concluding these details the Commanding Officer begs to offer to Captain Staunton and the whole of the European and Native Commissioned and non-Commissioned Officers and Privates engaged at Corrygaum his best thanks for their noble exertions and exemplary patience under every species of privation which he will not fail to bring to the notice of Government and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commanding Officer deems it proper to record the names of the officers engaged in this brilliant affair.

Madras Artillery.

Lieut. Chisholm killed Asstt. Surgeon Wyllie.
2/1 Regiment.

Captain Staunton, Commdr. Detachment.

Lieut. and Adjit Pattinson wounded since
dead.

Lieut. Cornellan wounded.

Lieut. Jones 10 Regt. doing duty 2/1;
Asstt. Surgeon Wingate killed auxiliary Horse
Lieut. Swanston, Madras Establishment, wounded.

No. 95—Elphinstone writes to the Government Secretary, the details of the plan of campaign for prosecuting the war against the Peshwa and advises him to keep secret the Governor General's intention of annexing the Peshwa's dominions.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—J. ADAM, SECRETARY, FORT WILLIAM.

Camp at Bhalavni, 17, January 1818.

Sir,

Since I had the honour to address you on the 9th instant I have fully considered the means of carrying into effect the instructions of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, communicated in your letter of the 15th ultimo. I am still of opinion that His Excellency's resolution to annex the Paishwa's territories to the British Dominions ought to be kept as secret as possible for the present. The people and the country are now pretty nearly neutral and any interests that could be created by their knowledge of our intended change in the Government is more likely to operate against us than for us. It is therefore, desirable to keep things in their present state until we should have obtained a firmer hold on the country, when resistance will be less likely to be thought of and less formidable if it should take place. By that time it is also probable that more troops may be spared to enable us to crush at once any attempts at opposition.

Little progress has as yet been made in the settlement of the country. At first it appeared to me to be an object to push at the Paishwa's person and endeavour to intimidate him to submission before his example should have any effect on other states; but his plans appear to have been too far advanced for the success of this design. He was almost immediately joined by the Rajah of Berar and by Holkar's Government, and he seems determined to avoid bringing matters to a crisis in his

own country and to await the combination he has formed abroad. It would, I conceive, be still possible to reduce the Paishwa to submission by a constant pursuit under His Excellency's resolution communicated in your letter of the 15th ult. His submission is no longer desirable and our plans can only be accomplished by the conquest of the country. The pursuit of the Paishwa will, however, be as necessary as ever to prevent his refreshing and recruiting his army as well as to keep up the impression of his being a fugitive and an adventurer. It will likewise be necessary to prevent his disturbing our own arrangements. To effect both objects it is necessary to form all the disposable force in the Paishwa's country into two divisions of which one may engage in sieges while the other pursues the enemy in the field. It appears to be that the latter division ought to consist of all the regular cavalry and horse artillery with two thousand five hundred Infantry, and as much of the disposable part of the irregular cavalry. As this force will be liable to be carried to distant parts of the country and will be exposed to unforeseen difficulties without support, it could scarcely be weaker than I have stated, although it leaves a very small force for sieges and for occupying the country. This last division will consist of three thousand Infantry, but a large proportion will be Europeans and it will have the fort Artillery of both Divisions. A party of the Auxiliary Horse will also be attached to it. General Smith in consultation with whom this arrangement has been settled, will undertake the pursuit of the Paishwa with the field army in which his knowledge of the country will give him great advantages, and the command of the other division will devolve on General Pritzler. Previously to carrying this plan into effect, it is necessary to assemble the whole of both divisions and to make a new distribution of the troops composing them. This cannot be done at present without abandoning the pursuit by both divisions, which is already commenced and which affords a prospect of dispersing the remains of the Paishwa's Infantry and of seizing his baggage. but this plan will be brought to some close before the end of the present month, after which the proposed distribution can immediately be effected. General Smith will then continue the field operations and General Pritzler will proceed to lay sieges to the forts of Sinhghur and Loghur which are important from their vicinity to the capital, and the latter likewise from its influence in the communication with Bombay. The situation of those places will also admit of temporary assistance being drawn from the troops stationed at Poona and even perhaps from those in the North Concan. The reduction of these forts will

probably lead some others to open their gates; and I should think there would be none to hold out between Poona and the Godavery. That part of the country however has great natural strength and much will depend on conciliating the goodwill of the Bheels. I shall early direct my attention to this object and I hope to derive great aid from some intercourse which General Smith had already established with them. It will be but settled hereafter whether to begin with the country north of Poona or with that to the south; but there can be no doubt that the territories beyond the Godavery must be left till an additional force can be spared to reduce them. That under General Doveton may probably soon be applicable to that purpose and I have suggested to His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop the employment of the whole or a part of it in that service. It is obvious that the settlement now contemplated as it is more important, more permanent and more desirable than any modifications of the existing Government, is also more difficult of execution, and requires the support of a greater force.

As soon as the new distribution has taken place, I intend to repair to Poona which is convenient for receiving Vakeels, for communicating with all parts of the country, and especially for judging of the extent to which our troops in that city may be applied to establishing our authority in the neighbourhood. I shall not however remain fixed in one place, but shall move with either division into any part of the country where my presence may be required, either for settling with the Inhabitants or for enquiring into the best course to pursue.

I have written to General Munro to make such arrangements as he thinks best in the country south of the Kishnah, and I shall even explain to him my own ideas regarding the terms to be granted to the Jageerdars. I took the liberty to write to the Government of Fort St. George to recommend that the squadron of Dragoons and Battalion of Infantry which His Excellency the Governor General requested to have added to the reserve, might be sent without delay to Dharwar. It is much to be regretted that General Munro could not be furnished with a greater force to enable him to go on with the plans, which he has commenced with so much judgment and with so good a prospect of success.

No. 96—Elphinstone gives a running account of the war during January in which the pursuit of the Peshwa and the capture of his forts figure prominently.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp Lonand, 31 January 1818.

My Lord,

When I had last the honour to address Your Excellency on the 4th instant the Paishwa had ascended the Bhore Ghaut 20 miles east of Poona on his way to the southward.

When General Smith set out in pursuit of the Paishwa to the northward on the 22nd of December General Pritzler was advancing to join this Division, with the intention of forming the new distribution so often alluded to in my letters. He was requested to take a position calculated for intercepting the Paishwa, should he return towards the south, to throw his stores and heavy baggage into Seroor and to take up the pursuit of the Paishwa as soon as he should come into his neighbourhood. General Pritzler was however, compelled to return several marches from Punderpore to favour a junction of a convoy from the south, and had scarcely set out again from Punderpore towards Pargaum when he received information of the Paishwa's having turned towards the south. On this he judiciously struck off to the westward, although he was still encumbered by his supplies amounting to 16,000 bullock loads and had not received the intended reinforcements. He fell into the Paishwa's track on the 6th and immediately turned south, ascended the Salpee Ghaut, and on the 6th came up with a body of horse about 18 miles from Sattarah, whom he charged with his cavalry and dispersed, killing 60 and taking 6 prisoners and 30 horses. The Paishwa who was at no great distance during this affair, renewed his flight and was pursued by General Pritzler past Meritch and across the Kishna by the ford of Error. He seems at this time to have entertained thoughts of standing an action as he sent for the guns he had left near Sattara on his former flight, but it ended in his sending them with most of his infantry to Neepauny while he pursued his flight to Gokauk on the Gutpurba. He left that neighbourhood on the 15th instant when finding himself pressed by General Pritzler and probably aware of the force under General Munro, he turned to the eastward and recrossed the Krishna

at Gulgalla from whence he moved in a westerly direction along the left bank of the river towards Utny (Athni). He had adopted the same plan with General Pritzler that he formerly adopted with General Smith, of keeping a light Division in his rear to impede the General's pursuit, but this body probably intimidated by the cavalry gave him but little disturbance. On the 17th however, they appeared in force and General Pritzler sent out his cavalry against them; Major Doveton who commanded charged three successive bodies amounting in all to 10,000 with 3 squadrons only and put them all to flight killing and taking 40 men. From this time General Pritzler pursued the Paishwa's track to Gulgalla without seeing any more of his horse. General Smith marched from Seroor on the 8th instant with his light Division and proceeded in a southerly direction by Pairgaum on the Beema and a pass east of the temple of Mahadeo, towards Eituney or Huttany. His intention was to intercept the Paishwa should he return towards the north or to support General Pritzler if necessary when within a march of Utny. On the 21st instant he received intelligence of the arrival of the Paishwa at that place moving west, on which he marched in the direction of Meritch to prevent the Paishwa's escaping to the west of him and then moved down (30 miles in all) to Oogar a place on the Kisna where the Paishwa had been encamped the night before. The Paishwa now crossed the Kisna and made a point of moving on his guns and infantry at Nepauny, but suddenly turning north he marched along the right bank of the Kisna towards Sattara where he arrived on the 27th. General Smith on receiving intimation of this movement, renewed his march to the northward, but kept the left bank of the Kisna to prevent the Paishwa escaping to the eastward as has since proved to be his real design. Near Tausgaum on the 23rd General Smith was overtaken by the whole of the Paishwa's light army which had been reinforced since we last saw it and amounted to not less than 15,000 men at the lowest computation. This body was commanded by Gokla, Appa Dessye, Trimbuckjee, the Vichoorkur and several of the Putwurdhuns. After leaving General Pritzler they had heard that the Paishwa with his heavy division was pressed by General Smith and had come by forced marches to his assistance. Their appearance was so sudden that they were enabled to cut off a few sepoy and upwards of 200 men of General Smith's Bazar in a village where they had gone to procure grain. These men were afterwards released by orders from the Paishwa and given half a rupee each to pay their expenses to camp. The Horse pressed on the rear all the march, rocketing and sniping

and wounded an officer, 2 Europeans and 7 sepoys. They continued this sort of attack but with less boldness until the 29th when we approached the Salpee Ghaut. On that day the Paishwa finding General Smith near him on the east with his light Division and his reserve under Col. Boles approaching from the northward began to fear being enclosed among the branches of the western ghauts. He therefore left Sattara and by a forced march crossed in front of General Smith, descended the Salpee Ghaut and moved off the eastward. His light Division after an unsuccessful attempt to pass General Smith and join the Paishwa, made another push at a place where the valley heading to the Ghaut is about six miles wide. General Smith moved out with the cavalry and horse artillery, supported by infantry to intercept them and forced them to separate and fly in great confusion along the face of the hills. Some of their Bazar fell in our hands but the greater part of the horse got through and the rest returned towards Sattara. All have now joined the Paishwa who was last heard of at Natta Potta. On the 30th General Smith descended the Ghaut and joined his reserve having marched for 40 days with only 3 halts in which time he has gone through 570 miles. The whole pursuit of the Paishwa amounts already to 850 miles. We are now waiting for General Pritzler who followed the Paishwa to Gulgulla and is now on his return by the route pursued by this Division. His cattle are much exhausted. During his pursuit of the Paishwa he moved 23 days without a halt and marched a distance of 300 miles in 18 days notwithstanding his heavy convoy and numerous sick.

I shall do myself the honour to submit to Your Excellency my correspondence with General Pritzler upto this time. General Smith's report of operations shall be forwarded to Your Excellency as soon as it is received. The interruptions of our communications prevent my hearing often from General Munro. My last letter is dated the 21st. General Munro had taken the field (though I am not informed with what force), had breached and taken Dummal and Gudduk, and had reduced all the Paishwa's and Gokla's country south of the Gutpurba. The people of the country had cordially assisted him in expelling the Marhattas. General Munro had also in a great measure succeeded in drawing off the Dessye of Kittoor and some other local chiefs from the Paishwa's cause. He had dispersed a body of Pindarries returning from Chittledroog (probably part of the body that passed Mulcapoor on the 18th of December) and the report of the country states that he likewise cut up a party of Gokla's troops.

I shall transmit copies of my correspondence with General Munro to Mr. Adam from which Your Excellency will be informed of my proceedings regarding the southern Jageerdars.

Your Excellency will have heard from Bombay that the troops belonging to the Northern Concan under Lieut. Col. Prother have taken the strong fort of Carnalla and that the fort of Muddunghur* in the northern Concan has also been reduced. These successes will have considerable effect even above the Ghauts and they will give confidence to our sepoys whose families in the southern Concan are still persecuted by the Paishwa.

The City of Poona continues quiet and abundantly supplied, but the surrounding country is disturbed by the Paishwa's troops from Singhur, Chakun and Loghur. A variety of reports have circulated of an intended attack on the capital by Arabs and other troops from those garrisons and from different parts of the country. These accounts induced Col. Burr to request Col. Boles to remain for some time at Poona with the reserve, but it is uncertain whether they have their origin in fact or are purposely circulated by the enemy. A conspiracy had been discovered in Poona to corrupt our troops. One of the criminals had been executed and several others are in custody. There seems no reason to suspect the bulk of the inhabitants of any designs or even wishes against us.

The country round Amednuggur has suffered disturbance similar to that experienced about Poona. Small parties of horse move about the country interrupting our collections of the revenue and collecting it for themselves. A party of 2,000 or 3,000 horse under Dhurmajee Purtaub Ray lately appeared near Ahmednuggur on their way to join the Paishwa probably from the Nizam's frontier; intelligence of their arrival having reached Captain Gibbon who is in charge of that district, he set out at midnight with one company of sepoys and 70 of his own peons and succeeded in beating up the party and putting it to flight. It has however, continued its course and probably joined the Paishwa. Another party consisting of 3,000 horse and some Arabs who had fled from Nagpoor under Gunput Row, lately passed to the south of Jaulna on their way to join the Paishwa by the route of Moongy Pytun. Col. Deacon was in pursuit of them on the 23rd, but I have not heard with what success. Godajee Dainglia is said also to be coming to the southward with a party of Arabs raised in Candeish. These reinforcements

*Between Thana and Nasik.

must be very welcome to the Paishwa, who seems disposed before long to try the fortune of another battle. His moving out guns at Neepauny and other places appears to me to be indication of such resolution. Some effort of the kind may be required to prevent the Jageerdars deserting him and the state of his cavalry probably renders him averse to place all his hopes in flight. Many of the horse with his army are said to be greatly exhausted and General Pritzler found many abandoned in the villages through which he had passed. The worst horse are with the Paishwa whose whole personal division does not in all probability exceed from 5,000 to 7,000. The rest are in the light force which must be 15,000 strong; all the Chiefs except Chintamun Row are with it.

I continue to receive indirect overtures from the Paishwa to which I pay no attention.

No. 97—Elphinstone informs Munro of the plan he had formed for overcoming the Peshwa and settling the country as quickly as possible.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—BRIGADIER GENERAL MUNRO.

Camp Lonand north of the Salpah Ghaut, 31 January 1818.

Sir,

Your letters of the 19th and 21st and 9th instant reached me only the 27th and brought me the first intimation of your intention of coming to the Krishna, or even of your having any force beyond that in Darwar. We were at that time marching back for our supplies of which owing to the unexpected detention of Col. Boles we were in great want, and I suppose that General Pritzler had taken the straight road after the Paishwa and had crossed the Kishnah. The circumstances I thought would discourage you from the prosecution of your marching to the Kishnah, but as I have since found that General Pritzler went as far east as Jamcundy and was not to be at Eroor till the 27th or 28th, it is possible though barely so that you may have overtaken him and may be coming on after leaving a detachment in the Carnatic. In that case I should propose your lending General Pritzler's cavalry to General Smith and receiving in exchange 2,000 Infantry with some reinforcements expected from Bombay and whatever could be spared for a time from Poona. With these

troops joined to General Pritzler's Infantry, I think we might set taking forts, and settling the country with every prospect of good success. I should derive great benefit from your advice if this arrangement were to take effect; but on the other hand we should certainly lose much by not having a political authority in the Carnatic capable of managing the Jageerdars, and gaining in the support of the inhabitants against the Mahrattas; that I should consider a most desirable object though I do not know that your force will be sufficient for your share of it, being quite unacquainted with your strength. My idea is that General Smith who is thoroughly acquainted with the country should pursue the Paishwa, prevent his increasing his army or engage him if he should increase it sufficiently to stand, that General Pritzler should take the forts immediately around Poona so as to secure the capital, protect the communication with Bombay and give us tolerable settled possession of a tract stretching from the sea to Ahmednuggur and cutting off the northern half of the Paishwa's country from the southern. In the meantime you might settle the Paishwa's country south of the Kishna, and establish a depot on that river as soon as General Pritzler performs the task before assigned to him, which ought to be in six weeks. He might march to the southward which with your previous success would probably decide the Jageerdars, and your combined forces would settle the southern parts of the Paishwa's country above the Ghauts and probably assist the operations of the Bombay Government below them. At all events you would cut off the Southern Concan from the rest of the Paishwa's remaining possessions, and prevent his either taking refuge or sending assistance to that part of the country. When Sattarah was taken I would hoist the Rajah's flag on it and the neighbouring forts and declare our intention of establishing him in some real sovereignty. During these operations I would leave the northern half of the Paishwa's country to be settled by the force under General Doveton or any other that might be disengaged from the other wars now raging, and I should hope that the whole country might be tolerably well settled before the end of the rains. It is, however, to be remembered that the Paishwa will receive continual addition to his force from the solidiery discharged by the other states, which we are subduing. Some of these reinforcements are already coming in; a party of 3,000 horse and some hundred Arabs were pushing for Moongy-Peytun on the Godavery on the 23rd pursued by Col. Deacon, and a few more such bodies of Infantry, would with the help of some guns, which the Paishwa is said to have deposited at

Nepaunee, enable him to stand another action in the field. If your force is not strong, it may be worthwhile your taking this into consideration in case the Paishwa again approaches you. I shall send by this man copy of my letter to Mr. Adam containing my plans.

No. 98—Elphinstone proposes to capture Satara before pursuing the Peshwa.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Camp Ruhmutpore, 6 February 1818.

Sir,

On the Paishwa's turning towards Punderpore, it seemed most desirable to General Smith to desist from the pursuit of him and await the junction of General Pritzler. He had been prevented adopting this course when the Paishwa was last at Punderpore (in December) by the apprehension that he would if left to himself, turn into the Nizam's Dominions which were then unprotected. We were afterwards obliged to follow him because he threatened the north Concan and these movements which were absolutely necessary at the time, retarded the period when General Smith and General Pritzler could co-operate for a month or six weeks.

As there are new troops within reach of the quarters threatened and as the Paishwa shows no inclination to quit this country, there is no motive for risking another separation from General Pritzler's Division.

General Smith was to have halted at the foot of the Salpa Ghaut until General Pritzler's arrival, and from that place the heavy Division was to have moved and the Light to Punderpore, but intelligence was received that the Paishwa's guns and Infantry which he had thrown into Nepaunee with his baggage during the pursuit by both Divisions, had now arrived at Kurrar, and it was generally believed in the country that he would immediately return with all his Horse to join. This circumstance and the state of General Pritzler's Division which was encumbered with its numerous sick and heavy convoy and which began to feel the want of money, and of some articles of supply, rendered it advisable for General Smith to move to meet it. He accordingly did so on the 4th and the Divisions are today within a few miles of each other. The Infantry and guns have

withdrawn to the fort of Wassunt Ghur, *and the Paishwa when last heard of was still at Punderpore.

Circumstances have thus brought the whole force within a march of Sattarah, and in the present state of affairs, it appears of peculiar importance to take the opportunity of reducing that fortress. All accounts represent the garrison as weakened to strengthen the body of Infantry with the guns, and our armies have now so often passed this road that the fort is now off its guard and may be taken with much more facility than when regularly attacked. When taken it will afford a place of safety for General Pritzler's sick, and his supplies, grain and stores. A detachment may be formed there for future operations in this quarter and intelligence may be procured and preparations made for the siege of Wassota and the other places in the south of the Paishwa's country. But the great advantage of taking Sattara is the impression that will enable us to make on the Mahratta nation. The possession of that fort in their minds is always connected with the control of the Empire, and the loss of it will therefore injure the Paishwa more than that of many stronger places. By hoisting the Rajah's flag and when taken appointing a Mahratta to the nominal office of Killedar, and declaring that it is intended for the capital of a little sovereignty to be formed for the Rajah, we shall soothe the prejudices of the natives, give the prospect of employment to those who might dread serving our Government and by these means facilitate the progress of our other designs and operations.

I am, however, so aware of the danger of deranging a plan already formed, by entering on an enterprize not immediately connected with its execution, that I should prefer proceeding to the forts near Poona and leaving Sattarah for the present time, but General Smith is of opinion that the reduction of it is very unlikely to detain the army more than a week. That period would be nearly consumed by the halts necessary to refresh General Pritzler's Division and to form the new arrangements and if it is not much exceeded, one may be reckoned to have lost no time at all by the siege.

No. 99—Substance of a Mahratta Proclamation Issued on the 11th February 1818 by the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone, sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territories conquered from the Paishwa.

From the time when Bajee Row ascended the musnud, his country was a prey to faction, and there was no efficient Government to protect the people. At length Bajee Row was expelled

*Near Karhad.

from his dominions and took refuge in Bassein where he was dependent on the bounty of Cundee Row Rastia. At this time he entered into alliance with the British Government and was immediately restored to the full possession of his authority. The tranquillity that has been enjoyed since that period is known to all ranks of men. At Bajee Row's restoration, the country was laid waste by war and famine, the people were reduced to misery and the Government derived scarcely any revenue from its lands. Since then in spite of the farming system and the exactions of Bajee Row's officers, the country has completely recovered through the protection afforded it by the British Government and Bajee Row has accumulated those treasures which he is now employing against his benefactors. The British Government not only protected the Paishwa's own possessions but maintained his rights abroad. It could not only, without injury to the rights of others, restore his authority over the Mahratta chiefs which had expired long before its alliance with him, but it paid the greatest attention to satisfying his admissible demands, and had succeeded in spite of many difficulties in adjusting some and putting others in a train of settlement. Among these were Bajee Row's claims on the Guicawar. The British Government prevailed on that prince to send his Prime Minister to Poona for the express purpose of settling those demands, and they were on the eve of adjustment with great profit to the Paishwa, when Gungadher Shastrey, the Guycowar Vakeel, was murdered by Trimbeckjee Dainglia the Paishwa's Minister, while in actual attendance on his Court and during the solemn pilgrimage of Punderpore. Strong suspicions rested on Bajee Row, who was accused by the voice of the whole country, but the British Government, unwilling to credit such charges against a Prince and an ally, contended itself with demanding the punishment of Trimbeckjee. This was refused until the British Government had marched an army to support its demand; yet it made no claim on the Paishwa for its expenses and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer. It simply required the surrender of the criminal and on Bajee Row's compliance it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity Bajee Row immediately commenced on a new system of intrigues and used every exertion to turn all the powers of India against the British Government. At length he gave the signal of disturbances by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions and prepared to support the insurgents by open force. The British Government had then no remedy but to arm in turn. Its troops entered Bajee Row's territories at all points and surrounded him in his capital before any of those with whom he

had intrigued had time to stir. Bajee Row's life was now in the hands of the British Government; but that Government moved by Bajee Row's professions of gratitude for past favours and of entire dependence on its moderation, once more resolved to continue him on his throne, after imposing such terms on him as might secure it from his future perfidy. The principal of these terms was a commutation of the contingent which the Paishwa was bound to furnish, for money equal to the pay of a similar body of troops; and on their being agreed to, the British Government restored Bajee Row to its friendship and proceeded to settle the Pindarries who had so long been the pest of the peaceable inhabitants of India, and of none more than the Paishwa's own subjects. Bajee Row affected to enter with zeal into an enterprize so worthy of a great Government and assembled a large army on pretence of cordially assisting in the contest. But in the midst of all his professions he spared neither pains nor money to engage the powers of Hindoostan to combine against the British; and no sooner had the British troops marched towards the haunts of the Pindarries than he seized the opportunity to commence a war without a declaration and without even an alleged ground of complaint. He attacked and burned the house of the British Resident contrary to the laws of nations and the practice of India, plundered and seized on peaceable travellers and put two British Officers to an ignominious death. Bajee Row himself found the last transaction too barbarous to avow, but as the perpetrators are still unpunished and retain their command in his army, the guilt remains with him. After the commencement of the war Bajee Row threw off the mask regarding the murder of Gungadher Shastry and avowed his participation in the crime by uniting his cause with that of the murderer. By these acts of perfidy and violence, Bajee Row has compelled the British Government to drive him from his Musnud and to conquer his dominions. For this purpose a force is gone in pursuit of Bajee Row, which will allow him no rest; another is employed in taking his forts, a third has arrived by the way of Ahmednuggur and a greater force than either is now entering by Candeish under the personal command of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop. A force under General Munro is reducing the Carnatic, and a force from Bombay is taking the forts in the Concan and occupying that country so that in a short time no trace of Bajee Row will remain. The Rajah of Sattara who is now a prisoner in Bajee Row's hands will be released and placed at the head of an independent sovereignty of such an extent as may maintain the Rajah and his family in comfort and dignity. With this view the

fort of Sattara has been taken, the Rajah's flag has been set up in it, and his former ministers have been called into employment. Whatever country is assigned to the Rajah will be administered by him and he will be bound to establish a system of justice and order. The rest of the country will be held by the Honourable Company. The revenue will be collected for the Government, but all property real or personal will be secured. All Wuttuns and Enams (hereditary lands) Wurshaushuns (annual stipends) and all religious and charitable establishments will be protected, and all religious sects will be tolerated and their customs maintained as far as is just and reasonable. The farming system is abolished. Officers shall be forthwith appointed to collect a regular and moderate revenue on the part of the British Government, to administer justice, and to encourage the cultivators of the soil: they will be authorized to allow remissions in consideration of the circumstances of the times. All persons are prohibited paying revenue to Bajee Row or his adherents or assisting them in any shape. No reduction will be made from the revenue on account of such payments. Wuttundars and other holders of lands are required to quit his standard, and return to their villages within two months from this time. The zemindars will report the names of those who remain, and all who fail to appear in that time shall forfeit their lands and shall be pursued without remission until they are entirely crushed.

All persons whether belonging to the enemy or otherwise who may attempt to lay waste the country or to plunder the roads, will be put to death wherever they are found.

No. 100—General Smith communicates to General Pritzler the plan of action decided upon by him.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

To—BRIGADIER GENERAL PRITZLER.

Camp Koregaum, 9 February 1818.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to enclose a copy of orders I have issued arising from the instructions of the Commissioner for the junction of the 4th and Reserve Divisions of the army, and for a temporary arrangement between the two Divisions to enable one to pursue the enemy and the other to undertake sieges.

I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Elphinstone has appointed me to the former duty, and for this purpose I have been obliged to call upon you for the temporary services of the Dragoons and cavalry. In lieu of these I have put 5 Native Bombay Battalions under your orders and one of Madras with the whole of the Fort Artillery of both establishments and the park.

From what I understood from you in respect to the state of the 12th Madras N. I. and considering it extremely desirable Madras troops should occupy Poona in consequence of the renewed attempts of the enemy to seduce the Maratta sepoys in the Bombay Army from their duty. I have taken upon me to arrange for a Madras Brigade of Infantry being stationed there under Lieut. Col. Boles.

The removal in consequence of the 2nd Bombay Battn. there has made an alteration in the distribution of Brigade Commandants, which the two senior officers both of the Madras Establishment have succeeded to.

I beg to say that none of these arrangements are intended to interfere with any of the staff appointments of the Reserve, which of course continues perfectly in the footing established by the Commander-in-Chief.

Having thus arranged to the best of my judgment for the good of the service, it only remains for me to inform you that I shall, in my own Division-orders of this day place the whole of the troops of the 2 Cantonments and on the northern communication under your authority, a copy of which I shall transmit to you; and that I have then no object or desire of interference in any way with your command or until we can mutually return the troops to their original respective Divisions.

I shall send a copy of this letter and of the orders to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

No. 101—The capture of the Satara Fort is reported.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.

Camp Satara, 12 February 1818.

Sir,

My last report to you was dated the 7th ultimo from Seroor where I was preparing to follow up the enemy to the southward or to support Brigadier General Pritzler's Division in that duty.

The Paishwa's army continued in that direction across the Kistnah and was followed by Brigadier General Pritzler.

On the 21st ultimo, I heard of his having recrossed that river and of his arrival at Utny (Athny), on which I accordingly marched rapidly. His Highness then immediately returned as if to draw me on the same side of the river, and he then kept a westerly direction towards Kurrar and thence to the northward by this place, till he descended the Salpee Ghaut on the 30th ultimo when I had gained upon him considerably. During my marches which were made to the very utmost exertions of my Light Division, I was considerably harassed by the enemy's cavalry which appeared more numerous than usual.

The enemy constantly refused front even to our smallest parties of Infantry, but he often pressed the Rear-guard which occasioned a few casualties in slight wounds from distant matchlocks, a return of which is transmitted herewith.

Having had your instructions to form a junction near this place with Brigadier General Pritzler's Division for the purposes of interchanging troops for pursuit and siege services, I solicited your permission to reduce Sattara while this operation was accomplishing. I accordingly reconnoitered it on the 9th instant, and marched upon it the following day, when after summoning it and desiring Lieut. Col. Dalrymple the senior artillery officer of the two Divisions, to throw a few light shells into it until regular Batteries could be taken up, the Killedar agreed to surrender the fort on his being permitted to march away with his garrison unmolested and carrying away their arms.

The garrison consisted only of about 400 sebundy troops, who seemed so little disposed to use their arms on this occasion that it was immaterial what became of them hereafter, while time was very valuable to me. I, therefore, allowed them these terms and having taken possession of the fort, the Rajah's flag was established there yesterday noon agreeable to your instructions and his palace and property have been preserved for him.

About 25 pieces of ordnance of different calibres with a few swivel ginjals and rockets were taken in the fort, correct returns of which will be forwarded hereafter.

Sattara is strong and as the ancient seat of the Maratta Empire carries great consequence with it in the estimation and prejudices of the natives and may, therefore, prove of greater value to us in the war against the Paishwa than in its mere local importance.

No. 102—Elphinstone communicates his plan of the campaign in the South Maratha Country to the Governor of Bombay.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

TO—G. STRACHEY.

Camp Neera Bridge, 16 February 1818.

Sir,

When I had the honor to address you suggesting the addition of a Battalion to Brigadier Munro's force, I wrote under the impression that the Brigadier General was already at the head of a considerable Detachment placed at his disposal by the Right Hon'ble the Governor. I am now, informed that this is not the case and therefore trust I may be excused in pointing out the great necessity there is for the presence of a force to the south of the Kishna. Should it appear in the same light to the Right Hon'ble the Governor his own anxiety to promote every branch of the public service will probably induce him to employ such a Detachment as he can spare in that part of the country. The presence of General Munro, the dislike of the inhabitants to the Marathas and their knowledge of the benefits of our Government from their vicinity to the provinces, would enable a small force to gain greater advantages to the south of the Kishna than a much stronger one in any other part of the Paishwa's Dominions. If there were only troops enough to reduce a few strong forts that overawe the country, there can be little doubt that the whole of the inhabitants would come forward to assist us. If it be desirable to undertake this settlement from the facility with which it may be accomplished, it is still more so from the importance of the consequences to which it would tend. The lands of almost all the great Jageerdars are situated in that direction and their being occupied or threatened would soon draw off those Chiefs from the Paishwa. The direct effect of such a secession on the Paishwa's power would be great and the effect on public opinion would be much greater. The seizure of this country would also cut off much of Bajee Row's own resources; it would narrow the ground of his operations and it would facilitate ours by enabling us to found depots where they are now much wanted and to derive all the advantages of carrying on the war on the borders of a friendly country.

It would enable General Munro to advance in this direction so as to meet the progress of this Division and thus to reduce the whole of the country south of Poona before the monsoon.

It would likewise shut up the only direct entrance for the Paishwa and his banditti into the Company's territories and would compel them if they ventured on such an invasion to penetrate in the first instance through the dominions of the Nizam and to traverse a great extent of country before they approached our frontier. But the great argument in favour of the proposed arrangement is its tendency to bring the present war to a conclusion. I therefore submit it to the Right Hon'ble the Governor in the confidence that it will meet with his approbation unless its execution should materially interfere with the general policy of his Government.

No. 103—The action at Ashtee in which Bapu Gokhle was killed is reported.

— From—GENERAL SMITH,

To—ELPHINSTONE.

Camp Ashtee, 20 February 1818.

My Dear Sir,

I have infinite pleasure in acquainting you that I have at last had the good fortune to get up with the enemy.

I marched from Yellapoor at one o'clock last night having heard in the course of the day that the Paishwa had moved in a westerly direction from Sholapoor towards Panderpoor.

After proceeding 8 or 9 miles on that road I heard he had turned upon Kurkum, on which I immediately changed my route also. Soon after crossing the Beema at Karawhly, I heard His Highness was encamped last evening at this place, when I immediately marched in with all the cavalry.

After advancing a few miles beyond Mandapur we heard their Naqaras beating below a hill which covered us from their view.

I then formed the cavalry in three contiguous columns having the two squarons of His Majesty's 22nd dragoons in the centre and in this order we descended and came up close to the enemy, who had one body formed to the number of between 2 and 3,000 in some low uneven ground. We then formed and charged and the enemy availed himself of a Nallah and of the broken ground to receive us, and whilst the right squadron of the 7th Cavalry

was attacking in this disadvantageous ground, the enemy got round their right flank and rear and at first created a little confusion and loss. This, however, which was perfectly unavoidable from the nature of the ground, was soon remedied and he was driven off.

In the meantime they gave way to the charges in front and were rapidly pursued to a larger body in which they attempted to form and stand, but were soon routed also by the 22nd Dragoons.

Each column following up their success soon brought them among the enemy's followers and baggages.

The Sattara Rajah and family were all taken and are now in my camp, joyful and delighted at their escape from Bajee Row.

Gokla was killed very early in the action and the loss of the enemy has been very considerable. Bajee Row abandoned his Palanqueen and took to horse.

Our loss has been killed and 1 officer *and 18 wounded. I will send the official details as early as possible tomorrow.

We have captured about 12 elephants, 57 camels and a few horses; our march was 29 miles 1 furlong but the cavalry went between 7 and 8 miles further in pursuit, which was not relinquished till the horses were perfectly exhausted.

No. 104—This is a full report of the battle of Ashtee in which the Raja of Satara was captured with his family.

From—GENERAL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.

Camp Kurkumb, 21 February 1818.

Sir,

My letter to your address under date of the 12th Instant went to acquaint you with the operations of the troops under my command up to that period. The enemy after having been pursued through the range of Ghauts on which Sattara is situated, marched by Punderpoor to Sholapoor on the Seena, where he remained during the time I was occupied at Sattara,

* Lieut. Warrant, 22nd Dragoons.

and for some days longer. I proceeded gradually upon Punderpoor on the 13th Instant with the Light Division intending to avoid forced marches till I approached the enemy within 25 or 30 miles.

At Yellapoor the day before yesterday I had information of his quitting Sholapoor and of his moving in a westerly direction, which determined me to make a night march in hopes of coming upon him near Punderpoor.

On the route, however, I received information of his having turned upon Kurkumb to which I immediately changed my route also. I crossed the Beema at Karowly near Goorsalla. I now heard that the Paishwa had encamped the preceding evening near Ashtee and immediately pushed on with all the cavalry, horse artillery and gallopers.

My intelligence was confirmed and my hopes considerably raised at Mandapoor, where I heard the enemy was only there preparing to move from Ashtee and at about half past 8 O'clock yesterday morning, we had the satisfaction of distinctly hearing their Naqaras beating below a hill which covered us from their view. It seems however they had some information of our approach but not in sufficient time to enable them to avoid us without losing their baggage. In these circumstances Gokla took the resolution of risking an action. As we descended the hill we saw one body rather near us in mass and to the number of between 2 and 3,000 and the number of streamers implied the presence of several sirdars. The ground was so rocky and uneven, I hardly expected to be able to bring any guns into action but directed them to keep on the nearest road ready to form as required. The two squadrons of His Majesty's 22nd Dragoons formed the centre column and were directed to attack the enemy's centre; the 7th Light cavalry in column on the right and the 2nd Light cavalry was the left column. We descended the hill in this order upon the enemy who stood very firm, and after forming squadrons I ordered the whole to charge. The enemy not only continued firm but advanced to meet each charge with great spirit. He had however, availed himself of a nulla and very difficult ground to receive our attack; and while the right squadron of the 7th Cavalry was engaging under this disadvantage, some of the enemy got round their right flank and rear and at first created a little confusion. As they passed the rear and left of the 7th Cavalry Major Dawes of the 22nd Light Dragoons with admirable presence of mind threw back a troop of that regiment which immediately charged and broke them

and they were afterwards met and suffered also by a troop of the 2nd Light Cavalry which Major Walker had also prepared for them.

Captain Pierce of the horse artillery had indeed with his usual exertion and zeal, and notwithstanding the very unfavourable nature of the ground contrived to get one gun in position to protect the right flank of the 7th cavalry, and I had the enemy in my power in a solid mass within half range of grape; but as this would have impeded the charge and have obliged him to disperse without a trial with our cavalry which he now seemed willing to give and which all our corps so much wished for, I kept the gun in reserve.

The charge of the two squadrons of the 22nd Dragoons penetrated through the mass and did great execution. Bappoo Gokla the chief of the Marattha army fell early and fighting bravely to the last. This event I have little doubt, hastened the flight of this body which afterwards endeavoured to form on a still larger one, that was covered in low ground beyond the village of Ashta and out of our view from the first scene of action. These were also immediately charged by the 22nd Dragoons as they came up, and the whole being routed and pursued soon brought our troops upon the enemy's baggage and followers.

I have infinite satisfaction in reporting that the Sattara Rajah, his brother and mother were in these circumstances rescued and brought safe into camp to their great satisfaction and joy.

I calculated the loss of the enemy at between 2 and 300 men and besides Gokla another sirdar of distinction said to be Narro Punt Aptey was killed.

The Paishwa abandoned his Palanqueen early and took to his horse and I regret exceedingly his person could not have been secured, but the troops had marched nearly 30 miles before that affair commenced and the pursuit and return (nearly 16 miles more) exhausted the horses.

12 elephants, 57 camels, several Palankeens and aftarbeers and a few horses fell into our hands.

I enclose a copy of the orders which convey my sentiments of the conduct of the troops and also a list of the killed and wounded and I cannot close a dispatch which may claim some interest without bestowing the praise justly due to the staff.

I have been greatly and cheerfully assisted in all my duties by Captain Tovey the Dept. Adjt. Genl. and by Captn. Mayne the Dept. Q.R.M.R., Genl. officers well experienced in their departments and of valuable professional acquirements. You are already aware that although I had taken the precaution of forming a considerable grain Depot from the general aspect of affairs with the Paishwa's Government, his sudden treachery prevented my obtaining timely carriage for it with the army. The good arrangement, foresight and assiduity of Major Hull, the Deputy Commissary General greatly overcame this and other difficulties of supply and I owe it to that officer to state my sense of his abilities and services in that important Department.

The Paymaster of the force Captain James, the Commissary of stores, Captain Griffiths of the Bombay artillery and the Medical Board under Mr. Superintending Surgeon Phillips, are entitled also to my earnest praise in always keeping their departments in perfect arrangement and efficiency.

The officers of my personal staff Captain Hardcastle Lieuts. Place and Bellamore have been most active and zealous in their duties and deserve the public expression of my grateful acknowledgements.

I have not yet been able to trace the course of the Paishwa's flight nor can I follow him till I have disposed of the Rajah's family in Poonah and as he has made earnest entreaties for an early interview with you, I beg you, if possible to meet me on my route there, that I may the sooner proceed again in quest of the enemy.

P.S. A third Sirdar was found killed, said to be the Balla Rajah.

No. 105—Smith communicates his future plan of campaign against the Peshwa.

From—GENERAL SMITH,

**To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.**

Camp Baramooty, 27 February 1818.

Sir,

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 25th instant.

I shall be careful to communicate your message to the Sattara Rajah, I regret exceedingly that you are unable to meet him, as I pledged myself either to see him placed safe under your protection or to take him to Poona. This I must now explain away as well as I can. My letters subsequent to that of the 21st will have acquainted you with my route and that I should be at Morishwar on the 1st proximo. It was not in my power to march faster when consulting the convenience of the Rajah's family. I consider as I am already north of the Neera Bridge, it would be extremely disadvantageous my moving south west to meet the convoy, while the distance from Morishwar to Singhur is not so great as from that Bridge to Singhur. I therefore promise myself you may have altered your orders for the convoy, and I have taken the precaution to request Captain Davis to march upon Morishwar, where I shall wait his arrival. I shall obey your orders strictly in sending back with the princes one of the strongest battalions I have.

I would however take the liberty to remind you that the enemy's infantry and guns to the southward are still untouched and that by reducing my infantry I shall not be able to act with cavalry separately and independently for two or three days together.

The whole infantry, European and Native, with me this day amounts to 2353 only. Of these I shall send you the strongest corps about 600.

With regard to the supernumerary auxiliary Battalion, I have no doubt it is a very fine Battalion, but it will be of no sort of use to me for a long time to come from not being accustomed to hard marching; on the contrary, it will only crowd my hospitals and difficulties of sick carriage. I will therefore to avoid rendering them useless and encumbering myself, take upon me to return that corps to your disposal, which with the whole of the auxiliary and reformed horse and the corps of 600 men from my division, will, I hope, considerably increase the means of settling the country.

No. 106—Elphinstone's visit to Pratapsinh, the Raja of Satara and a sabre wound received by General Smith in the action of 20th February are reported by Elphinstone to the Governor General.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

**To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST NOBLE THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.**

Camp Bailsur, 5 March 1818.

My Lord,

I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency that I yesterday arrived in General Smith's camp at this place.

I soon after waited on the Raja to offer my own and Your Excellency's congratulations on his escape from captivity, and on the flattering prospects that were opening to him. His Highness received me with great cordiality and with strong appearance of satisfaction and gratitude to Your Excellency for your intentions in his favour.

The Raja is about 20 years of age and seems frank and good humoured, not destitute of intelligence. His two brothers are still more prepossessing in their appearance and his mother seems to be a woman of some talents and address. They observe all the Eastern sovereignty, neither rising on the entrance of strangers nor returning salutes.

They spoke with the greatest warmth of their obligations to General Smith, as well for his gallantry and conduct on achieving their deliverance as for the kindness and attention which he had shown to them since they came into his hands.

It is only since my arrival in the camp that I have learned (what General Smith himself had suppressed) that he was wounded in the action of the 20th. He was at one time alone surrounded by the enemy and was in imminent danger until he could force his way to the Dragoons. While in this situation he received a blow in the head from a sabre which had nearly proved fatal, but which is now almost recovered.

No. 107—Elphinstone gives a graphic account of the measures he has taken to destroy what remained of the Peshwa's armies and his resources.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Bailsur, 7 March 1818.

My Lord,

My last detailed report to Your Excellency was dated from Lonund. A few days afterwards Brigadier General Pritzler's Division joined that of Brigadier General Smith and an opportunity was offered for forming a new distribution of the force. The objects of this distribution are stated at length in my despatch to Brigadier General Smith, dated 6th December 1817, and the details of it are given in my letter to Brigadier General Munro, dated 9th February. Many circumstances retarded its completion from the beginning of December till the 8th of February, when the Divisions met at Coregaum one march from Sattarah. As there were now for the first time the means of beginning to settle the country without giving up the pursuit of the Paishwa, and as I was satisfied that some of the Putwardhuns were ready to set the example of defection from Bajee Row, that Bajee Row's situation was now weak and nearly desperate throughout the country, and that the arrival of the troops which I had every reason to expect from the northward would complete the impression of the hopelessness of his course, I determined no longer to delay the publication of our views on this country, but to declare our intention of dethroning the Paishwa, of conquering his territories and of founding a new sovereignty for the Rajah of Sattara. It appears to me very desirable that this declaration should be preceded by the capture of Sattara and the display of the Rajah's flag on that fortress, and General Smith having proposed this enterprize and undertaken to accomplish it within a period which at any rate would have been requisite for completing the separation of the Divisions, the army moved towards Sattara, on the 10th and the place surrounded in the course of the evening. Next day I assembled the Rajah's officers and principal inhabitants and laid open our views which were received with much satisfaction by the auditors. I likewise drew up a proclamation to the same effect, which however was not generally circulated until the army arrived before Singhur. I have the honour to enclose a translation of this document.

On the 13th Brigadier General Smith proceeded in pursuit of the Paishwa. Bajee Row was then at Sholapoor more than 100 miles to the east of the General. A large body of his horse was at Khuttow in the hills between Sattara and the river Maun, and his Infantry and guns were in the neighbourhood of Kerar on the Kirsna. It appeared to be the Paishwa's intention to draw all these troops together and probably to move to the northward where after being joined by Ram Deen and the Barra Bhye, he probably meant to stand an action. He had been diverted from this plan by the wish to seize on the treasures of the late Seddasheo Maunkaisur at Sholapoor and Taimboornee, and he was returning from the former place when Brigadier General Smith obtained intelligence of his approach. The manner in which General Smith availed himself of this opportunity has already been reported to Your Excellency. The result has been the precipitate flight of the Paishwa, the rescue of the Rajah of Sattara and the death of Gokla. The Paishwa passed Kewra on the 27th when the Native Officer Commanding the party very gallantly made a sally on one of his Divisions, killing and taking several men and horses. Another Division attempted without success to take Newassa from Captain Gibbon's Sebundies. At length he reached Copergaum where he was on the 1st instant. But as His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop was to be at Cassirbary within 30 miles on the same day, it is probable that the Paishwa has before this been again attacked or compelled to return to the southward as rapidly as he left it. In the event of such movement he will have great difficulty in escaping General Smith and he must soon lose a great part of his army by desertion.

During these operations of General Smith, General Pritzler moved towards Singhur which from the nature of the roads he could not reach till the 20th. The fort is of great strength and was absolutely defended but surrendered as Your Excellency is already informed, on the 2nd instant. The Killedar was the guardian of the son of the late Ropp Ram Chowdery who holds a jageer of 3 lacs of rupees from the Paishwa. On the surrender of the place he went with his ward to reside in Poona and expressed his hopes of receiving some provision from the British Government.

At the same time that Singhur was invested, Col. Deacon marched against Chakun. Col. Deacon on crossing the Godavery

drove the enemy's garrison out of Newassa, a place of considerable strength and one from which the Nizam's country and our communications had suffered annoyance and interruption. He then marched against Kuna(?) a place which greatly annoyed the villages that had submitted to the Collector of Ahmednuggur. It was capable of a long defence, but being vigorously attacked by Col. Deacon, it was soon intimidated into a surrender. Colonel Deacon then proceeded to Chakun where he was joined on the 21st by Ordnance and artillery-men from Poona. On the 22nd, his breaching battery was completed after some casualties when the garrison surrendered themselves prisoners. The artillery men furnished from Poona to act against Chakun, have now proceeded to Loghur where the 2/6 Native Infantry and a detail of the 2/1 had already been detached for the purpose of joining a Detachment, (which) consisted of about 300 Europeans and Natives with a battering train and had been ordered for the Concan by the Right Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay for the purpose of undertaking the seige of Loghur. It was to reach Carley, the 2nd instant and notwithstanding the strength of the place, I hope soon to hear of its reduction. These detachments with another which co-operated in the seige of Singhur, and a Battalion which marched with a Convoy to General Smith have left Poona. There is no reason to distrust the inhabitants of Poona and all attack from without is rendered difficult by the neighbourhood of the force under General Pritzler and of Col. Deacon's detachments.

Notwithstanding, the inadequacy of the force under General Munro to any great operation, that officer had advanced towards the Kisna and has taken Badaumy and Bagulcotta. The first of these places is one of the strongest hill forts in India and made a famous defence against the whole Mahratta army under Nana Furnavees although attacked with a spirit unusual to these people. The storm of this place by such a force must impress the natives with a surprise and admiration that must raise our character and facilitate our conquests in all parts of the country.

The letters of General Munro, General Smith, General Pritzler, and Colonel Deacon to my address will have made Your Excellency acquainted with the details of their proceedings and Your Excellency will have heard from the Right Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay; the rapid progress of the Detachments under the immediate orders of that Government

in reducing the strong forts of the Concan. The same activity and enterprize was also shown in the reduction of the forts of Nowapoorra on the borders of Gujarat by a detachment which had been ordered from Surat.

As soon as Loghur shall have fallen the Detachment under Lieut. Col. Prother will again become applicable to the reductions of the forts in the Concan. That under Brigadier General Pritzler on the capture of Poorunder will move against Paundughur and the forts round Sattara and after taking Wassota, where the Rajah's family are lodged, part of it will join General Munro, who will have made great progress in the interim in the conquest of the Carnatic, and part will be disposable to the settlement of the country south of Poona. Brigadier General Smith will continue the pursuit of the Paishwa and the light force which His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop has been recommended to form will (if His Excellency should adopt my suggestions) be ready to take up the pursuit when Bajee Row turns north. When not thus employed he will settle the country between Poona and the Godavery, while the force under Brigadier General Doveton effects the conquest of Candesh. These measures will speedily destroy what remains of the Paishwa's armies and at the same time cut off his resources.

The principal object of attention will then be to crush all petty insurrections and assemblages of banditti. These are the natural consequences of the dispersion of armies and deposition of Governments and they must be expected in a greater degree now than at any former period, from the check which has been given in all parts of India to the employment of the predatory part of the Mahratta Nation, as well as from the expulsion of all hordes of plunderers from the surrounding countries. The dangers thus occasioned hereafter may be prevented by opening a channel for the useful employment of the Native soldiery and by prompt and severe proceedings against all who shall endeavour to disturb the quiet of the community.

From the opportunities I have of judging disposition of the country, I am satisfied that there is every inclination in the body of the people to receive our Government cheerfully and the upper classes to whom the change cannot be welcome, seem nevertheless prepared for a ready submission.

Before my proclamation was published the greater part of the Putwurdhuns had left the Paishwa. Chintamun Row had sent to say that his former letter (alluded to in one of my despatches to General Munro) had been dictated by the Paishwa, that he was determined not to join the army again and that his troops should be withdrawn on the first opportunity. Gopal Row and Nana Saheb (the nephew and son of Madhoo Row Dadjee) alone remained in camp and they send the most positive promises that they would soon withdraw on the issuing of the proclamation. The Prittee Neddee and the Punt Sacheev, the only great officers of the Raja who still hold lands, sent to offer their submission. The Prittee Neddee is still in Bajee Row's camp, but I believe he is detained by force. The Punt Sacheev withdrew to his head village of Bhore and after attempting to remain neutral which I would not allow, he came into camp and openly joined us. This resolution was no doubt greatly affected by the reduction of the strong fort of Bhorup in Concan which fell to Col. Prother some days before. About the same time Annaba Rahtekar, one of the most respectable of the Paishwa's farmers of the revenue, sent to say that he would surrender the important fort of Sheonere close to Joonere and four other small places in the same neighbourhood. Essajee Punt Gokla the cousin of Bapoo Gokla also opened a negotiation for his coming over with his party of horse.

Since the release of the Raja the Punt Amaut, another of his hereditary officers has come into camp. The Killedar of Wurdhunghur has offered to surrender his fort to Vithul Punt, the Rajah's Fernavees, whom I left in charge of the town of Sattara and that officer has sent 200 men to take possession, being part of a body which he was authorized to raise for the purpose of protecting the town from the enterprizes of the neighbouring garrison belonging to Bajee Row. Pandoo Rung Punt Dumderry a near relation of the Paishwa has sent to offer to quit his standard and in the meantime has tendered the fort of Rajma-chee near the Khandala Ghaut to the first Detachment that may be sent against it. The Raja of Akalcote is said to have returned to his Jageer immediately after the affair of the 20th. and Madhoo Row Rastia is likewise said to have withdrawn having so timed his secession as to lose all claim to the merit of fidelity to the Paishwa and of gratitude to the British Government.

I shall submit in a separate despatch a report on my proceedings with the Rajah of Sattara, the plan I would recommend for his future establishment and for the settlement of the country under our own Government.

No. 108—The Brigadier General seeks the Governor General's decision⁵ on the claims to captured prize property put forward by the various commanders who were engaged in the war.

From—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.

Camp Ahmednagar, 12 March 1818.

Sir,

When I had last the honour of seeing you, I took occasion to express my anxiety to submit through you to the Most Noble the Governor General, some considerations respecting prize property captured by the troops within my command.

You are already acquainted that the officers of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies and of His Majesty's service have elected among themselves prize agents, which I in no way controlled or interfered with. My original object in this was to stop plundering and to have responsible officers always ready to collect whatever might be taken for an eventual distribution among the whole of the troops engaged against Bajee Row.

The troops have, however, been fortunate in capturing at Poona, under the walls of Singhur, in the affair at Ashtee, and in the capitulation of Singhur, to the value, I believe, of about 5 lacs and a half of rupees, exclusive of compensation if any be allowed in this country for ordnance and Military stores.

It becomes essential, therefore, the subject of distribution should be only submitted to His Lordship's consideration.

In your letter of instructions to my address under date of the 6th December enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Secretary Adam of the 14th of the preceding month, it is stated, "You will observe that it is His Excellency's (The Governor General's) wish that the force under your command should be withdrawn for the present from the army of the Deccan, and applied to the special purpose of the war with the Paishwa."

The greater part of the Campaign was consequently conducted under your personal observation and control and my reports went through you direct to the Most Noble the Governor General, but as His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop did not release me

from the appellation of the 4th Division of his army, counterparts of those reports were also forwarded to him under the feelings of duty and respect I owed to his high situation. But I received no aid or orders from His Excellency for my guidance, and none of the troops from the army under his immediate orders have been sent to my assistance with the exception of Lieut. Col. Deacon's Detachment very lately and which I believe had never joined His Excellency.

An inefficient Battalion of Infantry and a broken down Regiment of Cavalry were all the troops I had ever of his Presidency and those were short of the compliment of troops of Fort St. George, the Governor General had placed under me antecedent to the war. Lately indeed (from the 13th of last month) you placed at my disposal the Cavalry of Brig. Gen. Pritzler's Division and I was not very long in turning them to account.

Under these circumstances it was impossible for me not to feel surprised and disappointed, that His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop and the General Staff of his army should claim to share in prize-property captured by the troops under my command. You will find this claim preferred in the enclosed letter, which I have of course received with all submission.

The Most Noble the Governor General when he authorized this claim may not possibly have recollected, that I was acting under his immediate orders through you as his representative, and that I never had the benefit of the Lieut. General's orders or till very lately the effectual aid of any of his troops; and service has heretofore been borne and conducted principally by the troops of the Bombay Presidency. These are points probably which would be referable to decide on the Lieut. General's claims as a question of right or justice as well as the custom of the army, and I confidently rely on the justice of the Governor General to give them consideration.

Of my own claims and those of all the troops under me I shall say little. I leave them in your hands who so long saw their labours. Their zeal and perfect discipline under incessant hard marching, the strict attention given to the protection of the people and in paying liberally for all we wanted from them, which compelled individuals to increase all the wages of their establishments to prevent the most remote excuse for plundering and their labours and uncompensated additional expenses, last year also, when before the Capital are so many claims upon His Lordship's generous consideration, which will not I am sure escape your notice in preferring this representation.

Whatever His Lordship's determination may be on the question of the Lieut. General's right to share in the prize property of this Division, it will of course be yielded to, but I should not feel I had done my duty to those under me or to my own interests if I did not solicit his further consideration of the subject.

It will be of great advantage and encouragement to the troops if instructions could be given so as to authorize a distribution of any realized prize funds in the course of the ensuing monsoon.

In consequence of references I have already had, I have stated in orders, that I should recommend that all co-operating detachments are to be entitled to share from the date of the day they crossed the right bank of the Godavery north, or the left bank of the Kistna south, which were generally considered the boundaries of the command of the Poona Subsidiary Force. This rule I have reason to believe has been considered perfectly equitable by all parties.

Another point of decision for the Governor General in the comparative claims of Brig. General Pritzler and myself, he with the besieging force, consisting of my park Engineer Department with a European Regiment and two Battalions of my Native troops also and I with the Light Division in which are his Cavalry?

He as second in command in the reserve Division of the army, is also junior to me, and acting within the limits of my original command under His Lordship's appointment.

I think under these circumstances I have a fair claim as commanding officer of the whole, but whatever His Lordship may decide upon, I am perfectly convinced will be strictly correct and I shall set up no pretensions beyond this first and last appeal to his justice.

No. 109—Elphinstone reports the peaceful condition of the city of Poona, the gifts he made to prominent Brahmins of that place, the overtures for submission started by Bajl Rao and the fall of most of the forts in the Maratha country.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp Belsur, 20 March 1818.

My Lord,

General Pritzler being detained by repairs of his ordnance after the fall of Poorunder I took the opportunity of visiting Poona for two days.

who resides at Jejoory in this neighbourhood to know whether I would receive an overture which Bajee Rao was prepared to make to me. I replied in the negative and warned the Vakeel of the impropriety of his having intercourse with a foreign power, especially an enemy of the British Government contrary to the terms of the treaty with Holkar. The Vakeel promised to have no further communication with Bajee Rao, but declared he had no orders from his court to discontinue his intercourse either with the Paishwa or any other power. Brigadier General Pritzler marched this morning from Poorunder. I have written to the Killedar of Pandooghur and Kelinja and the other forts round Wae, calling on them to surrender to a detachment which General Pritzler intends to send by a direct route impracticable for heavy guns. If they comply, the General intends to proceed against Wassota. Otherwise he must move on Wae by a circuitous road round the mountains. Bajee Rao, after his defeat on the 20th marched by Nessa to Copergaum and Nassick. Near the last place he was joined by Ram Deen and the fugitives from Holkar's army. He then proceeded towards Chandore. The approach of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop drove him back to Copergaum where he was on the day before His Excellency's arrival at Byzapor. He then fled to the S.E. and was last heard of at Beer on the 16th. General Smith being on the same day at a place about 150 miles north west of that town, his infantry and guns I believe had joined him, in which case he must soon be overtaken. General Munro after the capture of Badamy and surrender of Baugulcote, moved on and took possession of Padshapoor. He has now taken every place of the Paishwa's or Gokla's beyond the Kisna except Belgaum. The Brigadier General had sent a body of pcons to occupy the country about Beejapur or at least to deprive the enemy of its resources. I hear they have occupied Beejapur. Col. Prother has taken the strong fort of Loghur almost without opposition; he has likewise taken possession of Rajmachee, Toong and Tikona and has compelled Cowaree to surrender after a bombardment. The Sucheev to whom Toong and Tikona belong having submitted before the surrender of those places, I have restored them to him. The details of these operations will be laid before Your Lordship in the despatches I have received from the officers by whom they have been accomplished.

The country shews every disposition to submit to our Government, but it is remarkable that no chief of note has left the Paishwa since his defeat by General Smith. The Aculcotekar and Rastia prove to be still with him.

No. 110—Baji Rao's movements and the arrangements which General Smith proposes to make are reported by him to Elphinstone for approval.

From—L. SMITH,

To—ELPHINSTONE.

Camp Peeplegaum (Digras) on the Doodnee. 24 March 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that Bajee Row proceeded from the Godavery north: He was on the ground I now occupy seven days ago and by my last accounts was at Bassim (*Vasim*). His rapid marches in this direction seem to have been undertaken in concert with a new conspiracy at Nagpoor.

I have done all I could day and night to get up with him but believe I was at no time within 30 coss of him. He gained so much time and rest while I was encumbered with the Satara Rajah's family.

He has plundered the Nizam's villages in all directions, hung one or two of our Tappal runners, and committed the most disgraceful excesses. Ram Deen's troops are principally the perpetrators of these crimes and the natives allow that Bajee Row himself does all he can to control them, but that since Gokla's death there is no ostensible leader and each Sirdar acts as he thinks proper.

There are also reports that both Tattiah Saib, and Nipaunikar are prisoners in Bajee Row's camp for having corresponded with you, but they are mere reports.

I have regularly reported all the information I could collect to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. He was at Elora on the 20th and had directed Major Hunt of the 6th Cavalry with 4 horse artillery guns, and 1,800 Mysore horse to march from General Doveton's division at Aurungabad, towards Bassim to prevent the enemy's further progress north. I am in great hope that a dispatch which I forwarded to His Excellency's Camp yesterday evening from this ground suggesting the expediency of General Doveton pushing north and direct upon Nagpoor as fast as possible, may occasion the recall of Major Hunt's Detachment which I should consider without the aid of Infantry dangerously small to encounter at least 25,000 horse,

I also propose to His Excellency if I had not the honour of receiving orders from him, that I should as soon as possible follow on the enemy's rear and co-operate with Brigadier General Doveton, mentioning that the cavalry he had thrown upon Ahmednuggur, would be sufficient to cover the besieging division to the westward, and to secure the tranquillity of Bajee Row's late territories from the Godavery to the Kistnah. I have information, however, that one body of the enemy's horse stated at four to seven thousand and under Ramchunder Subedar, are still south of the Godavery and I believe there is no doubt the enemy still has some Infantry and guns at Sholapore.

In these circumstances if you have no immediate-employment for Lt. Col. Deacon's detachment from Ahmednuggur. I think he should immediately take up a position at Pairgaon about the junction of the Ghode with the Beemah. At least His Cavalry there under Major Lushington would effectually control 7,000 horse from doing much mischief. I shall not however, send him any orders till I am better acquainted with your intentions respecting him.

I lament to say that my marches since I left Ahmednuggur owing to the excessive heat have distressed my troops and cattle more than at any former period.

As I must turn the Etslah Hills in the westward, I shall approach Jaulnah where I mean to throw in my sick, and from whence I hope to obtain about 3 lacs of rupees for the current month's pay and disbursements, before which however I shall hope to be honoured with Sir Thomas Hislop's commands and which I shall not fail to communicate to you.

No. 111—Elphinstone communicates the results of the operations conducted against the Peshwa, by the various British Commanders. He visited Wai and there made gifts to prominent Brahmins as at Poona.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

15 Miles from Wasota, 31 March 1818.

My Lord,

Since the fall of Poorunder the forts of Chundun Wundun, Nandgerec, Wyratghur, Kummulghur, Pandooghur and Kelinja

have surrendered to General Pritzler and to a detachment which he sent through the valley of Waee. Most of those forts are strong, and Kelinja could scarcely be taken if resolutely defended, but none of them offered resistance except Pandoo-ghur and Kelinja which were evacuated by the garrisons after firing a few guns at our troops. This division is now on its march to Wassota which is about 15 miles from this place. The road lies over a difficult ghaut beyond which is a wild mountainous and woody country. The Killedar has returned a letter I addressed to him unopened and a strong detachment without guns has marched this morning to invest this fort. The Raja of Sattara's family and Cornets Hunter and Morrison are prisoners in this place which is also said to be the depository of much of the Paishwa's treasure. Little money has been found in the places hitherto taken ; it is to be hoped that the treasure is equally lost to the Paishwa by being buried within the walls, removed to fortresses, beyond his reach or embezzled by the officers in charge.

While possession was being taken of the forts around Waee, I paid a visit to that town which is always much frequented by the Hindoos on account of the beauty of its situation and its numerous temples, Ghauts and gardens. At present it is crowded by the greater part of the respectable inhabitants of Poona who retired there previously to our occupation of that capital. Though my stay did not exceed a few hours I was visited by most people of note about the place and received assurances from all of them of their submission to our Government.

Anna Nuggurkur presented me with orders of surrender for the important forts of Anjunwell and Vijaydroog or Gheriah in the Concan and Dhoorp and Moolere in Candeish. The last two have twenty seven smaller forts dependent on them. Anna Nuggurkur made no stipulation for himself, but as he was a principal man under the old Government I promised to continue his personal Jageer of 8,000 rupees a year, besides assuring him of the safety of his Enam lands, his houses, gardens and the property. Dhondoo Punt Joshee gave me orders for the fort of Ruttunghur in the Ghauts west of Joneere and those in Baglan near Nassick.

I likewise received a message from Baupoo Apty the brother of Waumun Row, the Paishwa's favourite, with a promise of the forts of Parlee near Sattara, Jungly (Jawley?), Jyghur and

Wassota and Tattora in the hills of Mahadeo. The object of this proposal was to be allowed to retain some Enam lands.

These offers are very acceptable as the great number of the Paishwa's forts and the intricacy of the country in which they are situated render it a work of time to approach them with an army even if they surrender on the first summons. As Wae is one of the principal seats of Hindoos living in the Deckan, I received the Brahmins and distributed presents among them as at Poona. The number that came was from 5 to 600 and upwards of 40 were the most eminent for their learning and sanctity in the Paishwa's late dominions. This class has not yet shown disposition at all hostile to the British Government.

In passing Sattara the Rajah visited the town with a large escort of regular infantry and horse. He preferred postponing his formal entry until the expiration of the present month which is considered as unlucky by the Hindoos.

I last heard from General Smith at Digras on the Doodna on the 24th. The Paishwa had passed the same place seven days before and was supposed to be at Bassim moving towards Nagpore. He appears to have quitted Copergaum on the 10th while General Smith was between Seroor and Ahmednuggur and to have made a feint of moving to the south by Beer before he struck off in an opposite direction. General Doveton was to march from the neighbourhood of Aurungabad on the 26th on the direct road to Nagpore while General Smith was to pursue that of Bassim. The force under Colonel Deacon was at Ahmednuggur. On the 26th His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop having been unable to complete it in the manner I suggested, it is not adopted to be of use in settling the country. I have therefore requested Colonel Deacon to move along the Seena between Ahmednuggur and Perinda to cut off any bodies of the Paishwa's horse who may be sent back to his own country and to keep an eye on the Paishwa himself if he should endeavour to return.

Colonel McDowell was left with part of General Doveton's force to settle Candeish. I have left it to Captain Briggs to employ the Detachment in that manner or confine its operations to settling the country between the range of Chandore and the Godavery according to his idea of the force required for the former purpose. I have earnestly requested him not to lose a moment in beginning on the line he determines in the manner most likely to have immediate effect.

I have not yet heard from the Commander-in-chief how His Excellency intends to distribute the troops mentioned in his letter of February 16th as disposable for the conquest of the Paishwa's country, but I believe I can account for them all except 2 battalions and 4 Companies of the line, should they be still disposable. I would propose strengthening Colonel Deacon so as to make him equal to engaging the Paishwa's whole force, cavalry infantry and guns, and should send anything that remained disposable to reinforce Colonel McDowell in Candeish. General Munro was before Belgaum the 22nd instant. When Wassota is reduced I propose to send the Madras troops with this force to join General Munro along with a sufficient portion of the ordnance belonging to the 4th Division to enable him to lay seige to Nepauny. When that place is taken the force under his command may be advantageously employed in settling the south east of the Paishwa's country and taking Sholapur where the remains of his guns and Infantry are deposited.

The Bombay troops with the division may return from Wassota to supply the place of those which were intended to settle the country to the north of Ahmednuggur and Poona, or to reinforce Colonel Deacon, if that measure should still appear to be necessary.

No. 112—General Smith requests Elphinstone to recommend to Government for favourable consideration his proposal asking for sanction of two months full pay to all men under Captain Staunton, who lost their baggage in the battle of Koregaon.

From—GENERAL LIONEL SMITH,

**To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.**

Camp Runjerry, 2 April 1818.

Sir,

It will be in your recollection that immediately after the action at Koregaum by the 2nd Battn. 1st Regt. with Bajee Row's army, I suggested to you that it would be necessary to have both the officers and men indemnified for the loss of their baggage, knapsacks, and necessaries.

I directed Captain Staunton to assemble a Battalion committee for the purpose of ascertaining these losses, but at first the state of the numerous wounded and afterwards its march to Poona and the subsequent employment of part of the troops against Loghur, and the Detachment made to the different new Regiments, prevented that from being accomplished.

As I pledged myself that they would be indemnified I could wish the subject should be brought to the consideration of Government; and under the difficulty of ascertaining the exact state of losses I would beg to propose that a grant of two months full pay should be made to the Native Commissioned, non-Commissioned officers, Drummers, and Privates of the 2nd Bn. 1st Regiment in full remuneration for all losses on that arduous service.

Regarding the remuneration to the European Officers their losses are provided for, I believe, by the Regulations though their losses were larger than those allowances can replace.

Most of the Officers' Baggage and men's Knapsacks were taken and destroyed whilst the enemy partly occupied the village, and even if they had been saved, the nature of the retreat when almost all the men were required to assist in carrying the wounded, precluded the possibilities of their taking on their knapsacks.

These circumstances in an exertion truly glorious to the Bombay army, will not, I confidently hope, escape the liberal consideration of Government when honoured with your support.

There is also another case of loss of knapsacks in H.M.'s 65th Regt. which I have now the honour to submit in detail and by committee report.

In the march to join the Poona Brigade in November last, the line of baggage and stores though strongly flanked, was so extensive that the enemy had an opportunity of cutting into it near Gandapoor (where from the road narrowing through ravines and hills it could not be kept very compact) and they succeeded in capturing a considerable number of grain bullocks and the knapsacks and bedding of two companies of the 65th Regiment.

The accompanying returns show the exact value of the losses each man has to replace. I have encouraged the Europeans in the expense of carrying their knapsacks by bullocks or other animals as rendering them so much more able to endure fatigue themselves, and in fact they never could have marched as they

have done but for this practice. In similar circumstances in His Majesty's service, this would be considered an equitable claim to remuneration having originated in unavoidable causes, and where no blame or neglect could attach to the soldier on the general arrangement for the security of the baggage. I had but 400 auxiliary horse which did engage the enemy's horse once, but they increased in the proportion of thousands to one hundred and I had no means of keeping them entirely off.

This will I also hope be received as a claim on the liberality of Government, the soldiers having lost every single article of their regulated necessaries.

I enclose also a copy of Division-orders I issued to show Government that I guarded against any abuses by improper claims of this nature, and as I consider those I now submit perfectly just, I rely on your recommendation to their favourable consideration by Government.

No. 113—Smith cautions Doveton against the illusive methods of Baji Rao and requests concerted action.

From—GENERAL LIONEL SMITH,

To—BRIGADIER GENERAL DOVETON.

Camp Lessuna 13 April 1818.

Sir,

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 11th Instant with its enclosed correspondence on the subject of Bajee Row's movements.

I should hope the actual arrival of either Col. Scott's or Adams' detachments near Chanda must enable them to trace the direction of his march beyond that place.

That he went in the neighbourhood of Chanda and with the design originally of supporting or encouraging fresh disturbances at Nagpoor I have very little doubt. Disappointed in those views, he would probably look for intrigues, his favourite study and pursuit, in some other quarter. Perhaps Hyderabad presented some temptations and I should think his real march in that direction very probable, if he has taken any pains to circulate reports of his going north or if letters of such designs have been laid purposely to be intercepted.

He has lately taken some pains to conciliate and flatter all the Mussalman caste in his camp and it is said has even overlooked the slaughter of bullocks

It is, however, very difficult to form any opinion of his proceedings, beyond conjecture, but I should think it impossible for him to have continued for north without our having had some information from the various quarters stated in your letter to Colonel Adams.

If I hear that he has advanced on Hyderabad positively, you would probably approve as I am most to the southward that I should march on that Capital as fast as possible. In this case I would beg you to provide in some way to march or attack his infantry and guns which are getting formidable and still laying waste the country between the Godavery and Maunjeera and now said to be in the neighbourhood of Tooljapoor. Poona is almost destitute of troops and it will be of most serious consequence if they should be able to act offensively against the various Detachments employed in settling Bajee Row's country.

No. 114—News of Baji Rao's plans and movements is herein communicated.

From—MAJOR WOODHOUSE,

**To—BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH, COMMANDING
POONA SUBSIDIARY FORCE.**

Nirmal, 15 April 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward you a copy of the following statement which I this night sent off to Henry Russell Esquire, British Resident at Hyderabad.

A Bramin of Chitwale named Sackaraum Pandit related to me that yesterday a Bramin who had been plundered came to that town and asked relief of him as one of his tribe, that he gave him assistance and fed him. On enquiring who he was, he stated his name was Baupoo and that he was employed by Bajee Row's Karkoon named Bannahgee Pundit, that he had left Bajee Row three days, that Gunput Rao had called Bajee Rao north, towards Chanda, and when in the vicinity of the Wurdah a communication commenced between Bajee Rao and some relations of Appa Saib (in Chanda), the purport of which

was to release the latter from our hands. That a sum of money to a large amount was demanded on one side and promised on the other, but that they broke off intercourse from Bajee Rao's demanding it beforehand, after this Bajee Rao returned to the Wurdah when subsequently measures began to be taken for Bajee Rao's retiring to Hindoostan and joining Scindiah. This put his camp into great alarm, the major part not approving of the measure. On the march of Bajee Rao for Hindoostan 4 days ago, he and his master determined to abandon Bajee Rao's fortunes and return to Poona

The above report has been confirmed in part by a Gosien who said he left Edulabad before day-light this morning and that four days ago at Neelingah 14 coss from Pandarcowrah he met Bajee Rao's army on its march north-west supposed to be in the direction of Omrowtee, that the people of his army said they were on their way to Hindoostan to join Scindiah. That a party of our troops from Nagoor were in the vicinity of Hingunghaut which put Bajee Rao's army into great alarm. That he saw two small pieces of Cannon with the force elephants, etc., and that Bajee Rao was in his Palanqueen.

This confirms that paragraph of the Persian letter I had the honour to forward you in the afternoon.

No. 115—*Baji Rao's feeble attempt to organize his followers is evidenced in a curious proclamation issued by him, a copy of which was forwarded by the Resident to the higher authorities.*

17 April 1818.

Translated copy of a Sunnud from in the districts in the Concan, to all the Brahmins, Zemindars (public officers), Soorsun Sman usur Myautyn Ouluf (A.D. 1817-1818).

This sunnud is issued in the said districts, that after perusing it, it may constitute a rule of conduct, that is to say : Twenty years ago the English formed an alliance with Shreemunt Baba Saheb and obtained admission into the country, under the pretext of serving him : Mr. Ford also received fifty lacs of rupees for military purposes, and was desired to raise some battalions, which were equipped accordingly. In the month of Asswin of the present year (November), His Highness ordered Mr. Ford to come and take up a position with his battalions and equipments near Purbuttee, where Gokla's army was encamped ; but

No. 116A—Translation of a Maratta letter dated 17th April from the Headman at Seevnee to the amildar of Pandercourrah.

“Yesterday the Pindarries of the Paishwa came to this place and after they had attacked us for several hours the Paishwa's Suwarree arrived, when of course we had no means and were much distressed by them.

About 9 o'clock at night the Pindarries brought information saying that Doveton Sahib had arrived at Ghaut-Anjee, in consequence about 12 o'clock at night the Paishwa marched back to Rallagaum, and he was met by the Hingunghaut Faringees troops (Col. Adams) near Chickle Durra Ghaut where the battle took place, and the Marattas failed.

The Faringeeey troops Suwars pursued them and the Marattas fled in every direction where they could get a road. The English troops are encamped today at Karygaum.

No. 117—News-sheet containing intelligence of Bajl Rao's plans.

Nirmal, 21 April 1818.

The deposition of Rhymon Khan, a Pathan native of Cad-dapah lately in the service of Gokalah, and with whom he had been during the war having three horses hired by that chief..... He says he left the enemy's army nine days ago rest at the Camp, that the party under Muddunsing marched from Bajee Row's camp. That parties of horse under Muddunsing, Apparao Dissie (the Nepanykur) Baboo Rao and a relative of the Vinchoor man were to leave Bajee Rao's camp, and to return to the Poona territories in order to lay them waste, and utterly ruin the country, and the whole of the plunder was promised as a reward to such as would follow those Sirdars and undertake it, as well as join the party with the guns of Bajee Rao. He says he was invited but having wished from the time Bajee Row passed near Nandair, to leave him, he took this opportunity to get off, and halted at villages on the road until the alarm of Muddensing's approach by Neermul might have passed over, and he could get down the ghauts in safety.

That it was the intention of those sirdars who might be dispatched to come by Neermul, but that it being reported Muddensing's party was attacked, that other bodies had gone by Oomerkair, but as they left camp after him, he cannot actually

say what their names were, or whether those Sirdars have moved, or others in their stead but that whoever are sent good security is taken as to their fidelity.

That one party of Arabs and Scindi's who were at Ecchoora and Woodbor were returning with their Jemadars to join Bajee Row's guns, and to commence plundering, and that in short all those who moved off in bodies of 100 or from that to 1000 and upwards had the same news and orders, whilst those who are deserting from Bajee Rao's camp, leave it in parties of 2-3 or a few more individuals.

That Bajee Rao at first ordered his guns to join him, they having by that time made Wyrang near Tooljapoor, but afterwards ordered them back to Sholapur.

That it is said to be Bajee Rao's intention to go north in case of failure in his present views, but should the expected assistance arrive from Scindiah that he would not continue his route northward, but return in a southerly direction. That Kauder Baldar has been sent to hasten the Kampoos and that a confidential man of Ram Deen was sent for the same purpose.

That Trimbukjee Dainglia was in charge of the intelligence department and that he had people in Gen. Doveton's camp and had also ascertained and reported the number of people with myself, which was said to be 30 or 40 horse and a few sepoys. That Brahmins and people dressed as Byraugies are mostly employed.

Numbers of Harkarahs and people with intelligence and invitations to return are daily arriving from the Poona territories, and that after his leaving camp, whilst he stayed a day or two a Boosie (?) upwards of 20 passed carrying letters, requests, and invitations from individuals to that effect.

That Nowlajee of Nawah and Comerkair entered into Bajee Row's views, has received orders to raise a body of horse and that he has already taken a party of Pathans nearly 200 into his service and actually accompanied Bajee Row the first two marches he made after leaving those places.

That letters from the Poona territories had mentioned our wishes to settle that country, and that those officers placed in charge of districts had informed the inhabitants whatever had been given to Bajee Row would be carried to account, but that not a cash more was to be paid him.

existence is concerned in abandoning altogether the cause of the Pindarries ; and of effecting this, I have no doubt. To reclaim these chiefs from their habits of plunder is a more difficult task, and one which the vicinity of an English force can alone effect ; but of this even I do not despair ; and my efforts shall be unremittingly directed to its accomplishment, which is very essential to the peace and prosperity of this part of the territories of Mulhar Rao Holkar, and particularly the town and province of Indore, which has hitherto been at once the resort and the prey of free-booters of every description.

The reports lately received from Lieutenant-Colonel Adams' camp and from Nagpore, have led to a very general impression that the Paishwa was likely to move in a northern or north-westerly direction ; and the position of our corps has rendered it more probable he might be compelled to take this course, though I can hardly believe he will even attempt, at this late period of the season, so desperate a measure as that of crossing the Nerbudda, or even approaching that river. I have still thought it my duty to adopt every step that would enable me to meet such an emergency. I have increased the strength of the corps proceeding south with the captured guns, and sick and wounded, in a degree that will render it equal to repel his whole force. It now consists of the whole of the Russell Brigade (with the exception of the four flank companies retained with me), details amounting to nearly two hundred rank and file, four field pieces, and two thousand irregular horse. This corps will be able to march from Hindia on the 24th instant, before which, I conclude, I must hear something positive of the Paishwa's movements. If he comes north, in the direction of Hindia I occupy a position from whence I can concentrate the troops I have near this point, and reach that place in three forced marches ; and as I should, in that case, order Lieutenant-Colonel Corsellis's Brigade, joined by Major Moodie, to occupy a position to the south of Indore, so as to prevent the entrance of the enemy into Malwah by the Simrole or Jam ghat. I should be at liberty not only to oppose but pursue him, if he lingered in the country between the Sautpoorah range of hills and the Nerbudda. Should the Peishwah pass the Nerbudda at any gaut to the east of Hoosingabad, I shall move towards Shojawulpore with the force under my immediate command, and bring both the corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Corsellis and that with Holkar's army into co-operation, as circumstances may require. In the more probable case of the Peishwah moving west of his present

position, and continuing in the Deccan, I shall hasten the march of the troops now assembled at Hindia, that they may be early available for the more urgent service of that quarter.

No. 119—Smith communicates his own plans to Elphinstone.

From—GENERAL LIONEL SMITH,

To—M. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp Baile near Neermul, 21 April 1818.

Sir,

My letter to you of the 18th instant enclosing a copy of one of the same date to Brigadier General Doveton will have acquainted you with my future plans of operations supposing Bajee Row to have gone off north of Nagpore. Although I have had no direct intelligence from General Doveton since the letter from him which I sent you yesterday, dated the 15th instant, I think there cannot possibly be a doubt of the enemy having taken that course.

From 8, to 10,000 of the enemy's horse are still south of the Godavery, in parties of 4 or 2,000 in the vicinity of their infantry near Tooljapoor. I have also accounts that the Infantry and guns are dividing into parties to intimidate the villages and plunder.

I am strongly of opinion, I should lose no time in crossing the river to protect the country and endeavour to bring the infantry to action.

For this object, my endeavour would be to cut them off from Sholapore (about 36 miles south-west of Tooljapoor) which is described to me as being very strong and as the very centre of assembly for the enemy's infantry and guns, ought, I should think, to be reduced as soon as possible.

I feel so satisfied that General Doveton will not wish me to lose time in what I have proposed to him, after it is once known Bajee Row has gone north, that if I do not hear anything to change my own plans after tomorrow, I shall march to the westward on the 23rd instant and shall cross the river between this point and Nandair.

If I can possibly make use of the cavalry and horse to cut the enemy off from Solapoor, they will be obliged to fight. But I must avoid the fort itself or submit to be fired upon as I could

part of Bajee Row of his guns in number five, of some elephants, many camels laden with treasure, besides many other things. Several men were killed and wounded. Previous to the Mahratta quitting Anwer, they burnt it, as they did also a village at which they halted near Mahoor. From this ground they came to Omerkair. They have with them, about 30,000 horses and 300 Arabs. The only sardars known to be in camp were Abba Poorundurree and Ramchunder Subedaur. It was not known whither they were going, some said to Sholapoor, others to Nassick, while a great number talked of returning home.

No. 121—Captain Woodhouse sends intelligence of Baji Rao's flight.

Nirmal, 24 April 1818.

My Dear Sir,

I send you the line of march Bajee Row took, for everyone now says he was in the party I wrote you about. His first route lay towards Hyderabad having come direct on it from Pandacourah, to Cair, Booric Pindawarah and so on as far as within 4 coss of Edulabad, when he made a sharp turn to the westward and struck through Koochulpoor to Gotee in Kinweet—Dankee Bittergaum towards Omerkair, further I hear nothing of him, he was followed by General Doveton.

I had today the good fortune to get hold of 4 of Bajee Row's personal Palanqueen bearers, at least so these people acknowledged. They had about 400 rupees with them in gold and money, etc., and said in the confusion of the attack by General Adams, that the Paishwa mounted his horse, put his wives on others and abandoned every Palanqucen he had and went off with about 70 horsemen giving out Mahoor and ultimately Sholapoor. They say the Peshwa was only accompanied by three Sirdars of rank at the time he got off viz., the Nepaunee-kar, Trimbuckjee Dainglia and another whose name I have forgot—that Chimnajee Appah, the Peshwa's brother, Gunput Rao and others having been dispersed, the army went off in three divisions and that themselves and every bearer ran off and that it was some time before he was joined by the party he has now with him, viz., either that night or towards morning.

No. 122—Brigadier General Smith sends intelligence of various occurrences in the pursuit of Bajji Rao and of his intended move towards Poona.

From—GENERAL LIONEL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.

Camp Dharoor, 2 May 1818.

Sir,

I left my position near Neermul on the 22nd instant marching to the westward. On the following day I had accounts of the dispersion of Bajee Row's army by the Nagpoor division, and I continued advancing rapidly to the westward in hopes of intercepting some of his horse in their retreat from Oomerkair to which they were closely pursued by Brig. General Doveton.

They assembled in a tolerable collected state upon the branch of the Doodna immediately above its junction with the Godavery, when they broke up in various divisions. My information went that one considerable body had actually crossed the Godavery and others were following, upon which I crossed that river myself a little to the westward of Nandair and arrived at Khair on the 28th ultimo here I had information of a body of 10,000 being on march for the Dharroor Ghaut.

I marched the same night by torch light with the cavalry, mounted light infantry and 4 horse artillery guns, by Soanpet, to enter these ghauts by the northern road, which Lieut. Col. Cunningham marched at the same time with two gallopers, the Light Battn., and the whole of the auxillary and reformed horse, by the south-western route round the ghauts in hopes of intercepting the enemy in his passage through, but I lament to say we were not able to overtake them, though each Division marched upwards of 60 miles.

This body was commended by Wiseajee Punt Gokla and Wittojee Naik, with, I believe, the remains of Bapoo Gokla's horse and the Nepauniker's and Aukulcote Rajah's baggage and valuables, and both those sirdars on their march publicly avowed they had broke up from the Paishwa and were on their way to disperse their troops in their own districts and to tender their personal submission to you. The former part of this report seems confirmed by their proceedings after passing the Maunjera at Cullianee, where numerous small parties went off in different directions.

The enclosed paper of information from a very intelligent Jemadar of Infantry who was taken by our horse with about

70 of his men, will acquaint you with the prevailing reports of the disposal of Bajee Row's army and which are confirmed by all the intelligence I have had from other quarters.

I have been obliged to wait here till today for the division of infantry under Lieut. Col. Milnes, which having joined I shall halt tomorrow for muster, and purpose marching on the 4th under the following arrangement which I hope you may approve of. Feeling very confident myself that the bulk of the enemy's army is broken up, I shall direct Lieut. Col. Cunningham to march to the southwest with his horse, 4 gallopers and 5 Companies of Infantry on a line through Perinda and Kurmulla and between the Neera and Kurra rivers, to cut up small parties of horse and foot, immediately within that line and then march upon Poona, subject of course to such change of direction as you may deem more advantageous for putting down bunds and giving confidence to the country which has come under our protection.

Captain Davis with the reformed horse will be directed to descend this ghaut and march upon Ahmednuggur through the Bheer district, where I have accounts of numerous small parties of the enemy's horse having returned and who should be disarmed or cut up.

It was my wish to have gone against the enemy's infantry and guns about Sholapore, but as that place is strong and I have no battering guns and could not feel certain of cutting them off from the fort and as you have assigned that duty under a regular plan of other operations to Brig. General Munro, I did not think myself at liberty to interfere with your arrangements.

No. 123—General Smith makes a pathetic appeal to Mr. Elphinstone and through him to the Governor General requesting stern measures to put down the disgraceful and oppressive practice of free foraging by British armies in time of war. He emphasizes that such a measure would be a lasting blessing creditable to the British rule in India.

From—LIONEL SMITH,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE,
COMMISSIONER.

Camp Nandeesser, 7 May 1818.

Sir,

I do myself the honour to enclose you herewith an extract of orders I have had occasion to issue which relate to the good

conduct of the auxiliary horse contrasted with that of other troops under my command and which I am therefore happy to bring to your notice.

The trouble I have had, the odium I have incurred and the daring opposition I have occasionally experienced from the Madras Troops and followers in my persevering endeavours to protect the inhabitants of these countries from the disgraceful and oppressive practice of free foraging, have finally determined me, to address you in a hope to bring this very important subject to the knowledge and consideration of the Governor General.

My motives for undertaking this task cannot be questioned. A regard for the principles of real discipline and I hope the common feeling of a British officer to protect the harmless inhabitants of the country from military abuses, and the time when you are occupied in possessing new countries for the Hon'ble Company, partly bordering upon these of allies, which must render the passage of British troops more frequent than ever, seems peculiarly calculated to draw from the fountain head of British authority some protecting regulation against a practice which is equally ruinous to the people and to the moral discipline of an army.

It has the honour of its origin in the custom of Native armies and is therefore, defended as a right with us even by, I own, some respectable British Officers, men of education and of general honourable principles, and it is further defended on a pretence, for I cannot call it a belief, that the Native Governments make deductions and ameliorate the rents from such tracts of country as have been cursed with the passage of such armies.

The customs of all native armies that I have ever read or heard of, are lawless, arbitrary and oppressive, and therefore, are not very worthy of British imitation, and as for Native Governments relaxing one cowrie of their collections for the sufferings of their people under any evil, no man who has been six months in India could believe it. Yet I never could hear of any better arguments for this practice of seizing the most valuable property the poor cultivators possess.

It will be well to look to the military evils of this extraordinary system in British armies. Free foraging creates a consumption or rather waste of at least ten times the quantity absolutely requisite. Hence arise destructive fires in camp endangering the magazine, line of tents etc.

By enforcing moderate payment from all ranks and followers no more will be purchased than is really wanted. In the one case, if you have to retrace the same ground in the course of military operations, you are distressed for the means of feeding your cattle and in the other you find plenty : in one case too you get rid of all useless cattle which tend to drain the country of forage and which the other system enables the poorest adventurer to maintain.

But this is only half the evil of this frightful privilege, the permission to forage-free sanctions the search of villages, and their houses to obtain it and gives facilities to every other species of plunder and oppression. Chatties, vegetables, sometimes sheep and fowls, and other little convenient articles for a march are demanded, and taken and these failing, quarrels ensue, and the village is probably altogether plundered, and perhaps half the people of it are pressed for the carriage of knapsacks, or baggage. In fact the consequences arising out of this one practice are incalculable ; among others it invites to camp professed thieves who have no other means of subsistence and, I have no hesitation in saying, is a just source of reproach and disgrace to our armies whenever tolerated.

It is a little singular that we have gone to wars against the Pindarries for plundering and allow a practice in our own armies which from what I have seen I declare is nearly as baneful to the peaceful inhabitants of a country as any mischief of these professional freebooters. The only difference perhaps is fewer cases of murder and rape by our followers than Pindarries may occasion.

Why is all this ? I have shown incontrovertably that the system is a military nuisance, and not a necessity. No armies in the world are so liberally or so regularly paid as those of the Hon'ble Company ; at least my division has hardly in four years been as many days in arrears and I may presume other corps are equally attended to. It cannot therefore be justified on any military urgency.

It cannot be maintained that Kirby (Jowarry stalk) or any other forage is of no value to the cultivator. He preserves it for the cattle, with which he tills his ground during the dry season and early part of the monsoon. British armies actually come and deprive him of this important property which either destroys these cattle or compels his family to emigrate, whereas

if he is paid for it, he easily replaces from the surplus of other villages, that have escaped, the passage of troops, what has been taken.

In the neighbourhood of large towns moreover forage is actually purposely raised as a valuable saleable article.

I regulate my prices accordingly, for instance when I come within the circle of 50 miles of Ahmednuggur, Poona or Seroor, where the demand for dry forage exceeds the immediate cultivation, and is consequently dear from distant importations. I fix the price at 10 rupees for every 1,000 bundles of Kirby, half a rupee for every camel load of Boosa or husk and half a rupee for every hundred bundles of dry grass, and when beyond that circle only one half of these prices are allowed.

The Cavalry regulations in the Madras army for foraging are admirably calculated to meet this system, Every horse is allowed a grass cutter. This is sufficient to supply the animal in seasons of green forage and in the dry season the commanding officers are allowed to discharge as many grass cutters, whose monthly pay (still drawn for each effective horse and funded) enables them to purchase dry forage. The regulations in no case admit of free foraging.

Nothing would be more simple than to put down this practice throughout India, for I am well aware, it extensively prevails both in foreign and allied territories though never in the Hon'ble Company's. It will improve the discipline of camps more than fifty codes of complicated regulations, and will be received as a most beneficial act of justice by the people.

The practice being decidedly prohibited, the Resident at all the courts in concert with the Commanding Officers can easily fix the forage rates, and the Quarter Master General's routes could easily specify the lines where they may have to vary and where there is no civil authority. All commanding officers should be held most strictly responsible to enforce moderate payment from all ranks and followers for forages, regulated by its local value. I have never found the least reluctance in the people to dispose of it, on the contrary they often bring it into any bazars for sale.

With your support and no one can give His Lordship more information on the subject than you, I do hope, I shall succeed in an object which I own I have much at heart for the good of the service and the good of a people who even in the heat of war, I have always found inoffensive and deserving of protection.

By enforcing moderate payment from all ranks and followers no more will be purchased than is really wanted. In the one case, if you have to retrace the same ground in the course of military operations, you are distressed for the means of feeding your cattle and in the other you find plenty: in one case too you get rid of all useless cattle which tend to drain the country of forage and which the other system enables the poorest adventurer to maintain.

But this is only half the evil of this frightful privilege, the permission to forage-free sanctions the search of villages, and their houses to obtain it and gives facilities to every other species of plunder and oppression. Chatties, vegetables, sometimes sheep and fowls, and other little convenient articles for a march are demanded, and taken and these failing, quarrels ensue, and the village is probably altogether plundered, and perhaps half the people of it are pressed for the carriage of knapsacks, or baggage. In fact the consequences arising out of this one practice are incalculable; among others it invites to camp professed thieves who have no other means of subsistence and, I have no hesitation in saying, is a just source of reproach and disgrace to our armies whenever tolerated.

It is a little singular that we have gone to wars against the Pindarries for plundering and allow a practice in our own armies which from what I have seen I declare is nearly as baneful to the peaceful inhabitants of a country as any mischief of these professional freebooters. The only difference perhaps is fewer cases of murder and rape by our followers than Pindarries may occasion.

Why is all this? I have shown incontrovertably that the system is a military nuisance, and not a necessity. No armies in the world are so liberally or so regularly paid as those of the Hon'ble Company; at least my division has hardly in four years been as many days in arrears and I may presume other corps are equally attended to. It cannot therefore be justified on any military urgency.

It cannot be maintained that Kirby (Jowarry stalk) or any other forage is of no value to the cultivator. He preserves it for the cattle, with which he tills his ground during the dry season and early part of the monsoon. British armies actually come and deprive him of this important property which either destroys these cattle or compels his family to emigrate, whereas

if he is paid for it, he easily replaces from the surplus of other villages, that have escaped the passage of troops, what has been taken.

In the neighbourhood of large towns moreover forage is actually purposely raised as a valuable saleable article.

I regulate my prices accordingly, for instance when I come within the circle of 50 miles of Ahmednuggur, Poona or Seroor, where the demand for dry forage exceeds the immediate cultivation, and is consequently dear from distant importations. I fix the price at 10 rupees for every 1,000 bundles of Kirby, half a rupee for every camel load of Boosa or husk and half a rupee for every hundred bundles of dry grass, and when beyond that circle only one half of these prices are allowed.

The Cavalry regulations in the Madras army for foraging are admirably calculated to meet this system, Every horse is allowed a grass cutter. This is sufficient to supply the animal in seasons of green forage and in the dry season the commanding officers are allowed to discharge as many grass cutters, whose monthly pay (still drawn for each effective horse and funded) enables them to purchase dry forage. The regulations in no case admit of free foraging.

Nothing would be more simple than to put down this practice throughout India, for I am well aware, it extensively prevails both in foreign and allied territories though never in the Hon'ble Company's. It will improve the discipline of camps more than fifty codes of complicated regulations, and will be received as a most beneficial act of justice by the people.

The practice being decidedly prohibited, the Resident at all the courts in concert with the Commanding Officers can easily fix the forage rates, and the Quarter Master General's routes could easily specify the lines where they may have to vary and where there is no civil authority. All commanding officers should be held most strictly responsible to enforce moderate payment from all ranks and followers for forages, regulated by its local value. I have never found the least reluctance in the people to dispose of it, on the contrary they often bring it into any bazars for sale.

With your support and no one can give His Lordship more information on the subject than you, I do hope, I shall succeed in an object which I own I have much at heart for the good of the service and the good of a people who even in the heat of war, I have always found inoffensive and deserving of protection.

day. This success was rendered particularly gratifying by the restoration to their families of the ladies of the Princes of Sattara and still more by the deliverance of Cornets Morrison and Hunter. These officers had been treated with the utmost harshness and severity at Kangoree, but their situation was improved at Wassota by express orders from Gokla, which do him the more honour as they were written within a few days after the death of his only son. On most occasions among the imprisoned they were well used by the native soldiery and met with several acts of kindness and sympathy that would be honourable to any nation.

From Wassota the army returned to Sattara where the Raja now made his entry in procession escorted by detachments from all the Corps of the Division and accompanied by most of the officers in camp. On this occasion he formally took his seat on his throne in full Durbar and soon after published a proclamation announcing his connection with the British and the peculiar injuries he had received from Bajee Row. Among these was an order the existence of which was confirmed by the Killedar of Wassota to put the whole family to death rather than suffer them to be rescued.

It was the time pointed out in my letter to Your Excellency dated March 31st for separating the troops under General Pritzler. Those formerly belonging to the reserve were to join Brigadier General Munro for the sieges of Nepauney and Sholapur, while those formerly in the Division were to move up and settle the country to the north of Poona. When on the point of making this arrangement I learned from General Munro that the Government of Fort St. George had not only been unable to afford him those reinforcements on which I had reckoned but had withdrawn the Detachment of the Madras Light Cavalry which had been serving with him. This left General Munro scarcely more troops than were required to protect his new conquests and those which were to join him under General Pritzler being evidently unequal to the duties assigned to them, I was obliged to add the 1/7th Bombay Native Infantry to General Pritzler's Detachment and thus to break up the Detachment intended for the north of Poona.

These arrangements were made and General Pritzler marched from Sattara on the 12th of April. On his way to join General Munro he reduced the forts and thanahs mentioned in the

If reference and enquiries be made, the whole present practice is against me and hence the odium and trouble I have had in resisting it. But if such reference goes back, His Lordship would learn that the Duke of Wellington was so strict on this very subject that he would not even suffer forage to be taken from a deserted village without the value of it in money, being placed in some conspicuous spot whence the forage was taken.

If His Lordship would deign to put down this abuse by his great authority and that arbitrary practice also of pressing coolies either for the carriage of officers' baggage or the men's knapsacks and who receive no remuneration for their labour (worth half a rupee per diem in the Deccan) which is lost to their own pursuits of a livelihood, he would draw a lasting blessing on his name and Government, and raise a respect towards our armies among the Natives of foreign states, which certainly requires to be improved

This force has I believe, stood alone in its regulations for the payment of forage, as well as everything else it requires from the country. No villagers ever quit their homes on my approach, and even where they have had strong local causes of attachment to the Peshwa they have received me in war with respectful neutrality and a gratifying confidence.

But every corps that comes to me from other armies gives me infinite trouble and tries to resist regulations which the practice in other quarters render hard and unwelcome.

No. 121—In this report, Elphinstone amply exhibits his wise and far sighted policy in bringing the Peshwa down to his knees and in settling the conquered country.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp near Poona, 9 May 1818.

My Lord,

Immediately after my last despatch to Your Excellency the fort of Wassota was invested by the force under Brigadier General Pritzler and the great difficulties arising from its situation being at length surmounted, the Batteries opened on the 5th of April from old Wassota, a mountain which commands the fort. This led to the surrender of the place on the following

day. This success was rendered particularly gratifying by the restoration to their families of the ladies of the Princes of Sattara and still more by the deliverance of Cornets Morrison and Hunter. These officers had been treated with the utmost harshness and severity at Kangoree, but their situation was improved at Wassota by express orders from Gokla, which do him the more honour as they were written within a few days after the death of his only son. On most occasions among the imprisoned they were well used by the native soldiery and met with several acts of kindness and sympathy that would be honourable to any nation.

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These arrangements were made and General Pritzler marched from Sattara on the 12th of April. On his way to join General Munro he reduced the forts and thanahs mentioned in the

margin *and gave us possession of all the country along the Kisna to its junction with the Warna. The forts of Jawli, Jeyghur, Mahinderghur, Narooghur, Mymunghur, Wundunghur and Tottora etc., were also taken possession of by Detachments of Captain Grant's sebandy from Sattara.

The Bombay troops of General Pritzler's Division marched from Sattara on the 13th of April under the command of Fitzsimon. They were now reduced to 6 companies of the Bombay European Regiment and the Supernumerary Auxiliary Battalion. It was intended to provide from this Detachment for the protection of Poona which from the various detachments in troops before reported was so bare of troops that the Commanding Officer reported it incapable of defence even for a few hours against any sudden attack which the enemy might make in force, but as Annaba Rahtekur after repeated promises to give up the town of Junnere and the fort of Sheoneree and its dependencies had refused to admit a garrison sent from Seroor, I thought it necessary to direct Major Eldridge who now commanded the Detachment to proceed against those places. He accordingly marched on the 24th arrived at Junere on the 27th and found the town and fort of Sheoneree evacuated. He afterwards reduced the strong forts of Hunnee, Narainghur, Hemychundee, Chawan and Joodhun, of which only the two last made resistance and thus established our authority through the whole country south of the range of hills which divides the Beema from the Godavery. Some of these forts are on hills 2,000 feet high surrounded by perpendicular rocks only to be ascended by steps and provided with covers that afford perfect security against shells.

The fort of Ruttunghur immediately to the north of the range had been previously taken possession of by a Detachment under Captain Barton sent from the northern Concan in consequence of the order of surrender given to me at Wye by Dhondoo Punt Joshee. Captain Barton also possessed himself of the forts of Kolallghur, Allemghur and Muddunghur and was of great use by his judicious communications with the Bheel Chiefs and the people of the neighbouring districts.

The country still further to the north beyond the range of hills that separates the Godavery from the Pira was taken possession of by Rungo Punt a Native agent detached by Captain Briggs

*Mussoor, Wassuntghur, Colao, Sedasheoghur, Muchinderghur, Wangee, Walwa, Buteess Serala, Islampur.

Captain Briggs' plan now is to enter in the settlement of Candeish, Taulner being taken, and Gaulna surrendered by Holkar's orders. Captain Briggs was enabled by means of his amils to take possession of many places throughout the province. The town and fortification of Soonghur in particular was taken possession of by Lieut. Rule Commanding at Galna, who moved thither on a plan settled between Captain Briggs' amil and the Paishwa's officer at the place, and drove out a body of Arabs who endeavoured to oppose him. This place was afterwards attacked by a strong body of Arabs but was resolutely defended by a Detachment of 14 Sepoys and a body of Sebundies who beat off the assailants though with some loss on their own parts. Lieut. Col. Macdowell sent Captain Rind with 500 of the Auxiliary Horse to the assistance of this place. They found it already abandoned by the enemy and advanced at the invitation of the inhabitants to Sind Kaira on the Tapti. They found this place in possession of a strong body of Arabs but gallantly attacked and carried it with considerable loss on their own part. The principal enemy that remains in Candeish is composed of Arabs who have been originally settled or have come from Nagpoor and other quarters. There are also some bodies of Bajee Row's Horse and of the old insurgents connected with Trimbuckjee Dainglia, besides some of the Bheels who are always ready to profit by disturbances. The strength of those bodies, the nature of some parts of the country and the fact that several forts in Candeish are still unsubdued, render it an enterprise of some hazard to attempt to reduce the province with the small force under Lieut. Col. Macdowell, but the progress already made, renders it more prudent to make the attempt than to leave our conquests liable to be overrun, and our smaller detachment exposed to be cut off. I have therefore expressed my approbation of Captain Briggs' design of immediately proceeding to Candeish. His plans are contained in his letters of which copies have been transmitted to Government. Lieut. Col. Macdowell is to move by Wun [Vani?] through Baglana Nandurbar or Sultanpoor which are the principal seats of the Arabs. Major Ives with the disposable part of his Battalion from Sendwa and 500 Auxiliary Horse under Captain Rind is to move by Talnere towards Galna, while a Battalion of the Russell Brigade with which Captain Briggs having properly made a requisition with 500 Auxiliary horse under Cornet Kaye will reduce the country on the south east of the Girna. Each of these detachments is too weak for its object but the force in Caundeish will soon be reinforced by a Detachment which the Government of Bombay has with its usual energy rendered applicable to that service,

the 2/17th now in this neighbourhood will move in the same direction as soon as it becomes disposable; and I have further requested Brigadier General Doveton as soon as he may be released from the more important duty of pursuing the Paishwa to move to the south eastern boundary of Candeish and either enter the province to complete its reduction or remain to watch any bodies of horse that may still appear as he thinks best.

If circumstances should admit of the relief of the Madras Battalions now with Sir John Malcolm, their presence in Candeish would be of essential advantage to settle and retain our conquests, which in this case is more difficult than the first requisition.

During these transactions in the north, General Munro had finished the arduous siege of Belgaum and was joined by General Pritzler on the 22nd of April. I had recommended to him the plan mentioned in my letter to Your Excellency of March 31st of proceeding after the reduction of Nepaunee to take Solapoor and settle the country to the south and west of that place, much of which had already been occupied by his sebundies. This plan however was founded as before mentioned on the supposition that troops could be spared from the Ceded Districts to occupy the newly conquered territory. As this was not the case, General Munro considered it impolitic to provoke the Nepaunee whose adherents might, disturb the Carnatic while the troops were away, and as it was necessary for General Munro to return to that country at all events on account of the inadequacy of the force left in it, it appeared of little consequence with which of the two forts he began. I therefore concurred in his determination to take Sholapoor first. With this view, he crossed the Kisna on the 27th and was on the 3rd at Bellary, which I believe within four or five marches of Sholapoor. The Paishwa's Infantry and guns after levying contributions for sometime in the Nizam's country near Sholapoor crossed the Beema, took and plundered the village of Indy which was, I imagine, occupied by some of our sebundies though I have had no distinct report on the subject. They drew off on the approach of General Munro, and will probably either be shut up in Sholapoor or will fall into the hands of General Smith who was approaching that place from the north east.

In my last report to Your Excellency I stated Brigadier General Smith to be at Diggrus on the Doodna on the 24th of March; he had moved thus far on his route to Bassim, but was

in small parties were attacked by the villagers, or stripped by the Naiks of the hills whom Bajee Row had before directed to intercept all persons who should endeavour to desert from his camp.

The first body of the fugitives that came into this part of the country appeared to the north of Ahmednuggur on the 28th ult. and soon after dispersed to their homes. Another considerable body in which were Madhoo Row Rastia, Ana Dhumdere, the Paishwa's father-in-law, Cooshaba Tattia, a principal man of the Vinchoorkurs and Bappojee Moraishur son of Moro Hurry Mozmudar, and long Sindia's secret agent with the Paishwa, arrived at Sendwa in Candeish on the 1st instant and sent in their submission to me with an application for passports. Another considerable body, in which were Essajee Punt Gokla, the cousin of Bappoo Gokla, Wittoba Naik Guickwar who brought the declaration of war on the 5th of November and many commanders of Selladar Horse came by a route to the westward of Nandair. They were pursued by General Smith in two divisions one under himself and the other under Lieut. Col. Cunningham of the Auxiliary Horse to the Ghauts near Daroor, from whence they proceeded to Punderpore and immediately sent in their submission. From Daroor General Smith detached Lieut. Col. Cunningham in the direction of Perinda and Captain Davies with the reformed Horse towards Ahmednuggur.

The Paishwa himself is said to have fled from Omer Khair towards Maiker and from thence to the neighbourhood of Jafferabad. His avowed intention was to proceed by Boorhanpoor to Hindoostan. This intention was spoken of before his defeat and increased the desertions which began when Bajee Row passed Nandair in the middle of March. Near Jafferabad he was left by his brother Appa Saheb, by Appa Dessye, and it is said by Ramchunder Soubedar formerly in Gokla's service and Naroo Punt Apty. The two first of these persons applied for passports on the 2nd to the Officer Commanding at Jaulnah and professed their intention of submitting to the British Government.

The Paishwa is still spoken of as having 10 or 15,000 Horse, but I cannot reconcile this account with the vast numbers of deserters that have returned to his late dominions. Accounts from all parts of the country speak of crowds of horsemen who are dispersing to their villages worn out with hunger and

fatigue. The numerous applications for letters of protection from persons of this description has induced me to issue a proclamation declaring all safe, who return quietly to their homes and announcing the punishment of rebels against all who plunder the country or take the field again after benefiting by this proclamation.

In this state of things, I indulge a sanguine hope that the war will speedily be brought to a close, and that nothing will remain during the rains, but to keep down insurrections and to settle the country in some permanent system. The inhabitants never showed any attachment to the Paishwa, and the proclamation of Sattara followed so closely by the capture of the Rajah and the death of Goklah, the reduction of Bajee Row's principal forts in all parts of the country and his own flight with his army to a distant quarter, appear to have put an end to all thoughts of his restoration and to have turned the eyes of all to the British Government as to their future sovereign. The people everywhere received our armies as friends, the persons in authority attend on our civil officers without hesitation and even the holders of forts are generally ready to surrender on the first summons.

The only insurrections now in existence are as follows. That on the frontier between the district of Ahmednuggur and the Nizam's frontier under Dhurmajee Pertaub Ray which had subsisted for some years though it has increased since the war. Dhurmajee at one time took the strong Ghurry of Amulnair, south-east of Ahmednuggur from our Sebundies, but evacuated it on the approach of a Detachment sent against it by Col. Deacon. He has lately committed great cruelties in that quarter of the district of Ahmednuggur but a Detachment of Infantry and Auxiliary Horse under Major Macleod has now marched against him at the requisition of the Collector Captain Pottinger, and will, at last, drive him out of the Company's territory, if not cut him up. There were two bands of insurgents of 100 or 200 Horse each near Barramittee and Nattapootah, but they have since withdrawn and joined Dhermajee. There have been some trifling inroads made by the Kolies from the ghauts north east of Poona and the adjoining parts of the Northern Concan, but the most considerable insurrections of that kind is that which has subsisted for two years, under the name of Chutter Sing and which is entirely composed of Ramoossees and other hill robbers. Their principal station is at Purchitghur west of Kurar and they plunder the country as far as Tausgaum and

to the neighbourhood of Sattara, Captain Grant has endeavoured to bring him to submit, and they always speak of themselves as partisans of our Government, and forbear to plunder places in our immediate occupation, but it may be doubted whether they will be effectually suppressed until a Detachment can be spared to go against them. These are the only insurrections at present, but we shall be obliged for a long time to be on guard against more extended disturbances than these, arising from the number of unemployed persons of the military profession, from the unsettled disposition produced by war and by the discontents naturally excited by the introduction of a foreign Government. If the Paishwa should go to Hindoostan, any assistance he meets there, would no doubt revive the activity of his partisans in the Deckan. His vicinity would have the same effect if he could still keep the field or remain in any of the strong countries under the Sautpoora mountains; and even if he were taken, the same general causes might, if neglected, lead to a war with the same people under a more active leader. This evil, I hope, be precluded by vigilance in our civil Government, by a judicious distribution and a state of constant preparation of our troops, and by the adoption of such measures as are likely to remove the causes in which the danger originates.

The letters of Captain Robertson and Captain Pottinger will show the tranquil state of the Poona and Ahmednuggur Districts.

Captain Grant's despatches do not go much into detail regarding the affairs of Sattara, but I have the satisfaction to say that everything in that country is going on in the best manner under his direction, and that he is gradually getting rid of the defects which I had to complain of in that new Court.

His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop arrived at this place on the 26th and left it on the 2nd for Bombay. He was chiefly induced to adopt that route by his anxiety to leave as large a portion as possible of his escort disposable for the war with the Paishwa. In the same spirit His Excellency was pleased to order out the whole of his escort except the Detachment of the rifle Corps to act against the first bodies of horse that entered the country from the Paishwa's army. The Detachment moved to Pairgaum on the Beema under Major Greenhill of the 2/17 Madras Native Infantry. His Excellency had ordered that corps to Toka to join his escort and acquainted me that it should

be disposable when he left this part of the country. I have therefore now ordered it to Gungterry to reinforce Colonel Macdowell.

Your Excellency is of course informed of the continued successes of the Detachments under Colonel Prother and Colonel Imlach. Ryghur has not yet fallen, but as the Paishwa's wife is said to have quitted it, the garrison is probably thinking of giving it up. It is probably the strongest hill fort in India.

No. 125—Captain Grant, the future historian of the Marathas, narrates how he managed to take possession of the forts of Pratapgad and Dategad.

From—JAMES GRANT,

To—M. ELPHINSTONE.

Sattara 16 May 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that agreeably to your verbal instructions, I endeavoured, from the time of my arrival here, to open a negotiation with the Killadar of Pertaubgurh. After some ineffectual attempts, I was introduced to a Bramin named Wittul Punt Bhokeel, an inhabitant of Corygaum, by Sewdashew Punt Joshie of Kerowlie, an old man who has been very useful to me on several occasions.

Wittul Punt being a great friend of Janoba Deshpande, whose younger brother, Nilkunt Rao, was the Killadar of Pertaubgurh, I endeavoured to convince him of the service he would render to the family, by persuading Nilkunt Rao and another, brother, Govind Punt, residing at Sewapore, that it was the wisest thing they could do to show themselves friends to the British Government; that they were fortunate in still having it in their power to do so, by the surrender of the fort of Pertaubgurh, that in a short time there would be leisure to send a force against it; that resistance then would be as ineffectual, as it had been everywhere else, and that the opportunity of giving the place in a friendly manner would be lost.

Wittul Punt set off for Pertaubgurh, and returned to Sattara on the 7th instant, bringing with him Pandoorung Punt Atrey, the Killadar's carcoon.

No. 126—Malcolm reports to the Governor General the steps he had taken to prevent Bajl Rao's entry into Malwa and mentions that a vakil of the Peshwa was soon to meet him with a letter.

From—SIR JOHN MALCOLM,

To—THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Mhow, 17 May 1818.

My Lord,

I had last the honour of addressing Your Lordship upon the 10th instant. Since that a report of Bajee Rao having advanced two marches from the vicinity of Burhanpore in the direct road to the Sindwa gaut, and an account of the inhabitants of the villages between that and the Nerbudda having fled their homes, made me advance to the top of Jam gaut, where I arrived on the 13th instant. On the 14th I received intelligence, which led me to conclude that if Bajee Rao ever had an intention of advancing in that direction it had been abandoned (probably on hearing I was in force upon it), and that he had turned east, passing the right flank and rear of Lieutenant Colonel Heath's convoy towards Asseer. The moment I was assured of this fact, I returned to Mhow, having first detached to Major Smith the remaining companies of the first battalion of the Fourteenth Native Infantry, committing, with the increased means, to the charge of that active and intelligent officer the defence of the line of the Nerbudda, from the River to Darampore gaut. To guard the gauts to the westward of the latter point, I have directed a detachment of four companies from Lieutenant Colonel Corsellis's force to occupy a position near Chikuldah, which completes the line, and will, I have no doubt, prevent an effort in the Paishwah to enter Malwah in this direction. I returned to Mhow on the 15th, and on the evening of that day I received information of the arrival of a Vakeel from the Peishwah at Barwah, a place near the Nerbudda about forty miles from this. While I invited the Vakeel to my camp, I detached Lieutenant Colonel Russell, of the Third regiment of cavalry and three companies of infantry and a brigade of gallopers, towards Ouchode, directing him to post a company of Infantry at the head of the Kotcote Pass, which is one of the only openings between this and the position he was marching

by. I directed, at the same time that I detached Lieutenant Colonel Russell, Lieutenant Colonel Corsellis (whose brigade was at Buturia) to move into my lines. He arrived this morning, and I have now completed an arrangement, which, after leaving two companies and near six hundred recruits, armed and in a forward state of discipline, to guard my sick and convalescent, superfluous stores and grain, gives me disposable nearly three battalions of infantry, besides those upon the river. I am in momentary expectation of Bajee Rao's Vakeel, who I understand from a horseman come in advance, has a letter to my address. I cannot determine upon the plan I am to pursue till I know what he proposes : but as I mean, for many reasons not to allow Bajee Rao to enter Malwah, I shall immediately move to the Nerbudda, being quite satisfied that whether I am to treat with or attack him, this is not a moment for delay.

No. 127—Malcolm forwards to the Governor General the letter he had received from Baji Rao and reports that he has deputed his assistant Lt. Low to meet Baji Rao and arrange further particulars.

From—JOHN MALCOLM,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Camp 18 May 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you for the information of the most noble the Governor General that Anund Row Jeswant arrived last night in my camp with a letter from Badgerow translation of which I have the honour to enclose. I had a conference of many hours with the Vakeel who urged everything he could in favour of his master even to the ascribing his inefficiency as a soldier to his reluctance to engage personally in any act of hostility against a Government that was the friend of his father and to which he owed his Musnad.

It is alike unnecessary to detail the arguments which he used or those with which I refuted him. Suffice it to say that by referring to the Proclamation that had been issued and the measures that were adopted I succeeded after some hours in fully satisfying the Vakeel that every hope in which his master might have indulged of his being restored even to nominal sovereignty was vain. He might I added if he had wisdom

sufficient to see the necessity of an immediate submission establish claims to liberal consideration by hastening the termination of the war which he had so unjustifiably commenced. I answered the strong appeals he made through the Vakeel to my personal friendship, by saying that I had before warned him of his charges, but my advice had proved fruitless. I should however delight in being the instrument of saving him from total ruin. He might, I said partake of the bounty of the English Government and his early submission would save numbers of his family and adherents from that destruction, to which a protracted and hopeless opposition must inevitably doom them.

Anund Row Jeswant was very solicitous, I should proceed to Badjee Row agreeably to his request. This was objectionable on every ground. It would have shown a solicitude for his submission that might have operated against the object which it was meant to promote. Besides it would have removed me from the situation where I can best employ the means placed at my disposal for the combined purposes of his reduction and other objects of the Public Service. Though I thought it impolitic for those considerations to proceed myself. I deemed every measure I could adopt short of that to give confidence to Badjerow of importance. It is also very desirable to obtain correct information of his actual condition. To effect these purposes, I have deputed my 1st assistant Lieutenant Low to his camp. I enclose copy of my instructions to that officer and of my reply to the letter from Badjerow. The former will convey to the Governor General a view of the proceedings I have adopted and of the principles I have laid down for my guidance. On this occasion I anxiously trust that I shall be early honoured with His Lordship's commands. There are some practical parts of the question particularly those that relate to the immediate residence of Badjerow that present considerable difficulties.

Anund Row Jeswunt does not disguise the distressed state to which Badjerow is reduced, which, has he admits been greatly aggravated by the recent defection of his brother Chimajee Appah and the Nepankur.

No. 127A—Translation of a letter bearing the seal of Baji Rao to Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm, dated 1st May 1818.

I had the pleasure of meeting you last at Mahawlee and there entreated you as being fully acquainted with the affairs of both States to remain a short time, but on account of a press of

business you could not stay. It cannot now be remedied. I have lately done all in my power to discover wherein General Malcolm was without success, but having now been informed that he is near the Nurbuddah river I have sent Anund Row Jeswant to you who will give you a full account of all in this quarter.

In former days I came from Bassein to Poonah when at a variance with Scindia and Bhounsla, you and General Wellesley had then entirely destroyed the power of those chiefs and had taken all their countries and forts and although you had done all this yet being then of superior wisdom and knowledge you replaced them in their former stations and entered into distinct treaties with their Governments. Where there is prosperity and wisdom this is the mode of proceeding, and even when great enmity and war may have existed for a time a man of your sagacity will nevertheless do all that is right. My family are the friends of the Company from two generations and it is my wish that this friendship shall continue and increase henceforward.

What need have I to enter into particulars on this point? Let there be no delay in renewing a cordial friendship between the two States and by effecting that object you will greatly delight me and if you will come and meet me you will be more acquainted with the detail of the whole business.

I have written this to you in the full impression that you have superior wisdom and that you are sincerely and cordially my friend and this is the time when your friendly support and assistance can be evinced.

Anund Row Jeswunt will give you all the particulars, what more can I say.

No. 128—Malcolm reports to the Governor General how he surrounded Baji Rao, to prevent his escape and ensure his submission.

From—JOHN MALCOLM, BRIGADIER GENERAL

To—THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,

Gogong (6 miles north of Bhukangam), 26 May 1818.

My Lord,

I had last the honour of addressing Your Lordship, under the date the 19th instant. On the 21st I marched to Jam, and next day to Mundlesir, from whence Major Smith had moved with

a small detachment two days before, under instructions to advance between thirty or forty miles in the direction of Asseergur. I at the same time directed the four flank companies of the Russell Brigade and three hundred Poona Auxiliary Horse to join Major Smith's detachment, meaning to form a small corps in the vicinity of Bajee Rao's position, that would be of sufficient strength to give him protection, if sincere, or to attack him if otherwise, and under every view of the case I could not but consider that our chief expectation of success rested upon his being so surrounded, that he could hardly escape, but as a fugitive with few adherents, and it was to be expected he would prefer the terms I proposed to offer him to such an alternative.

The day after my arrival at Mundhesur I learnt of Brigadier General Doveton's advance towards Burhanpur the neighbourhood of which city that officer wrote me he expected to reach on the 25th instant. This intelligence and the accounts I yesterday received of Bajee Rao's fears and indecision, from Lieutenant Low, who was in advance with Major Smith, made me determine to join the latter at Bakengang (Bhikangaum), after completing the arrangements for the defence of the ghauts and fords on the river, and leaving at Mhow Lieut. Col. Corzellis with a body of five hundred effective infantry, which I expected will be joined in a few days by the third regiment of Bengal Cavalry. I marched this morning twenty five miles with a Brigade of Horse Artillery, three hundred Native Infantry, and five hundred Irregular Horse. I shall continue my march at night, and be at Bekangong, which is sixteen miles from this (and where Major Smith is encamped) by daylight.

I have written to Bajee Rao informing him of my advance, referring it to solicitude for his welfare, and repeating what Lieutenant Low had before communicated, that unless he left his present position near Asseergur, and advanced towards me with intentions decidedly amicable, that he was on the brink of destruction.

From information I have this moment received, I am inclined to hope that Bajee Rao, though still surrounded by his worst counsellors, is fully alive to all the dangers of his situation. Brigadier-General Doveton's efficient force near Asseer forbids any hope of retreat to the southward or south-west. Lieutenant Colonel Russell's corps at Charwar and that which Brigadier General Watson has at my suggestion sent to Hussingabad, quite

shuts the valley of the Nerbudda. I am very confident in the arrangements made to prevent his entering Malwa at any point from Bhopal to Jaboah, and my corps, which will consist of a brigade and a half of Horse Artillery, one thousand Infantry, and eight hundred Irregular Horse, will be competent to check or pursue him in this quarter. The west, which leads to the wild and inhospitable hills of Northern Candeish, is the only point if he prefers flight to submission, in which he can find momentary safety, and there also detachments of our troops are moving in different directions. To proceed to Candeish would, in his present condition, be to adopt the life of a Bheel chief, for which no human being was ever worse calculated both from the frame of his body and mind, than Bajee Rao.

I am led to suppose, from the tenor of my latest information that though Bajee Rao clings to the vicinity of Asseer, from which and Burhanpore he has been recruited with supplies, he is not disposed to seek shelter in that fortress; nor do I think that the Killadar, though he has shewn him every attention and no doubt afforded him aid, would commit himself and his prince, by openly joining the enemy of the British Government.

No. 129—Malcolm reports to Government the position of affairs with regard to the submission of Baji Rao.

From—JOHN MALCOLM,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Camp at Bekangong, 27 May 1818.

Sir,

Having arrived at this ground at two o'clock A.M. before Lt. Low with Bajee Rao's Vakeel had marched, I had a full communication with the latter as well as with my aide-de-camp, Subadar Seyed Hussein. The purport of their communication was as before stated, but with this important addition, that Bajee Rao, though he had heard all I stated regarding his future prospects, remained still unshaken in his resolution to come to me, and to trust solely to me as his intercessor. The Subadar, who had frequent interviews with him, has received a very strong impression of the sincerity of his intentions. He is alarmed beyond measure at the advance of the different bodies of troops, particularly General Dovertton's force, which reached

Burhanpore on the 25th, and asked the Subadar twenty times, why I did not come or send Lieutenant Low to assure his mind. He was, he said, determined under all events to join me, who had been his friend for sixteen years, and he had now no other dependence upon earth. This last expression he repeated several times before the Vinchoorker, his Dewan, Balloba, the Purrundare Jagheerdar, the manager of the Gockla family, and Jeswunt Rao Lad, Killadar of Asseerghur, and they appeared all to assent to the propriety of the measure. Syed Hussein says, that of one description and another, he supposes that the Peishwah may have around him eight or ten thousand men. They have no baggage and very few tents. There appears, however, no want of money, and the horses are in good order, having been recruited by a halt of twenty days, and their supplies, which come from Asseer and Burhanpore were, he adds abundant.

Trimbuckjee was encamped separate, but at a short distance. He was never present at any interview: but on the Subadar's mentioning the expediency of seizing him, a Brahman minister replied, that Trimbuckjee had more the means of taking Bajee Rao, than the latter had of making him a captive.

Though Syed Hussein represents Jeswunt Rao Lad having received Bajee Rao with kindness, treated him with respect, and even having given him some aid of military means, he does not consider that chief as having openly joined his cause, or being disposed to encourage him to protract his resistance. The Subadar had been fired upon and nearly killed by a party of the Killadar's on his approach to camp. He rode up to them and said they might take his life; as a soldier, that was always in hazard; but he warned them of the fatal consequences of killing one who came for an amicable purpose. Jeswunt Rao Lad expressed regret at the occurrence and appeared desirous of conciliating Syed Hussein, and both the latter and Khealee Ram, a very observing native who accompanied him, seemed satisfied that the whole demenour of Jeswunt Rao Lad indicated the opposite of a desire to espouse, in any open or hostile manner, the cause of Bajee Rao, who at the same time he evidently thought he was bound to treat with that regard and hospitality, that in his mind was due to one whom he considered, however, fallen, as the head of the Mahratta empire. I have been more particular in stating these facts, as they are of consequence, inasmuch as we may draw the inference of this chief's conduct being influenced by the sentiments of his ruler, Dowlut Rao Scindia.

The Vakeels of Bajee Rao appeared in great alarm lest the vicinity of General Doveton should have let Bajee Rao to fly. I told them I had a letter of yesterday's date from the General, who in consequence of my letters did not mean to attack him till he knew the result of the negotiation; but on the occurrence of a move in any direction but towards me, I could not answer for the consequences as it would shew a want of confidence that could not be favourably interpreted. They said, if he had moved, it could be from nothing but alarm, and now I had advanced so near, all must go right.

Lieutenant Low will reach Bajee Rao tomorrow. I have insisted upon his advancing next day to a position that will allow of our meeting on the 30th or 31st at furthest, as it is quite impossible to admit of any further delay.

No. 130—Malcolm reports his negotiations with Baji Rao for his surrender.

From—JOHN MALCOLM, BRIGADIER GENERAL,

**To—THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,
GOVERNOR-GENERAL.**

*Camp Metowla, Twenty miles north of Asseerghur,
30 May 1818.*

My Lord, .

From my last, Your Lordship will have learnt of my intention to advance towards Bajee Rao. I joined Major Smith's detachment on the 27th instant at Bekangong from whence Lieutenant Low proceeded to the Peishwah's camp. I marched next day about ten miles, and yesterday took up this position, which is commanding, being clear of the close country, and within fifteen miles of the enemy, who are however enclosed in hills. I have directed Lieutenant Colonel Russell to move towards Borgham, and expect that officer will reach a position within ten miles of it the day after tomorrow. His vicinity to Asseerghur will prevent, I trust, any escape in a north-easterly direction.

The accounts of Lieutenant Low's arrival at the Peishwa's camp, with all that passed at the first interview, will be reported through the proper department. The result is not definitive; nor could it be expected to be so. Bajee Rao appears in excessive alarm. The proximity of the small body of troops under my personal command has been urged as a reason for his delaying

a meeting, which I however have insisted should take place at a very early period. This objection is more unreasonable, as I have offered to go unattended eight miles to meet him, on his advancing about a similar distance with some of the most respectable of his remaining adherents

Bajee Rao has from the moment he made the first overture, been naturally anxious to prevent the advance of our troops; but to have paid attention to such a desire would have been not only to sacrifice a real advantage in pursuit of a very doubtful one, but to have lessened the operation of the only motive from which we can expect success, in a negotiation which commences in requiring from a ruler the abdication of his throne. His distress may be very great; but the concession is one that can only be expected under a feeling of the most imminent alarm for his personal liberty or life. Having from the first taken this view of the case, I have never concealed the nature of the terms that would be exacted, nor given reason to think that our military operations would be relaxed for one moment till the object was accomplished, considering it better that Bajee Rao should escape (if resolved not to listen to such a proposition), than that the slightest suspicion should fall upon our good faith. Besides, I could not but be aware, that the publicity of our intention was the only antidote to that impression that the Paishwah would endeavour to spread, from his being admitted to treat at all, and which at this particular period might, if not counteracted, have had the effects injurious to our interests.

Your Lordship is fully informed of the position near Boorhanpore occupied by Brigadier General Doveton. From my communication of this date in the Political department, you will observe that an intended attack of Bajee Rao's camp was only stopped by that officer receiving a few hours before the troops were to march, a letter from Lieutenant Low, informing him of the negotiation. I can only add, that if it is broken off my chief hopes for the destruction of Bajee Rao will be grounded on the known activity and talent of the Brigadier General, and the character and composition of the fine force under his command.

It is with great satisfaction that I state, that my distance from the Nerbuddah has not diminished my confidence in the line of that river being defended by the efforts of the different chiefs upon its banks as well as the detachments stationed for that purpose. I have received the most satisfactory assurance from the former, some of whom have visited me since I crossed the river, to repeat their former promises of good conduct, and

small parties from the thakoors of Bakutgurh, Sylanee, and Barwa, are at this moment, with a Jemadar of the Poona Auxiliary Horse, in pursuit of Seetoo, the Pindarry Chief, who has within the last week returned to his old haunts with a few followers.

No. 131—The submission of the Chief of Vinchur to Malcolm is reported by him.

From—JOHN MALCOLM, BRIGADIER GENERAL,

To—JOHN ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Camp Metowla, 31 May 1818.

Sir,

Bekajee Nanah, a Vakeel from the Vinchoorker, has been with me for the last two hours; his object was to tender his submission to the British Government. His master had done his duty to the last, he said, to Bajee Rao, whose family that of the Vinchoorker had served with fidelity for five generations; and on this last occasion the present Jageerdar had made a sacrifice to his sense of duty, of his lands, forts, and property, and had, at this moment that Bajee Rao thought of terms for himself, no other prospect upon earth but the generosity of the British Government, all right to whose consideration he had given up, by not abandoning the Peishwah's cause within the period prescribed by the proclamation.

I told the Vakeel that the present was a moment when submission had little merit, but that it was such at which the Vinchoorker, who I understand had still two thousand horse, might institute claims upon the Company, by exerting his influence to promote the general peace of the country, by urging his master in language which was too strong to be mistaken to submit to a fate which he could not avert; to point out to him the necessity of seizing Trimbuckjee as the author of all his misfortunes; and to concert with the Purrunder chiefs and the adherents of Gokla, how best to effect that desirable object.

The Vakeel replied, that Balloba, who had so long managed the affairs of the Vinchoorkur, had no resolution to speak to the Peishwah in the manner I proposed, and that it was impossible the Jageedar, or any of the military chiefs, could address the

a meeting, which I however have insisted should take place at a very early period. This objection is more unreasonable, as I have offered to go unattended eight miles to meet him, on his advancing about a similar distance with some of the most respectable of his remaining adherents.

Bajee Rao has from the moment he made the first overture, been naturally anxious to prevent the advance of our troops; but to have paid attention to such a desire would have been not only to sacrifice a real advantage in pursuit of a very doubtful one, but to have lessened the operation of the only motive from which we can expect success, in a negotiation which commences in requiring from a ruler the abdication of his throne. His distress may be very great; but the concession is one that can only be expected under a feeling of the most imminent alarm for his personal liberty or life. Having from the first taken this view of the case, I have never concealed the nature of the terms that would be exacted, nor given reason to think that our military operations would be relaxed for one moment *till the object was accomplished, considering it better that Bajee Rao should escape (if resolved not to listen to such a proposition), than that the slightest suspicion should fall upon our good faith.* Besides, I could not but be aware, that the publicity of our intention was the only antidote to that impression that the Pajshwah would endeavour to spread, from his being admitted to treat at all, and which at this particular period might, if not counteracted, have had the effects injurious to our interests.

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small parties from the thakoors of Bakutgurh, Sylanee, and Barwa, are at this moment, with a Jemmadar of the Poona Auxiliary Horse, in pursuit of Seetoo, the Pindarry Chief, who has within the last week returned to his old haunts with a few followers.

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To—JOHN ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

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I told the Vakeel that the present was a moment when submission had little merit, but that it was such at which the Vinchoorker, who I understand had still two thousand horse, might institute claims upon the Company, by exerting his influence to promote the general peace of the country, by urging his master in language which was too strong to be mistaken to submit to a fate which he could not avert; to point out to him the necessity of seizing Trimbuckjee as the author of all his misfortunes; and to concert with the Purrunder chiefs and the adherents of Gokla, how best to effect that desirable object.

The Vakeel replied, that Balloba, who had so long managed the affairs of the Vinchoorkur, had no resolution to speak to the Peishwah in the manner I proposed, and that it was impossible the Jageedar, or any of the military chiefs, could address the

Keree, where I found him surrounded by about two thousand horse, seven or eight hundred infantry, and two guns, which had been brought down the Keree pass to guard against attack, though he knew I was eight miles from my camp, and had only three hundred men with me as an escort.

At our public meeting, Bajee Rao said little beyond a few complimentary enquiries after my health. He was low and dejected. After the ceremonies of the visit were over, I asked him if he wished to speak privately. He said he did; and we went to a small tent pitched for the purpose. I was alone; Bajee Rao was accompanied by Annund Rao Jeswunt, and Appajee, the other Vakeel who had been employed on the negotiation.

To detail all that passed at this conference, would be only to repeat the complaints and arguments which this Prince has before urged, and which have been so often answered and refuted. I shall, therefore, limit myself to what has more immediate reference to his actual situation. This he described as deplorable. He had been involved, he said, in a war he never intended, treated as an enemy by the state which had supported his family for two generations, and was at this moment in a condition that demanded commiseration. In such an hour, he said, as this, followers fled, adherents shrunk from their allegiance, and even the ties of relationship and blood were forgotten. A real friend was the only stay such a person could have on earth. Such, he believed, he had in me, and he had therefore sought this meeting, with an anxiety proportioned to the importance it had in his mind and he entreated, with tears in his eyes I would contemplate the situation to which he was reduced with feelings suited to the occasion, and afford him every relief that I had the power to administer.

I replied to this address, by telling Bajee Rao I was prepared to do the duty of a real friend; but that forbade me to soothe his feelings or flatter his hopes. This was a crisis in his life, when he must shew to what degree he possessed the courage and virtues of a man. It was of no use, I said, to think upon the past; suffice it to say, that the British Government had passed a final judgment, that he should be deprived of sovereign power and not allowed to reside on any terms in the Deccan. The first of those acts had been extorted by that policy which every great State must pursue. Personal feelings must be set at nought, when in opposition to those just but

rigorous rules which are essential for the general safety. His conduct has been thought of a nature to require this severity, not merely as a punishment of him, but as an example to others; and measures had been adopted which rendered the sentence irrevocable, as far as the British Government was able to carry it into execution. With respect to his remaining on any terms, in the country, where he had once enjoyed power, that was impossible; and he himself ought to deprecate an arrangement which whatever might be his own conduct, must, from the intrigues and wickedness of others who would use his name, involve him in constant troubles and danger. All that I had now stated, I had, I said, before mentioned to his Vakeels who were present (they made a gesture of assent). There were periods, I added when great sacrifices were required. That the tribe to which Bajee Rao belonged were celebrated for their elevated courage on such occasions. Bramin women burnt upon the pile in regard for their husbands and family: men threw themselves from precipices to propitiate the Deity or to avert misfortunes. He was called upon, I said, for no such effort; the sacrifice demanded of him was, in fact, the resignation of a power that he did not possess, and could never hope to regain, and the quitting of a country which had been the scene of his misfortunes. This was all that he abandoned; and the reward of his cheerful acquiescence in a proceeding that he could not avoid, was liberal comfort to himself and family, a promise of provision for some of the most respectable of those adherents that had been involved in his ruin. He had, I added (and no doubt he would deem the obligation sacred), an opportunity of promoting the prosperity of religious establishments more immediately connected with his family, and which the English Government could not, except from satisfaction with his conduct, be expected to regard with particular consideration. Bajee Rao, while he could not but admit the necessity of conforming to my advice, made every effort to obtain some change in what he termed the hard condition of resigning even the name of power, and being banished for ever from the home of his fathers. I told him the principal reason that had made me rejoice at the prospect of a meeting was, that I might have an opportunity of personally telling him that no change could be made on those points; for that I was assured every moment of delay was one of danger and that the sooner his mind was made up the better, to the course he was to pursue. He should either, I added, throw himself at once on the mercy of the British Government, or

determine upon further resistance. "How can I resist now?" he exclaimed: "I am surrounded. General Doveton is at Burhanpore ; you are at Metowla ; Colonel Russell at Burgham ; I am enclosed." I remarked that he was so ; but that he could not complain, as his overture to treat had been answered with a frank declaration of the only terms that would be given, and that he could never have expected to be allowed to refresh and recruit his army during a period that we were in action. Besides I asked him where he could have gone, or where remained, without encountering our armies. He had as much, I said, the power of escape as ever, if he preferred becoming a wanderer and a freebooter to the liberal provision that was designed for him. Bajee Rao replied with that flattery of which he is a master, "I have found you, who are my only friend, and will never leave you. I had once three friends—Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington), Close, and Malcolm. The first is in Europe, a great man ; the second is dead ; you alone remain. Would a shipwrecked mariner," he added. "after having reached the port he desired, form a wish to leave it?" I said I was glad he took so correct a view of his condition ; that I should send him that night the proposition to which he must consent within a very short period, as no procrastination could be admitted. I now discovered that his mind was far from being decided. He made use of every exertion to obtain even a few hours delay, and entreated me, by our former friendship, to give him one more meeting next day. This, however, I resisted, observing that if it appeared that the smallest benefit could result from the discussion of any one point, I would comply with his urgent desire for another conference. Before I took my leave, I spoke to him in the strongest terms about the murder of Captain Vaughan and his brother, and of his still retaining Trimbuckjee, and called upon him, as a proof of the sincerity of his present professions, to seize the latter and deliver him over to me. He declared his innocence of the murder of the officers to whom I alluded and added, that he had from the first regarded that atrocious act with horror. With respect to Trimbuckjee, he had long considered him as the person who produced his ruin ; but supported by Appa Dessaye, he had, he said, joined his army, where he had been, and was at this moment, at the head of a body of troops that put it quite out of his power to seize him ; but he regarded him as an enemy. I asked him if he was not encamped with him. He said he was not ; that he was eight miles distant, at Dholkote. "You can", I replied, "after what you have

stated, have no objection to his being attacked." "May you succeed" (Mubarick), was Bajee Rao's reply. He however added, that he had some people still at Dhalkote, whom he would recall. I requested he would lose no time in doing so.

After taking my leave and returning to my tents, I transmitted to Bajee Rao, a paper of propositions for his assent, of which I have the honour to forward a translation. I also addressed a letter to him, of which a copy is enclosed, pointing out the impossibility of any delay; the whole of my observation of this conference with Bajee Rao, as well as the communication I had with some of his chiefs, having satisfied me there never was a moment more favourable to press this wavering prince to a decision.

No. 132A.

EXTRACT of a letter from Lieutenant Low to Sir John Malcolm dated the 30th May Midnight.

Anund Rao Jeswunt*, Kyaleram (Khyali Ram), and Sham Rao, are only now returned from Bajee Rao's camp where they have been since eleven o' clock this forenoon.

They represent the Peishwah to have been greatly alarmed at my message, that he could not be allowed any law (? delay), and that some of his people advised him at once to fly, until they recollected another part of my message, viz., that any movement of his troops would be considered as evincing hostilities, and that our forces were prepared in that event, to pounce upon him without further reference to any one.

At last it was settled, that Bajee Rao, if I would excuse him tomorrow (which he has discovered to be very unlucky) will positively march next morning to Kohora. I have replied, that although contrary to orders, yet trusting to your kind indulgence to him, I will consent to the proposed delay. I have added, however, that nothing can induce me to remain here longer than tomorrow; that I will positively leave this the following morning; and that if he does not arrive at Kohora that day, I will consider it as a declaration of war and our forces will act accordingly.

*Surnamed Chandavarkar,

No. 132B.

Translation of a letter from Brigadier General, Sir John Malcolm to Bajee Rao, Dated 1st June 1818.

(After compliments).

I said, at the meeting I have just had with you, everything that was possible to reconcile your mind to your situation, and to the necessity of meeting it firmly. I enclose copy of the only terms which I have it in my power to offer to your acceptance; and, in my opinion, it is for your own interest, for that of your family and your friends, that you should accept them. You wish me to visit you tomorrow, to talk over the different articles of this paper; but my complying with this wish would only lead to delays, and expectations of alterations which cannot be admitted, and which therefore, in the situation in which you are placed, it is not for your good should be indulged. It is right you should know what is the utmost that can be done, and take your line decidedly. I pray it may be that of safety for yourself, and for those who look to you for future support.

No. 132C—Propositions to Bajee Rao.

1. That he shall resign for himself and successors, all right, title and claim over the Government of Poonah, or to any sovereign power whatever.

2. That Bajee Rao shall immediately come with his family and a small number of his adherents and attendants, to the camp of Brigadier General Malcolm, where he shall be received with honour and respect, and escorted safe to the city of Benares, or any other sacred place in Hindoostan that the Governor General may, at his request, fix for his residence.

3. On account of the peace of the Deccan and the advanced state of the season, Bajee Rao must proceed to Hindoostan without one day's delay; but General Malcolm engages, that any part of his family that may be left behind, shall be sent to him as early as possible, and every facility given to render their joining speedy and convenient.

4. That Bajee Rao shall, on his voluntary agreeing to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's Government, for the support of himself and family. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the Governor General; but Brigadier General Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that, it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum.

5. If Bajee Rao, by a complete and ready fulfilment of this agreement, shews that he reposes entire confidence in the British Government, his requests in favour of principal Jageerdars and old adherents who have been deceived by their attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention. His representations, also in favour of Brahmans of venerable character, and of religious establishments founded and supported by his family, will be treated with regard.

6. The above propositions must not only be accepted by Bajee Rao; but he must personally come into Brigadier General Malcolm's camp within twenty-four hours after this period, or else hostilities will be recommenced, and no further negotiations will be entered into with him.

No. 133—Baji Rao's acceptance of the terms offered by Malcolm.

From—JOHN MALCOLM, BRIGADIER GENERAL,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp Kheree, 3 June 1818.

My Lord,

I have the greatest satisfaction in informing Your Lordship, that Bajee Rao has accepted the propositions stated in my letter of yesterday's date to Mr. Adam. He this morning, at my desire, left the hills, amid which he was encamped, and is now pitched, with the few respectable adherents that remain with him, within half a mile of my camp.

I shall hereafter forward to Your Lordship the detail of those proceedings that have accelerated an event, upon which I shall at present only offer my congratulations.

No. 134—The complete submission of Baji Rao and his conversations on that topic are reported by Malcolm.

From—JOHN MALCOLM,

To—JOHN ADAM, SECRETARY.

Kheree, 4 June 1818.

Sir,

In my last I informed you of my interview with Bajee Rao. I alluded to the excessive alarm of that prince. It is a remarkable fact, which I omitted to mention, that before I took my

leave, he whispered to me as a secret, "I must discover to no one, that he could no longer exercise authority over his troops. I fear every moment", he added, "open disobedience from my oldest adherents, and my great reluctance to let you depart (he had three times after I rose made me sit down again) is, that it is only when you are present that I feel secure of my liberty and life."

The conjectures of Bajee Rao regarding his adherents were nearly correct. I have before stated the communications I had with the Vakeel of the Vinchoorker and the agent of Trimbuckjee. Throughout the whole night of the first, and all the day and night of the second, I had continued messages from different quarters.

My object was to make the various feelings of fear and hope, that were so generally and strongly excited tend to one object, the cheerful submission of Bajee Rao. I took care to separate the few respectable persons that remained with Bajee Rao from the more disrespectable. Trimbuckjee, who again sent, was told he could only be received on the terms before offered. Ram Deen, who came to me, was also informed he could never be recognized as an adherent of the Peishwah, or readmitted into the service or country of Holkar; but that if he dismissed his followers, and went to his native country of Hindoostan, he should not be refused protection; and that if opportunity offered of his rendering service, by seizing Trimbuckjee or Setoo Pindarry, he might be rewarded. The latter, who is still here (it was only a party of his that went to the Nerbuddah), also sent to offer to come in on promise of provision. He was advised to throw himself unconditionally upon the generosity of the British Government.

It would fill a volume to detail the particulars of all the intrigues which occurred. I have never, in the course of my experience, witnessed a scene in which every shade of the Indian character was more strongly displayed.

It is honourable to the Vinchoorker Jageerdar, and to the Purrunder chief and the manager of the interests of the Gokla family, who committed their cause to him, that though they professed themselves to be hopeless of every success and convinced by my arguments that Bajee Rao had no choice but submission, they took care to make me distinctly understand (when I informed them that their only claim rested on the success of their influence in promoting the measure), that though they,

would use every means of persuasion and remonstrance to effect this end, harshness or coercion they would never resort to. I told them such conduct was not required of them. I respected, I added, their spirit of allegiance; but the moment was come when their interests and those of their Prince alike required that an end should be put to a ruinous and ineffectual struggle, and that if their passiveness allowed the counsels of those worthless and wicked men who had brought Bajee Rao to his present state to complete his destruction, their delicacy would be termed imbecility, and that they could henceforward neither expect gratitude from their Prince nor consideration from us; and to conclude, I told them plainly that unless he came to my camp next day, I desired never to hear more of them or their claims. *As individuals, they were nothing; as attached adherents of a fallen Prince, who might by their firmness save him and themselves from total ruin, they had importance for a moment, but that if lost would never return.* As the Vakeels of Vinchoorkei and Appa Purrunder were leaving me, at eleven o'clock on the night of the 2nd, I told them I knew Bajee Rao had sent some of his most valuable property into Asseerghur, the day after I arrived at Metoula. It was no proof of confidence. Reports are, he meant to take refuge there. If he did, it was his last stake; and if they permitted him to adopt such a course, they and their families would merit all the ruin that would fall upon their heads.

When these Vakeels left camp, I permitted one of my writers to give them secretly, and as from himself, a copy of my letters of the day before to Bajee Rao and of the propositions I offered for his acceptance. They perused them, he told me, with eagerness and the knowledge of the consideration meant to be given to them, in the event of a settlement, appeared to quicken their zeal in no slight degree. When I dismissed those Vakeels, I sent for an agent of Bajee Rao, whom, I had on my arrival at Meetaul invited to my camp, and permitted to lay Dawks and send Hircarrahs in every direction, in order to allay the fears and suspicion of Bajee Rao with regard to intended movements and attacks, as there was no ground on which I had from the first more fear of failure than his excessive timidity. I now told this man that he must return to his master; he could no longer remain in my camp; but that he might write or say, that I did not mean to move till six o'clock next morning.

I should then march to near Kehree, and Bajee Rao, if he intended to accept the terms, must leave the hills and encamp near my camp by twelve o'clock. I at the same time told him

to inform Bajee Rao, that Colonel Russell had moved to Borgham, to attack any of Trimbuckjee's followers in that quarter; and that Brigadier General Doveton, whom I had informed of Bajee Rao's wish for that freebooter being destroyed, would no doubt march against him tomorrow. I had just heard from my Assistant, Lieutenant Low, whom I had, to facilitate communication, kept a few miles in advance, that the messengers he had sent with the letter and propositions had returned; they represented Bajee Rao as full of professions but in a very vacillating state of mind, and anxious beyond all description for another day's delay, as the 3rd of June was, he said, an unlucky day, and he had religious ceremonies to perform of the utmost indispensable nature before he came to my camp.

I affected to be very indignant at his conduct. I desired Lieutenant Low to send away and turn back any person desiring to communicate with him from Bajee Rao's camp.

I at the same time ordered parties of horse to occupy the roads to my camp, to prevent the approach of any messenger whatever. Having adopted these steps, about two o'clock of the morning of the 3rd, in a manner so public that I knew they would reach Bajee Rao through many channels, I marched at six o'clock, and reached this ground about nine o'clock.

Soon after Anund Rao Jeswunt came near me, in a state of much trepidation. I asked him where were his promises of sincerity, and bade him return. He said, "This is an unlucky day." I replied, "It would prove a most unlucky day for his master if he did not come in. I mean every thing kind," I added, "to Bajee Rao, but he forces me to these extremities, and from his character, nothing short of these will bring him to a resolution that is so obviously for the interest of him and all that are personally dependent upon him." He begged me to send some person to assure his mind, "for he is at this moment," he added, "in the greatest alarm." "At what is he alarmed?" I asked, "At the proposition". He replied, "He would consent to them." "Does he suspect me of breaking?" I demanded with some degree of anger. "No" he said, "But the orders of the Governor General might compel you to put guards and sentries over him, and then he would be disgraced for ever." "You may return," I replied, "to Bajee Rao and tell him from me, that I have no such orders; that the settlement, I had ventured to make, in anticipation of the Governor General's approbation, is too liberal to make me think it possible any human being in Bajee Rao's

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To—THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

Goruckpore 19, May 1818.

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situation would ever attempt to escape it, and if he did, he would forfeit all future claims whatever, and the English Government would be freed from a large disbursement, which it had incurred, more from a feeling of what was due to its own dignity, than to any claims which he had to its consideration." Anund Rao seemed pleased with this answer and galloped off. I sent a respectable Brahmin to hasten Bajee Rao, and at the same time to desire that Mahratta Sirdars alone should accompany him to the ground near my camp. This was complied with, and Ram Deen and a body of infantry were directed to encamp in the rear. The firing of some guns in the quarter of Asseer (probably from Brigadier General Doveton's attack of Trim-buckjee) seemed not a little to quicken the march, and at eleven o'clock Bajee Rao came near my camp. Lieutenant Low went to meet him and reported him in better spirits than he had yet seen him. I meant to pay my respect in the evening, but was prevented by a very violent storm. The accounts I received in the evening satisfied me that Bajee Rao's mind was more composed since he had taken his line. The gratification which all those who are around him feel at the prospect of some future provision, must tend greatly to tranquillize his mind; and to increase this effect, I have publicly assured those of his adherents who came to express their gratitude to me and their future hopes, that their thanks were alone due to Bajee Rao, who by his present and future conduct, I said, was determined to sacrifice any personal consideration to the hope of promoting the future welfare of those who had been the victims of their attachment to him and his family. This communication has, I am told, pleased him much. It gives him consequence with his own mind and with those around him, in the only mode that it is now legitimate for him to have it. I deemed it of importance on many grounds, to move today one march in the direction of the Nerbuddah, and Bajee Rao readily assented to it. I am engaged in dismissing his followers, and trust I shall be able, in the course of tomorrow, to send away all his military adherents to their homes in the Deccan. I have just made out passports and sent guards to convey the property which Bajee Rao sent three days ago into Asseergurh to my camp.

This voluntary act is a most satisfactory proof of his confidence, and of his determination to fulfil his engagement in a cheerful and willing manner, a point to which (as connected with the impression throughout India) I attach much importance.

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to the impending diminution of his strength, through the efficacy of the measures meditated against what was a real, though unavowed portion of his army. Our just title to subject Scindia to this extremity will not be questioned, when it is recollected that we were minutely acquainted with his secret promises to the Pindaries of support against us, and that we had acquired proofs of the hostile machinations which, at that very moment, he was exerting in other quarters against your Government. Ameer Khan was in connection, in habit, and in principle, essentially a Pindarry, equally interested with Scindia in the preservation of that predatory body, on account of the occasional assistance which he received from it. In truth, the hand of Ameer Khan was professedly against every one who had possessions; therefore every regular Government had legitimate motive and right to suppress his force.

The overt interposition of those two chiefs, or their subsequent insidious management for the revival of the Pindarry association, was of course to be provided against; and the precaution, to be effectual, was to be so fashioned, as that it should render their co-operation impracticable, while the force applicable against each should by its magnitude and the suddenness of its advance, overawe any disposition to separate efforts. The measures adopted had the good fortune to prove as decisive as I had hoped. In three months from the opening of the campaign, the Pindarries were utterly extinguished; the Rajpoot States were confederated with us, through Scindia having subscribed to a treaty which abrogated the former preclusion; and Ameer Khan had submitted to surrender his artillery, which was numerous and good, as well as to dissolve his army, consisting of fifty-two battalions with a large body of cavalry.

The early and complete fulfilment of so considerable an object, is the justification which I respectfully offer to your Honourable Court, for the scale of means employed; yet that justification is secondary to another view pursued in the statement. By thus laying the case before you, in a manner more distinct than has been done by me in any former communication, I venture to rely on my making it clear to your Honourable Court, that the many new arrangements established were not matters of speculative choice, but were inseparably involved in that imperious call of policy, which made it necessary to undertake the destruction of the Pindarries,

the actual position of your affairs here was the best that could be sought or attained under the circumstance which opened upon us in the campaign.

Looking either to the obligation of protecting your subjects, or to the security of your pecuniary interests, there could not be a dissentient opinion as to the indispensable necessity of undertaking the extirpation of the Pindarries. The effort would have been idle, had it extended to no object beyond the dislodging those ferocious plunderers from their actual haunts. It was obviously incumbent on us to provide against their assembling anew in some other situation, whence their invasions of your territories would have been carried on with all the keenness of revenge, superadded to their former cupidity. Their reunion could be barred only by our combining with, in the task of preventing it, those Rajpoot States who had a common interest with us in the object; at the same time that we required pledges from Scindia and Holkar, not to permit the renewal of the association in their dominions.

Towards obtaining the assistance of the Rajpoot States, we had to remove the obstacle of a treaty, by which we were bound to Scindia not to have any negotiation with those powers. It was certain our emancipation from that engagement would be the point, of all others, the most repugnant to the inclination of Scindia. His objection to the relaxation would not be merely, because its visible consequence was to put an end to his hitherto unremitting depredations in those states, but because he would anticipate in it the effectuation of our purpose against the Pindarries. When, early in last year, he entered into a private agreement with us to concur in the expulsion of the Pindarries from the districts which they then held, he internally flattered himself that he had evaded awkward discussions by an acquiescence wholly immaterial. Not suspecting the extent of the plan on which we meant to proceed, as he saw no sign of preparation in these provinces, he was satisfied we should fail in our endeavour; for he calculated that, although the Pindarries might be forced to recede before the troops from the Deccan, the free-booters would remain unbroken, and on the return of Sir Thomas Hislop's army to its Presidency would reoccupy stations on the Nerbudda. This resistance was, therefore, to be expected notwithstanding his late assurances, as soon as he should discover the project of our uniting the Rajpoot states with us in the operation, since his eyes would at once be opened

to the impending diminution of his strength, through the efficacy of the measures meditated against what was a real, though unavowed portion of his army. Our just title to subject Scindia to this extremity will not be questioned, when it is recollected that we were minutely acquainted with his secret promises to the Pindaries of support against us, and that we had acquired proofs of the hostile machinations which, at that very moment, he was exerting in other quarters against your Government. Ameer Khan was in connection, in habit, and in principle, essentially a Pindarry, equally interested with Scindia in the preservation of that predatory body, on account of the occasional assistance which he received from it. In truth, the hand of Ameer Khan was professedly against every one who had possessions; therefore every regular Government had legitimate motive and right to suppress his force.

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In this extensive plan, the addition of a rood to your territory had not been contemplated. Our projects were urged and guided strictly by considerations of self-defence. There was, indeed, a collateral encouragement, the influence of which might be honestly owned, that our success would free millions from the systematic rapine under which they had been for many years groaning. So widely beneficial a consequence, and the disinterestedness of the operation, would have made the achievement of it, without the shedding of other blood than of the banditti, a proud event for the Honourable Company and for those who wrought at it under their auspices. The hope of such a termination which had been indulged at the outset, was in fact substantiated; when passions not instigated by anything in the plan, intervened to give a different colour to the close of the campaign.

The Peishwah, sore from having been foiled in former base conspiracies, thought the opportunity favourable, from an expectation that we should find serious employment with Scindia and Ameer Khan; and with a profligate breach of the law of nations, he suddenly attempted to over-power and massacre our Resident at his Court. Looking to the impossibility *of reconciliation with us after so atrocious an act*, he had underhand previously summoned the other Mahratta States to take the field against the British Government. The Guickwar remained too much incensed against the Court of Poona, for the murder of his minister, to listen to the call. Scindia was incapable of moving without incurring certain and immediate destruction. The Regent Bai of Holkar's state (Tulsibai) proclaimed the obligation of obeying the orders of her master, as she termed the Peishwah, though she had acceded to the expulsion of the Pindharies, and had been engaged in spontaneous negotiation for Holkar's being taken under the protection of your Government. The Nagpore Rajah pleaded a similar excuse of duty for a perfidious assault on the Resident. Since it is found that ties so strong were acknowledged to the Peishwah, notwithstanding the extinction of that sort of connection stipulated at the Treaty of Bassein, it is fortunate that this convulsion occurred at a time when we had troops in the field prepared against all contingencies. It is further lucky, that the crisis was prematurely urged, as every indication or rather every proof assures us that a more extensive conspiracy was fashioning against the British power, than had ever been devised at any antecedent period.

The efforts of the Mahrattas have been crushed; but the necessity has, at the same time, been exhibited, for our rendering that faithless race unable to practise a similar treachery hereafter. This security can only be attained, by reducing to small compass the territories of those, whose perfidy and wanton outrage against us justify their being so punished. Such of those districts as you cannot make over to a safe ally, must unavoidably, on defensive principles, be retained for the Honourable Company. Advantage may, of course, be supposed from the retention of them beyond the mere point of precaution. Whether it does exist or not, depends on certain questions relating to those new possessions; namely, facility of protection, absence of liability to entail differences with other powers, and competency of their revenues to meet all charges of occupation. To discuss those points in detail at present would be an unnecessary trespass on the Honourable Court. I may presume to submit my opinion unequivocally, that the result of examination under each head is distinctly favourable in a high degree; while policy does not allow a hesitation about your continuing to hold those districts on military considerations.

With regard to the Rajpoot States, I respectfully solicit your Honourable Court to advert to the tone and tenor which are uniform in our several treaties with them. You will not see anything of domineering pretension which can make the engagement irksome to the weaker contracting party. We disclaim all privilege of interfering with the administration of their respective Governments, so as to leave no source of jealousy or estrangement. Their bond not to undertake military enterprises against any neighbouring power, but to submit all differences to our arbitration, is a restraint of which they understood the value, without feeling their pride affected, since the obligation is general. The condition that they shall prevent associations of plunderers corresponds with their own dispositions; and unity of interest with us is so advantageous for them, while no prejudice is wounded by the terms of the league, that we may rest confidently on the permanence of the arrangement. The tranquillity likely to be hence secured will be a blessing to a vast tract of country, and will, I trust, prove importantly beneficial to the concerns of the Honourable Company.

On hearing of his arrival I immediately sent orders to make over the Paishwa's Palace at Phoolshehr for his accommodation, and finding he was destitute of almost every convenience, I purchased tents and other articles for him and sent out Ramjee Oak a respectable Brahmin to attend him and provide for his wants. Next day I deputed Captain Tovey my acting Secretary and Deputy Adjutant General to the Poona Force to wait on him, and that gentleman having found his health much deranged, I applied to Mr. Coates the Superintending Surgeon of the Auxiliary Force to visit him. So much had Appa Saheb been harassed by his fatigues and alarms, that it appeared to those gentlemen as well as to the Natives who accompanied him from Ahmednuggur that his misfortunes had disordered his understanding. This impression however wore off and the rest he has since enjoyed has nearly restored his health, both bodily and mental.

Captain Tovey had been instructed to prevail on Appa Saheb to repair as soon as possible to Benares and was authorized to assure him that his situation would be better in a pecuniary point of view than under his brother and that if he had any particular dislike to Benares, after this country should be completely settled, Your Lordship would not be disposed to impose any unnecessary restraint in his choice of residence. I held nearly the same language in a letter I wrote to him on his arrival at Captain Tovey's first visit. Appa Saheb spoke of his brother and himself as still connected and expressed his wish that they should both be permitted to live on the banks of the Godavery or the Kishna, and to lead a life of devotion under our protection. It seemed, however, that he only used this language to avoid the appearance of deserting his brother, for on Captain Tovey's saying that he could not treat with Bajee Row, Appa Sahib confined his discourse to his own wishes. He at first showed a reluctance to proceed to Benares, and the persons about him endeavoured to establish a claim from his having voluntarily thrown himself on our protection to exemption from all suspicion and from all control in his choice of an abode. But Captain Tovey judiciously combated this pretension by representing the lateness of Appa Saheb's determination in our favour, when he would no longer remain where he was, and when his coming over did not benefit our cause. He however said that there was every disposition on Your Excellency's part to treat him in the most friendly manner and that his suggestion regarding his residence was in reality as beneficial to him as to the British Government, since it removed him from a scene

No. 136—Elphinstone communicates details of the Peshwa's flight towards the north, the submission of his brother Appa Sahib and the dispersal of most of the chiefs that had supported Baji Rao.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp Shirwal, 24 May 1818.

My Lord,

Since I had the honour to address Your Excellency fuller accounts have been received of the fate of the Paishwa's army after their defeat at Shewny. They suffered the extremities of hunger and fatigue for 6 days till they reached Omerkair and joined their baggage, which had escaped by another route. They halted there one day, and immediately after appear to have broken up almost with one consent and to have returned towards their own country, dispersing as they passed the frontier. Nothing can exceed their fatigues and their sufferings. The horses are so worn out that they can scarcely move, and the men are in rags and bear evident marks of famine on their countenances. So totally dispirited are they, that there is no account of their attempting to plunder even for subsistence, but many of them are being dismounted and disarmed by the common villagers.

Chimnaje Appa Saheb, and Appa Dessye after applying to the officer at Jaulnah as before reported, crossed the Godavery with about 2,500 horse on their way to the Kisna. Soon after they got into the neighbourhood of Captain Davies who was detached from Daroor as I before reported with 1,000 reformed horse. They acquainted that officer with their friendly intentions, but he very properly distrusted their professions and proceeded by a forced march to overtake them. On his coming up, both parties approached each other in order of battle, but Narroo Punt Apty, having advanced with a flag of truce, Captain Davies restrained his men, and by his temper and moderation soon brought an adjustment. The whole then proceeded towards Ahmednuggur. I had already selected this place for Chimnaje Appa's residence, until some final arrangement could be made, but he left it before my letter reached him, and in spite of the persuasions of Appa Dessye who did all he could to induce him to comply with my wish, he persevered in proceeding to Phoolshehr within 10 miles of Poona.

On hearing of his arrival I immediately sent orders to make over the Paishwa's Palace at Phoolshehr for his accommodation, and finding he was destitute of almost every convenience, I purchased tents and other articles for him and sent out Ramjee Oak a respectable Brahmin to attend him and provide for his wants. Next day I deputed Captain Tovey my acting Secretary and Deputy Adjutant General to the Poona Force to wait on him, and that gentleman having found his health much deranged, I applied to Mr. Coates the Superintending Surgeon of the Auxiliary Force to visit him. So much had Appa Saheb been harassed by his fatigues and alarms, that it appeared to those gentlemen as well as to the Natives who accompanied him from Ahmednuggur that his misfortunes had disordered his understanding. This impression however wore off and the rest he has since enjoyed has nearly restored his health, both bodily and mental.

Captain Tovey had been instructed to prevail on Appa Saheb to repair as soon as possible to Benares and was authorized to assure him that his situation would be better in a pecuniary point of view than under his brother and that if he had any particular dislike to Benares, after this country should be completely settled, Your Lordship would not be disposed to impose any unnecessary restraint in his choice of residence. I held nearly the same language in a letter I wrote to him on his arrival at Captain Tovey's first visit. Appa Saheb spoke of his brother and himself as still connected and expressed his wish that they should both be permitted to live on the banks of the Godavery or the Kishna, and to lead a life of devotion under our protection. It seemed, however, that he only used this language to avoid the appearance of deserting his brother, for on Captain Tovey's saying that he could not treat with Bajee Row, Appa Sahib confined his discourse to his own wishes. He at first showed a reluctance to proceed to Benares, and the persons about him endeavoured to establish a claim from his having voluntarily thrown himself on our protection to exemption from all suspicion and from all control in his choice of an abode. But Captain Tovey judiciously combated this pretension by representing the lateness of Appa Saheb's determination in our favour, when he would no longer remain where he was, and when his coming over did not benefit our cause. He however said that there was every disposition on Your Excellency's part to treat him in the most friendly manner and that his suggestion regarding his residence was in reality as beneficial to him as to the British Government, since it removed him from a scene

where he would be liable to suspicion, and where his name would no doubt be made use of in a manner quite contrary to his wishes. It likewise gave him an opportunity of establishing a well founded claim on the British Government by a ready compliance with Your Excellency's desire. These arguments at length had their effect upon Appa Saheb, and Captain Tovey returned with his full consent to go to Benares. He, however, desired to see Byajee Naik, who was formerly employed between the Paishwa and the late Sir B Close and through whom Appa Saheb's allowances were first obtained. On this person's visiting him he sent a message saying what he had frequently done in the interval that he wished to remain here during the rains to see his friends, to perform a vow of a pilgrimage to a place on the Kishna south of Meritch, and above all to avoid the inclemency of the season. If this were agreed to, he said he would be ready to go to Benares in November. This being a good deal insisted on, I said that it would be Your Excellency's wish that he should remain where he chose both during and after the rainy season, but that political motives rendered a temporary absence necessary. These motives were most forcible at the present moment and might have no weight at the period he alluded to, that I had no orders to force him to go to Benares against his inclination, but that if it was his wish to show a disposition to oblige Your Excellency, he would go now, and this I said, would doubtless lead to similar spirit of accommodation on the part of Your Excellency. In this I alluded to the payment of his debts and augmentation of his allowance to which his agents and Byajee Naik had very distinctly alluded. They then said that they were certain Appa Saheb would be disposed to adopt the line of conduct I had suggested. I avoided waiting on Appa Saheb at first, as I knew that my doing so would retard the desired adjustment, and on my expressing a wish to visit him subsequent to Captain Tovey's return, his own Dewan recommended that it should be deferred till everything was settled; but as I was now apprehensive that the ceremony might occasion delay in Appa Saheb's departure, I offered at the conversation just reported (which took place yesterday) to proceed immediately to Pholshehr and wait on Appa Sahib. The day however was unlucky and I then offered, if Appa Saheb could see me today, to attend him. The Dewan promised to let me know in the night if he wished it, and as I received no message, I came to this place in the morning. I had however impressed on the agents the uneasiness it would give me, if the execution of Your Lordship's wishes were delayed, and Appa Saheb's

journey deferred until the rains became heavy, for the mere purpose of a meeting with me, and as Captain Tovey has remained at Poona to expedite Appa Saheb's departure I hope no delay will now take place in it.

Appa Saheb was accompanied to Phool Shehr by Appa Dessye and Narroo Punt Apty, with their troops which were reduced to a small number before their arrival. Immediately afterwards Appa Dessye set off for Nepauny and Narroo Punt having paid off all his troops, Appa Sahib remains with scarcely any attendants and no guard except two Companies of sepoy and 100 Horse that accompanied Captain Tovey and are encamped in his neighbourhood. He has applied for no protection, and I do not wish to press it on him for fear of disgusting him by a supposed wish to have a control over his person.

At the same time with Chimnaje Appa, Cashee Pundit, a principal person in the service of the Vinchoorker came to Poona, tendered his submission and was allowed to occupy his house. At his first meeting he said he had a letter for me from the Paishwa, which if I chose he would send for. I said I must first know the contents; if it was an overture to negotiate, it was contrary to my orders to receive it, but if it contained an offer of submission, I should be happy to take every means to give effect to Your Excellency's clemency. Cashi Pundit seemed to think it unnecessary to deliver the letter and asked leave which I gave him, to report the ill success of his overture. He then entered into conversation on his own affairs, those of the Vinchoorker, to whom I held out the hope of the remaining part of his Jageer in the Deccan if he would return, and finally on Bajee Row's plans he said it was certainly that Prince's design to throw himself on Sindiah's protection and I impressed on him that it would be much wiser to throw himself on Your Lordship.

Cashi Pundit's opinion is confirmed by Appa Dessye, Narroo Punt Apty, Moro Dikshit's brother and all the other persons who have come from Bajee Row's army. These persons describe the fatigue and privations of Bajee Row and his immediate attendants as very great, but represent him as shewing great fortitude against all the evils he is exposed to except personal danger. Those about him however complain much of his temper and he seems tormented more than ever by the suspicions which haunted him even in prosperity. The usual excuse of the chiefs who have deserted him is his reproaches against them, as in league with the English and his

unbounded submission to the influence of Trimbuckjee. The return of this favourite seems to have been understood by the whole army as closing the door on all accommodation, and it was seriously debated among some of the Chiefs whether they should not remove the obstacle by attacking him and driving him from the camp.

Appa Dessy sent a Vakeel to Poona before he arrived at Phoolshehr. I received him well, expressed my satisfaction at his master's return, told him that his long delay had led us to enter into engagements with others which would occasion loss to him, but that as far as was consistent with those engagements, it was our wish to treat him kindly, that he might go with confidence to Nepauny and communicate with General Munro to whom the whole negotiation with him was committed.

About the same time of Appa Saheb's appearance at Phoolshehr, Varanessy Bye, the Paishwa's wife arrived at Poona. She had been placed in the fort of Ryghur which was considered as impregnable, and although at the commencement of the siege I sent her a passport to quit the place with all her property and attendants, she was not allowed to profit by it, for the flag of truce that carried it was fired on and driven back by the Arabs. On the capture of the place she received the fullest protection from Colonel Prother, whose humane and liberal anxiety to alleviate her misfortunes is not less favourable to him than the success which placed her at his mercy. The Bye came to Poona with an escort that has been furnished to her by Col. Prother and took up her residence at one of the Paishwa's Palaces which was assigned for her reception. I waited on her on the evening of her arrival and expressed my own anxiety to contribute to her comfort. To my conversation that I was only meeting Your Excellency's wishes in offering her every assistance, the Bye expressed much gratitude for these offices and still more for the treatment she had received at Ryghur and promised to communicate her wants to me as they arose. She said she wished to remain some days at Poona and to proceed to her native village of Wye. Accordingly after residence of ten days, she yesterday expressed a wish to set out for Wye and she was to do so this morning with an escort that had been ordered for her. Before she went she asked permission to give the Paishwa accounts of the treatment she had received. I gave her messenger a passport, and she declared her intention of endeavouring to prevail on the Paishwa to throw himself on Your Excellency's mercy.

Bajee Row was last heard of at Dhoolcote near Asseerghur where he had proceeded from Dewal ghaut. He had on his arrival not more than 6,000 horse, all of whom were totally disheartened and exhausted and but a small portion were actually fighting men. He is said however to be now recruiting both in strength and numbers. He has been visited by the Killedar of Asserghur, who it is thought will afford him an asylum. Your Excellency is apprized that I have instructed General Doveton to attack Asseerghur in this event, unless Bajee Row should entirely disperse his army and take refuge alone, with an obvious intention of submitting to Your Excellency through the medium of Scindia or otherwise. I trust those instructions may not be inconsistent with Your Excellency's general plans. The necessity of attacking the Paishwa wherever he might take refuge seemed indispensable as long as he continued to disturb or to threaten our possessions or those of our allies, but I did not think it became a subordinate authority to anticipate Your Excellency's decision on the case last contemplated. General Doveton was at Adjunta on the 10th of May and will ere this have compelled Bajee Row to quit his present position. Should he fly to the northward the arrangements made by Sir John Malcolm will probably ensure his intercepting him and if he should remain between the Nerbudda and Taptee he will scarcely find it possible to escape the troops destined for service by the same officer.

The State of Candeish is in some measure favourable to the Paishwa. Col. McDowell entered that province on the plan mentioned in my last despatch and advanced to Mallegaum where he has experienced a determined resistance from the Arab garrison, and has little hope of making further progress until after the rains, even if he should speedily succeed in his present undertaking. Captain Davies the Commanding Engineer, an officer of much talent, of the most ardent zeal, has been killed in a sally by the garrison of Malegaum. To supply the place of Col. McDowell's battering train which is beginning to fail and to enable Brigadier General Doveton to undertake the siege of Asseerghur if required, I have requested General Smith to send the greater part of his park to Mallegaum. The details of this arrangement will appear by the correspondence transmitted to Mr. Adam. The Bombay details from Surat consisting of 200 of His Majesty's 67th and 500 N. I. ought to be in Candeish before long. The 2/17th Light Infantry must also ere this have crossed the Godavery and these reinforcements joined to the Battalion of the Russell

Brigade already in the east of Candesh, will form a respectable force to co-operate in pursuing the Peshwa whether he takes refuge among the Arabs or returns into the Sautpoora mountains.

When I last reported to Your Excellency, Brigadier General Munro was on his march to Sholapoor. He arrived before that place on the 9th and found 5000 Infantry the principal of whom were Arabs and regular Sepoys encamped under the walls with 14 guns and 600 Cavalry. Next morning the Brigadier General carried the Pettah by escalade after a prolonged opposition from the Arabs. The Infantry and horse moved down during the contest to attack the reserve and were charged by the Brigadier General and driven back with the loss of three of their guns and many men, the Commander was wounded and one of the principal chiefs killed. This defeat so much disheartened the Infantry that they quitted their camp in the afternoon and commenced their retreat towards the river Seena, but General Munro being apprized of this movement immediately detached his handful of cavalry under Brigadier General Pritzler to cut off their retreat. The cavalry consisting of 3 troops of His Majesty's 22nd Light Dragoons and 400 irregular Horse soon overtook the enemy and charged them with such vigour that they gave way and fled in all directions. Nothing could be more complete than the destruction of this body; near 1000 men were left dead on the field, great number of the fugitives were wounded and of those who escaped many were plundered and even put to death by the villagers. Notwithstanding the impression made by this disaster the fort of Sholapoor stood a bombardment for one day and did not surrender till the breaching battery was ready to open. It is reckoned the strongest of the Paishwa's forts on the plain except Belgaum and Darwar. General Munro having now completely accomplished the object of his march to the eastward is on his return towards Nepauny to make a final settlement with the chief of that place.

General Smith returned from Daroor to cantonments at Seroor, and has since made such a distribution of his force as will probably secure the tranquillity of every part of the country.

Before his arrival, a detachment commanded by Major Macleod of the Auxiliary Horse had marched from Ahmednuggur at the requisition of Captain Pottinger against Dhermajee Pertaub Row, the only individual who remains in arms on

this side of the Godavery. The insurgent has dispersed his banditti and has himself disappeared, but General Smith has sent out a sufficient reinforcement to Major Macleod to enable him to reduce Dermajee's forts, and to cut off the means of renewing the rebellion.

I am happy to acquaint Your Excellency that Captain Grant has succeeded in obtaining possession of the fort of Purtaubghur by negotiation. It is a strong place, had a large garrison and was important from its means of annoying the country round Wye.

I have come thus far on my way to the southward to meet Brigadier General Munro for the purpose of consulting him on the arrangements in progress for the settlement of the Peshwa's late territories.

SECTION IV.

SETTLEMENT OF THE TERRITORY CONQUERED FROM
THE PESHWA

1818

No. 137—Elphinstone asks the Government of Bombay to accommodate and look after Chimnaji Appa, the Peshwa's brother at Bassein during the next rainy season, after which he would proceed to Benares.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE, COMMISSIONER,

To—FRANCIS WARDEN.

Camp near Poona, 4 June 1818.

Sir,

After a great deal of discussion with Chimnaje Appa on the subject of his going to Benares, I find so invincible a repugnance on his part to undertake such a journey at this time of the year, that it would be impossible to prevail on him to do it without giving him great disgust. The state of his health, and the real difficulties of a journey in the rains, combined with the

above consideration, have induced me to allow him to remain in this neighbourhood, provided he will consent to reside at Bassein and to forbear all intercourse with the people of the continent. To this I have no doubt he will consent; and in all the circumstances of the case, I anticipate the Right Honourable the Governor's approbation of my fixing on Bassein for his residence.

I shall therefore expedite his departure without waiting for an answer, in the apprehension that the setting in of the rainy season may afford a pretence for still further delay. He will be accompanied by few attendants, and is by no means a likely person to give any disturbance. I shall send an officer to attend Appa Saheb to Bassein, who may either remain or may be relieved by some gentleman on the spot, as it will be necessary at first to observe the course he adopts, and to prevent his receiving promiscuous visitors.

If the house formerly occupied by the Peishwah, when at Bassein, could be prepared for Appa Saheb's reception, it would be very desirable, as Appa Saheb, being under no restraint, must be reconciled to his situation as much as possible by kindness and attention.

No. 138—Elphinstone offers facts and observations on the subject of settling the Peshwa's country for the consideration of the Governor General. Efficient administration without innovation is the guiding principle of his settlement.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

18 June 1818.

My Lord,

I have hitherto been prevented by want of information and want of leisure for enquiry from submitting to Your Excellency any general view of the measures adopted for the settlement of the Paishwa's late country, or any suggestions on the plans which seem best suited to the completion of that object. I cannot even now furnish a complete report, but I shall offer such facts and observations as seem particularly to require Your Excellency's attention.

On entering on the state of this extensive country, it is necessary to distinguish the great different divisions into which it naturally falls. When that is done, the objects necessary for the settlement of the whole can be considered, and afterwards the best means of attaining those objects. The Divisions are 1st, the Carnatic between the Kishna and Toombudra; 2nd, the Marhatta country; 3rd, the Concan; 4th, Candeish. The whole of the three first divisions may be considered as completely reduced, for if there are any forts still unoccupied they are of no note beyond their own neighbourhood, and will probably surrender as soon as summoned. The Carnatic is principally inhabited by Canarese who are averse to the Marhatta Government and will probably remain perfectly submissive to us, if they continue to be wisely governed. The name of the Marhatta country shows that we have more to apprehend from it. The whole population are Marhattas, and all have some attachment to their nation and feel some interest in its greatness, but the common people are devoted to husbandry and are likely to submit to any Government that will protect them and secure to them the fruits of their industry. The gentry who lose their consequence and the soldiery who are thrown out of employment, must, however, be discontented and desirous of a change, and there are some of both classes in almost every village. The Bramins must everywhere be greatly discontented, though at present they show no sign of dissatisfaction, and at all times they are more likely to intrigue than to try any open mode of hostility. They are very unpopular with the bulk of the people. The hill tribes of Bheels, Coolies and Ramoossees, are to be considered as distinct from the other inhabitants. All are of predatory dispositions and the Bheels once created a troublesome insurrection, but I think that by good usage and occasional severity they will easily be kept quiet. The Concan though inhabited by the Marhattas differs from the rest of the country. The inhabitants are peaceful, there are no Jageers, nor any horse. Candeish is the only part of the country that is still unsettled. The bulk of the people there are Marhattas, but they seem wearied of the Government of the Bramins and the tyranny of the Arabs, and positively disposed to receive our Government. There are still some of the Paishwa's forts to take and some Arabs to expel who have occupied the strongholds of the country. The Bheels in the mountains, with which the province is surrounded are to be restrained from plundering the plains, and all the military

classes are to be broken of the lawless habits they have acquired during a long period of tumult and disorder. The difficulty of accomplishing these objects must be increased by the vicinity and intermixture of Sindia's territories.

Next to maintaining such a force as shall prevent all thoughts of rebellion, the best means of securing the tranquillity of the conquered country is to conciliate the people, the Marhâttas by setting up the Raja of Sattara and by liberality to the Jageerdars, the Bramins by keeping up their pensions and religious institutions, both castes by finding employment for the civil and military servants of the former princes, and all by just and good government. It is however to be remembered that even just government will not be a blessing if at variance with the habits and character of the nation.

These being the objects in view, the means of attaining them are next to be considered, and as they depend on the application of our pecuniary means, it is necessary before they are discussed to enter on an examination of the probable revenue of our new conquests.

The Paishwa's whole revenue before the last treaty amounted to 2,1500,000, of which 95,00,000 was paid into the treasury, and 1,20,00000 allotted to Jageerdars. Of this last sum 26,50,000 was produced by lands in Hindoostan which had greatly declined in value, and from which the Paishwa derived no benefit whatever.

This last 26,50,000 with 32,00,000 of the amount payable into the treasury was ceded by the treaty of Poona concluded in June last. The real state of the revenue therefore stood thus at the breaking out of the war :—

Paid to the treasury	63,00,000
Allotted to Jageerdars	93 50,000
			<hr/>
	Total	...	1,56,50,000
			<hr/>

The revenue paid to the treasury had however declined from over-assessment, and threatened further decline; that of the Jageerdars had suffered from the same cause, and it was besides overrated at first in assigning it to those chiefs, so that it falls

much farther below its nominal value than that paid to the treasury. One may therefore reckon them at :—

Paid to the treasury	50,00,000
Jageerdars	65,00,000
			<hr/>
	Total	...	1,15,00,000
			<hr/>

The first demand on this revenue is a provision for the Rajah of Sattara. Your Excellency's instructions left me the choice of giving him a Jageer or a small sovereignty and I was inclined to adopt the latter plan for various reasons. At the time when I had to decide, the Marhattas showed no disposition whatever to quit the Paishwa's standard, and it appeared not improbable that the dread of the complete extinction of their national independence and still more that of the entire loss of their means of subsistence from the want of Government likely to employ them, would induce them to adhere to Bajee Row with an obstinacy that could never have been produced by affection for his person or interest in his cause. It, therefore, seemed expedient to remove these grounds of alarm, by the establishment of a separate government. Your Excellency will have observed from Brigadier General Munro's letter of the opinion of that experienced officer, that a state like that of Mysore should be formed for the Rajah, and although I did not think myself at liberty to act on this plan to its full extent, I was deeply impressed with the same arguments that had occurred to General Munro on the importance of leaving for part of the Paishwa's subjects a Government which could afford them service in their own way. Some part of the revenue must necessarily have been sacrificed to the maintenance of these classes, and by adding a portion of the revenue so sacrificed to that designed for the support of the Rajah, I expected to keep many in our employment, and more in hopes, that would otherwise have remained disaffected and ready to join in every scheme for disturbing the Government or laying waste the country.

For these reasons, I thought it would be desirable to assign to the Rajah the territory bounded by the Neera on the north, the Warna and Kisna on the south, the Ghauts on the west, and the Nizam's frontier on the east, with the exception of the Jageers of the Putwurdhuns and such others as Your Excellency may think proper to exclude. I found it necessary to give the Rajah an outline of the establishment I meant to propose

for him, that I might put bounds to his extravagant expectations on the one hand and prevent disappointment and disgust on the other; but by the mode of my communication I retained for Your Excellency the power of circumscribing the grant within moderate limits, if you thought it politic and of altering the grounds of it entirely if the Rajah's conduct should render him unworthy of your liberality. By withholding all the lands that were in Jageer at the breaking out of the war Your Excellency would reduce the Rajah's revenue to thirteen lacs of rupees, which might be further lessened by requiring him to pay for a Regiment of Infantry to protect his country; and by granting him the lands of Jageerdars forfeited since that period, and placing under him the Jageers within his limits (with the exception of those of the Putwurdhuns) you would make his direct revenue upwards of 18,00,000 and that held of him by dependent chiefs about 4,00,000 additional. This is on a supposition that the eastern boundary was to be the Beema, but a further addition might be made by giving him Sholapoor and other places south of the line of the Neera, but beyond the Nizam's frontier. In this would also be included the Jageer of the Rajah of Akulcote and as the connection would be agreeable to both parties, this arrangement would perhaps be politic; that regarding Sholapoor more doubtful.

To conclude the subject of the Raja's limits I beg to observe that his conduct has been perfectly satisfactory and that the object of establishing his government would probably be best effected by fixing his territory on a liberal scale. With respect to the mode of his government, it must long be under the immediate control of a British agent. The Rajah is young and totally inexperienced, and the people about him are those who shared his misfortunes and are as ignorant as himself without being as intelligent or as well disposed. The Government ought, however, to be emancipated as soon as circumstances will admit of it, and to be placed on the same footing of independence as our other allies. The Raja is desirous to have a treaty concluded with him, but there is no urgency in the case and I shall therefore await Your Excellency's instructions regarding it. It will indeed be of advantage to delay the conclusion of it until experience shall have shown the terms fit to be imposed. Whenever a treaty is concluded, the Rajah's dignity should be scrupulously preserved, while his total separation from all the former dependants of his nominal state, should be explicitly declared, as one of the grand advantages of the

deposition of the Paishwa is that it dissolves the Mahratta confederacy by destroying the common point of attraction. An article may be required to compel the Rajah to keep up for a time at least the proportion of troops which his revenue can bear.

Some provision may be necessary to secure the Jageerdars who are under him from being worse off than they were under the Paishwa; but if they should voluntarily prefer his government to that of the British, they would have no claim to this protection and it probably would be for our interest to withhold it. The Punt Sucheev is entitled to particular consideration, as he was one of the first who left the Paishwa, on which account I promised him his whole Jageer, except his claims on the Nizam's country, which form a considerable part of it. He may be allowed his choice to be put under the British Government or the Rajah. Shekh Meera of Wye is likewise entitled to the same consideration for his early submission. His lands lie in the Company's share, but he resides at Wye and is an old adherent of the Rajah, who ought therefore to be required to give him an indemnity. The amount is small.

The next object is to provide for the Jageerdars and these may be divided into several classes. The Putwurdhans and the Kittoorkur form a class by themselves. Although the policy of the Putwurdhans was wavering and undecided, they soon took the important step of separating from the army and although this was done by the Paishwa's permission and with the intention of keeping a close connection with him as well as with us, the impression made by their conduct was nearly the same as that of an open defection. Gunput Row of Tausgaum though not included in our guarantee of Punderpore, was the first who decidedly took part with the British Government and is therefore entitled to particular attention. General Munro has repeatedly assured the Putwurdhans that their condition should be better than it was under Bajee Row, and latterly both he and I have distinctly held out the prospect of a small addition to their lands. The Kittoorkur's conduct was still more friendly; he remained at home from the commencement of the war, and though he might have had a small party of horse with the Paishwa, he showed more readiness to act with General Munro than with that Prince.

In discussing the manner of rewarding these partisans with General Munro, it appears to us both, that the Putwurdhans ought to receive an addition of about 300,000 in all made up as

much as possible of portions of the revenue of their Jageers which were formerly reserved by the Government according to the Mahratta practice, or of Government villages interspersed through their Jageers, and the sum total completed, if more were required, by the addition of such contiguous villages as might be most agreeable to themselves. This charge and that of rewarding other adherents will amount to 5 lacs at least.

The Dessye of Kittoor appears in the double form of a Jageerdar and the descendant of an ancient tributary. His ancestors were petty princes of Kittur until that country was conquered by Tippoo Sultan. It was ceded to the Marhattas by the treaty of 1792, and the Paishwa employed the descendant of the ancient princes as his Collector. This person took advantage of the troubles that followed Bajee Row's accession to establish his own independence. He was afterwards induced by the persuasion of Sir Barry Close to come to Poona, and to agree to pay 1,75,000 rupees for his country. At the same time the Paishwa conferred a Jageer on his second son for the maintenance of 500 horse. Since this time his payments have been irregular, and the Paishwa was strongly disposed to resume his whole lands which are valued at 600,000 rupees. General Munro and I concurred in opinion that this chief ought to be formally invested with his ancient character of a tributary prince, that his arrears ought to be remitted and his future tribute ought to be fixed on a liberal consideration of his ability to pay, but on no account to exceed what he was bound to pay to the Peshwa.

Some arrangements must likewise be made to indemnify him by deductions from his tribute, or otherwise, for a great part of the Jageer granted to a member of his family, which is composed of vexatious claims on the lands of the Putwurdhuns, and ought to be renounced. His tribute is not included in the 50,00,000 rupees at which I have estimated the Paishwa's revenue. The chief of Ramdroog having early joined General Munro is likewise entitled to retain all his lands and privileges, but I possess little information regarding the nature of them. I believe he is a petty tributary and ought not properly to be classed with Jageerdars.

Appa Dessy ought properly to belong to the class of Jageerdars which is next to follow as he remained with the Paishwa until after his defeat by Colonel Adams, but as he always kept up a negotiation with General Munro or with me, and certainly always counselled peace, and as he showed no particular activity against us during the war, it appeared only a reasonable liberality

to admit him to the terms of Punderpore, as far as was consistent with a promise I had made to reward the zeal and fidelity of the Raja of Colapoor by a grant of the long disputed districts of Chickoree and Manowly, for which he has always manifested the utmost anxiety. These districts are worth from 3,50,000 to 4,00,000 rupees and the remainder of Appa Dessye's Jageer is not more than 5,50,000 of which 80,000 consists of rights on the Nizam's lands now sequestrated. I have requested General Munro to promise Appa Dessye the restoration of these claims, or an indemnity (which I think ought to be paid by the Nizam) and likewise to promise further favourable consideration in case of good behaviour. I intended this consideration to extend to a grant of land equal to a fourth of the value of Chickoree and Monowlee, provided the amount of that portion did not exceed a lac of rupees. I am not certain whether General Munro considered Appa Dessye's conduct in his late negotiations to have entitled him to the fulfilment of these intentions. The Jageerdars must by our agreement with them continue to be governed according to the terms of Punderpore which are founded on the ancient custom of the Marhatta empire. They must therefore have the entire management of their own Jageers including the power of life and death, and must not be interfered with by Government unless in cases of very flagrant abuse of power or long continuance of gross misgovernment. Their contingents ought only to be called out for general service, but they ought to assist in quelling any disturbance in their immediate neighbourhood. When their contingent is called out, it ought not to be strictly mustered, and one fourth of the stipulated number of Horse ought to be considered sufficient; if any stricter rule is observed they will be losers by their transfer to our Government.

The rules regarding the independent authority of the Jageerdars apply more strongly to the Punt Sacheev, if he comes under us, and still more so to Angria, on whom the Paishwa seems to have had no just claim but that of conferring investiture with its attendant privileges.

The Jageerdars next to be mentioned will have no contingents to furnish, and will hold their lands like private estates under the authority of the British Magistrate, but that authority must for a time at least be exercised with caution and consideration for the habits and practice of the Marhatta Chiefs.

These Jageerdars may be divided into persons holding lands for the payment of troops, and persons holding lands for their

own support. The former class have lands for their personal expenses as well as for those of their troops, and in cases where the Jageerdars did not come in on my first proclamation, I would propose to leave them only the first part and to resume the second. It is politic and humane to allow a liberal maintenance even to those who obstinately resisted us, but it is neither required by humanity nor policy to give such persons the command of troops paid from the revenue which have fallen into our hands.

The individuals whose lands are assigned for their personal support alone, must, I think, be allowed to enjoy them, even if they had been in arms against us, but as most of them are civil ministers and generally those of former days, I do not think this will be the case in many instances. It may however be necessary to make some alterations in the allotment of their lands, as well as of those belonging to Military Chiefs, so as to make distinctions according to desert, and to leave some margin to provide for persons similarly situated who may not have derived their support from grants of land.

After deducting from the sums of 65,00,000 the Jageers of the Putwurdhuns and other Jageerdars who retain their lands, the personal Jageers and those which fall to the Raja, about 24,00,000 nominal revenue will remain to Government, but the most moderate allowance for the falling off of the revenue will reduce this sum to 15 lacs.

The preservation of religious establishments is always necessary in a conquered country, but more particularly so in one where the Bramins have so long possessed the temporal power. The Paishwa's charities and other religious expenses amounted to near 15,00,000 besides those of the wealthy persons in employment under his Government. It would be absurd to imitate this prodigality, but many expenses of this nature are rendered necessary by the proclamation of Sattara, and it would be worthy of a liberal Government to supply the place of the Paishwa's indiscriminate charities by instituting a Hindoo college at one or both of the sacred towns of Nassick and Wye. For this and other religious expenses we may allow 2,00,000, the rest of the necessary religious and charitable establishments, not defrayed in the districts independent of the net revenue, may be supported by the Rajah of Sattara, whom it would probably be impossible to restrain from this sort of expense even if it were necessary,

I now come to one of the most important subjects connected with a revolution like the present, the employment of the civil and military servants of the old Government. This has been found a difficult question to dispose of even in our former partial conquests, and it must be much more so in this case, as this is perhaps the first native Government of which we have annexed almost the whole territory at once to our own possessions. While any portion of the old state is left, there is always a retreat open for those who are dissatisfied with our management, but when the whole is brought under our dominion, many must remain within our territories who are dissatisfied with their own loss of profit and consequence, and disgusted with the novelty of our institutions and manners. This would leave many malcontents, even if we had no enemies besides the Paishwa and his army; but our late war was not with him alone but with all the predatory part of the troops driven from the courts of Holkar, the Raja of Berar, and the Pindarries. By far the greater part of these armies was no doubt melted into the mass of the population, but the most obstinate and untractable portion joined the Paishwa, and replaced the Marhatta cultivators who long since began to quit his army. I have not heard of these adventurers returning to their own country; they must therefore either be provided for as irregular horse, or extirpated as plunderers. Independent of these, the villages in the Marhatta country and in Candeish swarm with horsemen who were permanently or occasionally employed by Bajee Row and his Jageerdars, and who sent some of each family to serve Sindia and Holkar and the Raja of Berar; while others occasionally joined the Pindarries, and many in Candeish at least found constant employment in the distractions of the country.

The whole of the horse employed within the Peshwa's country during the late war may have amounted to from 25 to 30,000. The greater portion of these may be allowed to find a provision for them; but a part must be taken into pay directly or indirectly by Government. The Auxiliary Horse appear to afford a place for this description of soldiery, but the present composition of that corps unluckily does not fit it for that object. They were first raised at the commencement of the Pindaree war, when the Paishwa's recruiting was at its height. It was then and still more after the war broke out an object to get men, and it was of little consequence from what part of the country they came. 2,000 were raised in the Nizam's country, near 1,000 in Guzerat, 500 were recruited at Nagpore; and 500 at Poona were raised from people connected with the Subsidiary Force, who

embarked their money in the purchase of horses for the Auxiliaries, although not originally of the military profession. After the number originally intended was nearly complete, there arrived a body of about 1,800 recruited from the wreck of Holkar's army, and about 500 from the north of Hindoostan, making a total of 7,000 men of which only 500 are strictly of the description required.

I propose gradually to reduce the numbers of these troops : first by discharging all bad men and horses and men not of the military classes ; then by dismissing such foreigners as are likely to find employment or subsistence elsewhere ; and finally by reducing the pay of those who remain. A copy of my instructions on this subject to Lieut. Cunningham has been transmitted for Your Excellency's notice. Some of the Auxiliaries must be kept up for three years, because they have embarked their property in the purchase of horses in the hope of long employment, and because they have been explicitly promised service for that length of time, and the discharge of the rest must be gradual and can scarcely be in any forwardness before the opening of the next cold season. Up to that time I shall entertain none of the horse of the country. They could do no harm during the monsoon even if their horses were not exhausted by their late fatigue. The want of employment and of plunder will drive back to their old profession all who were not originally soldiers and a door may be gradually opened in the dry season to those who have no other means of subsistence. The persons of this description in the Paishwa's territory cannot be less than 5,000. Half of these ought to be disposed of with the Raja of Sattara and among the Jageerdars, and the remainder with such of the Auxiliary horse as cannot be reduced, will form a body of irregular cavalry, well adapted to maintaining tranquillity in a new and unsettled country. The expense of the whole ought to be kept within the amount ceded by the Paishwa for their payment, and in the course of next year, I think they may be so reduced in number and pay as to leave half that sum disposable for other purposes.

The Paishwa's Infantry was much more numerous than his cavalry. Their pay is however much less, and they more easily find employment either as Sebundies or as revenue peons. The only part who are difficult to dispose of are the Arabs whose high pay and their habits of insubordination render it impossible to entertain them. Many of these, it is to be hoped, will return to Arabia and others may find employment with the remaining native States, but there is still ground to expect disturbance from them before they are settled or expelled.

The principal officers of the Paishwa's army were Jageerdars and enough is done for them by leaving them their personal Jageers. The few not so provided for must be pensioned on moderate terms.

The number of great civil officers is small from the mode of administration pursued by the late Paishwa, which threw most of the administration of Government into the hands of farmers, often men of low birth and bad character who have no claim on government either from their own merit or their influence with the people of the respectable part. Some hold personal Jageers, which should be continued to them during their lives at least, and those that cannot find employment under the new government must receive pensions. To this I would add pensions to some of the old ministers of the state reduced to poverty by the persecution of Bajee Row, a sort of bounty that would be more popular than the provisions for that prince's own ministers.

In calculating the provisions for these persons I do not think it necessary to include those who remained with Bajee Row to the last. They are generally low men, the ministers of his pleasures who have no claim on the state, and whom he will probably be disposed to retain about him. The only respectable men with him were Jageerdars, and these will retain their personal lands. The whole of these pensions will probably not exceed 2,00,000 of rupees a year, and they will continually diminish as the holders will die off. I shall endeavour to provide for as many as possible of these persons in the public offices, to prevent their being absolutely a burden on the government.

The pension to Bajee Row is to be reckoned among the expenses of this country; eight lacs, though wisely bestowed in purchasing the submission of that prince, appears quite as much as it is politic to allow him to command. I shall therefore put down no addition to that sum.

Chimnaje Appa ought I think, to be allowed 3 lacs, and 2 more may be allowed for unexpected claims of the same kind which cannot now be foreseen. The extent of this sum renders it unnecessary to make any separate charge for a pension of Gungadhar Shastry's family, which as Your Excellency proposed it to the Paishwa, you might think it reasonable to grant now from the revenue which he formerly possessed.

These are all the pecuniary payments that will fall on the new territory. There are some territorial claims which require consideration. That of the Raja of Colapore has already been

settled without any charge on the government. The districts ceded by the Paishwa in Hindoostan have gone to reward our adherents in that quarter; the cessions of last year and perhaps exemption from his tribute would be amply sufficient for the Guickwar, and there only remains to consider the claims of His Highness the Nizam. His Highness's fidelity and exertions during the late war are no doubt worthy of an ample reward, but convenience appears to require that he should be put in possession of even more than the most liberal consideration would entitle him to claim and it is reasonable that some renunciation should be made to the British Government for excess of these cessions above what the Nizam ought in justice to have received. The amount of the Paishwa's Choute and other dues in the Nizam's country actually enjoyed by him, was charged in his accounts at 23,84,233; of this it is reckoned that as much of this amount is embezzled by the collectors or expended in the charges of management as reaches the treasury. The amount actually paid by the Nizam may therefore be reckoned at 12,00,000. In addition to this, the Paishwa had a claim on the Nizam for upwards of 18 lacs per annum, which were disputed by the latter prince on very insufficient grounds and to all this is to be added his claim to arrears for many years for the whole of the sums disputed or withheld. An officer had been appointed to investigate those claims, who was only prevented commencing by the Paishwa's plots against the British Government, and if the matter had come to an investigation, it seemed almost impossible that the sum to be paid in addition to that actually received by the Paishwa, could by any remissions or abatements have been brought below 10,00,000 rupees. It may therefore be fairly reckoned that the Nizam's Government gains at least 20 lacs of rupees by its exemption from the claims of the Paishwa. The lands intermixed with the Nizam's territory which are distinct from the choute and other dues, amount also to 3 lacs of rupees; and if the Nizam receives Holkar's possessions within his limits and the Raja of Berar's under Gawilghur, his whole gain cannot be less than 30 lacs of rupees. By the Marhatta accounts it would be 57 lacs, without counting the Paishwa's arrears. If this appears to me more than His Highness's proportion of the clear profit of the war, the excess might be advantageously compensated by a cession of tract between the Toombuddra and Krishna, which if annexed to our new possessions in the Carnatic, would unite them in the most convenient manner to the ceded districts. The Nizam's country between the Seena and Beema would also form a desirable possession, either in addition to the country

just mentioned or in lieu of it, as the revenue may prove to be greater or less than we are entitled to claim. I should think we might expect to receive at least ten lacs of net revenue.

I will now proceed to show in one view the amount of the Paishwa's revenue, the expenditure I have mentioned, and the balance remaining. In this I assume that the Nizam is at least to make compensation for the money which reached the treasury from the choute and the lands included within his frontier.

Jageerdars		Government revenue	
	Rs.	Rs.	
Amount of Jageer after deducting those in Hindoostan and those continued to the Patwardhans and Appa Dessye.		80,80,000	Total Revenue .. 50,00,000
			Assigned to the Rajah. 12,00,000
			Reward to the Patwardhans. 5,00,000
			Religious expenses .. 2,00,000
Deduct Choute on the Nizam's country.	5,00,000		Pensions to Civil and military officers. 2,00,000
The Jageers between the Neera and Kiana assigned to the Raja of Battaara.	17,80,000		Pension to Bajl Rao .. 8,00,000
			Pensions to Chitnajes. 3,00,000
Personal allowances to officers, civil and military.	11,20,000		Other Pensions .. 2,00,000
			<u>34,00,000</u>
			18,00,000
Lands which it may prove unjust to resume.	2,00,000	38,40,000	Add amount of Jageerdars resumed. 15,00,000
			<u>15,00,000</u>
Remaining with the Government.		24,40,000	Total Net Revenue .. 31,00,000
Deduct for defalcation.		9,40,000	
		<u>15,00,000</u>	
Real produce of the Government.		15,00,000	

This gives a prospect of a clear revenue of 31 lacs supposing that the civil expenses do not exceed those of Bajee Row and that the military expenses are covered by the cessions of Bassein and Poona. This last expectation may be confidently entertained. It may indeed be expected that the diminution of the expenses of the Auxiliary Horse will set free 18 or 20,00,000 additional, and leave 50,00,000 of clear revenue by the end of the next year. These estimates however are so often fallacious that they ought not to induce us to relax in the most rigid economy in all our establishments connected with the Paishwa's country.

The revenue of Holkar's share of Candeish has not been included in the above statement, but it must, I imagine, be very small and the present revenue with that addition will still

fall short of 40 lacs. Candesh is, however, the most improvable part of the whole of the conquered territory. Should the amount above mentioned be thought insufficient to meet the purpose to which Your Excellency may intend to allot it, the following additions may be made to it. Rastia's and Gokla's Jageer lands between the Neera and Krishna may be retained. The pensions to civil and military officers may be recovered by resumptions from the personal Jageers. The Guickwar's tribute may be exacted. Holkar's lands may be withheld and less favourable terms granted to the Nizam. The two last items cannot be exactly calculated, but the others would give the following addition :—

	Rs.
Rastia's and Gokla's lands	... 4,50,000
Pensions saved	... 4,00,000
Guickwar's tribute	... 4,00,000
	<hr/>
Total	. . 12,50,000
	<hr/>

I would recommend retrenching the Raja's revenue and enforcing demands on foreign states rather than lessening the pensions, but many of these last are for life only, and the others may be made so also, although with respect to the old military Jageerdars I would by no means recommend the resumption of the lands on the death of the individuals. Those of civil officers or new Jageerdars may more properly be lessened, or entirely resumed.

I have next to mention the civil administration of these acquisitions. The system at present in force is sufficiently explained by my instructions to the officers employed in that department. The main principles of those instructions were, to consider everything subservient to the conduct of the war, and scrupulously to avoid all sorts of innovations. This last rule, I am still anxious to enforce and to endeavour to show the people that they are to expect no change but in the better administration of their former laws.

No body of regulations could indeed be introduced into a state the component parts of which are at present so unsettled and at all times so complicated and so imperfectly known. Everything even in the details of civil administration must be done on a general view of all its bearings and improvements, and can only be made by degrees after a separate consideration of each individual measure.

In considering the arrangements to be hereafter adopted the first question is that pointed out in Your Excellency's instructions regarding the Presidency under which each part of the conquered territory is to fall. I think there can be no doubt that the country to the south of the Raja of Sattara's dominions ought to be 'assigned' to Madras, and that to the north of the same tract to Bombay. But there is no local circumstance to determine whether the political connection with the Raja of Sattara should remain under the Supreme Government or be assigned to one of the subordinate Presidencies. If troops can be furnished with nearly equal facility from both establishments, those for the protection of Sattara ought to be from Bombay, from whence the possession of the Southern Concan and the neighbourhood of the sea will give great facilities in supporting them. If the political control remains with the Supreme Government the Raja's dominions ought to be a separate command.

The time when these territories can be made over to the different governments can scarcely be fixed as yet. The reduction of Candeish which will complete the conquest of the country, will probably be effected before the end of the year and by that time it will be obvious whether any insurrections are likely to occur. Until that period the continuance of the present provisional government will probably be necessary on account of the advantage derived from unity of authority in quelling any attempt at revolt.

The Southern Concan, however, the conquest of which has been effected entirely under the immediate orders of the Government of Bombay, will best remain under that Government. Few of the difficulties to be apprehended in the Deckan exist there, and the Right Honourable the Governor will doubtless issue all the orders necessary for conciliating the prejudices of the people, and for giving a maintenance to those who have lost their former employment.

With respect to the territories above the Ghauts our ordinary administration ought not immediately to be introduced even when they are made over to the Government to which they are to belong even if they could be quietly occupied. It is a question whether our regulations would be beneficial to the people in their present state, and it is very doubtful how they would be received. Novelties must accompany every revolution, and if to these we voluntarily add an entire change in the laws, it is easy to conceive the odium and prejudice we shall raise up against us. The probability of disgust is increased where

there are so many intermixed authorities of foreign states, of dependant princes, of old and privileged feudatories, and of half subdued hill chiefs, while the number of unemployed soldiers and the various seeds of disorder that can be scarcely concealed, both in the country itself and in its connection with the other Marattas, point out the extended disaffection and convulsions which would be the result of an unsuccessful experiment. On the other hand, the present system is probably not bad in itself, as the country has prospered under it notwithstanding the feebleness and corruption with which it was administered. At all events it is generally known and understood; it suits the people whom indeed it has helped form, and it is probably capable of being made tolerably perfect by gradual improvements introduced as they appear to be called for. There seems no ground for fearing that we shall be remiss in introducing our own system, and it is better that it should gradually encroach on the institutions of the country than that it should overwhelm them at once and leave the inhabitants without any known objects by which they can direct their course.

On these principles I would long leave the Collector to administer the Government, without the restraint of any regulations but those which they find established. They would require to be well supplied with the assistance of European gentlemen. Their Mamludars would collect the revenue from the villages through the Patails, as is now usual. The Patails might settle village disputes by village Panchayets (arbitration). The Mamludars would superintend the trial of more important causes by Panchayets of the most respectable people within their divisions, while those of greater magnitude and all appeals would come before the Collector himself assisted also by Panchayets and by Hindoo Lawyers. Criminal justice would be conducted in the same manner, with the exception of the Panchayet, which though it might probably be found useful even in such cases, would be too new to be hastily introduced. In places where the lands remain to small Jageerdars, these persons would administer justice instead of the Mamludars, and would be treated by the Collector with more or less consideration according to their rank and character. Some of the greatest such as the Vinchoorkur, Purrunderee, etc., might be left for the present with little interference on our part, unless in cases of great injustice.

The great Jageerdars to the southward, who are entitled to govern their lands as formerly, would be best managed by the Collector of the Carnatic as Political Agent for Government, in

which character he ought to receive a distinct salary and have a separate office. The same officer ought to take charge of our affairs at Colapore and on this plan I shall proceed till further orders. It seems an easy arrangement to place the management of these chiefs under the Political Agent at Sattara, but besides the intermixture of their lands with the Company's in the Carnatic, it is an object not to make them look to Sattara as their Headquarters nor keep their Vakeels assembled at that court.

The numerous Bhil Chiefs in the province and the intermixture of Sindia and Holkar's authority, will render a similar appointment necessary in Candeish, but any treaty that could remove that intermixture by exchanges or otherwise would contribute more than almost any other arrangement to the settlement and prosperity of the country. The bad effect of such an intermixture is less felt in an old possession than in a province which is still in confusion, where occasional disturbances and constant example prevent men from acquiring the habits of regularity and tranquillity that are essential to the prosperity of a country. On these grounds, I would strongly disparage the cession to Holkar alluded to in Mr. Adam's letter to Sir J. Malcolm dated April 9th. The loss by such a cession to the British Government, would be thrice that gained to Holkar, as he would only receive the scanty tribute now drawn from a ruined district, while we should give up the hopes of the full revenue, not only of the tract ceded, but of the neighbouring districts where all improvement would be prevented by the neighbourhood of a Government like that of Holkar.

An arrangement with our own Jageerdars for a consolidation similar to that just proposed for foreign states, is one of the very innovations which I think, it would be desirable to adopt. Even that I should postpone, if the occasion were not particularly favourable. The Jageers of the greater part of the Jageerdars are already resumed, and as their personal lands will be restored as a favour, it will be easy to accompany the grant with a condition of exchanging the objectionable right or lands, either for a more convenient piece of land, or for a pecuniary payment. A similar agreement may be made with the Putwurdhuns when they receive the proposed addition to the lands and with Appa Dessye in settling his claims on the Nizam, and the eventual addition to his lands. The Punt Sucheev has already been warned that this concession would be expected, and all the other Jageerdars are in the predicament first alluded to.

The only remaining class of inhabitants are the Bheels, and other hill tribes to whom I would restore the allowances formerly given by the Marhatta Government on condition of their protecting the roads. I would even make some additions to secure their good conduct, and this with a regular persevering pursuit of any chiefs that continue their habits of depredation, would, I imagine, render them perfectly inoffensive.

I have said nothing in this report on the military arrangements requisite for the country, which have already been mentioned and ought on no account to be diminished in force during the approaching fair season. Whatever precaution we may take, there will remain many persons discontented and many unemployed. The number of these classes formed the strength of Dhoondia after the conquest of Tippoo's country and of Holkar after the Marhatta war in 1803. The same causes may be expected to lead again to the same result. At present the military classes are worn out with their late fatigues, the combination of which Bajee Row was the centre is dissolved, and no new one formed, and all ranks are stupefied by the blow that has fallen on them, and are scarcely sensible of the full effects of the revolution. When the season opens for military operations, when people have had time to feel their losses and communicate their regrets, when the soldiery begins to miss the accustomed call for their service and when Appa Saheb of Nagpore and other adventurers who still remain in arms, commence their operations, it may be expected that some tumults will arise in this country likewise. These can only be quelled by the speedy application of an overwhelming force, and even if no rebellions should break out, the presence of the troops will not be destitute of important and desirable results. Nothing has so powerful an effect in settling the minds of men as a consciousness in the disaffected that resistance is hopeless and a feeling among the peaceable part of the community that the country is secure even from partial disturbances. I shall endeavour to keep all the pecuniary arrangements alluded to in this dispatch open until I receive Your Excellency's commands, but it would be advantageous to have all arranged as soon as it may be convenient to decide on them.

No. 139—The Governor General communicates to the home authorities, the successful termination of the war, the conquest of the Peshwa's territories, and his proposal to annex them to the other British possessions in India.

From—THE MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,

To—THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

Goruckpore, 20 June 1818.

Honourable Sirs,

Bajee Rao having submitted and placed himself in the hands of Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm, I have the honour to congratulate you on the termination of what still bore a lingering character of war.

The troops with which Bajee Rao had crossed the Tapti, apparently in the fallacious expectation of being able to goad Dowlat Rao Scindia into a breach of his engagements, were completely surrounded. He found progress towards Gwalior impracticable, retreat as much so, and opposition to the British force altogether hopeless, so that any terms granted to him under such circumstances were purely gratuitous, and referable to that humanity which it was felt your Honourable Court would be desirous should be shown to an exhausted foe.

The ability with which Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm first secured the passes of the hills, and then advanced to confine Bajee Rao in front, while Brigadier General Doveton closed upon him from the rear, will not fail to be applauded by your Honourable Court, nor will you less estimate the moderation with which Sir John Malcolm held forth assurance of liberal and decorous treatment, even to an enemy stained with profligate treachery, when that enemy could no longer make resistance.

Bajee Rao is to reside as a private individual in some city within your ancient possessions, probably Benares, enjoying an allowance suited to a person of high birth, but without other pretensions.

Perhaps a more impressive lesson is given to India, by a Sovereign reduced to subscribe in this manner to his own deposition from the Musnud, than had he fallen in battle or become a prisoner.

In a former letter I had the honour of stating how totally unconnected your present acquisition of territory was, with any

thing could stimulate and enable prostrated enemies to rear a standard once against you, the odious nature of the struggle which you had espoused would have that effect, because your antagonist would reckon on the aid he must find from a universal concurrence in sentiments adverse to you. Similar dissatisfactions are not to be apprehended under your Government. The inhabitants are well aware of the comfort and security enjoyed by the subjects in the adjoining territories of the Honourable Company; and, indeed they have given every demonstration of eagerly anticipating an arrangement attended with no regrets to counterbalance their presumption in its favour.

The conclusion is, that you would be called upon, in urgent policy, to keep those countries in your hands, if you consulted only your immediate interest in the tranquillity of India. But Your Honourable Court will never so restrict your contemplation. The great work achieved by your arms ought to be followed by a peace, of which you will be solicitous to avail yourselves, as the fortunate opportunity for disseminating instruction and morals among immense communities, lamentably deficient in conception of social principles and duties. A vast field for the amelioration of man lies before us, and those enlarged sentiments of beneficence, which you have always manifested towards the inhabitants of India will tell you that the culture of it was not to be hazarded by leaving the public tranquillity to chance. It would be consonant to British fame and gratifying to British reflection, that you should have planted in the new sterile soil the germ of such permanent good. The improvement of the state of society in the country is not a visionary project. The speculation is extensive, indeed; but it refers itself for fulfilment to those simple and ready means, which are uniformly effectual if they be but put in course, and there be a time of quiet for their operation. Many occurrences, undoubtedly, may arise to blight so generous an effort; but even should it fail, it will be a proud consciousness to your Honourable Court that such was your endeavour.

P.S.—Though your Honourable Court would hardly miss being sensible of the distinction, it may not be superfluous to remark, that the establishment of the Rajah of Sattarah in a small sovereignty, can never have an effect similar to what is represented as unavoidable from the restoration of a Peishwah. There never has existed towards the Rajah of Sattarah any habitual subservience, nor could he, at any period, have carried with him the influence which the Peishwah possessed, from the combination of his high Bramincial caste with the military authority of hereditary office.

No. 140—The after-effects in the process of settlement of the conquered country are herein described by Elphinstone for the Governor General's information.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Camp Ranjungaon, 27 June 1818.

My Lord,

My last report to Your Excellency was dated the 24th of May. Almost all the transactions of this part of the country have been laid before Your Excellency through the various letters of the officers engaged in them.

The most important event that has occurred in the Deccan is the surrender of Bajee Row to Sir John Malcolm. That prince's resistance did not create among his late subjects any doubts of the stability of the present arrangement, but his submission has removed all apprehension of further disturbances that might have happened before the revolution was completed. All regular opposition is now at an end, but as many individuals must be ruined by the diminution of the Marhatta armies and the destruction of the predatory system, we may expect that some desperate adventurers will continue to disturb the public tranquillity. These causes may lead to the formation of considerable bands of freebooters after the rains, but a continuance of the vigorous measures hitherto pursued throughout India, will probably soon disperse and destroy them, and terminate the great undertaking in which Your Excellency has been engaged. If the unemployed soldiery were once settled Bajee Row would become completely insignificant, and till it shall be apparent that this settlement has taken place, I conclude that means will be taken to cut off as much as possible his communications with our Maratta subjects.

Chimnaje Appa Saheb is much less to be feared than his brother whom he neither resembles in talent nor in disposition. He ought, however, to be sent to Hindoostan and I regret that I have not yet been able to accomplish his removal. The state of his health, the advance of the rainy season and the apprehension from disturbances on the road in consequence of the escape of the late Raja of Nagpore, induced me at length to acquiesce in his earnest desire to remain in the Deccan, provided he should reside at Bassein, and that he should commence his journey to Benares as soon as the season opened. I have deputed

Lieut. Clark of the Auxiliary Horse to attend him, and a copy of my instructions to that officer has been transmitted to Mr. Adam for Your Excellency's notice.

The fort of Malligaum has surrendered since my last despatch. The detachment from Surat under the command of Major Jardin has taken possession of Nunderbar and Kokurmunda and opened the communication between Candeish and Guzerat. General Doveton on the surrender of Bajee Row sent a further reinforcement to Lieut. Col. Macdowall and marched himself to Jaulna, and the whole of his troops in Candeish have now cantoned for the monsoon in such situations as are most likely to keep the province quiet. It is to be feared that the Arabs who had quitted Bajee Row, will remain in Candeish notwithstanding their promises, and will require further operations hereafter. I have directed that all of them who quit the route they engaged to Sir John Malcolm to pursue, should be treated as enemies. If no further resistance is attempted by the Arabs, the province of Candeish will probably settle itself before our troops move out of cantonments.

A body of freebooters under Ramdeen have lately been plundering districts to the south east of Nassick, and Trimbuckjee who has taken refuge in the hills near Sungumnere, is also endeavouring to raise infantry and to excite the Bheels to rebellion. I have taken measures to send a detachment of regular infantry and 1100 Auxiliary Horse into the tract thus disturbed and likewise to fill it with Sebundies, a plan which operates doubly, as while it strengthens the Government, it takes away the materials for insurrections.

The freebooters under Dhurmajee Pertab Row seems to have entirely dispersed and the banditti at Percheetghur having been completely reduced by the able measures of Captain Grant, seconded by the division of Lieut. Col. Cunningham, the whole of the south is in perfect tranquillity.

General Munro finding some delay on the part of Appa Dessye in giving up the districts of Chickoree and Manowlee, marched straight upon Nepauny when his demands were complied with. He then continued his march to the southward and after strengthening his garrisons took up ground for the rains near Hooblee.

As far as the public opinion can be ascertained our civil administration appears to give satisfaction to the inhabitants. I receive innumerable applications from unemployed persons

civil and military, from Jageerdars and all sorts of pensioners and dependents of the old Government. To the first class I say that they must wait until the exigencies of the state require their services, which to a certain extent will be the case as things get settled; to the Military, that they can have no service now, but a small body of horse may perhaps be entertained after the rains; to the Jageerdars, that their troops are not wanted but that some arrangement will be thought of for their personal support; to the last description of persons I have, in but a few cases, even held out a hope that their cases would be considered. It is extremely desirable to discourage for a time all expectation of aid from our Government, that all may exert themselves to find a maintenance by other means, and that those only may remain to be provided for who would be totally destitute if our bounty were withheld.

I am now on my way to Candeish to confer with Captain Briggs, and make myself acquainted on the spot with the condition of the province. I shall have an opportunity, as I pass, of obtaining a knowledge of the state of the district of Ahmednuggur.

No. 141—The Governor General, while detailing the measures of future government and policy, expresses his sense of the distinguished merits and valuable services rendered by Elphinstone to his masters and to his nation. An emphatic and cordial approval to all the measures and steps taken by Elphinstone is communicated, and each is fully and separately mentioned. Jhon Adam's able penmanship is clearly visible in this despatch.

**From—JOHN ADAM, SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL,**

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Mongheer on the Ganges, 14 July 1818.

The Governor General having lately reviewed the series of your despatches received since the commencement of hostilities with Bajee Row containing a narrative of the circumstances immediately preceding that occurrence and of your measures, and the operations connected with them until the close of the war, I have been directed to communicate to you, His Lordship's sentiments and instructions on every part of those proceedings

on which it is necessary they should be stated, and on the principles and most material details of the system to be established in place of the Government of the Paishwa which has been subverted by the success of our arms.

During the progress of these transactions any communication of the Governor General's opinions and instructions excepting in such general terms as should apprize you of the principles by which it was desired that your proceedings should be regulated, and the objects to which they should be directed, were manifestly unnecessary. In the constantly changing state of affairs the transmission of precise instructions on each particular circumstance would have only tended to embarrass your proceedings and obstructed the exercise of your judgment on the spot even if the distance of the Governor General's position from the scene of operations and the great difficulties of communications owing to the disturbed state of the country, had not presented insurmountable obstacles to any such plan. By resting in you, in the first instance, full powers to decide on every question that might arise, and by placing under your orders as large and efficient a force as could be allotted to that branch of the service, of which the conduct was committed to your charge; and by distinctly stating, in the second place, the principles and objects of the Governor General's policy with relation to Bajee Row and his dominions, His Lordship made every provision for the successful prosecution of those measures which circumstances would allow. His Lordship committed to your hands the exercise of those ample and unrestricted powers, and the execution of those measures with a confidence in your energy, judgment, and decision, and in your thorough knowledge of the great interest involved in the successful issue of the enterprize, which was justified by your distinguished qualities and by the whole tenor of your public conduct in emergencies inferior only to that in which you were now to act; it is perhaps the highest and most appropriate praise His Lordship can bestow to declare that your execution of this momentous charge, though it has fully equalled, has not surpassed His Lordship's expectations founded on his previous estimate of your character and of your eminent qualifications for the trust. There is no part of your proceedings or your plans which does not bear indisputable proof of your thorough conception of His Lordship's policy, of the judgment and vigour with which you have pursued it, and of your just, liberal and enlightened views of the interests of the British Government and of the extensive provinces and numerous population over which you preside. Your personal exertion and ardent courage in the field have been no less conspicuous.

It has been a gratifying duty to bring to the notice of the authorities at home, in terms commensurate with his real estimate of them, His Lordship's sense of your distinguished merits, and of the essential service you have rendered to the Hon'ble Company and to the nation during the late crisis of affairs, and His Lordship feels assured that they will be duly appreciated by the wisdom and justice of those authorities.

Your exertions have been ably and successfully seconded by the officers whose duty it has been to co-operate with you in the destruction of the enemy's power and the re-establishment of our own throughout the country. The unremitting activity, perseverance, and zeal of Brigadier General Smith in his long pursuit of Bajee Row, the bold and skilful operations of Brigadier General Munro, who has exhibited a rare union of civil, political and military talents, and the general merits and services of the other officers commanding separate divisions or detachments and of the officers and men under their command respectively, will constitute the just theme of His Lordship's applause in the appropriate place and form. His Lordship cannot deny himself the satisfaction, however, of expressing directly to you his sense of services which your personal knowledge of their value, the support you have derived from them and their intimate connection with your own actions, will necessarily render a subject of peculiar interest to you. His Lordship will have occasion to advert again in the sequel to the singular merits of Brigadier General Munro in the reduction of the country south of the Kishna, with the very limited force at his disposal.

The whole tenor of Bajee Row's conduct from the time of his return from Mahowley, the activity he showed in levying troops, his collecting them in the vicinity of Poona instead of sending them to stations where alone they would have been useful for the service for which they were ostensibly raised, the attempts made to corrupt the fidelity of your sepoys and to compel them by menaces or by actual ill usage to their families to leave our service, of which you had now received undoubted evidence, and the general impression throughout the country of the hostile design meditated by Bajee Row, left no room to doubt the true and secret motives of all his proceedings. Impressed, however, as you were with the belief that Bajee Row would not have the temerity to proceed to extremities excepting in the event of some reverse to our arms in the approaching operations in Hindoostan, the line of conduct you adopted as described in your despatches and your forbearance from any manifestations

of distrust or from any proceedings that could seem to arise out of such a feeling, was manifestly the best suited to our general policy at the moment and to the apparent and probable circumstances of the particular case. The opinion formed by you of the disposition and views of Bajee Row was fully adopted by the Governor General, who entirely approved the whole of your proceedings as they became known to him through your direct communications and those which you addressed to Sir Thomas Hislop.

The increasing boldness and publicity of the the Paishwa's measures accompanied by the certain information you continued to receive of his secret practices, soon rendered the resort on your part to certain measures of precaution against sudden treachery indispensable. Your directions for the rapid advance of the European Regiment and your resolution on its junction to move the Brigade to the new position selected for it, the old one being obviously untenable and the presence of the troops were calculated suddenly to bring on a crisis; your prompt and successful execution of this movement the other precautions of a military nature adopted by you including the summons of the Light Battalion from Serroor and the recall of Brigadier General Smith to Poona, the moderate but at the same time firm language you held to the court while these transactions were passing and up to the very moment when the sudden and treacherous attack was made on the Residency, demand the Governor General's unqualified approbation.

The events that followed, the spirited and judicious advance of Lieutenant Colonel Burr against the enemy and the occupation of Poona by the British troops have already received the merited tribute of public applause. The spirit of moderation and humanity and at the same time wise policy which influenced your exertions in common with those of Brigadier General Smith to preserve the city from the natural and scarcely blameable vengeance of the troops, excited by an accumulation of insults and injuries, reflect the highest credit on you and on the Brigadier General and have been attended with their natural and beneficial consequences in the quiet submission of the inhabitants of the capital to our rule, the useful example of that submission in other quarters, the advantages of the position in a military and political point of view and the diffusion of an impression highly honourable to the national character.

The operations just referred to abundantly justified the confidence reposed in our sepoys and displayed the incorruptible integrity with which they had resisted all the arts employed to assail their fidelity. The Governor General perceived with great satisfaction the manner in which the exemplary conduct of Jamedar Shaikh Hussein and Private Hurry Bhye were marked and rewarded by the Government of Bombay and the just applause conferred on the whole body.

It is not necessary to follow your narrative through the subsequent pursuit of the Paishwa's army, the obstacles which opposed the adoption of the plan of forming one division for pursuit and another for the reduction of forts and the occupation of the country, the indirect attempts to negotiate made by the Peshwa and repelled by you during this period, and the subsequent meeting of the divisions of Brigadier General Smith and Pritzler in the vicinity of Sattara where the new distribution of the force was finally effected.

The determination to occupy the time necessarily allotted to formation of this plan and the refreshment of the troops after their long pursuit in the reduction of Sattarah, was most judiciously conceived and successfully executed. The result was of essential importance to the general success of our measures by the consequence attached to the place and the opportunity its capture afforded of declaring the resolutions of the Governor General relative to the future condition of the Rajah and his family.

While engaged in the pursuit of the Paishwa's army you had received my despatch of the 10th of December prescribing the principles and outlines of the system which His Lordship had on mature deliberation resolved to substitute for the ancient Government of the territories forming the Poona State. That plan had been judiciously kept secret by you till some serious impression should be made on the Paishwa's power and the general feeling of the country and the conduct likely to be pursued by the chiefs should be ascertained. The period for disclosing our views and for carrying them into effect was now fast approaching and the capture of Sattarah afforded a favourable opportunity of promulgating our intentions in connection with the declared establishment of a new state for the Rajah which formed an important feature of the plan.

The public declaration made by you at Sattarah of the intention of forming a state for the Rajah of which that place was to be the capital, and your discourse to the principal relations

and titular officers of the Rajah who could be assembled on the spot was entirely approved. The partial promulgation of the proclamation of the 11th of February and the more extended circulation which you afterwards gave it when before Singurh, were considered by His Lordship to be very judicious and well timed. The document itself exhibits a distinct view of the falsehood, ingratitude and treachery of Bajee Row, ably displaying the irrefragable grounds of justice and policy which led the Governor General to determine on deposing him, on abolishing the office and name of Peshwa and on annexing his territories, with certain exceptions, to the dominions of the British Government. The assurances held out of security of property to all holders of enaum or other lands, of protection to religious establishments and toleration of every sect, of a moderate and equitable assessment of the lands, the abolition of the farming system and of the other abuses in the old practice are eminently judicious and proper in themselves; nor were they less deserving of praise as calculated to create a just impression of our principles of government and to reconcile the inhabitants to the change of rule. The pains you have taken to confirm these impressions and your wise and successful efforts to conciliate the principal Bramins and other persons of weight and consequence during your visits to Poona and Wye, are highly approved by the Governor General who has perceived with great satisfaction the beneficial consequences of this procedure. The promise of pardon and protection held out in the proclamation to all persons who should quit the standard of Bajee Row within two months from that date and the denunciation of forfeiture and punishment to all such as shall not come in within the prescribed period, are also highly approved. The subsequent extension of the term and the general amnesty afterwards proclaimed by you for all those who left the Paishwa even at the latest period on the condition of their remaining at home and not disturbing the peace of country, were equally humane and politic.

The effect of the measures now referred to was most materially and opportunely promoted by the success of Brigadier General Smith's spirited attack on the Paishwa's army on the 20th February at Ashta and the consequent release of the Rajah of Sattarah whom you were thus enabled to bring forward personally as the recognized head of the new state. Your kind and soothing attentions to the Rajah and his family and your consideration for their comfort and dignity as well as the corresponding conduct towards them of Brigadier General Smith could not but receive the approbation of the Governor General. Your

reasons for inviting the Rajah to accompany you with General Pritzler's force instead of shutting himself up in Sattarah were perfectly conclusive. I shall, in a subsequent part of this despatch, advert to your provisional arrangements regarding the government of the new State of Sattarah and communicate to you His Lordship's sentiments and resolutions on the several questions connected with this important and interesting branch of the new settlement.

The successful commencement of the new plan of operations by the defeat of the Paishwa in the field, the liberation of the Rajah of Sattarah and the death of Gokla, whose energy and vigour, stimulated by certainty that his case was desperate, had been a main source of the confidence and perseverance of the enemy, were now followed by the successive reduction of the forts in the vicinity of Poona and subsequently by the capture of the important fortress of Wassota, marked by the release of the families of the Rajah of Sattarah and his brothers and of Lieutenants Morrison and Hunter who had been faithlessly attacked and made prisoners at the commencement of hostilities. These events afforded the fairest ground for hope of the early accomplishment of the objects of the war.

It was with a high degree of satisfaction that the Governor General observed the intermediate surrender to detachments sent by Brigadier General Pritzler of the several forts in the vicinity of Wye and the subsequent occupation of those in the direction of Sattarah which speedily placed the whole of that part of the country in our hands and allowed of the greater part of Brigadier General Pritzler's force being united with that of Brigadier General Munro thus enabling the latter officer to prosecute with augmented means the remaining operations confided to him.

The Governor General had marked with equal pleasure and admiration, the success of Brigadier General Munro's measures for expelling the Marhatta Government from the country to the south of the Kishna and the occupation with very inadequate means, of the whole of the possessions of the Paishwa and of Gokla to the southward of that river. His Lordship highly approves of the manner in which you availed yourself of the authority conveyed to you in my despatch of the 15th of December to invite the assistance of Brigadier General Munro in execution of any part of the general plan in which you might

desire to avail yourself of his experienced abilities and reputation. The reasons assigned by Brigadier General Munro and assented to by you for postponing the siege of Nepauny till after the reduction of Sholapoor and the defeat and capture of the Paishwa's Infantry and guns appeared to be conclusive. The performance in a manner so honourable to our arms of the latter service having enabled Brigadier General Munro to return to the southward of the Kishna, His Lordship trusts that notwithstanding the circumstances which compelled him to solicit conditional permission to withdraw, he may be able to complete his plans for the settlement of that country and of the affairs of the southern Jageerdars. It is at all events His Lordship's hopes that he will be able to put both those arrangements in such a train as shall greatly facilitate their ultimate accomplishment, should the Government unfortunately be deprived of his services before they are completed. The reduction of Nepaunee will, of course, under the circumstances of Appa Dessye's return and receipt of your permission of repair thitherto, have been abandoned altogether.

You have been apprized of the sentiments entertained and expressed by the Governor General regarding the refusal of the Government of Fort St. George to reinforce Brigadier General Munro and even actually recalling the troops which the officer commanding in the ceded districts had ordered to join them. No further remark on the subject is necessary in this place than that your urgent and repeated applications to the Government of Fort St. George to afford that aid were perfectly justified by the circumstances of the case and by the nature of the powers you held from the Governor General and were entirely approved and sanctioned by His Lordship.

The operations of the separate detachments commanded by Lieutenant Col. Deacon, Lieutenant Col. Eldridge and Captain Barton in reducing forts to the northward of Poona and establishing our authority throughout those parts of the country in which they acted, were viewed with much satisfaction and approbation by the Governor General as were the judicious communications held by Captain Barton with certain Bheel Chiefs and with the people of the countries in the neighbourhood of the operations of his detachment.

The continued pursuit of Bajee Row's army by Brigadier General Smith and the advance of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop from the northward having compelled him to make a rapid

movement to the eastward beyond the frontier of his former possessions and the expectation of profiting by the union of his forces with those of the late Rajah of Nagpore, with whom a plan of joint operations had been concerted, having led Bajee Row to a great distance, the juncture was peculiarly favourable for establishing our authority throughout the country and was promptly and judiciously employed by you. It very soon became apparent that Bajee Row had ceased to possess any hold on the country and that however complete the settlement of it might be deferred or interrupted while he could yet keep the field, there was little probability of his being able to offer any serious resistance to our plans, while the great body of the people was persuaded to acknowledge our rule and almost all the principal feudatories of the state had declared in our favour.

The subsequent defeat of Bajee Row by Lieutenant Col. Adams, the disasters which followed it and the dispersions of his army, the defection of his brother and the principal chiefs who had still adhered to him with one or two exceptions, speedily realized these expectations and proved that every prospect of reviving his dominions had been abandoned by Bajee Row and by those most closely united to him. It may be hoped that his subsequent surrender and removal from the Deccan has finally and completely broken all connexion between him and his former subjects and possessions.

The instructions issued by you to Brigadier General Doveton and to Brigadier General Smith for the guidance of their conduct during this latter period are highly approved by the Governor General. Your directions to Brigadier General Doveton to lose no time in besieging Asseeighur should Bajee Row have retired to that fortress with an army or rendered his reception there in any manner the means of prolonging the war, was entirely consonant with the views and wishes of the Governor General with relation to the supposed case. On the other hand your reserving for the decision of the Governor General the question of attacking Asseer in any circumstances admitting of delay and referring exclusively to His Lordship's policy with regard to Scindia as distinct from the prosecution of the war against Bajee Row was extremely well judged.

The pursuit by Brigadier General Smith and by detachment of his force of the retiring parties of the Paishwa's army was perfectly judicious, and the conduct of Captain Davies who

commanded one of those detachments on the occasion of his coming up with Chimnajeé and Appa Dessyé as well as the discipline of forbearance evinced by the troops, is highly creditable to that officer and to the detachment under his command.

The successful progress of our arms in the Concan under the immediate orders of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay, is a feature of the late operations which cannot be overlooked by His Lordship without injustice both to the energy and vigour of the measures pursued by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council and to the judgment, activity, gallantry and professional skill of Lieutenant Col. Prother and the officers employed in that branch of the service. These will be duly noticed by His Lordship in public orders and His Lordship will have the satisfaction of expressing in a direct address to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the high sense he entertains of the exertions made by the Government of Bombay from the commencement of the war, to afford the most effectual assistance in its power and of the energy and vigour with which the reduction of the Concan was effected under its orders. The merit is the more conspicuous from the very inadequate force at the disposal of the Government of Bombay for these objects, especially at the outset of the war.

The energy and success of our operations in Gungteree and Kandeish have been no less distinguished than in other quarters, and the conduct of Captain Briggs and Lieutenant Col. Macdowall and the whole of the officers and troops of the small detachment employed in that quarter by which the whole of the country on both sides of the Godavery has been reduced and the conquest of Kandeish nearly achieved, demands the warmest expressions of the Governor General's admiration. The successive reduction of the strong and hitherto deemed impregnable fortresses of Unkey, Rajdher and Trimbuck by so small a body, reflects the highest credit on the skill, energy and intrepidity of the officers and men. The cheerfulness with which the troops endured the labour and privations to which from the smallness of their number they were unavoidably exposed during the operations, deserves the highest praise. The check which our operations before Malligong received through the extraordinary pertinacity of the garrison and inadequacy of our means for siege, has been nobly redeemed by the success of the revived operations which, according to private

but apparently authentic advices, have terminated in the reduction of the fort. While the Governor General laments the severe loss of brave officers and men stationed in the siege of that fortress, His Lordship has the satisfaction of expressing his unqualified admiration of the conduct of the troops even when these efforts were not crowned with success. I am likewise desired by His Lordship to state that notwithstanding the want of success which attended our early operations against Malligong, His Lordship is satisfied that the considerations which weighed with Captain Briggs and Lieut. Col. Macdowall to undertake the siege of that place at the time when it was determined on, were such as fully to justify the resolution. The exploits of the separate detachments employed in Kandeish which have been brought to the Governor General's notice, have also received His Lordship's approbation.

The occupation of that part of Khandesh which was ceded to the British Government by Holkar, having been connected with the conquest of the Paishwa's possessions in that province, I am desired to take the opportunity of signifying His Lordship's approbation of the measures pursued by Captain Briggs for that purpose after the conduct of political affairs in Kandeish devolved on him on the departure of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop.

The Governor General desires me to convey to you his perfect approbation of the clear and judicious instructions given by you to Captain Briggs for his guidance in the occupation and settlement of Kandeish; the importance of the early removal from that province of the Arab soldiery was justly appreciated by both with respect to the obstacles to the occupation of the Province which their warlike habits and turbulent spirit presented and to the influence on the minds and dispositions of the inhabitants, which cannot fail to be created by their being relieved from the arduous and oppressive control exercised over them by a foreign soldiery. Your having anticipated the Governor General's opinion on this point and having authorized Captain Briggs in all cases compatible with the object of diffusing throughout the province a just impression of the power of the British Government to consent to their being conveyed with their arms and property to Arabia at the expense of the British Government, has met with His Lordship's entire approval. The proclamation addressed by Captain Briggs to the Arabs is in every respect consonant with the Governor General's views and although from unforeseen

circumstances the success of the measures connected with it has not yet been complete, the justice of the grounds on which they were determined on is by no means shaken.

Your directions to Captain Briggs regarding the line of proceeding to be observed towards the Bheels are considered to be perfectly judicious. His Excellency has remarked with much satisfaction throughout the whole of your correspondence with the officer placed by you in charge of positions of our newly acquired territory, the great importance you attach to the most unremitting exertions for the conciliation of the inhabitants and for leading them to regard the change of government as a source of benefit and immediate relief as well as of future security from the evils of anarchy to which in Kandeish especially the country has long been exposed.

The plan of operations proposed by Captain Briggs for the establishment of our authority throughout Kandeish and the movement of troops by which it was to be supported are regarded by the Governor General as being highly judicious and His Lordship regrets that circumstances prevented them from being carried into execution. It is His Lordship's hope that the force which has now been allotted to the service in Kandeish coupled with the reduction of Malligong and its probable consequences will enable Captain Briggs to enter on a regular and systematic plan for the subjugation of that part of the province which still resists our power and the settlement of the whole. The arrangements made for sending succours to Kandeish in concert with the Government of Bombay and Brigadier General Smith and latterly with Brigadier General Doveton, are regarded by the Governor General with much approbation.

The general scope of your instructions to Captain Briggs with regard to the future Government of Kandeish is considered by the Governor General to be in all respects judicious and adopted to the state of the country and to the nature and novelty of our connexion with it. The judgment, ability and prudence displayed by Captain Briggs throughout the late services, justifies the most confident expectations of the success of your views under his management.

His Lordship has been pleased to confirm the salary of S. Rs. 2,000 per mensem assigned by you to Captain Briggs and the authority you gave him to charge his expenses to an amount not exceeding Rs. 1,500 per mensem. Captain Briggs will of course have ceased to draw his former salary from the date on which

the present arrangement took effect. The salary of Rs. 300 per mensem assigned to the assistant to Captain Briggs is also sanctioned and the Governor General has been pleased to confirm the nomination of Captain Hodges to that duty.

The arrangement made by you for the provisional administration of the conquered territory between Kandesh and the Neera, the formation of the separate jurisdiction of Poona and Ahmednuggur, the selection of officers to introduce and administer our authority into those territories and the spirit and tenor of the instructions which you gave those officers for their guidance in the execution of the trust committed to them respectively, are all received by His Lordship with sentiments of unqualified approbation.

The wisdom and justice of taking for the basis of the new system of administration the existing institutions of the country except when they are inconsistent with reason and equity and of avoiding any innovations not indispensable for the removal of gross corruptions and abuses, are incontestable and the earnest desire shewn for the conciliation of all classes of inhabitants, the preservation of their just rights and the security of their persons and property, the abolition of the farming system and all the intolerable grievances resulting from it and the introduction of a moderate and equitable assignment, the abolition of odious and unjust taxes and the establishments of the ready means of access to redress through the medium of institutions founded on models known to and respected by the people, together with the vigorous administration of the police through the same channel as were employed by the ancient Government, all these objects are provided for by your instructions to the provincial collectors and are calculated to render the British Government equally popular and just.

I shall have the honour in a separate letter of acknowledging the receipt of your despatches transmitting the reports of Captain Pottinger and Captain Robertson, the provisional collectors of Ahmednugger and Poona and of conveying His Lordship's sense of their meritorious execution of the duties of their respective stations, and his sentiments on any part of the proceedings of those officers on which the communication of them may seem to be necessary.

Those gentlemen will continue to act in the capacities you have assigned to them until further orders, and will proceed without delay to make a settlement of the revenue for the ensuing year and to maintain the real resources of the country with a view to future and more permanent arrangements.

His Lordship deems it especially incumbent on him to notice with approbation the conduct of Mr. Coates, whose zeal led him to offer his services to you on the first establishment of our authority in the city of Poona and whose knowledge of the place and the confidence reposed in him by the people rendered his assistance of great value in the infancy of our administration.

His Lordship has particularly remarked the attention paid by you to the suppression of plunderers in every part of our newly acquired possessions and the protected territory of the Rajah of Sattarah. You justly attach the greatest importance to this object and the ample means you have placed at the disposal of the local authorities and the vigour and judgment with which they appear to have been applied will, His Lordship hopes, have the effect of completely subduing that spirit which has naturally been fostered and encouraged by the events of the last season. Your plans for the gradual conversion of the military classes from their present habits to those of peaceful industry, for giving employment to them in the interval and for sending back to their former occupations those who not strictly belonging to the military class have been encouraged to embrace that mode of life by the measures pursued by the Paishwa before the war and by the events that have followed are eminently judicious, and will, His Lordship doubts not, be attended with success in due time. In the meanwhile the conduct of this part of the population will demand your vigilant attention. You appear to have it in contemplation to require or encourage the Rajah of Sattarah as well as the great Jageerdars to maintain at least for a time a stipulated quota of Horse as one means of effecting this object. His Lordship entirely concurs in your opinion of the advantage of that measure.

His Lordship is happy to observe the reduction of Pruchitghur in a manner highly creditable to Major Cunningham and the officers and troops under his command and the partial success that has already attended the operations undertaken by Captain Pottinger against Dhermanjee Pertaub Row which will no doubt conduce to the attainment of the desirable object of suppressing systematic and organized plunder.

The settlement of the Concan will have been undertaken by the Governor in Council of Bombay under whose immediate orders it has been reduced. It will be expedient to annex the northern portion at least of that conquest to that presidency, and possibly this may be the most advantageous mode of disposing of the whole of the late Paishwa's territories below the Ghauts. You will be pleased to take the question into your consideration and communicate your sentiments to the Governor in Council of Bombay, who will be authorized to establish the authority of that Government in the Concan to the extent you may recommend. The rest will remain under your management. Should you be of opinion that the whole of the Concan should be placed under the authority of the Government of Bombay, then you are requested to correspond with the Governor in council relative to the most expedient line of boundary to be established between that district and the territories that will remain under your management and those of the Rajah of Sattarah, in any points in which the Ghauts may *not form a proper and natural boundary*. With the eventual exception of the Concan, it is the intention of the Governor General that the whole of the territory acquired from the Paishwa together with the cessions obtained from Holkar in Kandeish, should, for the present, be retained under your exclusive management. Probably this will continue to be the arrangement until the final orders of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors can be received on the whole question. Indeed, as His Lordship now contemplates the subject, he will be inclined to recommend that this system should continue for at least two or three years; but it is unnecessary to anticipate in this place all the considerations which suggest themselves to His Lordship's mind on this important question.

The territories to the south of Kishna have been under the entire management of Brigadier General Munro, and though His Lordship has not received any account of details of that officer's operations for the settlement of the civil administration of the districts occupied by him, His Lordship's entire confidence in the talents, experience and discretion of Brigadier General Munro, leave him no room for doubt or apprehensions on the subject. Should Brigadier General Munro be compelled to withdraw from the charge, you will probably deem it advisable to exercise a more direct control over the administration of those provinces and will especially take the management of the southern Jageerdars into your own hands,

aided to such an extent as you may find convenient and expedient by the the political Agent at Sattarah.

The Governor General has given his particular attention to your correspondence with Brigadier General Munro relative to the southern Jageerdars, and entirely approved the principles on which you recommended that our policy towards them should be regulated. The justice of your views and expectations have been abundantly verified by the early relinquishment of the case of Bajee Row by the whole body of the southern Jageerdars with the exception of Appah Dessye and Rastiah and the relations of some of the others of inferior note who appear to have been detained by compulsion. The active service of those chiefs against the Paishwa was not to be expected and their declaration in our favour and remaining quiet was justly regarded by you as constituting such a claim to the benefits of your declaration as to make it highly expedient to admit it, subject only to the right to require their assent to such modifications as we might desire not at variance with the principles of the articles of Punderpoor.

His Lordship concludes that Brig. Gen. Munro will have proceeded to settle with the Jageerdars who come within the above description on this principle. Until the details of that officer's proceedings shall be known to the Governor General, it would be premature to state any particular observations in addition to the sanction now given to the general principle of the arrangement. The following remarks, however, will serve to show the general colour of His Lordship's views with regard to those Chiefs.

The knowledge possessed by you and Brigadier General Munro of the interest and dispositions of the Jageerdars with relation to the Government and to each other, and the manner in which their relations with us as well as among themselves, can best be simplified and improved for the benefit of all parties, will have enabled you to introduce the modifications that may be most conducive to those objects. The articles of Punderpore and the Tynaut Zabitas to which the former have reference seem sufficiently to define the relations between the Government and the Jageerdars and it is not the intention or the wish of the Governor General to extend over them any authority not countenanced by those engagements, while they shall continue faithful and obedient. Above all His Lordship has no design of introducing into the territories of the Jageerdars our system of administration in any of its branches. His

Lordship conceives the British Government to be entitled however to require the establishment by the Jageerdars themselves of such an internal course of management as by maintaining the peace of their own districts shall prevent them from becoming dangerous to the tranquillity of the neighbouring possessions of the government. Some stipulations for preventing their lands from being converted into a harbour for offenders endeavouring to escape the vigilance of our police, will also be expedient and may justly be demanded.

His Lordship thinks it essential that the quota of horse which the Jageerdars are bound to maintain by the existing engagements should be reduced to a standard which will enable them really to keep them up. His Lordship is aware that this subject has raised your attention. When the quotas are once fixed on this improved principle, the Jageerdars should be required to keep up the stipulated number with punctuality. Some regulations with regard to muster and the quality of men and horses will probably be necessary, but on all other points, the Jageerdars will not be under any other restrictions than they were heretofore.

The case of Appah Dessye and of the other chiefs who adhered to Bajee Row after the period indicated in the proclamations and letters circulated by you, must be separately considered. Appa Dessye must of course forfeit Manowly and Chicorry, which are to be transferred to the Rajah of Colapore, whose fidelity and general good conduct have given him a strong claim to our consideration. These districts must be relinquished by Appah Dessye without equivalent, and indeed His Lordship apprehends that he has justly subjected himself to the forfeiture of all his Surunjaumy lands. It is a question of which His Lordship will be desirous to receive the opinion of you and Brigadier General Munro, how far this measure should be enforced and you will have considered yourselves at liberty under your general powers to determine it on the spot. His Lordship thinks that in no view of the case ought Appa Dessye to receive back any part of the lands that were resumed by the Paishwa before the war; and that he should also be deprived of the Chouth assigned to him in the territories of the Nizam. You will consider yourself at liberty however to relax the strictness of this provision if you deem it expedient on grounds of policy.

None of the Jageerdars appear to have merited the boon of any addition to their former Surunjaumy held out as the

reward of early and unequivocal declaration in our favour and active support of our cause, and the Governor General sees no reason for diminishing the proper revenues of the government by such liberality to any of them. The Dessye of Kittor whose conduct appears to have given satisfaction to Brigadier General Munro from the beginning, may be an exception, and if you and Brigadier General Munro should regard him in this light, His Lordship will be prepared to confirm any grant you may make to him.

The Governor General is not prepared to state anything regarding Rastia and the other chiefs who have returned until he shall receive a further communication of your views. The singular ingratitude and inconsistency of Rastia's conduct entitle him to no consideration beyond what mere motives of humanity may suggest.

The Vinchoorkur having adhered to Bajee Row to the last, however creditable such conduct may be to his fidelity towards his master, he can have no claim to the kindness of the British Government. You are aware that his former possessions in Hindustan have been already alienated and that Oolpar has been represented by the Government of Bombay as constituting so valuable an accession to that country as to render it highly inexpedient to relinquish it. Anything that may be retained by the Vinchoorkur beyond his enaum lands, which it is your proposal to leave even to those who adhered to Bajee Row to the last, must be regarded as purely gratuitous. His Lordship is indeed not yet prepared to say whether any such favour will be expediently extended to that chief. He has determined to attend Bajee Row to Hindoostan and his conduct during the journey may perhaps in some degree affect the decision on his case. This is a point on which His Lordship wishes you to execute your judgment with reference to the influence our conduct towards this chief and others similarly situated may have on the interests specially entrusted to your charge.

All the Jageerdars will be feudatories of the British Government with the exception of two or three whom it may be expedient to place in that relation to the Rajah of Sattarah, either on account of their connection with the prince's family, the situation of their lands, or other considerations. It is an object to uphold his dignity by giving him this species of supremacy over a certain number of chiefs, but His Lordship apprehends that a general transfer to him of the obligations of the Jageerdars would be raising him to an influence and authority beyond

what good policy would enjoin and it is moreover to be borne in mind that the consent of the Jageerdars generally would be necessary to warrant such an arrangement with reference to their interests.

The Jageerdars whom it is proper to attach to the Rajah are the Prithee Niddee, the Punt Sucheew, Jan Row Nimbalkur and the Rajah of Akulkot. The condition of the Rajah of Akulkot may possibly be affected by the interchange of territory which it may be necessary to make with the Nizam for the improvement of the common frontier.

I now proceed to state to you the sentiments of the Governor General on the arrangements you have made relative to the new state to be founded for the Rajah of Sattarah and His Lordship's instructions on such points connected with this subject as appear to require them.

His Lordship has perused with great satisfaction your instructions to Captain Grant whose provisional appointment to conduct those arrangements and the affairs of the Rajah is quite approved by His Lordship. Your supposition that His Lordship would wish the extent and value of the territories to be assigned to the Rajah of Sattarah to be calculated to render that state the means of providing for a portion of the soldiery of the country and likewise of maintaining some of the civil and religious orders whom it might be difficult to dispose of under our Government, in addition to the objects especially stated in my despatch of the 15th of December, was perfectly correct.

The limits proposed by you for the State of Sattara are entirely consistent with the views of the Governor General who does not conceive that the objects of its establishment could well be answered if it were placed on an inferior scale. His Lordship would propose to carry it to the full extent of the ancient territory of the Paishwa eastward subject to such cessions and interchanges of territory as it may be convenient to adjust with the Nizam. It will be necessary, His Lordship imagines, that the heads of the Ghauts to the westward should be possessed by the British Government. In other respects the whole territory formerly belonging to the Peshwa between the Neera to the north, the Kishna and the Warna to the south, the Nizam's possessions on the east, and the Ghauts on the west, will belong to the Rajah of Sattara, subject to the reservation above stated regarding the Jageerdars whom it will not be expedient to make dependent on the Rajah, although some of their territories be within the general limits above described. All resumed

lands within these limits will be annexed to the territories of the State of Saftara. The suggestions regarding the lands of the Prittee Niddee and others contained in your instructions to Captain Grant are entirely concurred in by the Governor General.

The course pointed out in your instructions to Captain Grant of taking possession in the first instance of the whole country in the name of the British Government and the other measures directed to the assumption and maintenance of the supremacy of that government are entirely approved. This object must be kept in mind in all the arrangements connected with the establishment of this State and the Rajah must be taught to understand the true nature of his situation with the British Government. The general tenor of your instructions to Captain Grant on this point appear to be extremely well calculated for the purpose. This object must, however, be carefully kept distinct from an habitual and systematic interference with the internal administration of the country after it shall have begun to be conducted by the Rajah and his immediate ministers. If appears to the Governor General to be essential to the respectability of the State of Satara, to its efficiency as a subordinately of the British Government and to the success of the whole arrangement, that while the Rajah is politically controlled by the British Power, he should feel himself in his internal government and the exercise of his authority over his own subjects, free and independent.

The circumstances that may tend to facilitate or obstruct the completion of the present arrangement were correctly stated by you and the measures enjoined in your instructions to Captain Grant for improving the one and counteracting the other, are in all respects judicious. The necessity for the general details of the administration being conducted by Captain Grant in the present inexperience of the Rajah and his ministers, is obvious and the rules you have prescribed for his guidance in the performance of this important duty are perfectly approved. The principles of government on which they are founded should be carefully inculcated in the mind of the Rajah and his ministers and should become their rule of action when the Rajah shall assume the administration of his own affairs and it will be matter of great satisfaction to the Governor General to witness the arrival of the period when this authority may safely be reposed in the Rajah. With a view to facilitate it and to secure as far as possible the success of the Rajah's administration, it

seems expedient that Captain Grant should endeavour to employ in the details of the government those persons who would naturally be the instruments of the Rajah and will thus acquire experience and habits of business and a knowledge of those principles of government by which the administration of their native prince should be guided.

The line of conduct which you have directed Captain Grant to pursue towards the Rajah and the members of his family, is perfectly proper and considerate, being wisely calculated to win his confidence and secure his attachment. Your opinion of the personal character and disposition of the Rajah, as far as it has yet developed itself, is very encouraging and His Lordship is happy to perceive from your latter despatches that Captain Grant was gradually getting the better of the defects observed by you in the Court of Sattarah.

Captain Grant's success in reducing forts, in bringing the country generally into order, as reported in his despatches to you, of which copies have been transmitted to the Governor General, and the general aspect of affairs in that quarter, have afforded the Governor General much satisfaction.

The restraints to be imposed on the Rajah's foreign correspondence are a necessary result of the relation in which he stands towards British Government. They will, of course not be enforced in a manner to wound his feelings and if the object and nature of them be skilfully rendered familiar to his mind, it is not probable that they will be regarded in any degree irksome.

It does not appear necessary to touch on any other points of your instructions to Captain Grant which appear throughout to partake of the same correct and enlightened views of humanity and policy which have characterized your general administration.

When the boundaries are settled and the extent of the Rajah's territories and that to remain in Jageers dependent on him is defined, it will be expedient to reduce the conditions of the grant and the several provisions with which it is accompanied to the form of a treaty with a specification of the lands forming his possessions. It will be necessary also to settle the amount and description of the Rajah's military establishments with a view both to the general efficiency of his government and to the

object of providing for a portion of the Marhatta Sirdars and soldiers whose habits will render them unfit for employment under our government. These definite engagements may, however, be expediently postponed till the practical success of the arrangements has been in some measure ascertained.

The salary of Rs. 2,000 per mensem assigned by you to Captain Grant with permission to charge his expenses to the extent of Rs. 1,000 per mensem is sanctioned as well as the authority to charge his office establishment separately. His Lordship also sanctions the allowance of Rs. 500 per mensem assigned by you to Ballajee Punt Natu exclusive of his pension.

I shall have the honour in a separate despatch to communicate to you His Lordship's views and instructions relative to the most expedient exchanges of territory with His Highness the Nizam for the purpose of improving the frontier of the possessions of the two States. The plan will include the cessions proposed to be made to the Nizam from the territories acquired by the British Government from the State of Nagpore and equivalent (of) it may seem reasonable to require from the Nizam's Government in return of those cessions and the relinquishment of the Paishwa's claims which have devolved on the British Government after providing a suitable remuneration to His Highness for the zealous and liberal co-operation afforded by his government during the late operations. Corresponding instructions will be issued at the same time to the Residents at Hyderabad and Nagpore.

The Governor General directs me to signify to you his perfect approbation of your reception of Chimnajee Appah after his separation from his brother's interests, of your prompt and humane attention to his distresses, and the means you took to relieve them.

His Lordship perceives by your correspondence with the Government of Bombay enclosed in your letter to me of the 12th of June that Bassein has been fixed on for the residence of Chimnajee and that you do not consider his vicinity to the scene of his brother's late power to be likely to produce any inconvenience. You will have inferred since the conclusion of the arrangement under which Bajee Row will probably reside at Benares that the removal of Chimnajee to that city might have been objectionable on that special ground. His Lordship is satisfied that your assent would not have been given to any arrangement for Chimnajee likely to create embarrassment and

His Lordship is disposed to believe that the quiet character and moderate talents and influence of Chimnajee, will preclude any such consequences from his residence at Bassein. You will of course observe his conduct with vigilance and be prepared on the first appearance of any suspicious proceeding on his part to interfere effectually for the prevention of his designs. You will of course have reported the nature and amount of provision you propose to assign to him. No letter on this subject however has yet reached Headquarters.

The management you may propose to make in favour of any of the late Paishwa's ministers as well as the mode and extent of reward to be conferred on persons who have adhered to us through the late contest, will also doubtless form the subject of an early report, so that government may know the amount of reduction on his head from the resources of the newly acquired territory.

The attention shown by you to the wife of Bajee Row and your anxiety to contribute to her comfort were highly approved by the Governor General, as was the humane and liberal treatment she experienced from Lieut. Col. Prother on the surrender of Ryeghur.

The foregoing paragraphs comprehend all the observations which have appeared to the Governor General to be required on the material points detailed in your despatches and to convey to you a sufficient exposition of His Lordship's views and sentiments relative to the measures actually in progress or remaining to be executed in order to complete the settlement of the late Paishwa's country. I shall have the honour to address you separately on several subsidiary and minor questions on which communications have been received from you.

The character of the war and the natural consequences of so complete a revolution in the government must naturally preclude the expectation of any material accession of revenue from those territories during the current season. Considerable remissions indeed would seem to be essential both for the relief of the people and to avoid at the outset of our Government the odium of pressing them too hard. It is the hope of His Lordship, however, that the value of these acquisitions will soon begin to be felt and the measures taken by the collectors under your orders are calculated to effect the realization of the revenue in a manner creditable to our name and little burthensome to the country. It will be satisfactory to His Lordship to receive at as early a period as may be practicable an account of the collections and expenditure of the present season and you are

requested to forward to the Accountant General at Fort William monthly statements in abstract of the collections, disbursements and balance of the preceding month. You will be pleased also to correspond with the Accountant General respecting the appropriation of the surplus revenue after the payment of the current charges.

The military provision that will be requisite for the service of those provinces is another point on which His Lordship is desirous of receiving an early report from you after consulting with Brigadier General Smith. The arrangements and dispositions actually in force must probably continue for the present, but after some months of peace and when the remains of insurrection shall be subdued and the province of Kandeish tranquillized and settled, it will be necessary to reconsider the question with reference to that supposed state of circumstances. It will also be necessary to consider and determine what garrisons are to be permanently formed of regular troops and to place the forts in a proper state of security. In all these arrangements the utmost attention will be paid by you to economy as far as that object may be consistent with our real strength and safety.

. As the Auxiliary Force must still be maintained for a time both with a view to the object of finding employment for a portion of the native soldiery and as furnishing a description of troops very useful for the service in which they are likely to be required at the commencement of the new government, His Lordship is disposed to hope that some early reduction of the regular troops now in the provinces under your charge may be practicable, even though a permanent allotment of the force to be stationed in them may still be postponed. Your attention will be directed to this object, at your earliest leisure from more pressing duties.

The Governor General having taken into consideration the nature and extent of the duties assigned to you under the instructions of the 15th of December and those contained in this despatch for exceeding in variety, difficulty and responsibility those of a Resident or indeed almost any other class of functionary in India, it has appeared to His Lordship no more than equitable to place your allowance on a corresponding footing. His Lordship has accordingly been pleased to determine that from the 15th of December the date of your appointment to be sole Commissioner you shall draw a personal salary of rupees fifty thousand per annum with authority to charge your expenses to the public.

No. 142—Malcolm gives graphic details of Baji Rao's mental agonies, his ardent wish to go back to Poona, the flat denial that Malcolm gave to any such expectations and the conversations that were held between them while on the journey to the north.

**From—J. MALCOLM, THE POLITICAL AGENT TO
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.**

**To—J. ADAM, CHIEF SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT.**

Kutchrode, 31 August 1818.

Sir,

Bajee Row marched from Mundesoor on the 22nd instant. You have already been informed of the arrangements I have made for his journey to Hindostan. It only remains that I should state such points as are necessary to complete the information of the Most Noble the Governor General respecting his conduct subsequent to his submission and the temper in which he proceeds to his place of destination. To do this fully it will be necessary to state in some detail the conduct I have observed towards him and its apparent effect.

The most Noble the Governor General is informed of the pains I took to explain to Bajee Row the exact nature of the terms that would be granted to him. I was satisfied that the ultimate success of any arrangements would rest upon the observance of this principle, and soon after his arrival in my camp I became aware that while Bajee Row and his adherents had endeavoured to obtain the best terms they possibly could, they still continued to cherish hopes of something further being conceded either to their entreaties or intrigues. It appeared therefore quite important that no measure or expressions of mine should furnish the slightest ground for such an expectation, but on the contrary, that these should convey to him, and to all around him, the impression, that while there was no comfort and respect which he would not receive as long as his conduct merited it every idea of restoration to power was at an end, and that no act however, trivial would be tolerated that had the remotest tendency to revive feelings inconsistent with his actual condition.

Attention to this principle regulated all my proceedings. On the same day that I struck the tents of my headquarters to give a spot of ground more convenient for water and near a Hindoo temple to Bajee Row, I reprimanded one of his principal officers with severity for daring to seize an inhabitant of the country accused of theft, without application or report to me, and I threatened one of Scindeah's petty officers with punishment for having ventured without my permission to make a direct communication respecting some articles of supply.

Bajee Row was long unwilling to confess even to his own mind his actual condition. This I observed from all his conduct, but particularly from his anxiety to evade every discussion of his journey and future place of residence. I also observed from the language of some of those around him, that a hope of some mitigation of his destiny was entertained. The indignation, however, with which I invariably treated every allusion to this expectation, made them very cautious in their expressions, and latterly I only learnt their hopes through the report of others, and particularly as those related to Bajee Row's journey to Hindoostan which it was rumoured had been deferred for several months, with a view to a more favourable arrangement. These circumstances made me happy to take advantage of the terror which the ravages of the cholera morbus had spread in Bajee Row's camp, to propose a movement, and though very unwell I put an end at once to all moral objections by stating that I would accompany him as far as Katchrode, or even Mundosore and settle all points which remained to be settled, upon the road or at one of those towns.

I was sensible from the hour of Bajee Row's submission of the importance of preventing as much as possible all intercourse between him and his former subjects in the Deccan, but while he remained in the southern part of Malwa, the vicinity of Indore and Ougein made the communication between his camp and his former territories so easy through a variety of channels, that any effort of mine to have put an end to it must have failed. The attempt would not only have lost temper, but have led to the establishment of other and more secure channels, which it appeared to me would by the gradual departure of Bajee Row's adherents, the cessation of his power to secure them, the operation of separate interests, and above all the great distance to which he was about to be removed, soon die a natural death, or at all events he would be placed in a situation where it would be easy to put a total stop to it, should that be desired. But perhaps it may be judged sufficient (when Bajee Row is settled

in the Company's territories) to require that all letters should be transmitted through British Agents, and submitted to their inspection. To such a regulation no rational objections could be made, particularly, as it might with justice be urged, that it was meant to secure Bajee Row from those imputations of continued intrigue which were more likely to hurt him in his present situation, than all other causes. Thus far it is certain that an indulgence of this description would reconcile all whose intentions were fair to the severest regulations against indirect correspondence.

I had entertained some apprehension at one time of the extent to which Bajee Row might think himself entitled under the terms I had granted, to recommend a number of his adherents to the notice of the British Government, but the feeling which I have before noticed operated for a long time in preventing his entering specifically upon such subjects, and though aware of all the temporary evil of allowing an impression to remain in the Deccan that their late prince had still the power of promoting the interest of individuals, I was withheld from opening this question by desiring him to present a list of persons or establishments that he was personally solicitous should be favoured, by the fear that his list would be excessive, and that the very circumstance of my asking for it, would be received as a pledge of more attention to his request than could possibly be given. Besides the 5th article of the propositions was general and it did not appear to me to be of advantage to admit of its being construed in a manner that established specific rights; independent of those considerations circumstances had limited and were daily limiting the number in whose favour such claims were likely to be advanced, and by combating them as they were brought forward, an opportunity was offered for closing all further demands upon this head, at a more moderate sacrifice than could otherwise have been expected. The result has not disappointed my expectations. Besides, the applications in favour of the Gokla family to whom I had before promised that the liberality of government should be extended, Bajee Row has only solicited consideration for Ramchunder Panduranga Deodar (his wife's brother-in-law) mentioned in my letter to Mr. Elphinstone of the 28th of July, and the Desmok family, and when I agreed to forward, what he stated regarding the claims of the latter, I distinctly informed him that the paper given to me had been transmitted as information, and that the degree of attention it would receive depended upon circumstances, with

which I was unacquainted and on which I had not even the power to give an opinion. I further stated that this was the last application which would be made to Mr. Elphinstone.

With regard to persons who remain with Bajee Row and who have made or may make themselves useful to the British Government in influencing him to that line of conduct which it is desirable he should pursue, their claim to consideration rests, I conceive, upon other grounds than his recommendation. When the principal Jageerdars, with their followers left Bajee Row, I complied with his request by intimating to Ballaba who had so long managed the Vinchoorker's family, my wish that he would go to Hindoostan with him. The same desire was expressed respecting Ramchander Venkatesh the principal leader of the Gokla family, and complied with. I knew my refusal of those requests would excite alarm in Bajee Row's mind and I concluded that if these persons did not proceed with him, men of less respectable character might attain an ascendancy over his mind; and under those impressions I did not hesitate to express to both Ballaba and Ramchunder my expectation that they would entitle themselves to the favour of the Governor General. Hitherto I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

Anund Row Jeswunt and Bhicajee Punt who had been employed as Vakeels in making that settlement, are individually persons of no pretensions. They have from the first, professed and shown an anxiety to forward the objects I had had in view, and if they continue the same conduct I have no doubt they will be deemed deserving of some reward; but beyond this I know no persons connected with Bajee Row that can bring forward any claims or in whose favour he can make any particular request.

While Bajee Row remained at Mhow I discouraged every intercourse between him and officers of Holkar's Government, and the desire of the latter to conform to every wish of mine prevented all necessity of harsh regulations or interference upon this point. His submission had made an instantaneous and striking difference in the conduct of Scindiah's chief officers in this quarter of Malwa, and the orders which their prince had issued to them, directing attention to my wishes and commands, have been obeyed by the principal amildars in a spirit, that leaves me no doubt of the sincerity in which they were issued. I have had particular cause to be satisfied with these officers since I left Mhow. The Amildar of Nolye was absent at Burhanpur, but his deputy while I was in his district, regulated his attention to Bajee Row with scrupulous regard to my orders.

He admitted of his respect by presenting a small Nuzzur, but all other points even to the furnishing him with a bundle of fire-wood when that could not be purchased, or a guide to show the road were obtained through me. Appa Gungadhur Vittell Nazim of Mundasore, Kutchraod Jawad, came sixty miles to meet me, that he might learn my wishes regarding his conduct, and that of the persons under him on this delicate occasion, and these he most strictly complied with during the twenty days that I remained in his country. The rank of Appah Gungadhur, made me deem it improper he should like others meet Bajee Row with a nuzzur, and it was not consistent with the rules I had laid down, to authorize any intercourse beyond such a testimony of respect. This conduct probably gave some offence, for when the extreme severity of the weather and Bajee Row's desire to observe the feast of sravani made me allow of his going into the town of Mundessor for a few days, Anund Rao Jeshwunt earnestly solicited that I would direct the aumildar to give up his house, and the buildings attached to it for his accommodation. This I positively refused, observing that I might have shown such a mark of attention within the Company's provinces, but that an act of indelicacy towards one of Scindiah's highest and most respectable officers, would be a bad return for the confidence which had led that prince to direct his subjects to attend to my commands. Appah Gungadhur's good sense, and feeling as a Brahmin, would, I added lead him to give suitable accommodation to Bajee Row and the few adherents whom he might take with him into Mundesoor. This was done, and Bajee Row willing, I conclude, to make me believe that he was not informed of a communication with which he, no doubt, heard I was displeased, signified that he was well satisfied with the two houses that had been allotted for his residence.

These facts will, I trust, satisfy the Most Noble the Governor General that I anticipated his orders on the mode in which I have treated Bajee Row. The impression made by his arrival in Malwa and by his proceeding through that province in the manner he has done, has been remarkable. The idea entertained by the inhabitants of all this quarter of India, of the Paishwa, was the more exaggerated from his former distinction. They only knew him as the descendant of the great leaders who had first established the Mahratta sovereignty, and from hearing him daily acknowledged as the legitimate head of those Marhatta princes under whose irregular and oppressive tyranny they and their forefathers had so long suffered, and in this view they had a very magnified opinion of his dignity, of the actual situation of

the Poona Government, and the changes which had taken place in that state within the last thirty years they were as ignorant of, as they were of the resources of Bajee Row respecting which they had heard nothing but through channels which falsified every report, and converted his defeats into victories. There were no doubt a few exceptions, but the above is a correct statement of the general information and feeling; and the actual arrival of Bajee Row in Malwa did not at first satisfy those who had remained incredulous of the accounts previously received of his submission. Persons were sent to my camp from distant districts to ascertain the fact by personal observation. His march through the country has not only banished all doubts but completed those impressions made upon the inhabitants of these quarters by the triumphant successes of the Most Noble the Governor General during the last twelve months, and nothing has been more striking than the apparent satisfaction produced in all by our generous treatment of Bajee Row. The general sentiment on this subject I believe was well expressed in an observation of Appah Gungadher the day I left Mundesore. "Bajee Row" he said, "had been most fortunate in having the English for an enemy, and the latter understand how to fix their power better than any nation in the universe." "You treat Bajee Row in a manner," he observed smiling, "that leaves us Mahratta Brahmins even without a shadow of complaint, and all others are full of admiration at your liberality, but it is confidence in strength alone," he added, "that can inspire such conduct towards a fallen enemy". "And what child," he concluded, turning to the natives around him, "does not know that there is now an end to every dream of opposition to the British Government?"

I have said more concerning the conduct and sentiments of Appah Gangadhur from a consideration of his situation and character. He now rents a country of nearly twenty lacs of rupees per annum, and is the third generation of a family who have held the province of Mundesoor, Naighur, Oniel, and Katchrode for more than twenty years; the consequence is, that his influence and authority has more the character of a ruler than a farmer, though his appearance and habits have all the simplicity and plainness of the latter condition, but the flourishing state of the countries under him is the best comment upon the disposition and ability of this respectable man.

I have before mentioned the grounds I had to suspect that Bajee Row and those around him continued to entertain expectations inconsistent with their actual condition, and as I deemed

it essential not only to their own welfare, but to the public interests that these should be fully entered upon and completely dispelled before they proceeded to Hindoostan, I called upon his principal advisers to state distinctly what hopes they had indulged on this subject. Upon this demand being once or twice repeated, a paper was presented to me, stating that Bajee Row, though sensible of the generosity with which he had been treated, could not when he referred to the conduct of the British Government since their first establishment in India, but expect that he would yet be restored to his native country after he had shown by two or three years peaceful and quiet demeanour in any place appointed for his residence, that he merited such favour. He had no hope, it was stated, beyond being called Paishwa, and living in his palace at Poona, to which city he was quite content that his authority should be limited.

The paper which contained this proposition had in it several minor requests. The principal of which was that no property that was personal, and not belonging to the state, should be deemed seizable after the 2nd of June, the day on which Bajee Row submitted. A considerable alarm on this point had been caused by letters from Poona. It was also requested that he should be allowed to send a vakeel to the Governor General at Calcutta; that I should promise to visit him in Hindoostan and till then that a Vakeel should remain with me and that as my first assistant Lieut. Low should be allowed to remain with him wherever he was; a compliance with the last request, it was added, was *the only thing that could reconcile Bajee Row to a temporary separation from me, though his confidence was quite personal he was in the habit of considering Lieut. Low as acting wholly from me and as influenced on all occasions by the same feelings of kindness and consideration.*

In answer to the first article of this paper I distinctly told the assembled advisers of Bajee Row that their master could never be restored to Poona by a less event than the overthrow of the British Rule in India. For no measure, I added, had even been more deliberately taken or confirmed by more solemn pledges of faith to others, than that which excluded him and his family from all name or exercise of sovereign power in the Deccan. I demanded with some warmth if the slightest word or action of mine, since the day the first Vakeel came to Mhow, had authorized such an expectation; I was answered by all in the negative. I then concluded by stating that I trusted I should never hear more of such a proposition, that if I did, I must write to the Governor General, whose confidence in the settlement

"You must content yourself, with your present condition, but be assured I am your friend and will try to improve it." When this was rejected another was brought forward, in a more modified form, and at last it was urged that if I should only express generally my wishes for his good fortune and happiness it would satisfy him. I told those agents by whom these messages were brought that the eagerness with which they pressed me upon this subject, carried conviction to my mind, that more would be understood than the words conveyed. I was not, I said, surprised that Bajee Row parted reluctantly with every hope of regaining sovereign power or of seeing once more the place of his nativity, but knowing as I did, that it was resolved past all power of change that such should be his destiny, I would never confirm a hope, which whatever comfort it might give at the moment, would prove the certain source of future misery. "Ask me," I said, "for anything connected with Bajee Row's comfort or happiness in his present condition, and it shall be granted." "What can we ask?" replied Ram Chunder, "You treat Bajee Row personally with kindness and regard. You have given him all your own tents. If he requires a camel you send him two. Money is supplied on the same scale. He pitches his camp where he pleases, and marches when it suits his convenience. Not a Hircarrah is employed to watch him. We are reported to be very bad," he added, "but we are not insensible to the value of such treatment." "You perceive in it," I observed in reply, "a hope of that which you will hereafter receive from the English Government if you continue to merit it. But I have no hesitation," I added, "in speaking plainly. It is your good sense more than your good principle to which I trust. You must see from the present situation of the Deccan and from that of the country through which you are passing that Bajee Row has no choice but that of making up his mind to his lot. He was at present," I said, "in a condition of comfort and affluence, but suppose him to have fled from the protection of the British Government, to what spot in India could he go with any prospect except that of misery and ruin? The man who holds a different language," I concluded, "is as great an enemy to him as Trimbuckjee." Ramchander, after some consideration, said he was at last convinced that it was altogether in vain to try further to effect a change, and that I should never again be troubled by him on this subject. From this moment there was an apparent alteration in the temper in which our intercourse was conducted. Difficulties and delays were no longer made to the discharge of remaining silladars (including about three hundred Mahraṭtas); and discussions were now fully

entered upon regarding the future residence of Bajee Row, a subject which had been before studiously avoided. Though I had meant (as stated in my letter of the 17th instant) to leave this point to Lieut. Low, I was happy to meet the disposition they now evinced to enter fully upon it. The objections that they stated against Bajee Row residing at Benaras were conceded in by me, without acquainting them with those entertained by the Governor General, as I feared such knowledge would strengthen in them the hopes he entertained of being allowed to reside at Mattra, which I positively objected to from its being on the frontier, and comparatively less [safe] than possessions more in the interior. I particularly pointed out the advantages of his fixed residence being at some place at a distance from a large city with liberty to pay occasional visits to places of worship. This proposal appeared to be relished, but I found an insurmountable objection to any place below Benaras. The country to the east of that city, it was stated was unfavourable to the health of strangers, and the inhabitants were known to have a marked aversion to Deckanees; there were many reasons, it was stated, against Bajee Row's ever going to Gaya and amongst others the expense, which would be beyond what his present circumstances could afford. They appeared to have an objection also to Allahabad, and urged that if Mattra was not liked somewhere in its vicinity might be fixed upon. I mentioned that the places in its vicinity were liable to the same objection as I had stated to it. Beekajee Punt who has been in Hindoostan then mentioned the Brahmin village of Beetoor or Brahmavarta upon the Ganges, which was he said certainly free from the objections I had made regarding security, as it was within a few miles of our large cantonment at Cawnpore. I demanded it that vicinity was not felt as an objection. Ram Chunder said on the contrary, that Bajee Row residing in a situation where we had so large a force was calculated to increase confidence in him, and to prevent the existence of those suspicions, which I had before said were so dangerous to his happiness. I finished this discussion by saying I would speak upon the subject to Bajee Row himself, and recommend him to conform, on this and on any other point, to the wishes of the most Noble the Governor General, conscious as I was that those wishes would be chiefly regulated by attention to his comfort and real interest. During this discussion I had constant intercourse with Bajee Row. Immediately after my last conversation with his advisers on the subject of his hopes of being restored to Poona he requested a private conference with me and Lieutenant Low. It was conveyed to me before this took place, that it was expected I would

listen patiently to what Bajee Row said, but give no answer. I observed that I was much disposed to attend to any wish he expressed, and should not intrude an answer unless it appeared urgent for me to do so. Bajee Row commenced this conference as I have always known him do, when much interested, by speaking to me direct, and in Hindoostani. He would, he said, relate to me two events, the one which he draws from the Shastras of his tribe, which had occurred more than five thousand years ago. The latter belonged to the history of the Emperor of Delhi and was of more recent date. He then related an allegory from the Hindoo mythology in which an attendant of the Court of Brumha, after being condemned to the earth for gazing too eagerly on the Goddess of Gunga, was from her feeling of remorse at being the cause of his removal from heaven, married to that Goddess, and after a short sojournment in the lower regions, restored through her influence to his former celestial abode.

The second story which related to the celebrated Hindoo Rajah Sewaee Jyesing, had also an allusion to his condition, and conveyed a hope that I would consider myself pledged to promote his future happiness and prosperity. Bajee Rao added quickly after relating these stories, that they were merely historical and required no observation, but he wished I would bear them in my memory. He appeared at the same time anxious to hasten the ceremonies of departure, desirous not to have the delusions he cherished destroyed. But I observed, on seeing this that I was not averse to do anything that could be considered disrespectful, but I had, I said, one question to ask, if Ram Chunder and those who had accompanied him to my tent, a few days before, had told him the result of our conversation upon the subject to which he had alluded. "Every word has been stated faithfully," Ram Chunder observed, and Bajee Row nodded assent. I continued, that at this moment of parting, when I was aware of his sufferings in the last struggle for amelioration of his destiny, it would have been a great consolation to me if I could have relieved him; but when I knew that to afford him one ray of hope would be but to cast a gloom over his life and to embitter every future enjoyment, by giving [rise] to an expectation that never could be realised, it became my duty as a friend to inform him in the most solemn manner that no event short of the downfall of the British Government could restore him to Poona, or to power; that measures including the faith and honour of the British name had been taken, which were grounded on his perpetual banishment from that

country, and the sentence therefore was irrevocable. I might never see him again, I added and I claimed as the reward of that openness and truth which I had observed in all my communications with him full and perfect belief upon this occasion, and I concluded by expressing a hope that the subject would never again be revived under any shape.

The effect of this declaration, was to throw Bajee Row into a deep grief, and we soon afterwards took our leave. Ram Chunder who followed me to my horse whispered, "You have done great good. You have taken the thorn from the side and all will be as you wish."

Next day I saw Bajee Row and was surprised at the difference of his manners and looks. He was disembarrassed and comparatively cheerful, and entered with interest upon all points connected with his march and place of future residence. Regarding the latter he expressed the same sentiments that had been conveyed to me by his agent. On the same day I received a message expressing of his hope that the generosity of the Governor General would increase his income beyond eight lakhs, which I had stated as the lowest sum that would be fixed for his maintenance. I distinctly informed the person who conveyed this message that there was not the slightest hope of any increase as the Governor General with every consideration for Bajee Row, had, when he confirmed the engagement I had made, stated his opinion that the pecuniary allowance assigned, was ample for his support.

The day before Bajee Row left Mundesoor, he requested another private conference at which Lieut. Low was present. He showed on this occasion, as on the former, an apparent resignation to his lot, he spoke first of his journey stating that he would go direct to Muttra, where he hoped he would be allowed to remain two months. I wished him to limit his stay at that place to a month, and it was ultimately arranged that the Governor General should be requested to permit him to remain six weeks at that sacred place. In consenting to this I informed Bajee Row that circumstances might occur to make the Governor General averse to this arrangement, and I urged him to entitle himself to indulgence by making as few delays as possible on the road to the Jumnah. He said he would, but he hoped occasional halts would be granted on days where the performance of religious ceremonies rendered those indispensable. He next went over the same ground that he did before regarding the place of his future residence, and I told him

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that I would convey all that he had urged upon this subject to the Governor General. He begged that at the same time I stated his resolution to study His Lordship's wishes, that I would express his hope that in deciding this question, his feeling and prejudices as a Brahmin might be as much considered as possible. But wherever he resided he said, he had one request more that was essential to his happiness, which was that Lieut. Low should remain with him. He should feel secure, he said, and tranquil, as long as that officer was near him, and be unhappy if he was removed. I explained to him how impossible it was for me to make him any promise beyond what I had already done. He urged me most earnestly to write to the Governor General regarding it. "Who can your government trust," he asked, "better than Mr. Low, and I know he will be always kind to me." Besides, he continued, "when I am going to a country of strangers, the Governor General will, I am assured, not refuse me one friend." He then requested that I would charge Lieut. Low to see he was treated with respect. "I am more anxious about these matters," he added, "since I have lost the power, than I was before" and he noticed some trifling omissions of complimentary etiquette in a person who had visited, and which had occurred from accident. It is however justice to Bajee Row to state, that he is far from being particular or troublesome on these points. With regard to his anxiety about Lieut. Low remaining near him, I believe it to be very sincere, and I know his alarm at strangers to be, as he states, excessive. I trust the Governor General will not disapprove of my having promised that Lieut. Low shall remain till he reaches his place of final destination. I have the most complete confidence in the vigilance and good sense of that officer, and am persuaded that the perfect knowledge he has of the character, and the influence he possesses over the mind of Bajee Row and his adherents, which has been gained entirely by his manliness and uniform good temper, will, while it conciliates them to a perservance in good conduct, give him means beyond what any other individual can possess, of detecting intrigues, or attempts of any kind to disappoint the objects of the present arrangement.

At the close of this conference Bajee Row assumed a serious air, and said he had something very private to say to me, which he begged might go no further. He then went once more in a general manner over his late misfortunes, but with this remarkable difference. There was evidently desire to extenuate rather

than to deny his crimes to the British Government; his mind had been, he said, for many years in a state of torture, from the causes to which he had alluded, and it was to that, more than to any premeditated guilt that the events must be referred, which had occasioned his seeing a day like the present. I replied that it certainly was not a moment for me to aggravate his feelings, but that nothing could tend more to his future peace of mind, than a just view of the real causes of his great misfortune, that there could be no doubt his view was to be solely ascribed to his having listened to the counsels of Irim-buckjee, whom he himself had confessed to me he now knew to be one of the wickedest and vilest of men. Bajee Row made no reply whatever to this remark, but said in continuation of his previous observation, "Pray write to the Governor General that I am not so bad as he may conceive me and that I will strive to merit his future favour. Entreat him not to suspect me of evil designs. Where indeed can I propose to be so well, as under the protection of the British Government?" I gave him an assurance, I would make the communication he desired. When rising to go away, Bajee Row said he had one favour more to ask of me. He wished the picture of his deceased friend Sir Barry Close to be sent to him from Poona where it was left in his palace; he also begged I would send him one of myself; he would place them, he observed, in whatever house he inhabited, and when melancholy as he must often expect to be, his spirit would be revived by looking at the countenances of two persons who he was satisfied had a sincere regard for him. I promised to comply if I had the power, with his wish. This was probably meant only as personal compliment, but I mention every fact however trivial that can throw the slightest light upon his real or pretended feeling on the occasion of his departure, and in elucidation of my last conferences, I shall add one of a very private nature that took place an hour after with Ram Chunder Vankatesh. I told this person when we were alone, that he was thought by numbers to have influenced Bapoo Gokla to the part he acted, adding the strong feelings I had of the deception of the latter, who had led me to believe when at Mahowlee that he would never engage in hostilities against the English; whereas he became the chief cause, as well as the principal actor in the war. Ram Chunder said that with regard to the accusations against himself they were of little consequence. He was in too subordinate a situation to give value to his opinion, but he could easily prove, he said, that though he had been most active in the prosecution

of the war, and had been wounded several times, he was against its commencement, and had with Gokla's uncle pointed out the ruin that would result from it. He had been promised he said (had affairs taken a different turn) to command five thousand horse, destined to act with our armies against the Pindarries and had therefore a personal interest in the alliance being preserved. I asked him if Gokla was eager for war. He was, he replied, latterly very much so, he seemed for the moment to have lost all that moderation and good sense by which he was distinguished, and became quite an enthusiast in his hopes of success. It was that villain Trimbeckjee, he added, who turned his brain and filled his mind with ambition, as he had done that of Bajee Row's with fears. "Was it, do you think through his fears chiefly," I asked Ram Chunder, "that Trimbeckjee worked upon Bajee Row." "Entirely," he replied, "Of this there can be no doubt, that prince had never for one instance the courage to expect as many others did, success in a war with the English, but his excessive timidity gave Trimbeckjee complete power over his mind, and when the vigilance of Mr. Elphinstone detected the machination and guilt of the former, he had art enough to persuade Bajee Row that every measure adopted by the Resident was directed against him personally and was only a prelude to one more severe and violent; the wickedness of this man, he concluded, and Bajee Row's weakness produced that state of torture of mind, to which the latter alluded in his conversation with you. Trimbeckjee actually made him tremble for his life and hurried him step by step into a scene for which he was altogether unsuited and which has ended in his complete ruin."

There was much apparent sincerity in the conversation of Ram Chunder. His statement was probably meant as an apology for Bajee Row. It is likely also that he was but imperfectly informed of facts, and if otherwise, would give them the colour best suited to his own interest. This communication conveyed a distinct account of the part taken by his chief, as that of Trimbeckjee. There never could be a doubt and everything I have heard and seen satisfied me that Bajee Row has been during his past life, and will continue for the future to act much from his personal fears. Though plausible and possessed of talents, he has neither virtue, courage, nor firmness to resist any bold or wicked councillor, and it is perhaps this prominent defect in his character that has rendered him from the first so uncertain and dangerous an ally to the British Government.

Bajee Row at the last conference I had with him said he hoped that he would be at liberty to ride about the country, eight or ten miles, and that he would not be subject to the jurisdiction of any local authorities. I told him that, he must expect certain limits to his excursions, but none resembling personal restraint. I then informed him of the intention conveyed in the 50th para of your letter of the 8th ultimo. He did not at first seem to understand clearly what an exemption from the laws or Adawlut exactly meant, but Balobah and Beecajee Punt, who have both been in Hindoostan, saved me the trouble of explanation, by assuring him that it implied everything that was beneficial and honourable, and he appeared relieved from much apprehension by the account they gave him of the value of this immunity.

I had considered it consistent with the manner in which I treated Bajee Row to go through the usual ceremonies of receiving and giving presents, and I was glad to observe that this and the attention paid upon points where personal respect and consideration alone were concerned, had a very considerable effect in removing the impression made by the strong and unreserved nature of my communications upon other subjects. He certainly proceeded upon his journey to Hindoostan more reconciled (as far as could be judged from appearance) to his condition than we expected to see him. This may be art, and a desire to conceal his real views, but I confess I am from the manner in which the change occurred, disposed to give him credit for some sincerity in his feelings on this occasion.

Since Bajee Row came into my camp I have obtained every information of his proceedings, that I could without a system of espionage so strict as to excite an alarm in his coward mind calculated to create the very danger against which such precautions might be meant to guard. I believe the intelligence mentioned in my letter of the 11th July was correct; the further enquiry went to satisfy my mind that the communication from Dowlut Rao was merely expressive of regret at Bajee Row's misfortunes. I have since received intimation of several secret letters and plots, but have invariably found my informers acting from motives so obviously interested that the credit due to them was greatly diminished, if not altogether destroyed. I am far from supposing that both Bajee Row and those around him have not since they came into my camp, entered into intrigues, and listened to schemes at variance with their condition, and our interest. This from the first appeared

to me almost as a matter of course, and I had my choice of an effort to put an end to the evil by a harsh and strong interposition of authority, or to apply a gradual remedy. I have deliberately preferred the latter mode, not only as the safest but the most effectual. I have never ceased in my communications with Bajee Row to warn him of this most serious of all dangers by which he can be assailed. My arrangements have been addressed more to his understanding and his feelings than to his principles or his good faith. I have particularly impressed upon his mind the impossibility of his entering into any intrigues without its being discovered from the fears and hopes which those around him must entertain of punishment or reward from the British Government, and supposing otherwise, I have asked what natural prospect to success was there to balance for a moment the hazard of entertaining such projects. The truth of my observations on this point has been always acknowledged and every conversation on this subject has ended in his imploring me not to admit suspicion into my mind; and in my strongly advising him to shape every act in a manner that will shew there is no course for it, and I have never failed to add that after what has passed it will be long before complete confidence can be expected on the part of the British Government.

I have before expressed my opinion regarding Bajee Row in his present condition. There is not much to dread, I think, from his future intrigues or efforts to regain power. He is no longer young, his habits incline him to repose; he places, as I have had a full opportunity of observing, no ordinary value upon the comforts and luxuries which he still enjoys, and though haunted as he occasionally must be by recollection of former greatness, he has not a mind to gain strength from difficulties or to increase in exertion as the means of success diminishes. He possesses as far as I can judge, none of that talent which enables some who want courage themselves to infuse it into those around them; destitute of confidence in himself and in others he appears to me unlikely to make and still more so to succeed in another struggle for a throne. On all these grounds and many others that I have not intruded I can feel no hesitation in expressing my belief that, with that kind and liberal treatment, which the Most Noble the Governor General has awarded him, joined with that precaution and vigilance which is necessary to repress, as well as to guard against a disposition to intrigues which may almost be deemed

constitutional, in persons of his class and character, little apprehension need be entertained of his ever again disturbing the peace of India.

No. 143—Lieut, John Low, Asst. Resident, discusses the question where Baji Rao, should fix his ultimate place of residence. The deposed Peshwa suggested Mathura, Benares or Bithur; after prolonged consultation, the last place was selected.

**From—JOHN LOW, FIRST ASSISTANT AT
HOLKAR'S COURT,**

**To—JOHN ADAM, CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE
SUPREME GOVERNMENT.**

Camp at Chittore, 11 September 1818.

Sir,

Adverting to the 46th paragraph of your despatch to Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm it has been my wish to acquaint you as early as possible for the information of the Most Noble the Governor General with the probable period of Bajee Rao's arrival at the Jumna, but I have been induced to defer addressing you for this purpose by the violence of the rains, which rendered all calculation regarding our movement very uncertain.

Bajee Row having requested me, at a visit which I paid him at Neemuch to speak upon all matters of business to Ramchunder Vyenkataish who was, he said, entirely in his confidence, I took occasion two days afterwards to advert in conversation with the latter to the subject of his master's ultimate place of residence.

I had no sooner commenced the conversation than Ram Chunder said that Bajee Row had been thinking much on that subject lately and that he found from every enquiry he had made, that Muttra was the only place where he would have an opportunity of passing his time in attention to those religious ceremonies which henceforward will constitute his chief pursuit in life. I reminded Ram Chunder in reply that he had before been informed both by Sir John Malcolm and myself, that there were many objections to Muttra as the residence of Bajee Row and thinking it best to close all discussion on that point, I added that I knew the objections in question to be such as could not be got over. Ram Chunder after a short silence asked the question, "Is the choice of the place of abode to rest with the Maharajah

or the Governor General?" I answered, "Undoubtedly with the Governor General." I then referred Ram Chunder to the wording of the paper sent to Bajee Row on the 2nd of June which left the selection distinctly, I continued, to the Governor General, though it implied at the same time that great attention would, if possible, be paid to his wishes. I added also that I knew the Most Noble the Governor General was much disposed to do so, but that a little reflection upon the actual condition of his master would surely convince him (Ram Chunder) that the positive choice of the place could not be permitted to rest with Bajee Row, if any circumstances should lead him to fix upon a spot at which his residence would be, for a variety of reasons quite contrary to the wishes of the British Government.

After a few moments reflection Ram Chunder said, "Well, Low Saheb, as you and I are brothers (a familiar term by which he has addressed me for the last 2 months), tell me frankly for my own private information what is the cause of the Governor General objecting so strongly to Muttra?" "I have seen no papers," I replied, "which gives any detail of his reasons. I only know that he has positive objection to it, and it is not in the least surprising to me," I added, "that this is the case, for I will be as frank as you desire and mention what I conceive must be the feelings on such an occasion in the mind of a person who has all the responsibility and anxiety inseparable from the duties of governing one of the most extensive empires in the world."

"It matters little as far as the British Government is concerned," I observed, "whether the frequent breach of the most solemn engagements on the part of Bajee Rao has proceeded entirely from his own and individual enmity towards us, or from his weakness in attending to the evil counsels of others. The Government can only judge and act according to the circumstances that have actually occurred, and granting even that the latter defect in Bajee Row's character has been the cause of his conduct, it by no means lessens the reasonable objections that I conceive there must exist in the mind of the Governor General, to his residing at a place immediately on the borders of the territories of other powers, where he would (without perhaps any evil intentions originally on his part) have frequent communications with designing men, who from motives connected only with their own ambition and altogether separate from any feelings for his welfare, might instigate him to revert, as far as he had the power, to a similar line of conduct to that which had already caused his removal from his former high station." I added that such conduct could do us no ultimate mischief, but that it would

be troublesome, and I concluded by adding Ram Chunder the following question, "Supposing this to occur, and that it should be discovered, which would certainly be the case, what possible good do you think could ever arise from it to Bajee Row?" "None whatever," was the immediate reply, and he added "what you say is very true, it must be Bajee Row's future conduct only that can give the Governor General confidence in his promises." Ram Chunder then changed the subject of conversation and shortly afterwards left my tent.

I anxiously hope that I did not in the conversation above related (which I had no doubt would be repeated), act contrary to the wishes of the Most Noble the Governor General respecting the mode of treating Bajee Row. I make a point both of never acting towards him in any manner that would seem to indicate suspicion and of never commencing any conversation, either with himself or his adherents that can remind him of his former treachery, but on being pressed as I was by Ram Chunder for an answer why his master's residing at Muttra was objectionable I conceived it to be not only unnecessary to conceal our just suspicions of Bajee Row's disposition, but that a frank declaration of what I conceived must be the feelings of government was the best answer I could make, as being more consistent than any other both with our past measures and the actual relative situation in which Bajee Row now stands to the British Government.

Ramchunder accompanied by Anna Daismookh paid me a visit the day before yesterday and immediately after the usual enquiries respecting my health, renewed the subject of Bajee Row's place of residence. His master requested, he said, notwithstanding what I had related, when he (Ram Chunder) last visited me, that I would request the Governor General's permission for his residing permanently either at Muttra, or within one day's journey of it, and if that could not be obtained, that the Maharajah trusted he should be permitted to live either at Bethoor near Cawnpore (where there is a temple dedicated to Brahma and which is held in great veneration) or at Benares.

I have observed with much satisfaction adverting to the sentiments of the Most Noble the Governor General respecting Benares as Bajee Row's place of residence that he has no longer that preference for it which he seemed to have some months ago. In proof of this feeling I may mention that on this occasion Ram Chunder begged me to acquaint His Lordship that Bethoor was preferred to Benares.

Without informing him that there were any objections on the part of our government to Benares, I asked Ram Chunder what were those of Bajee Row's. He answered, that they related partly to climate and partly to great crowd of Mahrattas residing there, who would expect more pecuniary assistance from the late head of that tribe than his circumstances could afford. He added, however, that Bajee Row would wish occasionally to visit Benares for a few weeks. I took this opportunity of adverting to the degree of restriction that by the nature of our regulations must be imposed upon the freedom of his followers, if he resided at any large town and I recommended therefore that Bajee Row should think of some retired spot where such restraint as I had alluded to would not be required. I added that though our rules respecting police were such that the Governor General could not avoid placing some restriction on Bajee Row's conduct if he resided at any populous place, yet that His Excellency would be very happy to remove them if Bajee Row should fix up on any place so retired as to render such a deviation from the usual practice possible, and I mentioned Goruckpore or Moongheer as places where I had no doubt but that a much greater degree of liberty would be permitted. Ram Chunder immediately interrupted me by exclaiming, "The Maharajah has always lived in one of the finest climates in the world, and the heat of Moongheer would kill him," and he added that Goruckpore would never suit his master from other causes, particularly because there are no temples of great sanctity in that quarter. I said that the Governor General would not object to his visiting Benares occasionally, but both Ram Chunder and Anna Daishmookh said that they were certain that Bajee Row would never consent without extreme reluctance indeed to live at any other place than one of the three they had mentioned, viz. Muttra, Bethoor or Benares. I did not fail to mention the advantage that Moongheer possesses of good accommodation, which is a point on which I know Bajee Row places much value, but it seemed to make no favourable impression. Their dislike of any situation far down in the Company's provinces seems very decided. With regard to Bethoor I made no reply excepting that I would report to the Governor General what they had said respecting it, and said nothing more on the subject of Bajee Row's future residence as there will be abundance of time for my being honoured with His Lordship's orders on every point necessary for my guidance before I can quit Muttra.

It is proper I should mention that Bajee Row solicited a halt of 11 days at this place for celebration of the Gunputty festival.

As we had been already much detained by the weather in addition to three halts (of a day each) that I had granted at his request, I limited the time to five days only for the Gunputty, finding from other Brahmins that the latter period was quite sufficient, as far as related to the prescribed rules in the Shaster for the occasion, and Bajee Row had consented to this arrangement, but I regret to say that from the 3rd day of our halt the rain fell in such torrents that any movement has been totally out of the question. The weather has moderated immediately round this place during the last two days, and the water which once flowed the country to a great distance on both sides of all the rivers in this neighbourhood has now retired within the usual banks, but the river Banas a short distance in our front is totally impassable, and, by all accounts of former years that I can obtain, there seems little reason to expect that it will be fordable for several days more.

In conclusion I have only to beg that you will be pleased to inform His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, that I have had no reason to be displeased with the conduct of Bajee Row since I have been deputed to attend him. His solicitations for halts and short marches have been very frequent, the ostensible excuse for which is his anxiety to attend to the rules of his religion with respect to fasting and prayer. This may not be the sole cause of his creating these delays, but I see no reason to attribute his conduct in this respect to any improper motives further than a wish which, I dare say, a man of his character has, to defer to as distant a period as possible his actual settlement within the Company's provinces, knowing as he does that he must then be deprived even of the appearance of power.

No. 144—The place where Trimbakji Dengele may be confined is discussed in this letter by Elphinstone.

From—M. ELPHINSTONE,

To—J. ADAM.

Camp at Poona, 20 September 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 7th ultimo respecting the confinement of Trimbuckjee Dainglia.

The object of sending Trimbuckjee to Tannah is attained by his return to his former prison and there will be no disadvantage in removing him to any of the hill forts in the Concan, where there may be sufficient garrison under a European officer or close to some such fort in a part of India where there would be less likelihood of his attempting to make escape.

No. 145—Malcolm forwards with his own comments for the Governor General's information translation of a memorandum he had received from Anand Rao, an agent of Baji Rao. It contains Baji Rao's plans for taking shelter at Ashirgad and continuing the war.

From—JOHN MALCOLM,

To—JOHN ADAM.

Mowe, 22 September 1818.

Sir,

I before mentioned to you that Anund Rao Jeswunt had been left by Bajee Row with me. This person had been employed from the first in the communications between me and his master, and had the merit, I believe, of a very sincere desire to bring affairs to a close, an object which he no doubt deemed connected with his own interest, and I encouraged this impression with a view of rendering him more useful.

Though Anund Row was apparently trusted by his master, from whom he was never separate, I was glad when a disagreement between him and other advisers of Bajee Row, caused his removal, as I thought his timid respect and servile flattery did harm, and at all events made him a bad medium for those unpleasant truths which were so often to be communicated. I have since he has been with me told him that I have no business to transact with him, but as Bajee Row wished that he should remain, there was no objection, and I hinted at the same time that if he desired to confirm that favourable impression he had made, it must be by giving me every information of the past transactions, as well as early intelligence of any intrigue that might come to his knowledge. He professed his readiness and as a proof of his sincerity brought me a secret memorandum the substance of which I translated and now transmit. It has little value, but as it corroborates and confirms facts before known relative to the encouragement both

Scindia and Holkar gave Bajee Row, and throws further light upon the conduct of Jeswunt Row Lad, who is now converting his fortress into an asylum for every enemy of the public peace. But of this I shall write further when some confidential persons whom I have sent to Asseer return.

The particulars stated by Anund Row respecting Bajee Row's intention of going into Asseerghur, are evidently coloured to enhance his own merit at having dissuaded him from taking that step, for I had positive information that the Vinchoorkur, the Gokla party, and the Purandares (actuated by a sense of their own interest) were as strong against the measure as Anund Row, and the fact of the bearers being led to carry a covered dooly that Bajee Row might proceed concealed (of which I had at the time intelligence from other quarters), proves there was a party of his military followers from whom he apprehended opposition to such a measure.

The account of the treasure still in the possession of Bajee Row, though not definite is curious. I have no doubt the amount is considerable when perceived as a means of corruption. His possession of such wealth is to be regretted; but on the other hand, as he could hardly hope to carry it off, it may be considered as an additional security against his adopting any desperate course.

No. 145A—Substance of a secret memorandum given by Anund Row Jeswunt to Brigadier General Malcolm.

When Mr. Elphinstone had settled with Bajee Row, about delivering up his districts and forts, a letter was received from Dowlut Row Scindia, stating that for two years he had felt restrained in all his measures by the English Government, and that his desire was to make war upon them; but now that as the Paishwa had consented to give up his forts and districts, he must expect an order to deliver over all his country and forts also, when however he should make war to a certainty; but it would be far better, he observed, that Bajee Row should emancipate himself from the English, collect his Jageerdars and adherents, and after preparing a large army commence a war. I shall be ready (Scindia added) to follow his example. This communication was conveyed, Anund Row states, through Sukaram Chimnaje. When Bajee Row left Poona to commence the war Gunesh Punt Pitkea and Withojee Koltea, the former a Pundit and the latter a Huzooreah, were sent to Mulhar Row

Holkar with commands for him to come instantly to Bajee Row. The answer was a profession of ready obedience to the summons, but a complaint of want of money with an intimation that unless he could pay them, his army would not obey his orders. He ended with soliciting an aid of treasure to enable him to march to the Deccan. Two lacs were sent for this purpose, of which, however, it was understood that only about one lac and a half of rupees were paid. Trimbuckjee Dainglia who had joined Bajee Rao at Foolser near Poona became the violent advocate for war. Gokla, Rastia and the Vinchoorkur were with Bajee Row. The Putwarduns were only nominal adherents, and Appa Dessye joined in order to carry his own plans of ambition into execution; his object was to obtain great reward from the English by seizing Bajee Row and giving him up to that government. (All the world, Anund Rao states, knew this to be a fact). When Gokla was slain and the Raja of Nagpore had submitted and was placed under restraint, a letter was received from the latter stating that if Bajee Row would march and release him, from a treasure of three crores of rupees which were in Chandeepeer and Chanda, one crore should be given to Bajee Row. It was on the strength of this communication that Bajee Row marched towards Nagpore. He was on his advance joined by Gunput Rao Subedar on the part of Appa Saheb. Bajee Rao was, however, met by the English troops and obliged to abandon his design of going to Nagpore. He was at this time advised by a communication from Appa Saheb to go direct to Asserghur and make an agreement with the Killedar of that fortress. Appa Saheb added that he would hereafter find an opportunity of escaping and he would then come to his aid. Bajee Row hastened towards Aseer and sent Anund Rao in front to learn the disposition of Jeswunt Rao Lad, the Killedar of that place, and with whom every thing was settled to his entire satisfaction. The latter having pledged himself that he, his fort, and all whom he could influence and command were at the disposal of Bajee Rao. He further represented that Aseer was amply stored with guns, ammunition and grain, and entreated Bajee Row to place himself in it as a place of security. He would he said, raise the Bheels, the Rangrees and all the military classes of the country in his favour. It was the intention of Bajee Row to adopt this course and with that view he fixed his camp where it was sheltered by Aseerghur. Jeswunt Row Lad came to meet Bajee Row, and personally confirmed every promise he had made, entreating him to enter the fort and make it his own residence and the

repository of his family and property, while the troops could continue to plunder the country and even pass the Nerbudda and enter Malwa where he had numerous and powerful friends. Bajee Row meant on adopting this step, to send Anund Row as a Vakeel to the Governor General, but on hearing General Malcolm was near Indore, he determined upon deputing him to that officer after his return, and when a meeting was settled between Bajee Rao and the General, numbers continued to throw doubts upon the mind of the latter. They succeeded so far that Bajee Row sent the most valuable of his property, his treasure, his wife and his other women into Asseerghur previous to the meeting and remained himself unencumbered by any baggage ready to follow. After the meeting was over, he was still strongly urged to go into Aseerghur, and almost all his councillors, Anund Rao states, advised the measure. Trim-buckjee who saw no hopes of settlement for himself expatiated strongly upon the strength of the fort, the approaching rainy season, and the manner in which the English armies were spread over Mewar, Marwar, Malwa and the Deccan, and the dislike that all men had to their usurpation of general power. Bajee Row was so alarmed at this period, that he did not know what to do, and as a proof of this, Anund Row states, it as a fact known to all immediately about him, that he had posted no less than eleven reliefs of bearers on a distance of five miles, that he might at any moment go unknown (even to his own army) in a covered dooley into Asseerghur; This irresolution, Anund Row asserts, continued to the last moment, and he claims merit as being the chief cause of deciding his master to the act of throwing himself at once upon the English Government.

The treasure discovered at Nassick, Anund Rao says, the Paishwa had concealed in the house of a Brahmin, but his principal property was with him, and had been lodged at Ascer. Some fears were entertained that Jeswunt Rao Lad might detain some of it, but everything was faithfully given up to Bapoo Gurbolah a confidential servant of Bajee Row, who went on the 3rd of June to receive it. This treasure Anund Row observed, consists chiefly of gold mohurs and bullion, gold and silver plates and dishes, gold ornaments and jewels. It is carried upon ten elephants and thirty camels, and he has had the whole estimated at one, two or three crores. He has however no means of judging the exact amount.

No. 146—This important despatch deals with the measures required for the settlement of the late Peshwa's territory. The Governor General heartily approves Elphinstone's proposals for consolidation of the British administration as much to promote the interests of Government as to secure the happiness and prosperity of the people.

From—J. ADAM, CHIEF SECRETARY,

To—THE HONOURABLE M. ELPHINSTONE.

Fort William, 26 September 1818.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 18th June, containing a general view of the measures adopted and proposed by you for the settlement of the Paishwa's late territory and stating such facts and observations relative to that subject, as are calculated to assist the judgment of the Governor General in Council, in deciding on the important questions which that despatch presents for deliberation.

You will since have received my despatch to your address of the 14th July containing the instructions of the Governor General in Council on the most material points connected with the settlement of the country acquired from the Paishwa, formed on the information derived from your previous reports and from an attentive consideration of the facts and circumstances which had come to His Lordship's knowledge during the course of the war. His Lordship in Council perceives with satisfaction that those instructions correspond in principle, and with few exceptions in detail, with the views entertained by you and unfolded in the despatch now referred to. The coincidence of opinion on the general question and the ample discretion with which you were vested by the Governor General, will have enabled you to proceed without interruption or embarrassment to carry into effect the measures best suited to the attainment of the object in view, even in those cases in which the exact mode of proceeding pointed out in the instructions, did not entirely accord with that proposed by you under a nearer view of circumstances and a more accurate knowledge of details.

In recommending to you by the directions of His Lordship in Council the further remarks suggested by the perusal of your despatch now acknowledged, the occasion will be taken of

adverting to the few and comparatively unimportant points in which a difference of sentiment has occurred and of stating to you the matured opinion of the Governor General in Council on each.

The general view taken by you of the different divisions of the country which the result of the war with Bajee Row has placed at our disposal, the distinctive character, habits, and feelings of the inhabitants of each, and the influence of those circumstances on their future conduct and consequently on the stability and ease of our rule, is interesting and important, and furnishes information which cannot fail to be useful in regulating our administration of those countries, and our treatment of the allies and dependents of the government, by whom a considerable portion of it will continue to be held. The completion of the conquest of Candeish, since the date of your letter and the consequent extinction of the remains of Bajee Row's authority throughout his late territories, the capture of Trimbuckjee Dainglia and Dhermajee Pertaub Row, and the suppression of the insurrection headed by the pretended Chutter Sing have improved the general condition of our affairs, and contributed to the consolidation of our power, and must necessarily have facilitated the introduction of those arrangements in which you are now engaged.

The statement given by you of the revenues of the territories of the late Paishwa remaining in the hands of the British Government, after meeting all the demands on us arising from the circumstances under which they were acquired, is satisfactory and appears to have been framed by you on such cautious and moderate principles as to afford just grounds for the belief that no disappointment will be experienced through any unexpected defalcation. The necessity of considerable remissions during the current year has been already recognised, but any immediate sacrifices of this nature cannot justly be regarded as an ultimate loss to the state, since the good effect of this early indulgence will not fail to be seen in an extended cultivation in succeeding years and a permanent improvement in the growing revenue of the country.

According to your statements the total clear revenue which we shall derive from the acquisition of the territory, supposing the expenses of the civil administration not to exceed those of Bajee Row, and the military charges to be met by the cessions of Bassein and Poona which may reasonably be expected, is

calculated at 31,00,000 per annum for the first year, and it is further hoped that by a considerable reduction of the charges of the Auxiliary Force, such an addition will be made to our clear revenue from this source as will make the whole not less than 50,00,000 from the close of the ensuing year.

In framing this calculation, you have provided for all the demands on the British Government, arising out of its accession to the power and dominion of the Paishwa, and the consequent necessity of providing in a suitable manner for many contingencies referable to the particular circumstances of the case.

The Governor General has already signified to you his entire assent to the force of those considerations, which induced you to extend the original objects of the establishment of the Rajah of Sattara in an independent sovereignty and the consequent arrangement of the territory to be conferred on that prince. The limits of the territory to be thus appropriated as described in your instructions to Captain Grant of the 8th April and in the despatch now acknowledged, are perfectly approved. The testimony now borne by you to the good conduct of the Rajah since the formation of his connection with the British Government, naturally confirms this view of the question, and will induce His Lordship in Council to approve of the extension of his territory to the widest limits you have proposed, and to place under his authority those of the Jaggeerdars, whose possessions fall within those general limits with the exception of the Putwurdhans. The particular case of Sholapore will perhaps require to be separately considered, and must depend in a good measure on the interchanges of territory to be effected with the Nizam, to which a reference will be made in a subsequent part of this despatch. It will be proper to make some provision for the security of these Jageerdars, and your attention is very properly directed to that object. In concluding the final arrangements with the Rajah (to which these remarks and the 52nd and following paragraphs of my despatch of the 14th July refer) you will keep this matter in view.

You will exercise your discretion with regard to the period when it will be proper to conclude a formal treaty with the Rajah.

The entire separation of the Rajah from the former dependants of his nominal State, is a fundamental and indispensable principle of the present arrangement. His new Jaggeerdars ought, however, to be made to look to him as their immediate superior and their contingents should form a portion of the horse which the Rajah is to be bound to bring forward for service of the British Government.

It is provided that the Rajah's administration is to be conducted for the present under the superintendence of the British Agent, but it is expedient that the name and authority of the Rajah should be employed in all personal and public acts, both to accustom his future subjects to the exercise of his authority and to give him proper weight and dignity in their eyes, and as the best means of giving an undisputed legal sanction to these acts.

The whole tenor of your sentiments and proceedings, and those of Brigadier General Munro, relative to the Southern Jageerdars, has received the approbation of the Governor General in Council. In the expectations, however, of receiving a detailed report from you or from Brigadier General Munro, of the arrangements made or in progress with those chiefs, His Lordship in Council refrains at the present time from offering any particular remarks on this important branch of the general settlement.

In my despatch of the 14th July, I stated the Governor General's opinion that Appa Dessye had forfeited all claims to indemnification for Chickory and Manowly, besides incurring further penalties. You have in your despatch now replied to take a more favourable view of Appa Dessye's claims to consideration, and the Governor General in Council will be fully prepared to consent to any arrangement in his favour which you or Brigadier General Munro may have led him to expect, or which you may think it proper to concede on grounds of expediency. His Lordship considers it to be equitable that any compensation to be made to Appa Dessye for his claims on the Nizam's territories, which under the sanction now given may be admitted, should be borne by the Government of Hyderabad.

In the former instructions also it was observed that the amount of the contingent of each Jageerdar should be reduced to the scale which he might reasonably be expected to maintain. It is inferred from a passage in your despatch, however, that a tacit acquiescence in their furnishing only a fourth part of the

stipulated quota is preferred by you to any change in the Tynaut Zabita. The Governor General in Council has of course no objection to this arrangement, if you see any particular reason for giving it the preference over a reduced quota fixed by regular engagement.

The opinions expressed by you relative to the advantage of resuming the Jageers of the second class of Jageerdars who held lands for the payment of troops and who did not quit the cause of Bajee Row on the first summons, accord with those of the Governor General in Council, and you will act on this principle, except when particular circumstances may render it expedient to make an exception. The proposal for allowing this class of persons and the other holders of lands for their personal expenses to retain the enjoyment of the last mentioned description of grants, is founded on principles of wise and liberal policy and has the perfect concurrence and sanction of the Governor General in Council, subject to such special arrangements and provisions as you may judge necessary in apportioning the grants with a view to make distinctions according to individual desert, and to leave at the same time some funds to provide for persons similarly entitled to consideration but who did not derive their support from grants of land.

Your propositions regarding the maintenance of the religious institutions of the country are entirely approved and adopted by the Governor General in Council. Those which have been confirmed by the proclamation of Sattara or other public declarations, must of course be supported on their present footing, but His Lordship in Council fully concurs with you in the propriety both on grounds of economy and morality, of substituting for the indiscriminate charities or rather alms-giving of Bajee Row some useful and permanent institutions for the benefit of the community. Your suggestion for the foundation of a Hindoo College at each of the sacred towns of Nassick and Wye is approved by the Governor General in Council, who requests you to submit further details of the plan you would propose and the extent of the endowment.

The employment of the military classes is a subject of the first importance and has naturally and properly occupied much of your attention, as well as that of the Governor General in Council. The views and plans you have formed on this subject are regarded as extremely correct and you will consider yourself at liberty to prosecute them in the manner you propose.

The establishment of the state of Sattara, and the obligation to be imposed on the great Jageerdars to maintain a certain number of horse, will occupy a portion of this class. The measures in progress for reducing gradually the Auxiliary Horse, will perhaps create vacancies in that corps sufficient to enable you during the ensuing season, to furnish employment for a further number, which will of course have the effect of keeping a still greater proportion at their homes, in expectation of similar service. By these expedients for a time it may reasonably be hoped, that the horsemen thrown out of employment by the dissolution of the late government and the other events of the war, will be kept from disturbing the country, while the progress of our authority and the gradual operations of time and nature, will reduce the number of this class of military adventurers to such a scale, as to render them of little consequence. The expense to be incurred in these measures ought not to exceed the sum allotted to the Auxiliary Horse, and it is very satisfactory to His Lordship in Council to observe the confidence with which you anticipate the early reduction of that charge to half its actual amount.

The Infantry of the late government will, as you remark, find employment as Sebundeas or revenue peons and they are not calculated to be so troublesome in the present state of India as the Horse. The Arabs are an exception, and as they are totally unfit for our service and of turbulent and licentious habits, there seems no recourse but acting against them with vigour whenever they collect until they are broken and disarmed or compelled to quit the country.

You are authorised to assign suitable but moderate pensions to such of the officers of the late Paishwa's service, as are not provided for by having their personal Jageers left to them.

The arrangements you propose regarding the civil officers of the late government and some of the old Ministers of the Poona State reduced to poverty by the persecution of Bajee Row, are entirely approved by the Governor General in Council. Your excluding from these arrangements those individuals who remained with Bajee Row to the last is also approved.

The pensions to Bajee Row and Chimanjee Appa will of course be a charge on the revenue of the conquered territory and the Governor General in Council sanctions the eventual appropriation of the further sum of two lacs for unexpected claims not provided for in your other calculations including a

provision for the family of Gungadhar Shastree, which it is equally just, liberal, and politic for the British Government to grant.

Adverting to the nature and origin of the claims of the Paishwa's Government on the Guicowar, as settled by the terms of the Treaty of Poona, to the degree in which the Guicowar's interests have been involved with our own in the transactions that led to the late revolution, as well as to the fidelity and zeal with which the Government of Baroda has performed the duty of an ally during the late war, the Governor General in Council considers it to be expedient and equitable to relieve the Guicowar from the payment of the annual tribute of four lacs of rupees per annum. Instructions (of which a copy will accompany this despatch) will be transmitted to the Government of Bombay, on this subject. Considering the benefit which the Government at Baroda will have thus acquired in the course of the late transactions, it will not be inequitable to render the completion of this grant a means of inducing the Guicowar to give his assent to any of the remaining objects we have in view at that Court.

The settlements to be made with the Nizam are more complicated, as they involve all the claims of the Paishwa's Government on the state of Hyderabad, besides various questions of exchange of territory and mutual concessions. The scale of His Majesty's exertions in the prosecution of the war, entitles him to the greatest consideration. As the negotiation for the adjustment of these claims, and the pecuniary and territorial arrangements arising out of them must be carried on at Hyderabad, I have been desired on this account as well as to avoid the unnecessary extension of this despatch to transmit His Lordship's instructions on these subjects to Mr. Russell. A copy of the instructions to Mr. Russell will accompany this despatch and you will be pleased to correspond with him on all points connected with these arrangements.

The result of your calculations of the clear revenue that will remain to the British Government from the conquered territory, has already been adverted to. His Lordship in Council observes that you have included in your statement the amount of the revenue of Holkar's share of Candeish; altho' inconsiderable at present, it may be expected to increase with the general improvement of the country.

On considering the mode pointed out by you of augmenting our immediate revenue, it has appeared to the Governor General in Council on the whole to be better, not to depart from the arrangements already contemplated for the sake of that object, since it must be acquired by some corresponding sacrifice of another kind.

The annexation to our territory of the lands of Rastia and Gokla between the Neera and the Kishna, tho' it would increase our direct revenue, would proportionally circumscribe that of the Raja of Sattara, whom it is a great object to maintain in dignity and ease. These lands will moreover be separated from our territories, and intermixed with the possessions of the Rajah or those of his Jageerdars or of ours; and although this is a minor objection and would not operate against the adoption of the plan, were it otherwise expedient, it adds force to the other objections.

The tranquillity of the country and the future success of our administration is so much involved in the grant of liberal provisions to the civil and military officers of the late government, that the Governor General in Council would feel very much averse to sanction any reduction of the amount appropriated to that purpose. Many of these are for life and will ultimately increase the revenue of government and they indirectly have the same effect by their influence on the general prosperity and productivity of our possessions. The Governor General in Council does not by any means contemplate a general resumption of the Jageers, especially those held by military officers. Every fair occasion, however, should be taken to resume or curtail Jageers falling in by the death of the holder.

The reasons already assigned for relieving the Guicawar from the tribute fixed by the Treaty of Poona, appear to the Governor General in Council to be conclusive in favour of that arrangement.

On the whole then, it is the opinion of the Governor General in Council that our real and permanent interest will be better consulted by confirming our immediate possessions and revenues within the limits assigned by you, trusting to the reduction of charges and the increase of rent for the future improvement of our revenues in this quarter.

Both of these sources of increase may be expected to be considerable when the services of the Auxiliary Force can be dispensed with and the tranquillization of the country shall have

extended cultivation and commerce, and have given competence (?) and security to the mass of the people.

I have already had the honour to convey to you the expression of the Governor General's full approbation of the principles on which you have proposed to establish the administration of the provinces which are to remain in our immediate possession.

The tenor of my letter of the 14th July will have prepared you for the assent of the Governor General in Council to the annexation of the whole of the Concan to the Presidency of Bombay, and the Right Honourable the Governor in Council will have acted on the conditional authority conveyed to him in my letter of the same date to Mr. Warden. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council will doubtless adopt all proper and necessary precautions for conciliating the inhabitants by an attention to their prejudices and institutions, and by providing a suitable maintenance for those who have lost their employment by the revolution.

The annexation to either of the established Presidencies of the remaining territory does not require to be particularly attended to at present, since you are aware of the resolution of the supreme Government that all the territory above the Ghauts including both Candeish and the Provinces south of the Kishna, shall remain for a term under a separate provisional administration to be conducted by you under the immediate authority of the Supreme Government. The means of rendering the system efficient by affording you the aid of qualified and experienced public officers in the several departments, will occupy the particular attention of the Governor General in Council, after receiving a statement of your sentiments and wishes in this respect and an intimation of the branches in which more intensive assistance than is immediately at your command, is required.

You will have seen from my dispatch of the 14th of July the decided repugnance of the Governor General to the introduction of any comprehensive body of regulations into the new provinces, and His Lordship's unqualified preference to a system founded on the existing institutions of the country, purified as far as may be practicable from all gross abuses. Such a system besides its immediate and obvious merits, will be open to gradual and temperate reform founded on a mature and distinct

consideration of each individual measure, suggested by progressive experience, and our increasing knowledge of the genius and character of the people, and of the structure of society as influenced by the civil and religious institutions of the State.

This system of administration, besides the advantages just stated, will possess that of requiring a less expensive establishment of civil officers of large emolument than a more perfect and artificial scheme of government. The principal officers must however proportionally enjoy a larger authority and must be placed on a footing which will set them above all temptation to abuse the confidence that, under such a state of things, must be reposed in the public agent of Government.

The provincial administration adopted by you and already approved, appears to be calculated for the attainment of those beneficial purposes. Further experience will naturally suggest improvements. In the mean while the Collectors will exercise the general powers of Judicial, Police and Revenue officers in their respective districts, subject to the general rules framed by you on the principles above stated.

You have already been apprized of the importance attached by the Governor General in Council to the collection and digestion of all useful information in the revenue department. It is not less requisite in cases of judicial investigation of any importance whether conducted by Panchayets or under the more immediate superintendence of the Collectors in their judicial capacity.

The powers confided to you by the Governor General were distinctly intended to vest you with the highest criminal jurisdiction within the territory subject to your authority, and it is gratifying to His Lordship in Council to observe the moderation and discretion with which this important trust has been exercised, and the care shown both in the investigation of charges by the magistrates and in your subsequent revision to arrive at the truth.

The precaution of receiving the deliberate opinion of a Hindoo Lawyer in all cases of magnitude, and of adhering more especially on the side of mercy as strictly as is practicable, consistently with our notions of penal justice, to the sanctions of the Hindoo Law, is perfectly approved. The reservation for your own confirmation of all capital sentences, was a proper and necessary precaution, and the Governor General

in Council has seen every reason to be satisfied with the manner in which this branch of your executive functions has been performed in the cases which have come under his observation.

You have also wisely founded the administration of civil justice in the existing institutions and usages of the people. Such a system while it not only secures in the most satisfactory manner of which present circumstances admit, the ends of essential equity, will form the best possible basis for such future ameliorations as the superior integrity and intelligence of the British Agents may enable them to introduce.

The degree of authority proposed to be left to the Mamlutdars under the orders of the Collector and the smaller Jageerdars within their lands under the same supervision, guarded by the regulations established by you, appears to be proper and calculated to combine the attainment of speedy justice with sufficient security against abuse. The greater Jageerdars who will still retain their personal Jageers such as the Vinchoorkur and Poorundere and others of this class, must be allowed a larger scope of authority and not be interfered with, except in cases of great injustice. The tenure by which they hold their lands, entitles them to exercise this authority while it is not abused.

The Southern Jageerdars must of course also retain the powers they at present possess. This privilege is distinctly recognised in my letter of the 14th July, and could not be invaded without a violation of their established rights.

In the 40th paragraph of my letter of the 14th of July I stated the opinion of the Governor General, that after the departure of Brigadier General Munro, you would find it expedient to take the management of the southern Jageerdars into your own hands, with such aid as you might think it proper to require from the agent at Sattara. The reasons assigned by you, however, for avoiding any arrangement that may encourage the Jageerdars to look to Sattara as the seat of authority or to keep their Vakeels there, are considered by the Governor General in Council to be just and conclusive, and His Lordship in Council will approve of your delegating such part of this duty as well as of the communications with the Rajah of Colapore, as cannot conveniently be performed by yourself, to the Collector in the southern districts. This officer may be permanently constituted the agent of Government for this purpose when the ultimate

annexation of the southern districts to the Presidency of Fort St. George shall take place, a measure which you are aware is considered premature at the present moment.

The Governor General in Council concurs in your opinion of the importance of maintaining a Political Agent in Candeish until the country is more settled, and the number of plunderers expelled, or weaned from their predatory habits, and His Lordship has confirmed your nomination of Captain John Briggs to this responsible office. The settlement and collection of the revenues and the superintendence of the administration of justice in that province (including the districts ceded by Holkar) will form a part of the duties of the Agent. The evil of the intermixture of authorities in that province, is strongly felt by the Governor General in Council, who has under his consideration the means of consolidating the respective possessions of the British and Maharatta Governments in that province by interchanges of territory. As this plan is connected with other arrangements affecting the interest and claims of Scindiah and Holkar in other quarters, it must remain suspended for the present. In the mean while every effort must be made to restrain the officers of these Governments from impeding our plans. Representations will be addressed to both Durbars on the subject, and no hesitation is to be made in chastising at once any aggression on the part of their officers or subjects. In cases requiring the prompt application of a remedy, notice should immediately be given on such occasions to the Residents at the Courts of Scindiah and Holkar respectively that the circumstances may be fully explained and the misrepresentation of the other party anticipated.

The Governor General in Council is disposed to concur in your view of the inexpediency of leaving to Holkar the possession of any portion of territory or rights in Candeish, and to restrict the indulgence rigidly to a few Enam villages, to which he is understood to attach much value, as being the ancient hereditary possessions of his family. A limited grant of this nature under restrictions will perhaps not be attended with the inconvenience apprehended from a more enlarged one, necessarily involving the possession of extensive powers.

It is also His Lordship's purpose to endeavour to obtain from Scindiah by exchange the lands he has continued to hold in Ahmednuggur and other parts of the late Paishwa's territories

by a loose and abusive construction with the connivance of the Paishwa, of the stipulations of the 8th article of the treaty of Sarjee Anjingaum.

An arrangement with our Jageerdars for a consolidation of their lands inconveniently mixed, is very desirable, and your attention should be directed to this object in the approaching grants or confirmations.

Your letter for reclaiming the Bheels, and other Hill Chiefs from their predatory habits, as sketched in the despatch now replied to, and more particularly explained in the instructions given by you to Captain Briggs and Captain Pottinger, appears to the Governor General in Council to be judicious and likely to be attended with success. You will accordingly consider yourself authorized to proceed in it.

The Governor General in Council has already signified his approbation of the military arrangements for the provinces under your authority concerted by you and Brigadier General Smith. His Lordship in Council has also called on the Government of Fort St. George for a reinforcement for the southern districts, which, it is hoped, will enable you to complete the disposition you have in view. His Lordship in Council fully concurs in your sentiments regarding the importance of maintaining an efficient force in the provinces under your charge during the infancy of our rule, both for the encouragement of the well affected and industrious and to curb the disloyal and turbulent, who must necessarily for a while be numerous.

These are the only remarks and instructions that have been suggested to the Governor General in Council by the perusal of your despatch now acknowledged, but they will, when combined with the general instructions conveyed to you in my former dispatch of the 14th July, and in the several replies to your separate references to His Lordship's authority on special points, put you sufficiently in possession of the views and principles of the Governor General in Council to enable you to establish the foundations and provide for the gradual consolidation of a system of administration, calculated not more to secure the just rights and promote the interests of Government, than to place the happiness and prosperity of the people on a firm and permanent basis.

No. 147—The officer-in-charge of Baji Rao and his party travelling towards their final destination, reports how Baji Rao was trying to seek the protection of Scindhia and bring about an insurrection.

From—JOHN LOW, FIRST ASSISTANT, HOLKAR'S COURT,

To—JOHN ADAM, CHIEF SECRETARY.

Camp at Sonedee, 16 October 1818.

Sir,

I had the honour on the 8th instant of forwarding to you a copy of a letter which I had that day received, dated the 20th ultimo from the Acting Resident at Gwalior. A variety of accounts had reached me from different parts of the country during the preceding three weeks, of intended insurrection immediately after the Dusserah on the part of members of the military class of the inhabitants who have been thrown out of employment by the events of the late campaign. I have also received reports (though not supported by any detailed information) that the plots alluded to were encouraged by Bajee Row, who, it was said, intended to make his escape with a few friends, and I had accurate intelligence of an unusual number of very private conferences having taken place since the 1st instant between Bajee Row and Ram Chunder, and of one during the night of the 7th between the latter and the Rajah of Shapoorah.

These circumstances though far from furnishing any proof against Bajee Row, had made me very uneasy respecting my present charge, and that anxiety was so much increased by the weight of Captain Stewart's letter, that I resolved to demand a private conference with Bajee Row in order to read it to him, as well as a paper which I have now the honour to enclose, purporting to be the reply which I have made to that communication.

My chief objects in this measure were first to give Bajee Row the impression that Dowlut Row Scindhia is preserving a line of conduct that gives no indication of any probability of his supporting the former, should he even be so ill-advised as to attempt to renew hostilities with the British Government. Secondly I wished to give Bajee Row a distinct view of the situation to which he would be ultimately reduced, should the

event alluded to actually occur (a duty towards him which his own adherents had probably never once performed), and lastly I conceived that I could give my whole communications the appearance of an act of personal friendship towards him, which would please him and increase his confidence in my goodwill, and might, therefore, give me advantages towards executing the duties that it may be necessary to perform before he shall arrive at his ultimate place of destination.

The Most Noble the Governor General in Council will have perceived that the paper just alluded to is worded in a manner so as to please Bajee Row, as far as regards my intentions respecting the mode of treating him, as well as with regard to my full reliance on his good conduct, but it may be proper to mention that in substance it is very much an extract of a private letter which I actually did write to Captain Stewart on the same day, excepting that in the latter I distinctly grounded my confidence of Bajee Row being determined to adhere to his present engagements on my hopes and belief that he was afraid to act otherwise. I did not, however, think it necessary or expedient to hurt his feelings by speaking so plain on this point to Bajee Row, particularly as he would not fail to see from other parts of the paper read to him, that he had every reason to be afraid of incurring such a risk, as he would do, if he should take so desperate a step as that of seeking protection from any other power than the British Government.

My conference with Bajee Row for the purpose above mentioned took place on the 9th instant, but as that is fully described in the enclosed separate report, it does not seem necessary, that I should make any reference to it in this despatch, further than to say that since it took place, he has apparently continued in perfect good humour towards me and has even shown more willingness than before to comply with my wishes. In proof of this I may mention the following fact.

I was informed by Bajee Row before arriving at Shaporah that the whole of the ceremonies connected with the festival of the Dussarah, would be concluded on the night of the 9th instant and it had therefore been arranged (entirely with his convenience) that we should continue our march on the morning of the 11th. In the afternoon of the 10th however I was visited by Ram Chunder Yenkataish and Anna Daishmook, who solicited on the part of their master in the most pressing terms that he should be permitted to halt another day at that

place, grounding this request on opinion which had been given by his principal Brahmins, that his images of the deities (which had been arranged according to custom in a particular manner, and lights kept continually around them, during the whole of the Dussarah) could not be lighted up until the night of the 11th instant without giving offence to the Supreme Being. Their supplications for this halt were so urgent that I did not think it right to refuse it positively, but as I was very anxious for his removal from Shaporah, I was much dissatisfied at the delay and I desired Ram Chunder therefore to inform his master, that though I would not insist upon the march, if he really thought of a halt of consequence in a religious point of view, yet that if he wished to please me, he would manage the matter with the Brahmins and march according to the original agreement next morning. Ram Chunder on taking his leave said, he was greatly obliged to me for granting the halt and added, "I will tell the Maharajah that you have given this indulgence freely and in good humour." I immediately replied, "I advise you will do no such thing, on the contrary I request you will tell him that I am displeased at this unexpected demand for another day, because we have already had many more halts than is probably expected by the Governor General, and because I previously granted a day more (by Bajee Row's own confession) than is required by general usage for the celebration of the festival." Ram Chunder said he would let me know in the course of a couple of hours how his master would determine and left my tent.

Bajee Row having hitherto made every halt that he could possibly obtain, I considered it quite certain that he would avail himself of the permission granted to him on this occasion, but to my great surprise, I received a note in the afternoon to say that although he would have wished much to have avoided the necessity of removing the images before the proper time, yet as he found that I would be displeased at the delay, he had ordered the march. I was so much pleased at this unexpected resolution that I immediately went to pay a visit to Bajee Row, when I told him that I was so well convinced by the instance he had just given me of his readiness to attend to my wishes that he would do so on all future occasions, that I had determined he should have his wished for halt as I was confident, I said, that he would make up for it by asking as few as possible during the remainder of our journey. This communication was to all appearance very gratefully received, and I have no reason

to suppose that the indulgence was ill bestowed, as he marched on the 12th instant and has continued to do so ever since without objecting to the length of the marches proposed by me (which he has frequently done) and making fewer difficulties than ever I have known him do before, with respect to the carriage of his sick and a number of other little aids which on marching days I am always obliged to procure for him.

I trust that the Governor General in Council will pardon my troubling him with so much detail respecting my proceedings on the occasion which has called for this report, as my only object in doing so is to afford His Lordship the best means in my power of judging of the present conduct and probable intentions of Bajee Row.

I have only to add that I cannot but conceive it very improbable that he will attempt to make his escape, but that I will never allow this belief to occasion any interruption to that vigilance over his actions which I know His Lordship would wish me at all times to exercise during the continuance of my present mission.

No. 148—The Governor General directs that Trimbakji Denge be transferred from Thana to Chunargad the better to prevent his escape.

**From—THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE
SUPREME GOVERNMENT,**

To—THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.

Fort William, 31 October 1818.

Sir,

On the apprehension of Trimbuckjee Dainglia the Governor General in Council judge it to be expedient that he should be remanded to Tannah, his former place of confinement in order to mark with peculiar distinctness the fruitlessness of those efforts to obstruct his imprisonment, which terminated only in the ruin of his master's fortune. That object has now been fully attained and the attention of the Governor General in Council has since been directed to the selection of a proper place for his future confinement; it being intended that his imprisonment shall be for life, the secure custody of his person will be best ensured by his confinement in a part of India, where besides

his being vigilantly guarded there is less probability of his being encouraged to attempt his escape. For this purpose the Governor General in Council has fixed on the fort of Chunar which after a full consideration, appears to be the most appropriate for his reception. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Bombay is requested to direct a vessel to be hired, if one of the Honourable Company's cruizers cannot conveniently be spared for the conveyance of Trimbuckjee Dainglia and his servants from Tannah to this Presidency whence he will be conducted to Chunar. The Governor General in Council relies on the strictest orders being given to the Captain for the security of the prisoner's person in the event of the vessel being obliged to touch at any intermediate port, which it is desirable should be avoided, excepting in a case of absolute necessity. It is further requested that the Captain be directed to take the first opportunity that may offer after his receiving a pilot at the land-heads to report his arrival to me for the information and orders of the Government, and that he be enjoined to use extreme caution during his progress up the river, to prevent the prisoner or his servants from landing or having communications with the shore until they be delivered to the guard, which will be appointed to receive charge of them.

No. 149—A complete and discriminating narrative of the last Maratha war was constructed and despatched by the Governor General to the home authorities much later after the events had occurred. Of such despatches, three appear to be most important, viz., those of 19th May 1818, of 21st August 1820 and of 17th October 1822. The first has been reproduced before; the second and the third are reprinted here for completing the whole narrative from the printed Papers relating to "the Pindari and Maratha Wars".

From—MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,

**To—THE HONOURABLE THE SECRET COMMITTEE
OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.**

21 August 1820.

Honourable Sirs,

In continuation of my letter of the 1st of March last, I now proceed to lay before you a short exposition of the course of policy I was constrained to adopt, by the occurrence of circumstances at Poona and Nagpore, which I am about to notice.

The course of measures pursued by the Peishwa, and the conduct which we were compelled to hold towards that Prince,

during the early part of the year 1817 up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Poona on the 13th of June of that year, have been fully reported, either to Your Honourable Committee or to the Court of Directors, particularly in the despatches of the Governor General in Council to Your Honourable Committee dated the 12th April and the 9th of June 1817, and in my letters of the 4th of September to the Court of Directors, and of the 5th of September 1817 to Your Honourable Committee. Those letters having already minutely informed you of the previous conduct and designs of Bajee Rao, and of the measures which it became the indispensable duty of your Government to adopt for counteracting such hostiles purposes, it is unnecessary for me, in this place, to do more than allude slightly to the repeated acts of perfidy exhibited towards us by that Prince. They require no colouring to prove the necessity of arresting the progress of his numerous and extensive intrigues against the power and interest of the British nation in India.

Our endeavour to screen his reputation, by throwing the whole guilt of the murder of Gungadhur Shastry on Trimbuckjee Dainglia, while the Peishwah himself was not less directly implicated in it, was perversely met by him. It is known to Your Honourable Committee, that from that time we discovered a more active prosecution of his intrigues at almost every Court in India, instigating combinations against our power, in revenge for the punishment of his despicable favourite. I regarded them as the consequences of an acrimony which would soon subside, and I wished to pass them over, as I had done the anterior negotiations of which we had detected traces. His machinations were, however, continued, till they attained such a height, that we could no longer conceal our knowledge of his *unceasing efforts to establish a hostile confederacy*, of his secret but active levies of troops, and of his manifest connivance in the insurrection excited by the escape of Trimbuckjee from Tannah, if not his direct encouragement of that procedure.

These practices, of the existence of which I possessed certain information, compelled me to disregard the shallow excuses and delusive professions of friendship, by which he had replied to a previous intimation, that I was not ignorant of his following a line of conduct deeply affecting the stability of the alliance, and destructive of its essential character. This intimation had been made in a tone of indulgence and conciliation; and the practices complained of were ascribed to his having yielded

to an inconsiderable spleen, which he would himself repress as soon as he perceived its real nature and dangerous tendency. I declared my readiness to obliterate the remembrance of what had passed in the confidence that he would frankly endeavour to retrace his steps ; and I invited him to a cordial reliance on my efforts to maintain his personal ease, dignity and power. This gentle tone of expostulation called forth from Bajee Rao expressions of never ending gratitude, and promises of adopting views and principles of conduct better suited to the object of the alliance, and more fitly corresponding with the unexampled and unmerited lenity which he had experienced. Private but unquestionable intelligence, supported by the unambiguous evidence of facts, proved the complete insincerity of these friendly protestations. The despatches cited above have already informed you, how soon I was constrained to anticipate this incorrigible plotter. It would be an useless intrusion on your attention here to recapitulate the circumstances which immediately preceded the treaty of Poonah, and the stipulations for the better security of our interests, to which we were forced to demand the Peishwa's assent. They must be in the recollection of Your Honourable Committee, having been reported in detail in the letters to which I have taken the liberty of referring you. A cursory allusion to them seemed to me, however, to be proper, as connecting the narrative of his former treacherous practices with that of his subsequent career of more enormous and conspicuous perfidy.

I do not propose to take any notice, in this place, of the arrangements which were commenced, for carrying into execution the provisions of the treaty of Poona, as they were but partially advanced, when the open hostility of the Peishwah and the necessity imposed on us of reducing the whole of his country, rendered any intention to those inferior details superfluous.

When I informed the Court of Directors of my having received Sir John Malcolm's account of his conference with Bajee Rao on the 9th of August 1817, I imparted my opinion that, although every effort of conciliation and attention would be employed to soothe his mind and reconcile it to a condition of affairs which his conduct had made indispensable, I could not flatter myself with the hope of his feeling a cordiality of disposition towards us, or of our being justified in a reliance on his fidelity, unless when it might be insured by a sense of our power. Still I was far from expecting the early and complete detection of his widely concerted plots. His ignorance of the engagements which we had recently imposed on Dowlut Rao

Scindia and Ameer Khan, and his own sanguinary participation in attacking the British Residency most happily exposed the extent of his plans, while the prematurity of his attempt rendered the baffling of it, a matter of little difficulty. I shall now briefly notice the several instances in which his perfidy became discoverable previously to his overt acts of hostility, and I solicit your particular attention to the despatches which I shall cite, detailing the procedures and observations of Mr. Elphinstone, while tracing the Peishwa's aberrations from that course of good faith which was no less enjoined on him by his own solemn assurances of contrition and amendment, than by our moderation in limiting our measures to arrangements of the strictest self-defence.

By reference to Mr. Elphinstone's despatch of the 30th of August 1817, you will observe that, at that period, one of the primary and indispensable stipulations of the treaty, that for the dismissal from Poonah of all Vakeels from Native States, and the recall of the Peishwah's Agents from the several quarters to which they were deputed, had not been carried into complete effect. Though I was willing to forgo all appearance of distrusting the Peishwa, still I deemed this point of so great importance, that I gave my directions to Mr. Elphinstone to continue pressing it with perseverance. The necessity of a vigilant attention to the execution of every article of the Peishwah's newly contracted engagements received an early demonstration.

But a few weeks were allowed to elapse, before the extensive levies of troops throughout his dominions rendered it apparent that the Peishwah was again preparing to lend himself to counsels of a desperate character, and was not deterred from *hazarding on their issue the total loss of his possessions, and his ruin and extinction as a prince.* Mr. Elphinstone wrote to me on the 15th of October, that such was Bajee Rao's anxiety for the speedy formation of an army, that there was then not a single horseman in his country out of employ. His pay was represented as being unusually liberal, and no difficulty was made as to the quality of either the men or the horses that were enrolled. His assigned motive for this preparation was a compliance with the earnest advice of Sir John Malcolm to enter into active and vigorous co-operation with us, in the measures which we were undertaking against the predatory tribes. This pretence, however, could not delude us. The troops he had raised were twice the number which could possibly be required for any service meditated conjointly with ours.

At an audience given to Mr. Elphinstone, the Peishwah listened to his explanation of the intended movements of our armies against the Pindarries, and his exhortations to a vigorous co-operation, without in any degree affecting zeal in the cause, or even claiming merit for his professed activity, his conversation being entirely confined to complaints of the degradation and loss which he had suffered by the treaty of Poona. Other steps, in no manner connected with the defence of his country, were likewise taken by him. Such were his studied conciliation of the Rajah of Sattarah, who from the first establishment of the power of the Peishwah had been wholly neglected; as well as the attentions paid to his brother, Chimnajee Appa, and his principal chiefs; and the care with which he, and all his immediate dependants, moved their property away from the capital. All these circumstances were naturally viewed by the natives as being preparatory to an undertaking of the first magnitude. The conjectures as to his precise intentions were, of course, various; but the general report of the inhabitants, together with all accounts of his proceedings, concurred in representing him to be actively employed in exciting enemies against the British Government.

Early in November, Sir Thomas Hislop despatched to me a copy of a private letter to Brigadier General Smith from Mr. Elphinstone, dated the 29th of October. That letter communicated Mr. Elphinstone's apprehension of being attacked before the arrival at Poonah of the Bombay European Regiment, which he did not expect before two days at soonest. Though Mr. Elphinstone was anxious to defer bringing on the crisis, he foresaw the probability of the Peishwa's hastening to the accomplishment of his designs, and the consequent interruption of all communication between himself and Brigadier General Smith, who was then unluckily too much in advance with his division, under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, Brigadier General Smith was, therefore warned that he would, in the expected contingency, necessarily be left to his own means of information; and it was recommended to him, in the event of the Residency being attacked, to consider a speedy march to Poonah as paramount to all other orders. Immediately on the receipt of this information, I ordered instructions to be forwarded to Mr. Elphinstone, and I addressed to Sir Thomas Hislop a letter of corresponding tenor. The object of those instructions was to give my authority for Mr. Elphinstone's taking the proper measures to oppose those hostile designs, which the procedure of the Peishwah could no longer allow me to doubt, and to vest the direction of those measures exclusively in the hands of the Resident. The event against which the instructions were to provide had, however, taken place in the interval; and a decision, accommodated to the new position of affairs, became requisite.

The intelligence of this over-hasty attack by the Peishwah, undertaken while he believed both Scindia and Ameer Khan to be already in the field against us, and the Rajah of Nagpore and the power of Holkar prepared to unite with him, reached me from many quarters. I also learned, though indistinctly, the signal gallantry with which the profligate attempt was repulsed by a handful of our troops; but I was not correctly informed of the immediate cause and actual progress of the hostilities with Bajee Rao, until I received Mr. Elphinstone's despatches, dated the 6th, 7th and 11th of November, copies of which were submitted to the Honourable Committee as soon as they could be prepared at the Presidency.

The first of those despatches has long ago informed you of the circumstances which immediately led to this open rupture, and will, together with Lieutenant Colonel Burr's official report

of the action, have given you a complete knowledge of the transactions of that day, the termination of which was so glorious to the character of the British arms. The gallant achievement of the small body of our troops which defeated the almost overpowering force of the Peishwah, formed a proud and appropriate sequel to the vigilance, sagacity, and firmness, displayed by Mr. Elphinstone, in detecting, opposing, and at length frustrating, the intrigues of a treacherous and implacable enemy. It would be superfluous to dwell at any greater length on the claims which Mr. Elphinstone and Lieutenant Colonel Burr, with the other officers and troops who, on the 5th of November 1817, so nobly performed their duty, have established to the honour of your distinguished applause.

The repulse of the enemy could not, through the paucity of our troops for a time, be followed up by the attack of the city of Poonah, though the step was one without which no efficient pursuit of Bajee Rao's army could have been undertaken. Lieutenant Colonel Osborne, who arrived on the evening of the battle and assumed the command of the troops, judiciously resolved to wait in his then position for the arrival of Brigadier General Smith's force, which was expected soon to reach Poonah.

You will observe, from the remarks in Mr. Elphinstone's despatch already cited, with which I profess my entire concurrence that the contest with the Peishwa was inevitable. It is a matter of congratulation to the British Government, that Bajee Rao threw off the mask before Brigadier General Smith's force had entirely left his territories and become engaged in distant operations, as well as before he had made any progress in tampering with our native soldiery. The zeal and bravery shewn by the sepoys in the first affair with his troops, proved how generally unsuccessful had been his attempts to debauch them from their duty.

Mr. Elphinstone's despatch to me, written two days after the action at Kirkee, forms a detailed and perspicuous report of the procedures of the Paishwah immediately preceding his attack on the Residency. I should fail to convey to you a more clear and animated representation of the character of the counsels and measures pursued by Bajee Rao, than that which is there to be found. The despatch has already been laid before Your Honourable Committee, and has, I perceive, been communicated in England to the public. A lengthened recapitulation, therefore, of the principal facts and observations which it contains is

unnecessary ; and even under other circumstances would be out of place, in an address which professes to offer to Your Honourable Committee only a condensed narrative of such transactions as were of primary importance, with an exposition of the leading features in the policy correspondently adopted by your Government. I thence necessarily content myself with a particular reference to the documents already in your possession, which will give you a minute and accurate acquaintance with that portion of the events of the late war.

Mr. Elphinstone's despatch to me of the 11th November is highly worthy of your attention, as containing some striking details of the impression throughout the country, and the state of affairs produced by our early success at Kirkee. From it also we learned the remarkable circumstance, of a native in Mr. Elphinstone's employment having seen in the hands of Gockla, who was understood to be the most strenuous advocate for warlike measures among the Peishwah's advisers, a paper under the Peishwah's seal, investing that chief with all the powers of his Government, and of his having ascertained from another minister, that the orders for burning and plundering the Residency proceeded from Bajee Rao himself.

After the affair of the 5th of November, the Peishwah's troops were dismayed, and none but the most ineffectual attempts were made to annoy the British position at Kirkee ; so that on the arrival of Brigadier General Smith on the 13th, after long marches during which he had been much harassed by Bajee Rao's cavalry, although they were several times gallantly beaten off, he found the enemy but little prepared for vigorous resistance. No time was lost in attacking the Peishwah's army, and the effort was crowned by the flight of that Prince and his troops. The possession of the city then became the chief object of Mr. Elphinstone's attention ; and I have to congratulate you on the manner in which its occupation was effected by Brigadier General Smith. I need not here recapitulate the particulars, which, as well as the details of the immediately previous attack on the Peishwah's army, are reported in the correspondence already in your possession. It is sufficient to remark, that very few excesses were committed in the suburbs before there was time to take the proper precautions, but that the city suffered no injury, and the loss of property was quite insignificant. Your Honourable Committee will doubtless regard the forbearance of the troops, under the irritation which they had experienced, as being entitled no less to your high

admiration, than the persevering exertion and ardent bravery which had already challenged for them conspicuous distinction. The successful protection of the city of Poona from plunder was calculated to produce very important advantages in favour of our general reputation, in the conciliation of friends during the contests, and in the facilitation of supplies of money and other necessaries for the army. The means taken by Mr. Elphinstone for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the city and adjoining country, were those which seemed best adapted to the circumstances of the moment, and were effected with a speed that soon enabled the army to march out in pursuit of the Peishwah. The detail is to be found in the despatch from Mr. Elphinstone last quoted.

On being apprized of the events of which I have now offered you a hasty sketch, it became my duty to form my determination with regard to the future occupation or disposal of the territories of Bajee Rao. Mr. Elphinstone, influenced by the spirit of my instructions on the former occasion of our proceedings against the Peishwah, was prepared to expect my sanction for the maintenance of Bajee Rao on the throne, and in a letter to the officer in charge of the Political Department with Sir Thomas Hislop's Headquarters, suggested the conditions and restrictions of which he thought it necessary to demand the acceptance, previously to the restoration of that Prince to power. Circumstances seemed to me, however, to be much changed since the occurrences at Poonah in the preceding months of May and June, when I signified an unwillingness to dispossess Bajee Rao of the throne of his ancestors. The terms detailed by Mr. Elphinstone were nevertheless founded on a just view of the limitations which it would be requisite to impose on him, had policy not regarded his restoration as inadmissible. Indeed, they appeared to me such as it would be indispensable to require from any individual whom we might think fit to establish in the Government of Poonah. But Bajee Rao's conduct had been such as to forbid his restoration on any terms, and even to preclude all negotiation with him, while political considerations of the first importance, which I shall presently indicate, pointed out to me the necessity of reducing him by force, occupying his territories, and annexing the greater portion of them to the Company's dominions. Having resolved on this measure as the fundamental principle of my policy, I necessarily contemplated the perpetual exclusion of Bajee Rao and his house from all sovereign authority, as well

as his own expulsion from the Deccan, and the seizure and detention of his person in the custody of the British Government, under such degree of restraint as circumstances might suggest. I consented to receive under the protection of the British Government, such of the Peishwah's Jagheerdars as had not taken a part in the contest, or as might speedily submit themselves, their lands being allowed to be held on the same tenure as before, with such modifications as might subsequently be settled on the basis of the agreement of Punderpore. On the other hand, I insisted that the lands of Gockla, or any other Jagheerdar not coming within the preceding description, should be annexed to our possessions, or be otherwise disposed of at our option. * These were the leading features of the instructions which I at first gave to Mr. Elphinstone. Among other measures, as subordinate to the general arrangement or connected with it, I required that the murderers of Captain Vaughan, and Mr. Vaughan, two gentlemen who were cut off on their journey from Bombay to Poonah, or the abettors or authors of their murder, or that of any other British officer, should be publicly executed; but of course, I thought it sufficient to direct that Gockla, or any other person known to have been active in exciting Bajee Rao to war, or in the subsequent prosecution of hostilities, should be seized, and their persons detained in custody, unless it should be established that any of them, by being directly or indirectly concerned in the murder of a British officer, had exposed themselves to the higher penalty of that crime.

I also authorized, at that period, the eventual assignment of a provision in lands for the Rajah of Sattarah, as a Jagheer; or the establishment of a small and compact sovereignty, under such stipulations as might be required for upholding our supremacy. The choice between the two arrangements was confided to Mr. Elphinstone's discretion and experience, my object being simply to secure the conciliation of the Mahratta tribes to the new order of things, and to effect a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the former Brahminical Government. Circumstances preponderated in favour of the Rajah's elevation to sovereign station; and, on his person coming into our possession, he was restored to the nominal rank of the former princes of his fallen house, and placed at the head of the Government of a limited yet handsome territory.

The nature and extent of the provision which I designed for Chimnaje Appa, and others of Bajee Rao's family and principal officers, who were not deeply implicated in his crimes, I left to be decided according to circumstances which might hereafter influence my judgment, contenting myself with holding out to them the prospect of a permanent and honourable retreat, or the means of a suitable maintenance in their own country.'

These instructions, of which I have given you a faint outline, were intended only to convey to Mr. Elphinstone's mind the general principles which I desired to be the basis of the settlement of the territory to be occupied by force of arms. He was enjoined to consider himself as being at entire liberty in the application of them to the actual state of affairs, to exercise his own judgment and unrivalled discretion in executing the prescribed measures, and to adjust and modify them according to the results of his experience and local knowledge, the primary and indispensable objects of the arrangement being held steadily in view.

It was impracticable, at that moment, to give Mr. Elphinstone detailed directions for the provisional settlement of the territory falling into our hands, and he was thence necessarily empowered to establish such temporary measures as he might deem requisite or proper, and to avail himself of the talents and experience of Brigadier General Munro, by inviting assistance from the latter in introducing the British authority into the southern territory, and in carrying on communications with such Jagheerdars in that quarter as might not be so conveniently accessible to Mr. Elphinstone himself.

I at the same time nominated Mr. Elphinstone to be sole Commissioner for the territory conquered from the Peishwah, and invested him with authority over all civil and military functionaries in that quarter, to be exercised according to the established rules and principles of the public service.

I shall now advert to the motives which swayed me in the resolution for annexing the Peishwah's dominions to our own. When Bajee Rao resorted to arms, he was, as I have before observed, uninformed of the reduction of Dowlut Rao Scindia and Ameer Khan to an entire incapacity of co-operating with him: but the force of Holkar and the Rajah of Nagpore had still the power of moving. After their defeat, they defended the extravagant act of attacking us, with whom they were in bonds

of plighted amity, by pleading the order of the Peishwah, which they declared to be imperative on their duty as Mahrattas, and not to be contested. Holkar's ministers avowed their desire of being received under British protection, but urged the necessity of obeying the commands of the Peishwah, their acknowledged master. Appa Sahib, after his last seizure, when charged with ingratitude to us by one of his former ministers, owned that our conduct towards him had been an unvaried stream of benefits conferred, and denied the existence of any transient dissatisfaction, but affirmed it to be his paramount duty to fulfil every direction from his superior, the Peishwah. These declarations are here quoted, as giving confirmation to the multiplied proofs which I already possessed, that not only the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, by which the authority of the Peishwah, as head of the Mahratta empire was annihilated, were nugatory, but that the most solemn obligations, and the strongest bonds of gratitude, were insufficient to counter-balance the influence inherent in the name of his office. You will thence conceive, why I felt the revival of a title carrying with it such mischievous power over the several branches of the tribe, to be at once an irrational and dangerous experiment. For the future consequences of the trial, I should be deeply responsible to my country, when such facts stood on record as ought rationally to have satisfied me what must be the inevitable result. Thoroughly convinced of the impolicy and peril of raising a Peishwah to the throne, I could not but be certain that the elevation of another of Bajee Rao's house under a different appellation, would be found a shallow delusion. The undefeasible character of the Peishwah as chief of the Mahratta armies would have been ascribed to the individual, in despite of any barriers of form.

On the same principle, I could assign to the Rajah of Sattarah only a limited dominion, and by no means ventured to invest him with the sovereignty of the State of Poonah. To set up any one of a family without pretensions, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, would have been to bind ourselves to uphold him against every distaste and prejudice of the inhabitants, and further to support, against the just indignation of the country, that misrule, and perhaps brutal tyranny, which must be expected from a native so called to the throne. It would be discreditable, were we to suffer the expulsion of a sovereign nominated by us; it would be still more so, should we

screen him in the exercise of oppressions, of which we should not unnaturally be deemed the authors.

These were the leading considerations which forced on me the annexation of Bajee Rao's possessions to the Company's as a measure of absolute moral necessity.

No. 150—This is in continuation of the letter dated 21st August 1820.

From—MARQUIS OF HASTINGS,

To—THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE HONOURABLE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

17 October 1822.

Honourable Sirs,

This despatch will close the Narrative, of which the preceding portion is contained in my despatches to your Honourable Committee of the 1st of March and 21st August 1820; and I shall follow, in what remains, the plan observed in those despatches, of abstaining from minute details, so as to restrict the narration of those prominent events which may be supposed to have mainly influenced the progress of the war, or may serve to illustrate the views and principles, with reference to which my measures were formed and prosecuted.

I now resume the narrative of operations against Bajee Rao, at the point where I left off in the nineteenth paragraph of my despatch of the 21st August 1820. Bajee Rao, after his defeat at Poona and the occupation of that city by our troops, directed his flight, in the first instance, to the southward across the river Neirah, and Brigadier General Smith prepared for an active pursuit. Mr. Elphinstone having made some progress in the organization of a regular police and a provisional administration for the city of Poona, gave his early attention to the pursuit of Bajee Rao, and accompanied Brigadier General Smith's division. In his instructions to Brigadier General Smith, he justly adverted to the paramount importance of bringing the war with Bajee Rao to an early termination, in order that the application of our military means might not be longer diverted from their original and primary object, the suppression of the Pindarries and the other freebooters in the central country of Hindoostan. For this purpose, he recommended it to the Brigadier General to act against his person,

rather than protract operations by taking his forts, reducing his country, and detaching his chiefs by separate movements. At this period, as Your Honourable Committee will have observed, Mr. Elphinstone had not received my instructions for the prosecution of the war, directed to the dethronement of Bajee Rao the subjugation of his territories, and the future disposal of them, to his absolute exclusion and that of the members of his house. On the contrary, Mr. Elphinstone contemplated, as you will recollect, that my policy might still admit the return to power, under considerable limitation and restriction, of our profligate assailant. Mr. Elphinstone, however, justly concluded, that the example of protracted opposition to our arms by Bajee Rao, could not but have a very unfavourable effect on such of our allies as were either wavering or disaffected, and that, from his former rank as head of the Mahrattah confederacy, a continuance of hostilities with him might unsettle the minds of all the other chieftains of his nation. It was not long before the instructions referred to reached him, and operations were thence forward carried on with more extensive views and with ample resources. Mr. Elphinstone did not, however, deem matters to be ripe for a disclosure of the full extent of my views, and maintained a strict secrecy regarding the contemplated change of Government, until, by the progress of our arms, we should obtain such a footing in the country and such an ascendancy over the minds of the people, especially the native Mahrattas, as might secure the accomplishment of the plan. In any case, the pursuit of Bajee Rao, while he kept the field in force, remained urgently incumbent; and to this the attention of the political and military authorities was in the first instance directed.

It was concerted between Mr. Elphinstone and Brigadier General Smith, that the force at their disposal for field service should be formed into two divisions, one to be composed wholly of cavalry and light troops, to keep up an active pursuit of the enemy; the other of infantry, with an ample battering train, to reduce forts and gradually occupy the country. To effect this purpose it was necessary that Brigadier General Smith and Brigadier General Pritzler should form a junction; but the direction in which the Peishwa moved opposed an obstacle for some time to the accomplishment of this plan. The Peishwah, having in his flight to the southward escaped for the moment beyond Brigadier General Smith's pursuit, was obliged by the advance of Brigadier General Pritzler to change the

direction of his route. He took an easterly direction so far as Punderpore, whence he struck off to the north-west, followed by Brigadier General Smith, and passing Poonah and Serroor, advanced as far as Wuttoor,* pointing towards Nassick, having been joined on the route by Trimbuckjee Dainglia with a considerable reinforcement. Finding that Brigadier General Smith, who had moved to the northward on a line eastward of that taken by the Peishwah, was in a position to intercept his retreat in that direction, he suddenly turned to the south again by the straight route for Poona, pursued by our detachment. On this occasion occurred the memorable affair of Corygaum, which, however, glorious to our military character, it is not necessary to dwell on in this narrative, all the details being already in the possession of Your Honourable Committee and the public. After his failure at Corygaum, the Peishwah continued his flight to the south, and the pursuit was taken up by Brigadier General Pritzler, who occasionally pushed him very close, but without being able to make a decided impression. Followed by the Brigadier General, he pursued his course as far south as Gokauck on the Gutpurba giving out his intention of invading Mysore. Finding, however, the country to the south of the Kistna raised against him by the able and active measures of Brigadier General Munro, he contrived, by a sudden movement to the eastward, to escape from that hazardous position, and though the pursuit was now again taken up by Brigadier General Smith, he was able to get away to the eastward as far as Sholapore. Instead of pursuing the Peishwah in that direction, Brigadier General Smith determined to take the opportunity of reducing Sattarah effecting a junction with Brigadier General Pritzler, for the purpose of accomplishing the proposed division of forces. Sattarah surrendered after the opening of our mortar batteries, and Mr. Elphinstone considering the time to be arrived for declaring publicly our views with regard to the Peishwah's country, hoisted the Rajah of Sattarah's flag and availed himself of the occasion to impart to the assembled members of the Rajah's family, their principal adherents and the chief men of the place, the intention of the Brigadier General to restore the Rajah to an independent sovereignty, as well as the general scope of my views regarding the Peishwah's territory, and the considerations on which they were founded. He soon after issued a proclamation to the same effect, which was at first cautiously, and afterwards more

*Otur.

openly circulated, as the progress of our arms and the revolution in public opinion raised partisans in our favour. The proclamation declared also my intentions with regard to the Southern Jagheerdars and other classes of the chiefs and subjects of the Poona State, confirming all enaums and other personal grants, promising the correction of the abuses which had been most felt in Bajee Rao's time, and holding out to the several classes those specific advantages from the change of Government, which would give each an interest in the permanency of the new system. I do not enter into details, as the proclamation which, in fact, was the basis of our future arrangements in the country, will naturally have been perused at length with the interest due to its importance.

These arrangements being made and the force divided as previously planned, Brigadier General Smith resumed the pursuit of Bajee Rao, while Brigadier General Pritzler proceeded to the successive reduction of the forts and strongholds in the neighbourhood of Poona. Brigadier General Smith having surprised Bajee Rao's army at Ashta in the direction of Punderpore, on the 19th of February, gave him a complete defeat. This gallant and well-conducted action was attended with consequences of great importance to the future events of the war. The Rajah of Sattarah, and a part of his family who had been brought by Bajee Rao into his camp on his passing the vicinity of Wussotah on his first flight from Poona, fell into our hands and were honourably treated. They remained in Brigadier General Smith's camp for some time, and were there visited by Mr. Elphinstone, under whose direction they were subsequently established at Satarah. In this action also fell Gokla, Bajee Rao's principal adviser in his late measures and his ablest and bravest general. His loss at this crisis was a severe blow to Bajee Rao's cause. After sustaining this defeat, the broken army of Bajee Rao fled in a northerly direction, and crossing the Godavery at Fooltumba, entered Candeish, a measure which brought him in contact with other divisions of the British army. On his route he was joined by a part of the infantry of Holkar that had escaped destruction at Maheidpore, and he had been previously joined near Sholapore by Gunput Rao of Nagpore, with the remains of Appa Sahib's army.

Brigadier General Pritzler had, in the meantime, reduced several of the strongest forts to the southward of Poona, and a separate detachment, under Lieutenant Colonel Deacon, was engaged with equal success in the same species of service to the

north. Other detachments were employed in the Concan, under the immediate direction of the Government of Bombay, in gradually reducing that tract of country to subjection, while Brigadier General Munro, with the imperfect means at his disposal, prosecuted his measures for the subjugation of the country south of the Kistna with his wonted energy and success.

The progress of these operations, the defeat and flight of the Peishwah, accomplished by the death of Gokla and the rescue and elevation of the family of Satarrah, now occasioned the Peishwah's to be generally regarded as a falling cause. Accordingly, many of the principal Jagheerdars at this time opened communications with Mr. Elphinstone, and disclaimed any participation of interests with Bajee Rao. The Putwurduns set the example and were speedily followed by others. None of them, however, actually supported our cause, but contented themselves with remaining at home and preserving a professed neutrality, though a portion of the troops of some of them could not be withdrawn from Bajee Rao's army. The only chiefs of note among the southern Jagheedars who remained with him were Appa Dessye of Nipaunee and Rastia. His brother, Chimnajee, the Vinchorkur, and others holding more northerly possessions, still adhered to his fortunes; but the general feeling of the country was now evidently fast turning against him.

Mr. Elphinstone, who had remained with Brigadier General Pritzler's division after the march of the troops from Sattarah, availed himself of its vicinity to Poona to visit that city, and by judicious measures conciliated the Bramins and other classes to the new Government. With a similar view he visited Wye, a city much resorted to by learned and pious characters, and which had served as a retreat for many of the principal inhabitants of Poona before our occupation of the latter city.

Mr. Elphinstone also proceeded to make various arrangements for the introduction and establishment of our authority throughout the country. He appointed officers, under the designation of Collectors of Political Agents, according to circumstances, and furnished them with instructions for their guidance. The settlement of the country south of the Kistna was assigned to Brigadier General Munro. The details of these arrangements need not be stated, as both the principles on which they were founded and the practical result, have been already laid before you in Mr. Elphinstone's reports, and will be found in the correspondence.

The subsequent direction of Bajee Rao's movements beyond the limits of his own territories, contributed to promote the decline of his cause in the opinion of the people in general. Although this course was adopted, in consequence of invitation and promises of assistance from Appa Sahib, it had the appearance of a hopeless relinquishment of the contest; so that the impression caused by it facilitated the efforts of Mr. Elphinstone and the gentlemen acting under his orders, to introduce and establish the authority of the British Government.

Bajee Rao, on his arrival in Candeish after the defeat at Ashta, found his progress to the northward stopped by the advance of Sir Thomas Hislop, who after leaving a force for the service of Malwa, was now returning to the Deccan with the remainder of the Madras troops, as reported in the eighty-seventh paragraph of my despatch of the 1st of March 1820. Terrified by this interception, he fled with the utmost precipitation across the Godavery to the southward, till, apprehensive of being intercepted by Brigadier General Smith, he turned suddenly to the eastward, and directed his march almost directly upon Chanda in the Nagpore territory. This movement had long been pressed upon him by the agents of the Nagpore Rajah and by Gunput Rao, the Commander of the Nagpore forces, by whom he had been joined as already reported. Sir Thomas Hislop, after following Bajee Rao some marches, finding that all his efforts to overtake him were fruitless, proceeded to carry into effect my instructions for breaking up the army of the Deccan. After reinforcing the several divisions still intended to keep the field, and allotting a force for the service of Candeish, he marched to Poona, whence leaving the troops forming his escort at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, he repaired to Bombay, and returned by sea to the Madras territories. During his march back from Malwa, Sir Thomas Hislop's operations had been directed to the reduction of Holkar's possessions in Candeish, and several forts were successively summoned and compelled to surrender: among these was Talneir, concerning which interest and discussion has been excited by the circumstances attending its capture. It is not my purpose to interrupt this narrative, by any observations on a subject on which my sentiments are already before Your Honourable Committee in full detail. It is sufficient to say, that the fate entailed upon itself by the garrison was very instrumental in securing the peaceable surrender of Galna, Chandore, and other fortresses of far greater strength than Talneir itself.

The pursuit of Bajee Rao to the eastward was conducted by Brigadier General Doveton, whose division was now become available for this service; and by Brigadier General Smith, who being reinforced in cavalry, was now more equal to an effective pursuit than he had hitherto been. Moving in a line somewhat to the southward of the direction of Bajee Rao's march, Brigadier General Smith effectually covered the Nizam's central provinces from any attempt on the part of the enemy to penetrate them; while Brigadier General Doveton, who kept a more northerly route, was enabled to press Bajee Rao closely, and to cut him off if he should make an attempt to move towards the Nerbudda, with a view to crossing into Hindoostan. Bajee Rao's army is stated to have committed great excesses during his progress through the Nizam's frontier country, which he traversed without meeting any opposition in front, till he arrived in the vicinity of Pundercourah. Having heard of the arrest of Appa Sahib and the hopelessness of support within the Nagpore territory, he seems to have remained in this neighbourhood for some days in a state of irresolution. Lieutenant Colonel Adams, who, had moved to Hingunghaut for the protection of the frontier, and in the hopes of intercepting Bajee Rao if he should advance, receiving regular and correct intelligence of his proceedings, and finding that he still lingered in the same neighbourhood, refrained from disturbing him, partly that he might recruit his own supplies in preparation for undertaking a pursuit, and partly to enable Brigadier Generals Doveton and Smith to close in upon the enemy, whose situation became every day more perilous. Apprized at length by Brigadier General Doveton that he would reach Pundercourah by the 17th of April, and calculating that Brigadier General Smith would be sufficiently advanced to cut off a retreat to the south, Lieutenant Colonel Adams resolved to delay no longer. He had intelligence of Bajee Rao's being within a forced march of his position, and thence determined to attempt surprising and attacking the Mahratta camp, with the hope of at least driving Bajee Rao back upon one of the other divisions. With this view, he marched on the night of the 16th, and next morning reached Peepulkote, where Bajee Rao had been encamped with his whole force the preceding day. Receiving intelligence here that he was still at Sheonee, a village only six coss distant, Lieutenant Colonel Adams pushed forward with the cavalry, horse artillery, and light infantry. On approaching the village, he found the enemy forced to a change of route by the near approach of Brigadier General Doveton, marching in the very

road in which he himself was taking. It is not consistent with the object of the narrative to report in detail the engagement which followed: it will suffice to say, that the route of the enemy was complete, Bajee Rao himself with difficulty escaping on horseback, the palanquin in which he had been borne being taken just after he had left it. Lieutenant Colonel Adams having out-marched his supplies in the neighbourhood of the field of battle, the pursuit was taken up by Brigadier General Doveton, who had reached Pundercourah on the day of the engagement. Dividing his force into two columns, the Brigadier pursued the enemy for five days without intermission, except occasional halts, to refresh the men and horses, till they reached Omerkair. At this place, overcome with fatigue, privation, and terror, the army of Bajee Rao broke up, and he himself, quitted by all his Sirdars except Trimbuckjee Dainglia, the Vinchorkur, and some of inferior note, with about eight or ten thousand men according to a loose estimate, proceeded in a north westerly direction towards the Taptee. The greater proportion of his troops fled by different routes towards the Poona territory, followed by Brigadier Generals Doveton and Smith. The dispersion of the several Sirdars and their followers in different bodies, and the rapidity of their flight, rendered it so difficult to ascertain which was the direction taken by Bajee Rao himself, that both Generals Smith and Doveton were misled into the pursuit of parties headed by other chiefs. Of these, one was led by Chimnajee, the brother of Bajee Rao, and Appa Dessye, both of whom surrendered to one of our parties, and were sent to make their submissions to Mr. Elphinstone. Appa Dessye retired to Nepaunee; and Chimnajee, after some time, repaired to Benares, where he has since resided on a stipend of three lacs of rupees per annum. Neither his character or talents render him likely to engage in desperate designs, but his residence in the Deccan would have been liable to many objections. Other Sidars reached the Poona territory in safety, and their followers dispersing to their villages, they sent in their submission, which was accepted, pursuant to the plan adopted by Mr. Elphinstone of receiving all who should come in, however long they might have adhered to Bajee Rao. The fugitives are represented to have suffered all the extremities of distress; and the miserable condition of themselves and of their horses is forcibly depicted by Mr. Elphinstone. Judicious and successful arrangements were made by the local authorities for preventing this sudden influx of armed men from affecting the peace of the country. Lieutenant Colonel Adams,

on ascertaining that the whole of Bajee Rao's broken army prosecuted its flight to the westward, and was actively pursued by the other divisions, withdrew within the Nagpore frontier, and proceeded to lay siege to Chanda, as already reported.

Bajee Rao marched from Boree in a north-westerly direction, and crossing the Taptee, seemed to be pushing for the Nerbudda by the route of the Scindwa gaut.

Finding that we had already secured that pass, and that his progress in that line was impracticable, he suddenly turned to the east, and made for the neighbourhood of Asseergurh, into which fortress he appeared inclined to throw himself, justly calculating on the friendly disposition of the Killadar.

As soon as Brigadier General Doveton received information of his route, that officer moved upon Boorhaunpoor, in hopes of coming up and striking a decisive blow, while the detachments from the Nerbudda should prevent Bajee Rao from getting off to the northward. On the first intelligence of his moving in that direction, Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm had drawn all his disposable force to that neighbourhood, and so stationed it as effectually to preclude Bajee Rao's escape to the northward, while the advance of Brigadier General Doveton from the south afforded the hope that the enemy would be effectually surrounded.

As soon as I received information of Bajee Rao's movements indicating a disposition to cross the Nerbudda, I despatched instructions to Major General Sir David Ochterlony, who still kept the field with the force that had constituted the reserve of the grand army, to be prepared by a rapid movement to the southward to interpose himself between Bajee Rao and Gawlior, and I made all other requisite provisions for the event of that Chief's crossing the Nerbudda, either in force or as a fugitive. I felt satisfied that, while he was kept at a distance, I might rely on Scindia's neutrality, and that it was the earnest wish of the Maharajah that Bajee Rao should not, by throwing himself on him, involve him unavoidably (according to Mahratta notions), in his cause. My arrangements and instructions were founded on this assumption, my instructions provided also for the possible case of Bajee Rao's reaching Gawlior, and throwing himself on Scindia, in such a manner as to induce that prince without espousing his cause, to endeavour to mediate an accommodation with the British Government. It soon however appeared, that these prospective dispositions could not

be called into activity. Bajee Rao, bewildered and disheartened by unexpectedly finding bodies of our troops on every side of him, opened a negotiation with Sir John Malcolm, which being encouraged by that officer, terminated in Bajee Rao's submission to the British power.

On his returning towards Asseergurh as above described, Bajee Rao had deputed two Vakeels with a letter to Sir John Malcolm, who received them at Mhow near Indore. This circumstance appeared to Sir John Malcolm to present a favourable opportunity of inducing Bajee Rao to surrender, and of thus closing the war. He applied himself at once, with his accustomed zeal and energy, to accomplish that object. Meanwhile he relaxed none of his military preparations for preventing Bajee Rao from passing the Nerbudda and for surrounding his actual position, and those arrangements were successfully pursued while the negotiation was going on, that had it failed, there is little doubt of Bajee Rao's having been compelled to surrender or to seek saving himself by flight in disguise, after the dispersion of his few troops. It has always been my impression, that Bajee Rao was so sensible of the straits to which he had been reduced, that he had resolved to come in, and that his efforts were directed to obtaining the most favourable terms, by keeping up the show of an optional negotiation. Accordingly, no attempt seems to have been made by him to extricate himself from his present perilous situation, of which he was evidently quite sensible, as he might perhaps in the early part of Sir John Malcolm's arrangements and before the advance of Brigadier General Doveton upon Asseergurh, have done for the moment.

Sir John Malcolm reports, that in his first interview with the Vakeels, he succeeded with some difficulty in convincing them that no hope remained of Bajee Rao's restoration even to a nominal sovereignty, or his being permitted to reside in the Deccan on any terms. Professing to take my instructions to Mr. Elphinstone of the 15th December 1817 as his guide, he justly regarded renunciation of such a hope as indispensable: he also proposed to insist on Bajee Rao's surrendering Trim-buckee and the murderer of the Vaughans, if within his power, or at all events separating himself from all communion with those persons, and with all rebels and freebooters who might

nave joined his standard. These preliminaries being understood and acquiesced in, Sir John declared his readiness to receive Bajee Rao, and to guarantee his personal safety, and every possible attention to his wishes, and reasonable expectations in the selection of the place of his future residence and the amount of stipend to be assigned for his maintenance. The Vakeels were also permitted to encourage Bajee Rao to hope that his intercession in behalf of his principal adherents (always excepting those strained with flagrant crimes) would be listened to with consideration. The Vakeels then urged Sir John Malcolm to proceed to Bajee Rao's camp and have a meeting with him. Sir John justly estimated the objections to that measure; but it did not appear to him that similar ones opposed the deputation of an officer of his family, and he determined to depute Lieutenant Low, his first assistant, accompanied by his second assistant, Lieutenant Macdonald, and by Syed Hussain, his native Aide-de-camp, to Bajee Rao's camp, furnished with instructions framed on the foregoing principles. Lieutenant Low was directed merely to declare Sir John Malcolm's intentions, and to obtain Bajee Rao's reply, refraining from all negotiation. He was desired to urge that chief, if he accepted the propositions, to repair immediately to the vicinity of Sir John's camp at Mundlesir with a few of his Mahratta Sirdars and a small portion of his troops, and to dismiss the remainder as the best proof of his sincerity. Lieutenant Low was desired also to inform himself of the actual condition of Bajee Rao's troops, and to endeavour to learn the disposition and state of mind of that Chief and his principal adherents.

On the receipt of Sir John Malcolm's report of these proceedings, I lost no time in communicating to him my sentiments. Although the distance of my position made it hardly possible that they could reach him before the question was decided, yet in the event of the present negotiations being broke off they might be useful at some future conjuncture, and even in the opposite case might still be in time to influence the adjustment of some of the details. My view of the course to be pursued on this occasion differed widely from that entertained by Sir John Malcolm, who appeared to have given to my instruction of the 15th December to Mr. Elphinstone a construction never put upon them by the officer to whom they were addressed. The admission of Bajee Rao to negotiate, which though professedly guarded against, was the inevitable result of Sir John

was wholly at variance with any view
 entertained since the Peshwah's first breaking out.
 The reputation of an officer to his camp seemed also to me a
 matter above all others inapplicable to the actual situation
 of the affairs, and calculated to produce the very worst specu-
 lations on the mind of Bajee Rao, as well as liable to be mis-
 apprehended throughout all India, besides operating as an
 impediment to any of our divisions attacking and dispersing
 the Rao's force while he should be present in his camp.
 I impressed on Sir John Malcolm the importance I attached
 to the choice of Bajee Rao's residence being left to the British
 Government, and his stipend being either left open in like
 manner, or fixed at the lowest possible amount, adequate to
 maintain him in comfort and respectability. I pointed out the
 distinction between his case and that of Amrut Rao, and other
 personages whom the British Government had received and
 provided for; and protested against those cases being assumed
 as parallel. These instructions provided also for the measures
 it might be necessary to take, in the event of the negotiations
 breaking off and Bajee Rao being subsequently captured or
 reduced to submission. These instructions were scarcely dis-
 patched; before the question to which they referred was deter-
 mined by Bajee Rao's acceptance of Sir John Malcolm's terms,
 which exceeded in liberality what I had contemplated.
 Anxious to quicken the negotiation, and also to hem in Bajee
 Rao still more closely, Sir John abandoned the plan of maintain-
 ing his position at Mundlesir on the Nerbudda, and moved
 down to Metawul, about twenty miles north of Asseergurh, and
 fifteen from Bajee Rao's camp. About the same time Brigadier
 General Doveton, who had reached the neighbourhood of
 Boorhaunpore, had actually prepared a light force to surprise
 Bajee Rao's camp, when the receipt of a letter from Lieutenant
 Low, announcing his being on his march, thither, induced the
 Brigadier General to relinquish the enterprize. The few days
 which intervened between Sir John Malcolm's arrival at
 Metawul (the position above noted) and the submission of Bajee
 Rao, seems to have passed in negotiation with that chief and
 with most of the principal Sirdars who still remained with
 him. Sir John endeavoured to impress on them all that
 submission was their only safe line, and he seems to have
 engaged the Sirdars to use their influence with their master to
 adopt it. He continued to urge Bajee Rao to a meeting to which
 the latter at length agreed, and it took place on the 2nd of
 June, midway between the two camps. In a long private

conference detailed in Sir John's despatches, he repeated personally to Bajee Rao all the arguments he had previously used to the Vakeels, in explanation of the necessity of Bajee Rao's throwing himself on the British Government as the only means of escape from speedy destruction. Sir John Malcolm pressed him also to seize Trimbuckjee, but Bajee Rao and his Vakeels declared that Trimbuckjee's strength made that impracticable. He assented readily, however, to Trimbuckjee's being attacked by the British troops, though there is every reason to think he warned him of his danger, and enabled him to avoid it by flight. After leaving Bajee Rao, Sir J. Malcolm sent him a letter, containing a paper of proposition for his assent, as the only terms on which he could be received, and urged his early acceptance of them. Bajee Rao resorted to every means of delay before he came in; but perceiving, by the movements of the troops, that they were drawing still more closely round him, and probably becoming satisfied that he could obtain no relaxation of the terms, he finally moved, on the morning of the 3rd of June, to within half a mile of Sir John Malcolm's camp, accompanied by the few respectable Mahratta Sirdars who remained with him, and by a force of about three or four thousand horse and two or three thousand infantry, of which twelve hundred were Arabs. The remainder dispersed in various directions. After a halt of a day or two near Asseer, to enable Bajee Rao to receive thence his family and treasures, which had been taken under the protection of Jeswunt Rao Lad, Sir John Malcolm urged Bajee Rao to march without delay to the Nerbudda. It became an object of Sir John Malcolm's early care, to reduce expeditiously to a reasonable amount the force remaining with Bajee Rao; but the principles which he had prescribed to himself for regulating his conduct towards that chief prevented him from taking any active steps for that purpose. A mutiny of the Arabs, however, regarding their pay, in the suppression of which Sir John Malcolm displayed equal judgment, spirit and humanity, and his troops, extraordinary steadiness and forbearance, enabled him to get rid of the whole of the troublesome class, who were followed by many of the natives of India, so that, by the time he crossed the Nerbudda, the troops remaining with Bajee Rao did not exceed one thousand horse and two hundred infantry; and many of the former shortly after left him and returned to their homes, the rest being intended to accompany Bajee Rao to his destination. These occurrences were dexterously improved by

Sir John Malcolm, and seemed to have given him a greater influence over Bajee Rao at the moment, than was likely otherwise to have been acquired for a considerable time. The despatches in which the foregoing events are reported are recorded on the proceedings. In order to avoid interruption of the preceding narrative, I have reserved for this place my observation on the proposition tendered by Sir John Malcolm to Bajee Rao on the 2nd of June, and which must be regarded as the basis of all subsequent arrangement with him.

The following is a Transcript of these propositions.

1st. That he shall resign for himself and successors, all right, title and claim over the Government of Poona, or to any sovereign power whatever.

2nd. That Bajee Rao shall immediately come, with his family and a small number of his adherents and attendants, to the camp of Brigadier General Malcolm, where he shall be received with honour and respect, and be escorted safe to the city of Benares, or any other sacred place in Hindoostan that the Government General may at his request fix for his residence.

3rd. On account of the peace of the Deccan and the advanced state of the season, Bajee Rao must proceed to Hindoostan without one day's delay. But Brigadier General Malcolm engages, that any part of his family that may be left behind shall be sent to him as early as possible, and every facility given to render their journey speedy and convenient.

4th. That Bajee Rao shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to the arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's Government, for the support of himself and family. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the Government; but Sir John Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum.

5th. If Bajee Rao, by a complete and ready fulfilment of this agreement, shows that he reposes entire confidence in the British Government, his requests in favour of principal Jagheerdars and old adherents who have been ruined by their attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention. His representations, also in favour of Brahmins of venerable character and of religious establishments founded or supported by his family, will be treated with regard.

6th. The above propositions must not only be accepted by Bajee Rao; but he must personally come into Brigadier General

Malcolm's camp, within 24 hours of this period, or else hostilities will be recommenced and no further negotiation will be entered with him.

Your Honourable Committee will not fail to observe that they were much more favourable than I contemplated; but Bajee Rao having actually come in upon the faith of them, I could not hesitate a moment to confirm them and I despatched immediately a notice to Sir John Malcolm to this effect.

On the receipt of my instructions of the 30th May Sir John Malcolm entered into a more particular explanation of the views and motives which prompted his procedure, and the subject was pursued in subsequent despatches. I do not propose to trouble Your Honourable Committee with any detail, either of the arguments offered by Sir John in support of his view of the question or those whereby what I considered the most correct one were maintained; they will be found in the correspondence.

Sir John Malcolm stated in substance, that the importance of securing Bajee Rao's early submission, and the consequent termination of the war, was regarded by him so great as to be cheaply purchased by the sacrifices he had consented to make. He represented Bajee Rao's army as refreshed by a long halt, and still able, if he eluded the British detachments now surrounding him (a circumstance deemed by Sir John Malcolm by no means improbable), to maintain a desultory contest, and to keep alive a flame throughout the country, which our interest required us to extinguish at the earliest possible moment. On the other hand, Bajee Rao was assured of the support of the Killadar of Asseer, and by throwing himself into that fort, which Sir John Malcolm maintained could not be besieged or even blockaded during the approaching monsoon, he would be secure from our attacks, and enabled to employ the influence of his name and authority (both still), and his immense wealth, in organizing further opposition to us and impeding the settlement of the country. Sir John further urged, that the submission of Bajee Rao, in the manner in which it had taken place, and his public renunciation of sovereignty, followed by his march through the country to our provinces in the apparent condition of a prisoner, was a more desirable result of the war, and more calculated to make an useful impression on the public mind and on his late subjects, than his capture or extinction in the field, supposing either of these issues to be probable. Sir John justified the grant of eight lacs of rupees by the instance of Amrut Row, and the impossibility of offering to the ex-Peishwah a smaller sum than what was assigned to the former with any prospect of

its being accepted, neither did he consider it as too much for the suitable maintenance of Bajee Rao, or as likely to furnish the means of creating combinations against us. To none of these propositions could I give my assent ; but, as already stated, I did not hesitate to ratify the terms actually made, however, unaccordant to my own expectations.

The importance of Bajee Rao's early surrender was an advance which I always felt and acknowledged, and the zeal and ability manifested by Sir John Malcolm have invariably received my warmest testimony. Not after the lapse of four years from the period of Bajee Rao's surrender, I am happy to state, that none of the ill consequences I apprehended from the very favourable terms offered by Sir John have taken place ; except that, perhaps, a larger actual expense has been incurred than would have sufficed to put him down. On reviewing the whole transaction, however, I see no reason for admitting that my original view, formed on the facts before stated, was erroneous.*

After crossing the Nerbudda, Sir John Malcolm marched with the utmost practicable expedition to Mehdpoor with Bajee Rao. Here he made final arrangements for the latter's proceeding to Hindoostan ; and Sir John Malcolm being unable to leave Malwa himself, he assigned to his first Assistant, Captain Low, the duty of conducting Bajee Rao to Hindoostan.

He proceeded, in the first instance by the most direct route to Muttra, and after passing some months there in devotional exercises, repaired to Bittoor, where his permanent residence was after some discussion established. He has since resided there, without any other interruption than one or two visits to Muttra and Bindrabund (Brindawan), and his conduct has been such as on the whole to afford great satisfaction. That he has relinquished all hopes of restoration of his affairs is not to be supposed, and he has not failed at times to resort to his old habits of intrigue, and to endeavour to keep alive in his former territories an interest in his fate. The little success he has met with, however, must have discouraged the repetition of the experiment, and for some time past the rumours of intrigues and plots, which occasionally were current, have almost ceased. No relaxation of vigilance in observance has, however, be permitted to creep in.

* The Governor General's strong disapproval of Sir John Malcolm's terms was probably the cause for the appointment of Elphinstone to the Governorship of Bombay in suppression of Malcolm's Senior Claim. Malcolm resigned service and returned to England. He succeeded Elphinstone at Bombay.

Captain Low, whose temper and discretion well qualified him for the duty, and who had in a degree acquired Bajee Rao's confidence, continued to reside with him as Commissioner on the part of the British Government, till ill-health compelled him to quit the station, and his place has been supplied by Captain St. John Blacker in a very satisfactory manner.

Of the Mahratta Sirdars who accompanied Bajee Rao to Bittoor, the principal one, Ramchunder Vinkatash, seems to have conceived at an early period a just view of his master's condition, and his influence appears to have been employed with diligence and success, to second the measures of the Commissioner for reconciling Bajee Rao to his fate, and for weaning his mind from the expectation of a change in his favour.

The submission of Bajee Rao, and his removal across the Nerbudda, with the consequent dispersion of his army, may be received as the termination of the war in the Poona territory; and would have been no less the sequel of general peace, but for the escape of Appa Sahib and the insurrection raised by him and its results, which will be brought to your notice in the sequel of this despatch. Before Bajee Rao's surrender, the success of the detachments under Brigadier-General Pritzler and other officers, in capturing forts, and the defeat by Brigadier General Munro of the remains of Bajee Rao's infantry, with the capture of all his guns, together with the fort of Sholapore, completed the occupation of all the country south of the Godavery, where a few Arab garrisons still maintained the forts they held against us in Candiesh; and at Maligaum, especially, made a brave and prolonged resistance, the particulars of which, and our final success, are already before Your Honourable Committee and the public. The reduction of Maligaum was speedily followed by the surrender of the remaining forts, and this completed the possession of the whole of the late Peishwah's dominions.

Trimbuckjee, on the breaking up of Bajee Rao's force, retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he remained concealed for some time; but information having been obtained of his lurking place, a body of horse under Captain Swanston was detached from a station so distant as not to excite his suspicion and succeeded in surprising and making him prisoner. He was first sent to Tannah, from whence he had formerly escaped, and was afterwards, as Your Honourable Committee knows,

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